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Abstract 
This thesis examines the insights which may be gained from analysis of the potential 
for establishing a normative regime in English law for cohabitants, who now form a 
substantial constituency as an established alternative family unit, headed by 
apparently committed cohabiting couples, who are neither married nor in registered 
civil partnerships. The thesis critically analyses the 2006-7 work of the Law 
Commission in London, the apparent government reluctance to take this further 
despite Scottish implementation of a similar relationship generated compensation 
scheme on breakdown of such relationships, and the experience of other 
jurisdictions which have provided dedicated legislation for such families.  
 
The thesis also includes the results of some empirical fieldwork in qualitative studies 
with practitioners in a small number of key jurisdictions, including some comparative 
analysis of these experiences, and presents a theory which addresses the practical 
adverse impact of the lack of such a normative scheme in England and Wales. 
 
The thesis makes an original contribution to the debate on this area of English 
Family Law by providing a theoretical basis for legislation likely to be acceptable 
within the current modernisation of Family Justice in the recently established Family 
Court. It aims to meet both the drivers of that modernisation and most of the historic 
arguments against formally recognising (and discretely addressing the needs of) the 
substantial and continually growing cohabitant community.  It makes further original 
contribution in analysing  experience in the key jurisdictions which have introduced 
cohabitant legislation, both within our own geographical neighbourhood of the UK 
and EU and within the common law states of the Commonwealth,  which were 
originally British settlements importing English law with them.  Another original 
contribution is provided by an analysis of how such legislation could fit within the 
English legal system to provide a pragmatic solution to the escalating numbers of 
such families who now form a significant group expecting to find clarity in legal 
provision for their circumstances.  
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Chapter 1:  Formalised cohabitation as an  
element of  English Law? 
 
Introduction  
This chapter sets out the proposed scope of the thesis, and its aims, which are:  
(i) to examine the so far unsuccessful attempts to introduce normative 
legislation into English Law,  so as to give legal recognition to the 
contemporary trend towards cohabitation by couples of same or opposite 
sexes who are neither married nor in registered civil partnerships, but who 
have apparently made such a choice as a direct alternative to marriage or 
civil partnership, whether or not they have children; 
(ii) to analyse apparent obstacles to introducing such legislation; 
(iii) to investigate the apparent success of schemes in other jurisdictions 
having  potential relevance to the likely requirements of an English Law 
scheme;  and 
(iv) to propose legislation which, on the basis of the evidence thus gathered, 
might have a better chance of enactment than on previous attempts. 
 
Chapter 1 critically analyses the background to the continuing absence of any 
formalised legislative regime for such informally cohabiting couples and their 
children, if any, and then reviews the scope for providing a discrete scheme to meet 
the needs of such couples and families, whether as an amendment to existing 
legislation, or as independent statutory provision for this new family structure.   
 
By ‘cohabitation’ is meant living together in a relationship which includes sharing a 
household or households in a manner which replicates a married or registered civil 
partnership relationship but without having entered the formalities associated with 
the legal status of those relationships, and with no associated pre-qualifying period1. 
 
																																								 																				
1 As with the establishment of domicile, sometimes regarded as an equally elusive concept,  there is 
no particular reason for a qualifying period once the fact of cohabitation is apparent,  although 
legislation might conveniently include conditions for recognition of the fact, as in New Zealand law 
which operates a checklist: see Chapter 8, which to some extent replicates that proposed  in the 
English case of Kimber v Kimber [2000] FLR 383. 
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By ‘couples’ in this context is meant same or opposite sex couples living together in 
an intimate relationship, whether or not their relationship or household includes 
children. 
 
By ‘normative regime’ is meant formal legislative provision defining at least 
minimum rights attaching to such cohabitation, the word ‘normative’ being usually 
interpreted as rule governed conduct, a central feature of law which inevitably has a 
normative dimension ‘lying at the heart of any comprehensive legal-theoretical 
project’.2 
 
The prime aim of the chapter is critically to examine the more recent background in 
which an established trend towards increasing numbers of informally constituted 
families has apparently been determinedly ignored by government policy, despite 
claims that ‘the family’ is important to social cohesion:   a strangely illogical stance in 
the face of strong indications of urgent legislative demand. More specifically, a 2009 
projection of increasing numbers towards 2030 – which was originally responsible for 
generating a research interest for this thesis - has already been overtaken by events, 
since rising numbers of such families have now shown that those 2009 projections 
are likely to be exceeded at a much earlier date, since the November 2015 estimated 
figure is now already 3.2m3.   
 
While there is a long history of a lack of English legislation for cohabitants’ rights, 
such governmental inaction seems particularly illogical in the context of other 
relevant post-2009 indicators, which  include the modernisation of Family Law 
currently being undertaken in the new Family Court, the  widening of the scope of 
Family Law in the introduction of same-sex marriage - a key equality issue which 
significantly highlights the continued neglect of any cohabitants’ rights reform -   and 
the  austerity generated cuts in public services which have fallen heavily on the 
delivery of Family justice. Moreover while all such potential Family  litigation is now 
steered towards Non- Court Dispute Resolution, this has disproportionately  
impacted upon cohabitants’ disputes which, lacking their own regime, fall within the 
																																								 																				
2 Stefano Bertea and George Pavlakos, New Essays on the Normativity of Law, Hart, 2011. Preface 
and Introduction, p1.  
3 Announcement, Office for National Statistics, 5 November 2015. 
  
 
8 
much more expensive and complex Chancery Trusts’ jurisdiction,  which has always 
been entirely unsuitable to their context.  
 
This first chapter’s secondary aim is therefore to examine the main obstacles to 
introducing legislation, with the ultimate objective of considering whether if the 
English legal system is realistically unable to continue to address the contemporary 
factual position of cohabitants within existing English law without such legislation, 
how a realistic alternative might be achieved.  In this context it is clear that 
evaluation of whether the various historic obstacles can be overcome (as to which 
the stubborn background initially appears determinedly negative) achieving success 
might be an uphill task, but one that cannot in logic be avoided.    
 
The tertiary aim - while taking note of all that has gone before, and selecting for  
recycling anything of remaining contemporary value – is to take a fresh look at the 
wider field of cohabitants’ rights so as to identify whether, and if so how, this new  
contemporary family form could – and realistically it seems now should -  be 
recognised in a discrete regime in English law. 
 
Chapter 2 then sets out the methodology adopted. In view of the type and scale of 
the comparative investigations required, this was inevitably a combination of library-
based and empirical research, the latter through some interviews.  These were set 
up with key academics and practitioners in those jurisdictions from which valuable 
insights might be learned from their practical experience within their own new 
systems, so as to inform a potentially successful English scheme.    
 
Clearly, despite the contemporary availability of much international literature on line, 
it was recognised that servicing even this restricted methodology would be a 
challenge since, of the most useful comparator jurisdictions, only Scotland in the 
United Kingdom and whichever was chosen from the civil law jurisdictions in the 
European Union were within easy travelling and time zone distances.   
 
On the other hand, the two leading jurisdictions which must claim most success so 
far in establishing cohabitants’ rights legislation are Australia and New Zealand, 
which are each 11, 000 miles from the UK,  and  almost 12 hours in time zone 
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difference, making asynchronous communication essential in the first instance .  On 
the other hand such is the ongoing relevance of these two common law jurisdictions 
to much English law that many of their academics and practitioners can often be 
found bringing their input ‘from the bottom of the world’ to the conference circuits of 
the UK and  Europe,  where it was thus possible for some very helpful face to face 
exchanges to take place. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a selective literature review: selective because the cohabitants’ 
rights debate has now continued for so long that some contributions, particularly 
earlier work, is no longer of key interest: however this applies by no means to all, 
and indeed much previous work is valuable and still insightful. 
 
Chapter 4 evaluates some of the findings that are still useful from the 2006-7 work of 
the Law Commission, which did not really deserve the abrupt rejection it has 
received from two successive governments.  Much of its content has clearly been 
under appreciated even if not instantly acceptable as it stood. 
 
Chapter 5 looks at a topic which the Law Commission did not examine in much 
depth, namely the apparently definitive choice which cohabitants are clearly making 
away from marriage and towards cohabitation when choosing their form of family 
structure. 
 
Chapters 6 to 8 are devoted to the selected individual jurisdictions chosen for 
analysis of the apparent success of the systems they have established.   
 
Chapter 6 critically analyses the 2006 legislation in Scotland, an obvious choice 
since Scotland is part of the UK, geographically close to England and Wales, and 
sharing the Supreme Court at Westminster as its final appellate court, although for 
historical reasons its legal system is not a pure common law one.  
 
Chapter 7 selects and examines Spain as the European Union comparator, this 
choice having been made for a variety of reasons which are explained in that 
chapter, including the extent of the crossover of Spanish and English law in Spanish 
courts because of the large numbers of British expatriates who live in Spain and 
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periodically litigate there, particularly since the implementation, in both Spanish and 
English Law, of the 1996 Hague Convention on Applicable Law.   
 
Chapter 8 critically examines the Australian and New Zealand systems, the two 
jurisdictions which are closest to our common law system, and both long term 
leaders in jurisprudence of the common law world.  
 
Chapter 9 then draws conclusions and proposes simple statutory reform, together 
with an exemplar draft in an Appendix.  There is also a full Bibliography, collating 
an extensive background of reference material, including the painstaking work of 
longstanding experts who have kept the debate alive which has informed this study. 
 
 
The recent background:  2009-2015 
Beginning with the primary aim of this first chapter, the established trend which has 
generated this research question was a significant increase in the likely numbers of 
such families by 2030 as originally predicted by the Parenting and Policy Unit4  
and since supported by numerous cohabitation figures extrapolated from the 
Lifestyle Surveys analysed by the Office of National Statistics5 . However in the 
intervening six years it seems that figures have galloped so far ahead without 
noticeable governmental reaction that the first point to note may be that numbers are 
no longer the driving force they once were. 
 
The 2009 Report 
The Unit’s Report in September 2009 was based on a figure of two million such 
families in that year’s statistics, but also projected a likely doubling of that base figure 
in the suggested timescale to 2030, a projection thought even at that time  to be 
likely to be conservative.  This was because the comparable figures of 10 years 
previously, which were thought, in the absence of accurate data, to involve only 
around one million  cohabiting families,   had already, by 2011, apparently  risen to 
																																								 																				
4 Report of the Parenting and Policy Unit, British Families Since the 1950s, NFPPU 2009,  Family Law 
Newsweek, Jordan Publishing, September 2009, www.jordanpublishing.co.uk , last accessed 21 
September 2011. 
5 Lifestyle Surveys, ONS, 2012-2015. 
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2.9 million (up from 2.4 million in 2003).   More recently more like 3m was projected, 
now established in November 2015 to be already 3.2m: thus the 4m figure for 2030 
looks likely now to be significantly exceeded, and that that indicates significant 
growth rather than that the base figures were merely over-estimated - raising an 
immediate query as to how relevant statistics are at all,  now that it seems that an 
identifiable constituency has been established. 
 
Indeed by 2013, it was suggested by the then latest Office of National Statistics 
information paper6  that concerns about rising numbers of cohabiting families was 
entirely valid, such as these figures were, since it has always been accepted that the 
data were always difficult to capture accurately.  However, even if data are not 100% 
reliable, the round figures regularly released must have been concerning to some 
part of government if any interest was actually being taken in this information:  the 
obvious purpose of collecting such data is for forward planning, of which 
(surprisingly) there appears still to be none in the legal context, whatever policies 
may, or may not, be silently feeding into future support for ‘the family’, of which there 
seems little indication.  Unfortunately ‘the family’ appears to be a context in which 
successive governments continue to emphasise that its welfare is of key importance, 
although this is sometimes difficult to discern alongside, for example, cuts to Family 
justice, always strenuously opposed by the pan-professional organisations. 
 
In 2009, one could say with only moderate alarm that the year 2030 was a date 
which was ‘now only two decades away’, although it remained to be seen whether 
the 2011 and 2021 censuses together accurately supported this projection 
(depending on what questions were asked in 2021) since it has always been, and 
still remains, clear that data continues to be insufficiently comprehensive to map 
much detail of cohabiting families either fully or accurately.  
 
However, as time slips by and other family units have been catered for in 
dramatically innovative legislation - while normative discrete legal provision for 
																																								 																				
6	ONS	statement,	26 April 2013, explaining the methodology of annually mapping these cohabitation 
statistics.   
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cohabitants remains unaddressed - the awkward situation of this solely remaining 
atypical family unit begins to assume a much more urgent claim on juristic attention.   
  
Thus, before going any further, it seems it must first be asked whether, in anxiously 
watching the Office of National Statistics for the latest rising numbers, scholarly 
study should be taking any notice of statistics at all, or whether the attention of jurists 
would in fact be better fixed elsewhere, on the underlying phenomena, since those 
might be more relevant to whether, and if so how cohabitants’ place in ‘the family’ 
should be addressed.   In so far as statistics may now be relevant, it can at least be 
said that a recognisable family format has now in practice been identified where it 
either did not previously exist or was simply ignored. Thus regardless of figures it 
seems that in reality there is an urgent need for the law to recognise the existence of 
this new normative family unit.   
 
This must be especially relevant as other new family forms – such as same-sex 
marriages - are now not only recognised, but this has been done by specific 
amendment to statutory provision for more traditional units, such as the once 
standard opposite sex marriage, which was only half a century ago the sole 
recognised cradle for procreation and nurturing of the children essential for creating 
the future population.  It is noticeable that the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 
2013 does not create a new form of marriage for same-sex couples (in the way that 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004 created the entirely new registered civil partnership for 
same-sex couples alone, and from which opposite sex couples remain excluded).  
Instead Parliament simply amended the Marriage Act 1949 and the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 to include same-sex couples in the existing law of marriage and 
divorce, which (for centuries before these provisions became statutory) had only 
concerned traditional opposite sex matrimony and its dissolution. 
 
Statistics played no part in the legislation of either 2004 or 2013 since numbers 
availing themselves of such legal provisions have always been small. Both were 
equality statutes.  Thus there seems no reason to pore over statistics in relation to 
the formal recognition of cohabitation: nor does it appear that numbers have been a 
driver in any of the existing jurisdictions which recognise cohabitants as a discrete 
constituency, so are our obvious comparators in the present project. 
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It is, of course, possible that statistics in fact play no part in the formulation of 
government policy in relation to recognition of cohabitants as a new family form, 
perhaps because the statistics are considered incomplete, unreliable and thus of no 
particular significance, so that there are other drivers of government inaction in 
relation to cohabitants while other groups received priority legislative attention.  It is 
true that cohabitation figures only began to be collected in 1979, as officialdom was 
apparently slow to recognise the post-WWII evolution of this family form, and 
perhaps this is a fleeting period in the lifeline of data collection, especially as only in 
1986 were figures about men in unmarried relationships added to the existing 
statistics.  
 
The Law Commission 2006-7 
Nevertheless, there was, in the last decade, a realistic opportunity for formal 
progress in recognising cohabitation as a permanent population phenomenon:  the 
Law Commission’s relatively recent work in 2006-7, which did, entirely properly, 
examine such data as was available.  Their reports record the 2006 Social Trends 
figure of 42% of births occurring outside marriage (which rose to 45% by 2012): an 
oblique comment on both marriage and cohabitation, in a period in which social 
change has escalated at an astonishing rate7. The most recent numbers of 
dependent children in cohabiting families in 20158 is said to be 2 million, up from 1.4 
million in 2003.  
 
Since it has to be emphasised that there is, and probably will always remain, some 
scepticism about the accuracy of these figures owing to the difficulty of collection, the 
point that is probably much more relevant is that there is still no reliable picture of the 
reasons for such cohabitation: various suggestions made, including by the Law 
Commission in 2006-7, include the cost of marrying or transitory retreat from other 
broken relationships, as much as a possibly conscious decision to cohabit rather 
than marry9 but it seems there has been no serious work on this.  Also the figures do 
																																								 																				
7Helen Wood, John Eames, Ashley Murray, Mark Harrop, Angharad Palin and David Salter, 
Cohabitation Law, Practice and Precedents,  6th edn, Jordan Publishing, 2015, Preface.  And see 
review by Caitlin Jenkins, Law Society Gazette, 21 September 2015. 
8 ONS statement 5 November 2015. 
9 See Chapter 5. 
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not include the (albeit possibly small) numbers of same-sex cohabitants who are not 
in registered civil partnerships – and which cannot be similarly tracked, unlike same-
sex registered civil partnerships which are recorded owing to their registration 
ceremonies, although there are occasional media claims suggesting that there are 
figures for these relationships, for example, in 2012 there were 69,000 such 
relationships and in 2013 this rose to 89,00010.  
 
Looking back, therefore, to the base line date of the current research project in 2009, 
the first point to note is that in the intervening short period of six years there has 
appeared to be increasing urgency to address this identified trend in family 
composition but no action has been taken.  Moreover, the rate of statistical 
escalation suggests that the trend has been growing for some time.    
 
Burns v Burns 1984: Baroness Hale’s law reform watershed   
One feature of this growing spotlight on cohabitants’ rights - which began to register 
in earnest upon both the academic and public radar as long ago as 1984 with the 
case of Burns v Burns11 - is the interest which has recently been revived by both the 
actual  physical reappearance on the scene of Mrs Valerie Burns, the applicant in 
that case,  and by reference to this very case as the watershed of cohabitants’ rights 
need by Baroness Hale in her  key judgment in the Supreme Court Scottish appeal 
of Gow v Grant 12. It is difficult to pick an accurate date for any widely accepted 
awareness of the cohabitation trend, influences on which have been variously 
identified as anywhere from WWII to 1960s liberalism, so that that the Burns case 
judgment 13 is probably as good as any. Indeed, in the Gow v Grant judgment in the 
most recent cohabitant case to reach the UK’s final appeal court Baroness Hale puts 
the case for 1984 more strongly, that is, that it has been ‘obvious’ since Burns  that 
legislation similar to that of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 is necessary – in 
effect indicating  that there was already by 1984 a sufficiently identifiable trend to 
trigger statutory activity for a notable constituency.   It thus does not seem 
unsurprising that legislation is certainly now, over 30 years later, clearly justified, 
which indeed this project will go on to show. 
																																								 																				
10 E Malnick, Sharp Rise in Cohabiting Gay Couples, The Telegraph, London, 31 October 2013. 
11 [1984] Ch 317. 
12 [2012] UKSC 29. 
13 [1984] Ch 317. 
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The Burns case has long been the archetypical situation owing to Mrs Valerie Burns’ 
unsuccessful attempt in her trust claim, especially as this unsuitable process remains 
over 30 years later the only legal remedy available to cohabitants to resolve their 
post separation asset division problems, and yet it has not led to any obviously 
needed law reform.  Moreover, she is not only still alive to embarrass contemporary 
Family justice but in 2011 was contacted by Dr Dawn Watkins of the University of 
Leicester, in connection with her own research project ‘Finding the Lost Human 
Studies of the Law’14. As a result of this successful search for her, years after the 
disappointing 1984 proceedings, Mrs Burns participated in a guest lecture with Dr 
Watkins, delivered to Equity and Trusts final year students in the School of Law15 . At 
this event it was emphasised that her case would almost certainly be decided in the 
same way today, namely because there is no help from the Law of Trusts where a 
cohabitant is unable to establish any interest in the family home under the strict 
property rules applied in that context.  However it should be noted that at least one 
leading London practitioner does not agree that the case would necessarily have the 
same result if it were heard again now16.  
 
Many attempts have been made by academic commentators in the years between 
1984 and today to draw attention to the plight of separating cohabitants who cannot 
themselves agree on the practical division of their accumulated assets in a form 
recognised by English law.  Much dedicated work has been done in this field, and 
with such commitment that a handful of specialists has already over the years 
assembled a solid corpus of work, on some of which the Law Commission drew in its 
2006-7 project17.  This has also been followed up by Parliamentary activists.  
However no discrete legislation based on any of these initiatives has succeeded, 
although some private members’ Bills18  have been introduced into Parliament, by 
Lord Lester of Herne Hill, a Liberal Democrat peer and most recently by Lord Marks 
																																								 																				
14 Dawn Watkins, ‘Recovering the Lost Human Studies of the Law: Finding Mrs Burns’, (2013) 7 Law 
and Humanities , 68-90. 
15 www2.le.ac.uk,News and Events, 2011 Archive, 9 December 2011. 
16 See Chapter 9, Conclusions. 
17 Law Commission The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown, A Consultation Paper, 
No 179, London, HMSO (2006); Law Commission The Financial Consequences of Relationship 
Breakdown: Final Report, No 307, London, HMSO (2007). 
18 Cohabitation Bill 2008 and Cohabitation Bill 2009. 
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of Henley-on-Thames, who practises at the Family Bar as Jonathan Marks QC19. 
This latest Bill has recently passed through its second re-reading following the May 
2015 dissolution, owing to which its then progress to a date for Committee stage had 
been lost, although it has now once again been put down to enter Committee stage 
in the House of Lords. However, this was the first Bill so far to last beyond a second 
reading, as private members’ Bills rarely do unless supported by government.   
 
Besides these disappointing outcomes, it has often appeared that there is no 
synergy to be found (politically, philosophically, jurisprudentially or doctrinally) with 
the concept of a discrete legislative regime for cohabitants, let alone for recognition 
of their apparent social status as a valid form of family function. Little notice appears 
to have been taken by government of the work of any specialist researchers who 
might have been supposed to be working on this topic for public benefit, including 
following the strong support of Baroness Hale of Richmond20 in her judgment in the 
Supreme Court case of Gow v Grant21, which provided a unique opportunity for  a 
particularly strong comment, since this the first appeal under the now established 
Scottish cohabitants’ legislation to reach that court,  in which  the  judgment not only 
endorsed the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 in positive  terms but also stated 
‘...English and Welsh cohabitants deserve no less’22. 
 
Lord Marks’ continued attempts to achieve a basis for such statutory intervention in 
England and Wales therefore appear daunting, to say the least, as his tenacious Bill 
must yet survive debate in both Houses, although some hope of that may be 
supported by the recent dramatic acceleration of English law in accepting atypical 
families, owing to the fact that, since Lord Lester’s failed Bills, those new family units 
now involve both transsexuals 23 and full gay rights 24.  
 
																																								 																				
19 Cohabitants Rights Bill, 2013, since relisted in 2014-2015, see www.parliament.uk.   
20 Former Family law academic, Professor of English Law at Kings College London and Law 
Commissioner, now Deputy President of the Supreme Court.  Ideally positioned to comment on 
potential law reform, as previous judgments in cohabitant cases have adversely done  in relation to 
the lost opportunities for reform of the law, thus occasioning the need for the Lords Justices to adapt 
the common law.  See Kernott v Jones [2011] UKSC 53, especially per Lord Wilson [78]. . 
21 [2012] UKSC 29, see especially per Hale, DP, [44]-[56] on the 5 lessons to be learned from the 
Family Law (Scotland) 2006 scheme in relation to which this appeal was decided. 
22 [Ibid, 56]. 
23 Gender Recognition Act 2004. 
24 Civil Partnership 2004 and Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2014.   
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The Historical Background: 1984-2009 
 
Obstacles to reform 
Having established the apparent irrelevance of statistics to any drive for legislated 
cohabitants’ rights, there is still now much background to this topic (which might 
almost be termed, in psychologists’ language, ‘baggage’) which must be rehearsed 
before a successful pathway forward is likely to be identified through the apparent 
obstacles to achieving legislative reform.   
 
As so much has already been disregarded by officialdom that was originally thought, 
at various stages of the debate, to be compelling, much of the past history is now out 
of date, so that perhaps the shortest summary of most of that work will therefore 
suffice.  However, the fact that there now does appear to be a valid cohabitation 
constituency whose interests should be served must inevitably place new 
perspectives on contemporary consideration of the extensive historical background. 
Thus some preliminary consideration of the impact of three most likely contemporary 
drivers seems necessary so as to identify the optimum direction of future treatment 
of this new family format.  This is particularly so in relation to the second aim of this 
chapter, which is to assess and evaluate the obstacles to legislative reform.  
Although there is certainly a case for saying these might simply be summarised as 
government apathy it is worth specifically addressing some points the government 
seems to have overlooked when declining to do anything either to further the Law 
Commission work or to consider seriously the Scottish achievement. 
 
Three points 
 
(a) If ‘numbers’ are irrelevant and a completely fresh approach is required to 
secure attention to the necessity for reform, what might be contemporary practical 
drivers?  
(b)    Is there a human rights issue that is being ignored? 
(c )  Is there any relevance of harmonisation of law in the European Union? 
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(a)The contemporary practical drivers for legislative reform? 
As numbers have done little or nothing for cohabitants’ rights - though they may have 
helped to raise some awareness at earlier stages of the emergence of the new 
family form - it is difficult to see what, if anything, might create belated panic in 
government circles so as, for example, to secure support for Lord Marks’ Bill, but as 
Cabinet absorption is focussed on the economy the following may be relevant.  
 
Strain on the welfare benefits budget? 
A possible catalyst might include the impact on already significant benefits liability 
amongst the poorer classes to which many cohabitants belong, although this seems 
unlikely, since the adverse impact of the LASPO 201225 reforms has not secured any 
amelioration in legal aid cuts although it has been made clear that those cuts are in 
fact creating greater expense in the administration of justice than is being saved from 
the legal aid budget26.   
 
Births out of wedlock? 
Nor does it seem that an increase in the numbers of births out of wedlock would 
have the effect it did following WWII when divorce reform was then expedited 
following such concern, although Baroness Hale, for example, refers in her seminal 
judgments in the Supreme Court not only to Burns in 1984, but also to extra-marital 
birth data, as have (early) researchers on cohabitation.  In this respect time has 
moved on, as it seems the government now does not like to differentiate between 
married and unmarried families as a secure background in which to bring up children 
for fear of appearing to be discriminatory, as a result of which both Labour (1997-
2010) and the subsequent coalition (2010-2015) hastily retreated from an earlier 
assurance that marriage was best: not least since any discrimination sits awkwardly 
with the general consolidation of anti-discrimination in the Equality Act 2010 
 
Any ideologies at all which might promote reform? – or is the government simply  
irremediably apathetic in this context? 
																																								 																				
25 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, www.legislation.gov.uk,,  which 
made stringent cuts to legal aid availability in Family cases from April 2013. 
26 See Lindner v Rawlins,  [2015] EWCA Civ 51 per Black LJ, [32], condemning the false economy of 
legal aid cuts in which a husband acting in person had unsurprisingly misunderstood the law causing 
the Court of Appeal to be obliged to undertake legal research normally presented by advocates and 
for which the judiciary has insufficient resources.  
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There are, of course, analogies which indicate that not only are numbers alone not 
the most valid defining factor recognising a change sufficient to dictate a need for 
reform, but that there are other relevant ideologies of which from time to time 
governments take note: for example, numbers of transsexuals affected by the pre-
Goodwin27 jurisprudence were small, but the significant impact on those affected was 
significant, so important in itself.  The resultant Gender Recognition Act 2004 
achieved a life change for those able to rely on its provisions to secure recognition in 
their acquired gender for all purposes (some cases no doubt following personal 
disappointment generated by the powerful dissenting judgments in the earlier cases 
in the European Court of Human Rights before the Goodwin decision).  
 
Similarly there have been routinely only about 6,000 civil partnerships a year, yet the 
government chose to fast track the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 and to 
implement it promptly on 29 March 2014, though  the s 9 transfer into full marriage 
for the then existing registered civil partners was not provided until 10 December 
2014.   
 
Curiously, however, 15,000 same sex marriages have since been recorded in the 
ensuing 18 months28, dwarfing the previous average of 6,000 civil partnerships per 
annum, so it seems the much trumpeted ‘equality’ statute, the Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2012, was a popular move that coincidentally turned out to be justified 
by numerical take-up as well. Nevertheless, this 15,000 figure is genuinely surprising 
since anecdotally when the statute was passed many civil partners declared their 
intention of not wishing to upgrade their relationship to full marriage, yet clearly have 
done so.  This suggests that significant numbers really were waiting for full marriage 
instead of engaging with the interim status of civil partnership despite the 
government’s repeated reminders that the Civil Partnership Act bestowed precisely 
the same benefits as marriage except for the label.  
 
Nevertheless, since this 15,000 figure is supported by official records, by analogy 
there is no logic in denying cohabitants legal recognition of their apparently much 
larger, and faster increasing, numbers by dismissing what is often seen as the most 
																																								 																				
27 Goodwin v UK [2002] 2 FLR 577, ECtHR No 28957 95 (11 July 2002). 
28 The Guardian, London, 20 October 2015. 
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important issue in their lack of an articulated legal regime for their situation - their 
claims to fairer financial and property provision on relationship breakdown. One must 
therefore ask what then can be the reason for the government’s not supporting Lord 
Marks’ current Cohabitants’ Rights Bill, which would make the difference between its 
being enacted and very likely suffering the same fate as previous such Bills. It would 
also certainly be a cost effective way of giving in to one of the demands of the latest 
lobbying by the Family lawyers’  pan-professional organisations for reform29, 
simultaneously providing a distraction from other current Cabinet problems and also 
requiring no significant expenditure since the Bill is already in Parliament. Moreover, 
it is not even promoted by an Opposition peer but by a member of the Liberal 
Democrat party (formerly in coalition with the government but now of little political 
significance).  It seems really difficult to comprehend that there is some supervening 
governmental ideology which requires this opportunity to be ignored as is obviously 
the case! 
 
It is of course the case that previously one of the grounds historically relied on for not 
providing cohabitants’ rights reform is that their numbers have not yet reached a 
critical mass. If  that be the case, which on the basis of figures presently available is 
not currently known, statistics are not driving any decisions in relation to this 
potential reform,  there is other evidence that this is probably an ‘old chestnut’.  For 
instance,  it seems that the tone of both the Law Commission’s 2006-7 reports and 
the government’s dismissive 2011 announcement that they would not action those 
2007 recommendations (which proposed a regime not dissimilar to that of the 
Scottish Act) simply depended on a perceived sense of lack of urgency, 
preoccupation with other matters,  a desire not to do anything that appeared to be  
influenced by Scotland’s reforms, and a dismissive attitude towards the law and the 
legal profession in general .   There have, of course, now been two recent Lord 
Chancellor appointments of Ministers with no legal qualifications or background 
whatever, a very good Junior Minister in the Coalition Government of 2010-15 has 
now left the House of Commons and the plain fact appears to be that the 
government presents as taking no interest in any aspect of the Law as such, unless 
required for enactment of some previously articulated policy. 
																																								 																				
29 The Resolution Manifesto of Autumn 2015 also asks, inter alia,   for No Fault Divorce, better advice 
services in lieu of legal aid, as well as Cohabitants’ Rights. 
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Impact on the economy? 
This would clearly be a potent driver if it could be established that legislating quickly 
and easily to provide cohabitants’ rights could show up in some balance sheet or 
other.  In fact that is precisely what could happen if Lord Marks’ Bill – or perhaps, 
better, a simpler one, taking less Parliamentary time and offering less opportunity for 
pages of contentious Hansard debate in both Houses – could be relied upon.  
Accordingly, while there is no lack of literature on this property angle (both doctrinal 
and practical) and on other aspects of cohabitants’ legal and practical situation, there 
is obviously no will for legislation while the present government is in power and 
engaged with migration and the EU membership.   
 
This is unfortunate since The first detailed attempt to address the property issues 
was that of Mee 30. Subsequently,  the leading researcher and commentator has 
been Anne Barlow31  whose contributions, alone and with others, 32 including with 
the later Law Commissioner Elizabeth Cooke33, have proposed workable solutions 
for formal recognition of cohabitants which have been completely ignored, while 
successive governments have legislated for every other family constituency .    
 
This is the more concerning, following government commitment to addressing 
excessive legal aid costs by implementing the ‘LASPO’ cuts mentioned above,  
which have not only removed legal aid from almost all family proceedings, but also 
severely restricted it in all cases including those property claims which must still be 
																																								 																				
30 John Mee, Property Rights of Cohabitants, Hart, 1999, based on his earlier doctoral research. 
31 Anne Barlow, Cohabitants and the Law, 3rd edn, Tottel Publishing, 2001, one of two early 
monographs used in Family Law courses, the other being Martin Parry’s The Law Relating to 
Cohabitation, 3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993. 
32 Anne Barlow, S Duncan, G James and  S Park, ‘Just A Piece of Paper? Marriage and Cohabitation’ 
in A Park, J Curtice, K Thomson, L Jarvis and C Bromley (eds) in British Social Attitudes: Public 
Policy,  social ties.  The 18th Report. Sage, 2001; Anne Barlow, S Duncan,  G James and S Park, 
Cohabitation, Marriage and the Law: social change and legal reform in the 21st century, Hart, 2005; 
Anne Barlow, C Burgoyne and J Smithson,  The Living Together Campaign: An Investigation of the 
impact on legally aware cohabitants, Ministry of Justice, 2007, available at www.justice.gov.uk, last 
accessed 3 November 2013. 
33 Anne Barlow, Elizabeth Cooke, Therese Callus, Community of Property: A Regime for England and 
Wales? Policy Press, 2006. 
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tried in the Chancery Division, despite Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendation in his 
Final Report on Civil Justice Costs34 that legal aid should not be cut further.   
 
In this respect, in theory there has been some benefit for cohabitants as they are not 
‘family’ for the purpose of the Children and Families Act 2014 s 10, which requires 
statutory attendance at a Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting (MIAM) 
before commencing any family proceedings is allowed.  This is, of course,  because 
cohabitants, in not being family members at all,  are only civil litigators who are 
obliged to take their property claims to the Chancery Division of the High Court or the 
Chancery lists of the county courts under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR),  not in 
the new unified Family Court under the Family Procedure Rules (FPR) 2010, 
although the 2014 cohabitants’ financial case of Seagrove v Sullivan35 has managed 
to cross into the Family Court through consolidation with a child issues case already 
there.   
 
However the expense of Chancery litigation is such that it is clearly not a genuine 
silver lining that this type of case misses the MIAMs embargo on proceedings 
without prior attempted mediation. No sensible cohabitant would choose Chancery 
litigation over either mediation or self- determination of some sort, owing to the 
notorious expense, delay, stress and uncertain outcome of any such case. This is 
hardly a benefit of denial of  membership of any recognised ‘family’ unit, although it 
has been posited by the practitioner David Burrows, that there is probably no reason 
why such cases should not in future even begin in the Family Court, rather than 
waiting for transfer36.  Whether or not he is right about this, the matter may soon be 
																																								 																				
34 Jackson, LJ, Review of Civil Litigation Costs, Interim Report, 2009, available at 
www.judiciary.gov.uk; Jackson,  LJ, Review of Civil Litigation Costs, 2009-2010, Final Report, 2010, 
available at www.judiciary.gov.uk.  
35 [2014] EWHC 1410 (Fam). 
36	Burrows, solicitor Mediator-Arbitrator, New Law Journal columnist and Family Law commentator,  
has long considered that in fact the Family Procedure Rules 2010 can be read in such a way that 
there is actually nothing to stop an application by a cohabitant under TOLATA 1996 from being 
started in the new unified Family Court, rather than in the Chancery jurisdiction of the High Court or 
county court, since TOLATA refers to ‘a Court’ which has always been interpreted as an application to 
the High Court, Chancery Division (especially as the rest of the statute refers to clear Chancery 
matters).  He further concludes that there is nothing in the statute or elsewhere preventing a TOLATA 
case being started in the Family Court.   
 In support, it should be mentioned that the Family Court has not only occasionally dealt with ancillary 
issues of a cohabitation nature when determining core matters in relation to children (which 
indisputably go to the Family Court or High Court Family Division) but that this happens more 
frequently than is perhaps realised, such as in the recent case of Seagrove v Sullivan [2014] EWHC 
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overtaken by events, since the relevant allocation rules are in any case now likely to 
be updated in the present Chancery Modernisation Review ‘to ensure that those 
procedures are appropriate for current times’ (as mentioned by the Chancellor, Sir 
Terence Etherton, in his Preface to the 2013 Chancery Guide37. 
 
Summary 
Sadly the conclusion of this section appears to be that there probably are no 
immediately obvious ideological drivers which might now encourage the government 
to support legislative reform for cohabitants, since even if there is no interest in 
cohabitants as such,  the government has not responded to legislative opportunities 
which would have had obvious political and economic benefits in supporting 
allegedly urgent austerity aims, particularly in cutting welfare benefits, legal aid and 
civil litigation budgets.   
 
Accordingly it does seem that even if there were suddenly 20m cohabitants it would 
be unlikely to engage government attention, so that other drivers must be found 
since any cohabitant population explosion is obviously seen only as a supporting 
rather than driving factor. The 15,000 recorded same sex marriages figure (in any 
case ex post facto) appears entirely coincidental to the decision to enact the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, the driver for which was probably a 
combination of the policy behind the Equality Act 2010 and the Wilkinson v 
Kitzinger38 decision.  This case, involving two women married in a province of 
Canada, was obviously considered of some importance, since the judgment was 
given by the President of the Family Division, and made clear the cross border 
complexities of English law’s inability to recognise an overseas same sex marriage 
except as a civil partnership.   
 
 While the impact of Goodwin clearly indicates that the theory behind the statistics 
can establish a practical trend, in turn demanding analysis of absence of juristic 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
1410 (Fam)  which concerned a dispute about the half share of a house which came to the Family 
Court owing to its association with a dispute about how much time one of the children of the family 
should spend with his father: in other words  this was a consolidated hearing under both the Children 
Act 1989 and TOLATA 1996,  locating that consolidation in the Family Court not the Chancery 
jurisdiction.   
 
37 Sir Terence Etherton,  Chancery Guide, 13th edn, Ministry of Justice, Preface. 
38 [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam). 
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recognition of the family format involved, it looks as though the government is also 
only concerned about this if dislike of an English law stance might have some 
international impact such as embarrassing the UK in the ECtHR (as in Goodwin) or 
discouraging foreign tourist trade particularly from moneyed parts of the 
Commonwealth such as Canada.   
 
Accordingly unless there is a role for human rights it is difficult to see how to move 
forward. 
 
(b)  Is there a human rights issue? 
It seems that this aspect was not much considered until it could no longer be ignored 
that Christine Goodwin’s litigation, which finally progressed the transsexuals’ case 
towards full gender recognition, was squarely within the framework of the Convention 
on Human Rights, which had by 2002 been imported into English law by the Human 
Rights Act 1998. This was not the case when the previous key ECHR transsexual 
recognition cases of Rees v UK39, Cossey v UK 40  and Sheffield & Horsham v UK 41 
were before the ECtHR which persisted in allowing generous margins of 
appreciation.   
 
Nevertheless, a latent human rights issue may also exist in the cohabitation context, 
which should not therefore be brushed aside.  This is because the core mischief of a 
projected increase in numbers of families based on cohabiting relationships is that 
where there is inadequate financial provision in the existing law for the weaker party 
financially on the breakdown of such relationships, the state will almost certainly 
have to provide in the form of welfare benefits. There are currently alarming 
projections about the extent to which the welfare benefits budget is likely to be 
exceeded by 2017 alone, thus threatening the government’s strategy for returning 
the UK to solvency following the economic downturn and resultant austerity 
measures which have been in place since 2010.  Moreover the latest news, 
depressing even alongside the good news of an expanding economy, is of further 
																																								 																				
39 [1986] EHRR 56. 
40 [1993] 2 FCR 97. 
41 [1998]17 EHRR 163. 
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billions of cuts going forward from the current Budget, which logically must impact on 
the human fallout of broken partnering relationships, particularly cohabitation.   
 
This very result has for many years clearly illustrated what has happened in the 
absence of a specific legal regime for such relationships, since in 2010 the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies produced a report on outcomes for women and children 
respectively leaving marriage and cohabitation, which concluded, unsurprisingly, that 
those leaving cohabitation descended faster into poverty than those leaving a 
married family unit42.   
 
The latent human rights issue lies in the fact that the inherent disadvantage of such a 
result is that currently the imperfect gender equality produces unequal results 
adversely impacting on women.  This is because cohabiting relationship breakdowns 
tend to impact more significantly on women than on men, since it is women who are 
more often the carers of dependent children and of the home.  They are therefore 
inevitably more often part time workers or merely homemakers, and the resultant 
disadvantage suffered is indirect discrimination.  
 
Moreover, while in their 2007 work the Law Commission was against recognising 
any potential relationship disadvantage to be compensated where a cohabiting 
couple had no children, this is by no means the last word on this topic.   This is 
because where a cohabitating woman assumes the specialised homemaker role 
which is not shared by the man, even where there are no children that situation 
obviously generates a practical disadvantage in employment, which has been 
recognised for decades in employment literature and indeed in financial provision 
under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004, and 
arguably needs no further restatement. 
 
Summary 
This point looks more hopeful as a potential driver for reform. Unlike population 
explosion issue, which has clearly not been convincing in the face of an apparent 
government policy of inaction in progressing cohabitants’ rights, indirect 
																																								 																				
42Alissa Goodman, Ellen Greaves, Cohabitation, marriage and child outcomes, Institute of Fiscal 
Studies, IFS Commentary C114, IFS, 2010. 
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discrimination is now a highly topical element in any argument for a normative 
legislative scheme. This human rights issue is difficult to ignore, since equality has 
been a key feature of recent pro-minority policy evidenced by the passage of the 
2004 and 2013 statutes in favour of full gender recognition, gay partnership and full 
marriage rights.  The right to equality as a human right is thus a relatively new and 
developing contemporary argument for including cohabitants in such normative 
legislation. particularly when also supported by the third of the preliminary issues, 
harmonisation of international Family Law, especially in the UK’s neighbouring 
territories of the EU.  
 
(c) What is the influence, if any, of harmonisation of law in the European Union? 
The spread of European Union harmonisation of national laws in the wide 
geographical and ideological range of jurisdictions and societies in the enlarged EU 
has always highlighted the problems of cross border families.  In particular, as each 
such case of family disputes is litigated in the courts of England and Wales under 
English law,  it has seemed more than likely ultimately to bring with it also a portfolio 
of outcomes:   
 
(i) the spread of the influence of Human Rights law, together with  
(ii) more cross border migration in accordance with the EU principle of freedom of 
movement and of professional and employment establishment within the Union,  
where different treatment of cohabitants creates practical problems, and 
(iii) a questioning of the impact of the historical and political reasons for  
cohabitation  being treated differently from marriage. 
 
In theory this should be a fertile ground for taking forward the entire cohabitants’ 
rights  debate, marriage being a relationship where women are less likely to suffer 
disadvantage on relationship breakdown as there is a regime for financial provision 
and property adjustment on divorce, specifically set out for them in English law in the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and in most European civil law jurisdictions in one 
form or another of community of property, or a replacement agreement for a different 
regime. However, in the shadow of an imminent referendum on whether EU 
membership should continue, this is probably hardly the moment for such ideological 
discussions! 
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This current EU membership uncertainty clearly leaves English and Welsh 
cohabitants at a disadvantage which will probably be prolonged, as a number of 
European jurisdictions, including those in Eastern Europe, do have not merely 
married community of property but limited statutory codes applying to cohabitants 
who also qualify for them: in Western Europe Sweden, Norway, Portugal and Spain, 
and in Eastern Europe Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia. More jurisdictions have 
enacted provisions similar to the Civil Partnership Act.  In the circumstances it seems 
odd that English Law has still not tackled this issue more proactively since, as a 
member state, England and Wales as part of the UK belongs to a European Union 
where the population demonstrably migrates in connection with individuals’ working 
and private lives.  But for the referendum and the consequent political instability the 
energies of the developing European Family Law conference circuit might have 
contributed much to such cross border debate and exchange of views.   
 
Although the EU framework concedes that the member states are each at liberty to 
individualise their detailed treatment of their own Family Law systems, and in the 
wider common law and civil law world there is even greater diversity of treatment of 
key Family Law issues, the very mobility of individuals and families consequent on 
the establishment of relationships following on international employment  - and 
international migration for other reasons -   has already led to legal problems in other 
areas of Family Law which have resulted in a louder call for harmonisation.   
 
For example, the incidence of international child abduction, which is itself a product 
of different jurisdictional approaches to relocation of the carer parent, has been 
fuelled by increased mixed marriage and international family mobility. The diverse 
jurisdictional doctrines and practice associated with relocation itself in turn stoke the 
trend towards international child abduction when different approaches are taken in 
different countries and cultures, creating a vicious circle.  A perusal of 
www.reunite.org, the website of the leading specialist charity reunite international,    
makes clear the extent of this problem,  even to the non-specialist child lawyer or lay 
person.   
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No less than three large international conferences were held between mid- 2009 and 
the summer of 2010 to attempt to reach consensus in relation to these critical topics 
of abduction and relocation of children of ruptured  adult relationships  with some 
international element.43  No clearer signal could be sent of the importance of 
resolving issues of family mobility generated by the rupture of parental relationships, 
whether married or unmarried.  In this context, to add a potential further layer of 
complexity to that already generated by adult mobility within global Family Law 
systems by ignoring opportunities to create a normative cohabitation regime in 
English law is certainly not wise if avoidable, especially where cohabitation versus 
marriage is treated significantly differently from English law in many of those 
jurisdictions to which international families are likely to travel. 
 
It seems logical that, while it is by no means necessary, let alone desirable, for 
English law to attempt to match all or most of the European regimes recognising the 
status of cohabitants, it is actually illogical for English law to provide nothing at all  to 
recognise this type of family formation, since without any such recognition the 
cohabiting adults heading the family are merely two single persons, which can cause 
problems.  
 
For example, in the context of frequent cross border movement, it must be asked 
whether such an opposite sex couple living in England and having a holiday home in 
France could register under the French PACS (‘Pacte Civile de Solidarite’) system if 
they, for example, spend regular time in their French home (as many do, and in 
respect of which they would be restricted by the French inheritance law which 
imposes compulsory disposition within the family of property held in France?) And 
what would then be their position in England and Wales when they returned to the 
UK, where as an opposite sexes couple their PACS status would not be recognised?  
It would qualify as neither Civil Partnership (which does not include opposite sexes in 
such partnerships) nor marriage!   
 
																																								 																				
43 i.e.  (i) at Windsor (International Judicial Conference convened by Thorpe, LJ, Head of International 
Family Justice, of the High Court in England and Wales: August 2009);(ii) at Washington (ICMEC) 
March 2010; and (iii) at the Centre for Family Law and Practice in London, July 2010, all three 
including as speakers Thorpe, LJ and Professor William Duncan, at the time heading the Hague 
Convention Secretariat in the Netherlands.  
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This type of family mismatch has been addressed by the Marriage (Same-Sex 
Couples) Act 2013 for same-sex marriage overseas by the repeal in that Act of the 
anomaly identified in Wilkinson v Kitzinger44,  but it seems that no similar thought has 
been given to opposite sex registered partnerships,  such as that of PACS. With no 
opposite sex equivalent regime English law could surely not recognise PACS, 
potentially offending large numbers of French couples, just as the Canadian same-
sex spouses married in Canada were offended  in Wilkinson v Kitzinger.  
 
Such an omission in itself seems strange, given that France is probably the EU state 
with which much of the UK population is likely to be most familiar. 
 
First, it is the closest to travel to from England (whether by Channel Tunnel or any 
other mode of transport, including from regional airports)  so  that of all the EU states 
its coastal and rural locations are as likely a regular holiday destination as any in the 
UK,  especially for short breaks. It is therefore a prime candidate for establishing 
second homes,  giving a measure of stability to family holiday arrangements during 
school age phases of both married and cohabiting families,  and often with a view to 
later extended pre- and post-retirement occupation by the adults heading the family 
when children have grown up.   
 
Secondly, despite a substantial British exodus from such property arrangements in 
the current EU-wide economic downturn, as the UK situation improves economically 
it is highly likely  that early retirement from work may once again become feasible 
(especially as property in Europe has dropped in value in line with the widespread 
downturn trend). This has already led to a rise in the numbers returning to the 
continent when the more expensive period of children’s upbringing is over and 
cheaper French property, more relaxed French bourgeois lifestyle and a variety of 
better amenities may once again be easily accessed by British pensioners.   
 
It is thus not rash to imagine likely further potential for clashes of legal recognition of 
status where the affected parties are not married and encounter such international 
																																								 																				
44 [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam). 
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differences of treatment within the EU, so that they may move freely but without their 
family composition and relationships being uniformly recognised in the EU states. 
 
Moreover, in EU Law the Treaty of Lisbon45 (2007) protects ‘the family’ and the UK 
as a member state is a signatory to that treaty which is an important one in the 
ongoing restatement of the principles of the Union. This is similar to how the Treaty 
of Rome, which set up the Union to which the UK later acceded, protects both the 
principle of freedom of movement across internal EU borders and establishment for 
professions and employment.  These factors provide the impetus for the creation of 
international families who are therefore likely to wish to be able to rely on recognition 
for their family throughout the European Union. 
 
 
Summary 
Whether or not any future government eventually manages to participate effectively 
in any pan-European harmonisation of Family law -  which at present seems unlikely, 
owing to the sharply distinctive civil and common law systems involved,  and their 
respective principles -   there is a clear practical impact of the lack of harmonisation 
of equality issues  so as to include a common treatment of cohabitating families. This 
is a human rights issue of indirect discrimination which cannot be ignored in the way 
in which national jurisdictions may more easily cling to their own perceptions of 
individual property regimes.  Wilkinson v Kitzinger46 has already shown the 
difficulties created by distinct approaches to the recognition of adult relationship 
status, almost certainly one of the prime drivers for the Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2013 especially as it was presented as an equality Act by the 
government’s relatively newly reconstituted Equality Office. 
 
Accordingly, the contemporary impact of both human rights and European Union 
harmonisation are now potentially of much greater significance in the cohabitation 
debate than they were, especially once it is accepted that it is now equally clear that 
national demand from whatever size of cohabitant constituency is very unlikely to 
																																								 																				
45 Treaty of Lisbon, ‘the Reform Treaty’, available at eur-lex.europa.eu./homepage.html, accessed 24 
March 2016. 
 
46  [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam). 
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move government policy away from issues currently seen in their perspective as of 
more pressing concern. 
 
However government apathy is not the only obstacle to be overcome. The next step 
must be to consider what appears to be the long running entrenchment of hostility to 
recognition of cohabitation as a normative family format, which nevertheless sits 
oddly with the results of more recent social attitudes surveys. On the other hand, it 
may be that this formerly entrenched hostility no longer exists, or not to the same 
extent as previously, since if it did it is hard to see how the Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act could have been enacted, no matter how much it were presented as an 
equality issue. Some examination of the up to date position must be analysed.   
 
The English Law context:  Equality and Diversity and Marriage versus 
Cohabitation in English Law  
 
The nub of this problem appears to be the apparently long standing incompatibility in 
English law of Cohabitation and Marriage, an ideological clash which historically 
appears to have its roots in the perception of cohabiting relationships as a type of 
inferior status to that of Marriage.  This clearly raises questions which cannot be 
avoided if the problems created are to be addressed effectively.  This issue has been 
in existence for a long time but it may be that there is now room for a new 
perspective.  There are 2 points:  (i) historically it seems there has been a perceived 
bar to legislating for recognition of cohabitation as an alternative status to marriage 
(ii) various opportunities have emerged to address this problem, but the government 
has apparently preferred to keep its head in the sand, indeed it seems taking care 
not to notice any of them! The issue seems to be that while the practical context is 
plain for all to see, government policies are focussed in another direction. 
 
 
The practical context versus government policy 
 
(a) The practical context  
It seems unarguable that the current practice of litigating cohabitant disputes in the 
Chancery Division of the High Court under the Trusts jurisdiction of the Trusts of 
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Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 199647 is as expensive and inconvenient to 
both HM Courts and Tribunal Services as to the litigants involved.  It would therefore 
seem that there must be a case for discrete legislation for the identifiable cohabitant 
constituency, which has been created by a significant section of the public choosing 
unilaterally to adopt a manifestation of social change which argues for recognition of 
its function as a new format of family unit.   The obvious inadequacy of the present 
legislation and the onerous recourse to case law when the property incidences of 
cohabitation breakdown  have come before  the Supreme Court, as in Gow v Grant48 
already mentioned above,  also argue for discrete legislation for this alternative 
family unit which is clearly being positively chosen by couples not only for their own 
preferred lifestyle but also in which to bring up children.  Since the latter function is a 
nurturing facility which successive governments have repeatedly declared to be a 
necessary component in the ‘building blocks of society’, it is not clear why normative 
legislation at least addressing the family property issues has not claimed some 
attention in the reforming cycles of recent years, for example at least in the Family 
Justice Review of 2011. 
 
The only logical explanation for exclusion of this highly topical cohabitation issue 
would appear to be that the government is still shy of addressing the question of 
whether there are still practical reasons for treating married and cohabiting 
partnerships significantly differently, especially where such partnerships each head 
families with children.  Since the factual establishment of a significant cohabitant 
constituency and social change generally cannot any longer seriously be questioned, 
this functionality would appear to indicate that  the answer to this question is no 
longer  in the negative, unless some powerful new adverse reason can be identified 
in the social change involved which suggests that this alternative family format is 
likely to be only a passing phase.  On the contrary the likelihood that cohabitation is 
part of a wave of overriding social change seems particularly evidenced by 
government sponsored recent legislation in favour of other atypical family units with 
much smaller numbers than those in cohabiting families.  Thus, leaving cohabitants 
out of the equality driven recognition of these alternative family formats seems odd, 
especially when in the case of cohabitants there is the close core similarity of 
																																								 																				
47Commonly called ‘TOLATA’. 
48 [2012] UKSC 20, per Hale DP,[ 56 ]. 
  
 
33 
function between cohabiting and married families, clearly evidenced by the extra 
marital birth figures mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
This arguably advances three significant answers in favour of legislating to provide at 
least some basic regime in English law for recognition of cohabitants as a valid 
family unit.  Despite apparent government apathy in this context it must be queried 
whether there is no pressure on the legislator not to entrench stereotypes – and 
therefore to act to prevent such a result  – especially given the accepted Equality 
and Diversity culture,  which has been inculcated into English Law both by EU law 
which majors in following equality and diversity driven conventions and  by the 
ECHR jurisprudence? 
 
  
It is appreciated that this is a complex question involving both public law and policy 
and practical application of the law to a defined situation which has been brought 
about by social change:  but the tentative answer, following the Equality Act 2010,   
is that there must be some such pressure in view of UK membership of the EU, UK 
signature to the Lisbon Treaty (in force since 2009) and the government’s advance 
of equality policies which were articulated as the reason for the enactment of the 
Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. Moreover the 2013 Act is a statute which 
finally leaves opposite sex couples the only intimate adult partnership with no 
recourse to an alternative to marriage or single status:  whereas unregistered same-
sex couples can choose between civil partnership, marriage or retaining their formal 
single status with, in practice, a shared lifestyle.  
 
Clearly, there is some emerging feeling that this is unfair or impractical or both, since 
besides Lord Marks’ Bill, another private member’s Bill, this time amending the Civil 
Partnership Act, seeking to add opposite-sex registered civil partnership to that 
regime, was before the pre-May 2015 session of Parliament, has since been 
reintroduced and was due for its Second Reading in March 2016.. 
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In this connection, while the ECtHR has in the past stated in the case of X, Y and Z v 
UK 49  - a case decided before Goodwin changed the ECtHR direction - that there 
was no protection for family life with a transsexual, it appears that there is no case 
where the Court has ever made such a statement in connection with cohabitants, nor 
is there any apparent distinction excluding cohabitants from the core principle of 
protection of the family in any international instrument.  For example, Article 23 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 merely states that 
 
  ‘The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
              to protection by society and the State’.   
 
Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966 also states that  
 
 ‘The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the 
            family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly 
            for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of 
            dependent children’. 
 
In no Convention or Treaty so far found has an unmarried partnership heading a 
family been expressly excluded. Further, Article 13 (General Rule of Interpretation) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides in paragraph 1 that 
 
 ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
 meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
 of its object and purpose’.   
 
Accordingly, and particularly since no Western non-Islamic jurisdiction actually 
prohibits such cohabitation - although some American states did as recently as 25 
years ago50 -   it is difficult to see how the status of ‘parents’ heading a family,  
whether within natural, step- or other social parenting,  should not be accorded the 
protection of the family envisaged by these and any other conventions. Such 
																																								 																				
49[1997] 24 EHRR 143.  
50  Craig Rotherham, ‘The Contribution Interest in Quasi Matrimonial Disputes’ (1991) 4 Canterbury 
Law Review , p407, 418-419. 
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provisions are routinely drafted in wide terms within the continental civil law tradition, 
which adopts that style precisely so that these documents may be interpreted as 
living instruments according to prevailing social and other circumstances.  If the 
adults who are part of the family are protected, it is difficult to see how they 
themselves and their relationship do not also attract such protection. 
 
However, there is more to add in this respect: a relatively new slim volume Making 
Family Law by MacLean51 details in its short length a mine of information on the 
influences behind the eventual emergence of any legislation into Parliament.  The 
book is sub-titled A Socio Legal Account of Legislative Process in England and 
Wales, 1985 to 2010, which aptly describes the content: the flyleaf introduction alone 
indicates immediately that 
 
‘..the legislative process is complex, encompassing a variety of aims and outcomes. Some 
norms and rules are embodied in law because we are simply expected by government to 
follow them. Others are there for entirely different reasons. A legislator may wish to send 
messages about what constitutes desirable behaviour, to demonstrate government’s ability 
to deal with a local and short term issue, or to distract the electorate from other crises...’  
 
and adds that the book 
 
     ‘offers a rare insight into the real processes by which lawmakers attempt to influence (or 
fail to influence) human behaviour’...’it reveals a quite different picture from that of the 
rational lawmaker imagined in textbooks’.  
 
Given this frank introduction by an experienced researcher and academic adviser to 
successive government departments ‘responsible for family law-making’ in England 
and Wales, and drawing on her ‘long standing involvement in,  and knowledge of,  
the processes of law-making’,  this key work provides valuable signposts to 
legislative success.   
 
																																								 																				
51 Mavis MacLean with Jacek Kursewski, Making Family Law, Hart, 2011. 
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Perusing the historical and analytical content, including the section ‘Case Studies in 
the Reform of English Family Law, 1829-2010’52, the reader can only wonder that the 
Law Commission were as successful as they were in their 2006-7 work.   
 
Before even reading the whole of Maclean’s introduction53, the suspicion quickly 
dawns that perhaps the Law Commission’s proposed cohabitants’ rights reforms 
were not so much a law reform project intended to have a practical result, but a 
political process to be gone through for show, and in fact never meant to reach 
Parliament at all.  Even allowing for the restrictions within which the Law 
Commission works – since being a creature of statute and in theory independent of 
government, it must in 2006 when the Commission’s work began, have had the 
support of some government department before it could accept the brief to 
investigate potential law reform - a question remains as to why none of the 
recommended reforms have ever been implemented, further discussed or at least 
critically examined.   
 
While under the rules mentioned, there must have been an expectation that some 
government department would at some stage have progressed the Commission’s 
recommendations,  it is strange that both the Labour government in power following 
the 2007 Final Report and both the succeeding coalition and the current 
Conservative governments  have been so clearly against doing so.  Instead there 
has been a complete wall of silence, not only because of the abrupt and unlikely 
reasons given for this inaction on behalf of the first two governments, but also when 
the 2010-2015 coalition government immediately adopted other equality measures 
but did not intimate any change at all to the apparently wholly negative attitude to 
cohabitation legislation, indeed remaining totally silent on the matter when some 
comment was clearly required.   
 
While policy, it seems, is at the root of every such decision, sustained government 
inaction on this obviously topical and pressing issue is so highly visible as to be 
impossible to miss except by an alien from another planet without any 
telecommunication facilities! 
																																								 																				
52 Ibid p15. 
53 Ibid pp 1-19. 
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At the very least it is already established that there is both a human rights issue in 
the continued lack of a normative regime for cohabitants’ rights on their relationship 
breakdown and potential economic benefits in both welfare and legal aid/court costs’ 
budgets. It is therefore difficult to see either why formal policy decisions have 
actually been taken by two governments not to implement either the Law 
Commission’s 2007 recommendations or possibly something similar or simpler, and 
nothing at all has been said by a third when advancing other intimate family 
relationship equality legislation.   
 
Although  the reason given before 2010 was the lack of practical experience of  the 
Scottish legislation and was just credible, since at the time the Scottish system had 
been in force only for a short time, it  appears to have had little enduring validity 
later, when the inaction of the coalition itself took the recommendations no further,  
when there  was published research (actually already effected in 2010), nor most 
recently,  when Baroness Hale of Richmond, Deputy-President of the Supreme 
Court,  formally approved the practical application of the legislation in her Gow v 
Grant judgment. Admittedly, she therein identifies potential improvements, as now 
would some Scottish practitioners. (See further Chapter 6 where Scotland’s 
experience is evaluated).   
 
 
(b) The Present Policy Response in England and Wales: the Law Commission’s 
2007 scheme  
 
Despite general awareness in the media of the statistics mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter, of the practical impact of answers to the questions set out in (a) 
above in this section, and of the fact that the Law Commission’s 2006-7 scheme was 
commissioned by  Labour ministers who have been out of office – and their legacy 
obviously out of favour with their successors -   current government inaction arguably 
indicates that the Law Commission’s final report in 2007 might just as well not have 
been researched and written at all, although it is fair to say that Lord Marks’ 
Cohabitants’ Rights Bill, now back before Parliament, does substantially adopt the 
principles of the 2007 scheme.   
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However, official treatment of this Bill is odd, as while it is a private member’s Bill 
and its content no doubt  indicating unwelcome Labour associations, it is curious that 
the present and immediately preceding governments have still never taken the 
opportunity to adopt it:  in seeking at least to create a scheme of some sort,  its 
enactment would go some way towards supporting the last two ministry’s stringent 
policies which have clearly been aiming above all at achieving delivery of family 
justice at least possible cost.  
 
 Moreover, if the Bill were adopted, now it is back on track after a second reading, 
government could clearly also secure any changes to its content that were wanted. 
Perhaps they could not have done so easily while in the previous coalition - despite 
the fact that, in the session immediately preceding the current Parliament,  that 
coalition ministry included two new energetic Justice Ministers in the House of 
Commons 54 and House of Lords.55   
 
 Nevertheless, the fact is that no steps have so far been taken to support this or any 
other legislative initiative. Such dismissive treatment is concerning, since without 
government sponsorship the likely success of  Lord Marks’ Bill must be limited,  as is 
often the case with such Bills –  as happened to those introduced earlier by the 
Liberal Democrat peer, Lord Lester of Herne Hill.  Moreover, it is surprising that the 
Ministry of Justice team apparently continues to find no Parliamentary time to 
support Lord Marks’ initiative, given that the Law Commission itself expressed the 
hope, at the time of the 2011 rejection of the 2007 report’s recommendations, that an 
early opportunity would be found to legislate following the inauguration of the new 
2015 Parliamentary term.  Nevertheless,   there is nothing currently to suggest that 
the position will change under the present government. 
 
																																								 																				
54 Simon Hughes MP, who encouraged other reforming initiatives. 
55	Lord Faulks QC, who is an Arbitrator, and was therefore presumably aware of the initiative of IFLA, 
the pan-professional Family Arbitration scheme, to which some cohabitants have been obliged to 
have recourse rather than to incur the costs of Chancery  trusts litigation under TOLATA 1996.  
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This is really surprising, particularly during the later period of austerity under the 
2010-2015 coalition. The Law Commission work did produce in their final report a 
system for cohabitants which, while possibly not perfect,  could only have saved 
money at a time when,  from April 2013,  post-LASPO 2012 increased costs were 
already being incurred by HM Courts and Tribunal Services, since the presence of 
large numbers of new Litigants in Person (LIPs) was already trebling time spent on 
cases as well as inflating the costs to HMCTS of running trials.   
 
Considering how much court time would be saved by introducing a relatively simple 
piece of legislation to address the problems faced by separating cohabitants, it is 
surprising that the Law Commission’s scheme is not only still ignored but has not 
been pressed immediately into service in a fast tracked piece of emergency 
legislation.  It  was, after all  set out in considerable detail, including distinguishing 
cohabitants from married couples, although other jurisdictions  have chosen systems 
much closer to their existing regimes for married relationships,  such as in Spain’s 
constitution and detailed regional laws56, in Scotland’s Family Law (Scotland) Act 
200657  in federal Australia’s amendments to their Family Law Act 1973 - a 
Commonwealth of Australia Act -   and in New Zealand’s Property Relationships Act 
to include cohabitants58. 
 
While global uniformity is neither necessarily desirable, let alone achievable, it must 
be noted that in formally recognising the emergence of this cohabiting family format 
these jurisdictions are all adopting the ‘functionality’ argument of many lobbyists for 
more radical reform, a thread also adopted in many of her contributions by Barlow59. 
This perhaps raises a further question as to whether, nine years from the Law 
Commission’s work, it might finally be time to consider looking at whether a simple 
amendment of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 could be the most cost effective 
action to take (along the lines of the distinctions made between married and 
unmarried relationships in the Family Law Act 1996, which has worked perfectly well 
in that context).  
 
																																								 																				
56 See Chapter 7. 
57 See Chapter 6. 
58 See Chapter 8 for the approach of both of these Commonwealth common law jurisdictions. 
59  n31. n32, n33. 
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The question must therefore be asked at this stage which of these approaches is 
likely to be more appropriate to English law, since precisely as exact global 
uniformity is by no means essential (and indeed impossible in view of the variety of 
styles and frameworks adopted worldwide) it is also by no means necessarily the 
case that English law should adopt a unified, or near unified, system for both married 
and unmarried partners, whether that is simply because this has the merit of 
simplicity or because it is seen to  work in other jurisdictions such as New Zealand,  
or for any other reason.  
 
However, in view of the fact that since the Civil Partnership Act 2004 has taken as its 
close model the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, there are already two same-sex 
regimes in English Law which mirror each other – that is, for traditional married 
couples under the 1973 Act, to which same–sex couples have now been added by 
the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 - and (under the 2004 Act) for registered 
civil partnerships between same sex couples only.  This already produces an uneasy 
framework as, apart from excluding only opposite sex cohabitants whose claims to 
legal recognition arguably ought to fit somewhere (such as in the apparently still live 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 amendment Bill)  there has been no discussion as to 
where precisely the interests of opposite sex cohabitants should be located. 
 
If the 2013 Act was an equality statute, the present result outlined above seems not 
only not to have achieved that purpose but to have perpetuated the unfairness 
already identified, in leaving only one category of couples living together without 
similar customised legal provision - opposite sex cohabitants, whose union is still 
totally non-formalised qua union.  This seems a particularly glaring discrimination 
since  unregistered gay unions now have the opportunity of either gay marriage or 
registered civil partnership,  while opposite-sex cohabitants, who have presumably 
already rejected marriage, have only one choice, since they cannot register a civil 
partnership.They must either change their minds about marriage or remain two 
single persons.   
 
However, instead of merely unfair, this situation also seems illogical,   since such 
heterosexual unions are, in fact already recognised for some purposes as if they 
were married:  moreover, some would add that this only occurs where it suits the 
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government, for example, in welfare benefits law, inheritance and protection from 
domestic violence, but not where it does not, such as for home rights which is still 
restricted by Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 to married couples.   Overall, this is 
a confused situation which is clearly inappropriate in a modern liberal democracy.    
 
For welfare benefits  the definition of ‘cohabitants’ is the same as the Law 
Commission’s – same or opposite-sex persons living together who are not related by 
blood or affinity. This therefore excludes family home sharers who fall into a different 
category and have been traditionally subject to a different corpus of jurisprudence. 
However, they too could doubtless benefit from a distinct property and legal 
responsibility  regime,  since this was not adequately catered for by the Law 
Commission’s  2002 Home Sharer’s report60 which decided that such a regime was 
too complex to devise any framework for.  
 
Ascertaining precisely any particular government’s ‘party line’  on marriage and 
cohabitation is notoriously difficult, and sometimes variable depending on whether an 
election is imminent, in which it is desirable not to offend any particular  social sector. 
The Labour governments of 1997-2010 regularly drifted in their public statements, 
both within and outside Parliament, that is  between supporting married and 
unmarried parents equally as the foundation of a family in which children could be 
brought up,  and in supporting marriage as the best environment. The recent 
coalition government decided to implement favourable tax treatment for married 
couples and the present Prime Minister, now leading a Conservative majority 
administration,  tends towards marriage supporting statements, although logically 
this may be as likely to offend the large numbers of single parents who have 
deliberately chosen that status as much as cohabitants. 
 
While it would obviously assist in furthering the goal of harmonising European 
national systems, it does also seem that it would now only be fair in human rights 
terms, and clearer for the citizen in practice, if there were an explicit 
acknowledgement of the status of cohabitant.  This is especially so as some statutes 
repeatedly use the word ‘cohabitant’  in  a factual rather than a situational sense, for 
																																								 																				
60 Law Commission, Sharing Homes: A Discussion Paper, Law Com  278,  HMSO, 2002. 
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example  the Family Law Act 1996, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependents) Act and a plethora of welfare benefits legislation.  This seems to 
recognise cohabitants for the purposes of those statutes as an accepted normative 
category of persons rather than simply addressing their lack of a discrete property 
regime on rupture of their relationship, despite the fact that the 2006-7 Law 
Commission inquiry was specifically briefed not to address such recognition of a 
separate status.  
 
Whether a statutory regime for cohabitants was more or less close to the provisions 
of the 1973 married and 2004 civil partnership statutory regimes or not, it would 
seem that it would also be fairer and clearer if such a discrete regime at least moved 
away from obliging cohabitants to rely on both the general principles of the law of 
Equity and on Chancery statutes, such as ‘TOLATA 1996, both of which were 
originally created for an entirely different purpose.   
 
While the Chancery jurisdiction has ably demonstrated in recent decades that it is 
after all ‘not yet past the age of childbearing’  - for example  in the significant 
continuing development of the doctrine of restitution and unjust enrichment -  it does 
seem that it would be a short step towards the appropriate determination of 
cohabitants’ rights either to give cohabitants their own statute or to include them in 
the appropriate sections of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  There is certainly a 
case for inclusion of cohabitants in that mainstream statute as the entirely successful 
precedent of  Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 indicates.  In the 20 years since its 
passage there has ultimately proved to be no difficulty in applying the subtly distinct 
provisions of Part IV to married and unmarried couples, despite the initial Daily Mail 
led opposition to the concept of the original draft Bill.  Indeed, the recollection that in 
1996, that newspaper could in all seriousness oppose any specific domestic violence 
and home occupation protection for cohabitants, even clearly distinguished from that 
for married couples’ (marriage based) home rights, indicates the extent of the social 
change that has been effected in the intervening two decades.   
 
It does not, however, now appear prima facie that any cohabitants’ rights legislation -  
distinguished from that available to married couples -  would be objected to when 
cohabitants form such a significant section of society, since in the liberal democracy 
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of England and Wales, it is not, in the last analysis, an intellectual exercise as to 
whether cohabitants ought, or ought not,  to be allowed recognition as a normative 
family unit. On the contrary, it is a fundamental right of access to justice of any 
significant section of society which requires such access if that is not otherwise 
adequately provided -   and which should therefore have its own suitable jurisdiction, 
whether in a discrete statute or by amendment to include their class in another 
already catering for similar family functions.   
 
Since the Charter of Fundamental Rights incorporated into the Lisbon treaty protects 
‘the family’ as such, it is hard to see why cohabitants cannot belong to ‘the family’. 
Thus there does not seem much excuse for failing to legislate to permit cohabitants 
to join the modernisation of Family Justice in the new Family Court and in a context 
so patently required, not least for the protection of women and children in cohabiting 
families, as identified by the Institute of Fiscal Studies 61, protection of children and 
the weak being a prime historic function of the state with its origins in the role of the 
King as parens patriae.  
 
In these circumstances it is odd that the Law Commission, having the opportunity so 
recently to create an entirely new regime for cohabitants, was obliged by its terms of 
reference to treat them entirely differently from both civil partnerships and married 
couples: however it seems this is probably best debited to the then perhaps 
remaining vestiges of opposition to allowing any association which might suggest 
marriage was no longer the only ‘real’ family foundation. Although the Law 
Commission noted in their 2006-7 work that there was little opposition to legislation 
to protect property rights especially where cohabitants had children, the former 
‘marriage only’ lobby can surely now no longer insist on their prior position in view of 
the passage of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. In enacting this statute,  
Parliament has altered one of the key principles enunciated by Lord Penzance in the 
long standing leading case of Hyde v Hyde, 62 namely that marriage was the union of 
‘one man and one woman’. Since, owing to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy,  
Parliament is able to alter the traditional nature of marriage as understood in English 
law and culture, and recognised in countless judgments of the ECtHR in this way, it 
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62 [1866] LR1 P&D 130. 
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is arguably illogical not to extend recognition of cohabitation as a new family format – 
neither inferior not superior to marriage but simply different – in the same way as 
marriage is now recognised in its new format. 
 
Moreover, since the 2013 Act was presented as an equality statute, discrimination 
against cohabitants is a strange concomitant when the statute caters for every other 
intimate relationship.   This 2013 legislation is also surprisingly advanced, in stark 
contrast with the legislative product of  2004, when the civil partnership statute was 
being drafted: it seems at that stage the Government Legal Service chose that civil 
partnership should simply mirror almost exactly the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, 
despite the fact that this statute was much criticised for many years prior to that date,  
by academics, practitioners and public alike, as being hopelessly out of date and 
unfit for purpose . Then, having used this 1973 statute as a template - in effect 
creating a gay version of marriage though policy statements declared it was not so! -  
the GLS insisted it was nevertheless a completely distinct relationship.  Indeed 
Baroness Scotland of Asthal QC63, introducing the Act, repeatedly made this point.  
The logic is not easy to follow. 
 
Looking even further back in the history of legislation actually unpopular with the 
public, the attempt to replace the 1973 Act’s divorce provisions by Part II of the 
Family Law Act 1996 was the subject of such adverse reaction from both profession 
and public that the Lord Chancellor was ultimately obliged to announce that it would 
not be brought into force, although, amongst others, the Law Society and Resolution 
have since been pressing for a new regime of no fault divorce which is not markedly 
different form the rejected Part II.   Indeed, there has been recent suggestion of a 
new investigation into possible reform,  which was part of Resolution’s recent 
Manifesto setting out the changes  that this Solicitors’ Family Law Association 
considers are required to Family justice generally64.    
 
The government policy position in relation to the status of marriage therefore 
appears to be equivocal rather than to adopt a stance of protection of marriage 
																																								 																				
63 Hansard (HL) vol 660, cc 387-433, 22 April 2004, 11,37am. 
 
64 Resolution, 2015, www.resolution.org/familylawmanifesto/. 
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against any advance of cohabitation that might affect its statistics, and of therefore 
retaining distinctions between the two lifestyles. 
 
Addressing the policy issues: how could a reforming government escape from 
the paralysis of apathy which appears to have stultified any reform? 
 
It is difficult at present to see a downside to some discrete cohabitants’ rights  
reform, especially if it is accepted that there is another way to treat the legal rights of 
cohabitants without either precisely equating their status to that of married persons 
or requiring them to access the expensive TOLATA 1996 litigation which is currently 
their only recourse.  
 
Crucially, customised reform would not add any obligations that do not already exist 
under TOLATA but would have the benefit of enabling cohabitants’ rights to be 
determined under discrete legislation as well as under the FPR 2010 in the Family 
Court without entering that Court by the back door as recently occurred in Seagrove 
v Sullivan 65.  Certainly leaving cohabitants on their current pathway to costly 
Chancery litigation is highly unsatisfactory at a time when the remainder of ‘the 
family’ at last has a new unified Family Court, which is the centre of the remainder of 
the modernisation of Family Justice.  However this remains their present fate unless 
they do manage to sneak into the Family Court through consolidation with a child 
welfare case already appropriately there, or have already entered into a binding 
cohabitation agreement which defines their respective rights on separation and are 
able to divide their assets accordingly themselves under that agreement.  
 
If recognising a status for cohabitants were regarded as too fundamental, there 
could, of course, simply be a discrete cohabitants’ property regime, in particular 
making provision for division of assets on separation and relocating any dispute 
within the Family Court, either closer or less close as the case might be, to the 
virtually identical Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and Civil Partnership Act 2004 
regimes,  which are already providing respectively for married persons of both 
opposite and same-sex couples,  and civil partners.   
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 Nevertheless, such truncation of a potentially comprehensive regime would be a 
pity, given the very long period during which nothing whatever has been done.  
However, it has to be recognised that the choice of direction of such a reform clearly 
depends on juristic preference and/or social or other policy, and almost certainly 
requires further research not included in the current Law Commission proposals of 
2007, which pre-date the more recent introduction, also in 2007, of those of other 
common law jurisdictions in Scotland, New Zealand and Australia.  
 
There are in any case strong practical reasons for bringing  the resolution of 
cohabitants’ property disputes within the fold of Family Law, where at present such 
disputes are not  even located,  either in jurisprudential theory or litigation 
enforcement.   
 
First, it is not convenient that the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, as amended, should 
apply to such Chancery based cohabitation cases, rather than the Family Procedure 
Rules 2010 as in the case of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004.  Nor is it convenient that cases are heard in such Chancery 
lists  under TOLATA 1995, rather than  under any Family Law statute,  and not in the 
new unified Family Court, for which extensive modernising has ‘taken place both in 
litigation procedure and ‘N-CDR’ dispute resolution, including  the drive for 
transparency in decisions, clarity in everyday language in all information designed to 
be read by the general public, as well as in rules and new procedural forms. In all of 
these measures, accessibility to the public has been the prime aim.   
 
Continuing litigation in the Chancery jurisdiction is only likely to perpetuate the Burns 
type case, in which it was not really surprising that Mrs Burns failed to show, as an 
unmarried cohabitant without formal property owning status needs to do, that the 
formal legal ownership of the family home did not truly reflect the rights of property 
between the parties - despite the fact that she and Mr Burns had lived there together 
for nearly 2 decades, she had brought up their children as devotedly as any fully 
contributing wife might have done, and contributed in the traditional homemaker’s 
way in a married or quasi-married relationship where responsibilities are traditionally 
split in the way in which they were in that case. 
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An even more important point, as emphasised by the editorial of Resolution’s 
Cohabitation Claims Guide is that ‘the CPR context can add another layer of 
unfamiliarity’ 66 because the Chancery process is so different from that of Family 
justice, especially now in the new Family Court , but the core practical point is that 
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, even as extensively amended in accordance with 
emerging modern practice the last 18 years, do not admit the application of the 
Family Law protocols which follow long standing development at least since 1982 in 
discouraging adversarial claims,  whereas mainstream civil justice is an adversarial 
system conducted along completely different lines.   
 
This is the main difference between civil and Family justice which is keenly regretted 
by Family lawyers owing to their core belief that the best place for the resolution of 
any family dispute is  not in court. However, if there is to be litigation, the second 
choice is that they be located in the Family Court or Family Division of the High 
Court. All other first instance applications have now  been abolished as has the 
former Family Proceedings Court (FPC),  and the former Divorce and Child Care 
designated County Courts have also, for more than 2 years,  been subsumed into 
the new Family Court.  There, application is made on one form and the gate-keeping  
arrangements then allocate the case to the appropriate level within that Court. 
 
 
Indeed to the legal historian, it can be readily seen that 46 years after the wardship 
jurisdiction was removed from the Chancery jurisdiction, far from that Division of the 
High Court wanting to hold on to cohabitants’ property problems,  the unmet and 
repeated pleas of family lawyers to have those cases in the Family Court might well 
be suddenly trumped by the incisive process of the Chancery Modernisation Review. 
This could summarily decide that cohabitation cases have no place amongst the 
heavy commercial litigation which is now the regular Chancery diet, and that these 
issues should be sent to join the rest of Family Justice!    
 
																																								 																				
66 Ashley Palminteri, Cohabitation Claims: A Resolution Guide, Resolution, 2011, www.resolution.org.  
  
 
48 
Since this would be likely to coincide with the view of all Family lawyers it is hard to 
see how if this can already happen incrementally through consolidation of cases on 
case management, it could not also in future logically happen at the start, so that any 
such case was determined by a judge of the Family Court with the expertise and 
ethos of family practice which has long been recognised as of a different character 
from other civil litigation, rather than by a judge of the Chancery Division who is likely 
not to have that ethos67. 
 
This distinct Family justice philosophy stems from the foundation in 1982 of the 
Solicitors Family Law Association by a group of specialist Family Law solicitors, who 
had recognised that Family Law litigation was different from other types of civil 
litigation and required a different, non-confrontational, approach, which so far as 
possible benefited the family as a whole. From this was developed a members’ 
Code, which the Law Society very quickly recommended should be adopted by all 
Family Law solicitors, regardless of whether or not they were members of the 
Association, and which is now reflected in the Law Society’s Family Law protocol 
and in good practice in Family Law litigation generally.   
 
Further developments have included not only the incorporation of mediation (in a 
distinct Family Law version) into much Family Law practice but also the evolution of 
Collaborative Law, a scheme in which the parties and their lawyers all agree not to 
be involved in litigation at all other than for implementation of any orders by consent, 
for which the High Court has made provision for fast track implementation.  
 
None of this applies in the Chancery Division of the High Court or within litigation in 
the Chancery lists of county courts, where the current equity resolution of 
cohabitants’ property disputes are heard and determined.  The current President of 
the Family Division, Sir James Munby P, is already promoting the desirability of 
reducing adversarial litigation in Family cases, through the introduction of his own 
Non-Court Dispute Resolution philosophy.  However, as long as cohabitants’ 
property disputes remain outside Family Law, such cases will not benefit from these 
																																								 																				
67 Although there are honourable exceptions, for example, judgments of Balcombe, J and Charles J, 
both of whose backgrounds were Chancery practice, as indeed as is that of the current President of 
the Family Division, Munby P, and all have become distinguished Family justice authorities. 
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Family Court reforms.  While the government may continue to press for more use of 
mediation and other DR, and more law reform to produce clarity in the law, thus 
obviating the need for litigation and reducing court costs in conducting such cases, 
cohabitants will not benefit from this initiative until potential reform of the law relating 
to cohabitants takes cohabitation claims to the Family Court. 
 
There is another good reason for formally relocating TOLATA litigation within the 
Family Court, which is that it is, coincidentally, a distinct feature of Seagrove v 
Sullivan that grossly disproportionate costs have already been incurred in this case 
to date, which might well have been avoided in the Family Court if it had started 
there instead of waiting for transfer.  It is notorious that High Court proceedings in 
the Chancery Division (or the Family Division for that matter, as that too is a Division 
of the High Court with it attendant costs) are expensive.  On the other hand, in the 
new unified Family Court, there is significant potential for reducing these to a 
minimum since that Court’s current modernisation of Family justice removes many of 
the previous complexities, not least in uniting the different levels of jurisdiction under 
one roof.  Moreover, the new court obviates the need even to incur the expense of 
the High Court itself, in whichever Division, if a case can go directly to the Family 
Court where it will be cost effectively assigned to the appropriate level of judge. Thus 
costs could be saved and the ethos of the Family Court incorporated from the start, 
in connection with which it is politic to recall that Part I of the Family Law Act 1996 
incorporates this ethos and philosophy. Notably, Part II did not succeed in reforming 
Divorce Law and was finally repealed by the Children and Families Act 2014, albeit 
only in that year, some 19 years after it was first enacted but never implemented! 
 
Part I was brought into force however and clearly states in s 1(c) that 
  
 ‘...that a marriage which has irretrievably broken down and is being brought to an end 
              should be brought to an end – 
(i) With minimal distress to the parties and to the children affected... 
(ii) ... 
(iii) Without costs being unreasonably incurred in connection with the procedures to be 
followed in bringing the marriage to an end...’ 
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Clearly, if this philosophy is suitable for resolution of problems associated with 
marriage breakdown, it is likely to be even better for those relating to the breakdown 
of a cohabitation relationship, especially as the Fiscal Studies Institute 68 has 
identified that the descent into poverty of women and children leaving such a 
relationship is faster and more severe than those in a married family which has 
broken up.  In other words, cohabitants need the services of the cost efficient, 
modernised Family Law orientated Family Court at least as much as, if not more 
than, married people who are divorcing.  Therefore it makes no sense at all for them 
to be litigating in any Division of the High Court, but certainly not within the extra 
complexities of the Chancery Division as explicitly identified by Resolution. 
 
In Australia there has for some time been a discrete Family Court, specifically 
created for Family Law cases, a decision which was considered in England and 
Wales from the time of the Conservative Lord Chancellorship of Lord Mackay of 
Clashfern,  but which was not in practice seriously considered for implementation 
prior to the Family Procedure Rules 2010, nor  in fact progressed until  the Crime 
and Courts Act 2013, and the implementation of the new unified Family Court of 
England and Wales on 22 April 2014. 
 
Secondly, as identified by Mee 69, England and Wales is by no means alone or 
pioneering on terra incognita in addressing this issue of whether to legislate for 
cohabitants’ rights:  indeed we are somewhat tardy in getting round to it!  The 
common law systems have previously tackled this litigation minefield from at least 
five different doctrinal bases: Equity, Property, Family, Contract and Restitution 
which Mee’s classic text has examined within the law of five common law 
jurisdictions, England, Ireland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.  As he says in 
his monograph, he attempted ‘to break down the barriers which in the past have 
hindered a full understanding of the issues involved’ so as to make ‘a determined 
effort to isolate each strand of the doctrinal tangle and to trace it back to its source’, 
and has done so within the five common law jurisdictions which have each 
contributed in their different ways to one another’s stock of ‘persuasive authority’.  
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69 John Mee, The Property Rights of Cohabitees, Hart, 1997. 
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This work identified the resulting trust, estoppel and ‘common intention’ from 
England together with Lord Denning’s ‘resulting trust of the new model’; the ‘modified 
resulting trust’ from  Ireland;  ‘unjust enrichment’ from Canada; ‘unconscionability’ 
from Australia; and ‘reasonable expectations’ from New Zealand. Scotland, with a 
distinct system from England and Wales and Northern Ireland, (and owing 
something, in Family Law particularly, to the ‘Auld Alliance’ with France and that 
country’s civil law jurisdiction) is not included in his analysis of a quarter of a century 
ago, although now it is naturally of more interest to Family Lawyers in England and 
Wales because of Scotland’s recent legislation, its recent practice coming on appeal 
before the Supreme Court at Westminster,  and, not least, the academic analysis of 
Wasoff et al70.   
 
Although Mee identifies Eire as the ‘odd man out’, in its disinclination to take much 
‘notice of foreign developments’, he notes that the other four in their turn ‘have 
shown no interest in the Irish approach’. He concludes that there are themes that 
draw these different doctrinal approaches together, including Eire’s independence 
despite its being such a small jurisdiction,  and in spite of the fact that the competing 
doctrines and jurisdictions themselves have not reached consensus in view of  their 
‘common heritage, language and culture’. 
 
If there are such positive benefits from legislative reform, is there some reason 
for retaining the status quo? 
If so, it is hard to see, since continued lack of a normative regime seems likely to 
drive some appellant sooner or late to Strasbourg. The consideration of the cases of 
Jones v Kernott 71 and Gow v Grant 72 in the Supreme Court was a strong indication 
of what could happen if cohabitants’ only existing remedies in English law were not 
constrained by the present lack of any normative regime.  It is possible that if the 
common gender issue of disadvantage to the female cohabitant is pursued by 
Baroness Hale in other similar cases this could be the type of case to go to the 
ECtHR to start the human rights process for cohabitants, a step which was 
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71 [2011] UKSC 53. [89]. 
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successful for transsexuals with the ultimate decision in Christine Goodwin’s case, 
which finally forced the UK government to enact the Gender Recognition Act 2004.   
 
It is worth noting that two of the justices sitting on the Kernott v Jones (2012) appeal 
in the Supreme Court  (including Lady Hale) also sat in the House of Lords in that of 
its predecessor, the Stack v Dowden (2007) appeal, in which the judgments impart 
an air of unfinished business.  Out of the 12 Supreme Court Justices who could have 
heard this case, only Lady Hale had the academic and Family law background which 
was really needed for this essentially ‘Family’ law context, as Lord Wilson (the former 
Wilson LJ) whose appointment was already confirmed at the time was not eligible to 
sit until after the case was heard. 
 
The bland nature of the Stack v Dowden decision, particularly in the year of the Law 
Commission’s Final Report, was particularly unsatisfactory, although as an authority 
it was, until clarified in Kernott v Jones, for four years still the leading case on 
cohabitants’ property because no other had been to the Supreme Court.  In informal 
discussion with the Association of Women Barristers in the week before that 
forthcoming appeal, Baroness Hale was of the view that the Law Commission’s 
scheme was at least as complex as the application of the law of trusts in such cases 
which would face the Supreme Court and spoke favourably of the Scottish system 
which is very close to Scotland’s financial provision for married couples on divorce. 
Sadly,  Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, perhaps the leading property lawyer of his 
era, had at the time left the Supreme Court, having returned temporarily to the Court 
of Appeal as Master of the Rolls, so was not participating in this important Supreme 
Court decision, although he has since returned to the Supreme Court as President.  
 
However the key query in relation to this question is naturally the philosophical one, 
as to whether the parties necessarily wish to have such a normative regime, 
because there is clear evidence of many cohabiting couples preferring to retain their 
individuality in both property and finance and their single identity within their 
cohabiting relationship.  Some couples even prefer the contemporary trend of ‘living 
apart together’ (‘LAT’) although this is not exclusive to unmarried couples.  High 
profile examples of married and unmarried ‘LAT’ relationships have and still do 
include well known academics and writers, such as Iris Murdoch and Professor John 
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Bayley, as well as respected actors and film producers, such as Helena Bonham 
Carter and Tim Bevan, which have appeared to work extremely smoothly.  
 
Perhaps some input from psychology (possibly through the Medico-Legal Society 
and the literature of that crossover of the two professions)  is necessary to explain 
the cohabitants’ apparent preference, as displayed by the rising cohabitation and 
falling marriage statistics, for unmarried status, but by no means adequately 
explored or explained in the Law Commission’s 2007 report, for which see further 
Chapter 5. 
 
This inevitably raises the question of how to deal with the religious and traditional 
lobbies’ objections to treating cohabitants in the same way, or nearly the same way, 
as married couples, as well as that of why cohabitants themselves prefer not to 
marry.  This is not as easy as might have been thought, since while there is an 
established state church in England and Wales (the Church of England - although 
once there was also a separate Church of Wales) England and Wales does not now 
present as a religious country, despite the Prime Minister’s periodic assertion in 
speeches that it is ‘a Christian country’.  It has every appearance of being in fact a 
multi-cultural, multi-faith country, in which there is religious freedom and a state 
church but the approach of most of the population is secular and church going or 
overt religion in any form is not conspicuous, unlike, for example, Spain which used 
to be a Christian (Catholic) country but states in its post-Franco constitution that it is 
‘a secular state’73, a formal statement which appears to align with the contemporary 
practice of the population.  
 
This non-religious quality in England and Wales is most recently supported by data 
abstracted in 2015 by the ONS from the 2011 Census which indicated significant 
changes in the proportions of the population who were or thought themselves 
‘religious’, or thought about religion at all. There is some support for this in the views 
of Grayling who points out that many religious ideas seen as Britain’s defining 
characteristics, are not Christian at all but come from Greece and Rome. 
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In this respect a study of any backlash experience in the two jurisdictions (Scotland  
and Australia) which have adopted unified, or virtually unified, schemes for married 
and cohabiting partners would be instructive, although in the case of the latter of 
these two states officialdom says it is distinct from marriage which is perhaps not 
entirely correct though there are distinctions as well as close similarities74 . This may 
be particularly illuminating for England and Wales since these two examples, while 
both in fact operating a system that works, are poles apart in background and 
beliefs, which suggests that possibly there is little or no potential doctrinal influence 
to be discerned in relation to a successful normative scheme but that the key 
influences are practical and pragmatic – possibly a policy attractive to a government 
anxious to offend as few constituencies as possible.   
 
All the issues mentioned above which surround the future legal impact of 
cohabitation were serious questions which were not only ripe for academic critical 
analysis in 2006-7, but which the Law Commission appears not to have examined so 
as to identify any underlying theory in this context. However since recognition of 
cohabitation as a valid form of family unit affects both the lives of adults and children 
at the point of practical administration of family justice, this should surely be the 
subject of some doctrinal articulation. In this respect a closer look at some 
comparative insights may be useful. 
 
What can be learned from treatment in other jurisdictions: Scotland and 
Australia 
In Scotland, their endemic species of ‘marriage by cohabitation and repute’, in place 
for many years, is now replaced in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 by a modern 
legislative framework for cohabitants, 2011 evaluation of which the Ministry of 
Justice in London gave as its reason for not taking any action on the Law 
Commission’s 2007 proposals for England and Wales.  
 
Baroness Hale’s approval of the Scottish system’s affinity with the married provision 
in that jurisdiction, where, prima facie, it appears that the new Act is welcomed 75 
thus suggests that a further small scale study would be worthwhile, although (given 
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55 
the relatively tiny population in relation to the remainder of the UK- only 
approximately 5.5million in Scotland) only a small sample would ever be likely to be 
available for research, particularly as the legal profession is tiny too and outside the 
principal cities the scanty population is spread very thin.  However some fieldwork on 
Scottish popular opinion might still be worthwhile, since religion is still extremely 
significant in Scottish national life, as it is in Wales: the Sabbath, for example, has 
always been so strictly observed by many Scottish sects that Lord Mackay of 
Clashfern, when Lord Chancellor, was severely criticised by his own extremely strict 
sect for attending the funeral in London of a senior judicial colleague of a different 
religion, despite the fact that  the funeral of a prominent senior judge was a normal 
incidence of his position as Lord Chancellor.  
However, limited more recent fieldwork with Scottish practitioners in the course of 
the present inquiry76 indicated that jurisprudentially they were not nearly as 
enthusiastic as Professor Norrie’s Commentaries suggested, whatever might be the  
- still un-researched - position of the ordinary Scot. 
 
Preliminary inquiries indicated some local plans for such research, potentially by 
Professor Elaine Sutherland, University of Sterling and Lewis & Clark Law School 
Portland, Oregon, USA,  which may obviate the need for eventual independent 
fieldwork emanating from England, failing which, despite the likely small size of 
sample, the close geographical, jurisdictional and political proximity of Scotland 
would facilitate a proportionate, and probably relatively inexpensive cost effective, 
investigation before studying a jurisdiction further afield. 
 
In Australia, where radical legislation indicates that tradition is routinely swept aside 
when contemporary demands require, similar provision was also introduced into their 
Family Law Act by legislation in 2007. Preliminary inquiries revealed the aim is to 
incorporate as many ‘un-formalised’ couples into the statutory regime as possible77.  
It appears no local plans are at present projected for more than the very limited 
existing research, but are not ruled out either, and there are also extensive travaux 
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preparatoires available: such literature is strongly recommended by Cretney 78 in his 
study of the development of legal doctrine in English Family Law statutes and case 
law, where he says ‘studies of the process of law reform can be revealing…’ and that 
‘what are sometimes dismissed as technical details influence the development of law 
and policy’79. 
 
 Given the size of Australia and the fact that the enabling Act is a federal 
Commonwealth statute, this appears a potentially productive field for research into 
the impact of their reform and one which might attract some funding if any 
researcher could assemble the resources for such a large scale study. 
 
Social acceptance in England and Wales? The Family Law Act 1996 
Nevertheless if there is any guidance in England from the experience of the original 
hostility shown to the Family Law Act 1996 Part IV - which at first was intended to 
give the same home rights protection to married and unmarried couples - there 
could, in theory, still be opposition to any scheme aligning cohabitants and married 
couples in both status and any sort of  legal framework.  Although the 2011 Census 
found the population significantly less religious then previously80, there may still be 
some strong cultural adherence to a concept of marriage distinct from cohabitation. It 
is worth recalling two instances in which the public has not, however, reacted in a 
hostile manner to fairly fundamental change of principles: the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008 and the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
While it is prudent to remember the Family Law Act 1996 experience, it is also 
equally quite possible that there would now be no opposition at all to cohabitants’ 
rights legislation, since in an equally contentious subject area some of the more 
radical provisions of this 2008 Act were passed with little media fuss, despite the 
highly radical exclusion in the Act of the need for a child to have a father - any father 
at all! -  and even allowing instead two mothers, this following the extensive human 
assisted reproduction  technologies now made possible by science. 
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Indeed the Act not only permits such a child to have only two mothers, provided the 
woman who is the ‘other parent’ accepts the agreed parenthood conditions set out in 
the Act, but this status can be registered under the Births and Deaths Registration 
Act 1953 ss 1 and 10, without any father being registered as well. That this is 
possible when the law places such importance in the Children Act 1989 ss 4, 8, 11 
and 13 on the role of the father in parental responsibility ( ‘PR’),  contact, change of 
name and removal from the jurisdiction, is a significant change in philosophy.  It 
apparently excited no public outcry even from the normally vocal fathers’ pressure 
groups, especially the more exhibitionist organisations normally providing both copy 
and photographs for the sensationalist section of the press.  
 
Compared to this, calibration of the precise degree of radical change between the 
2008 and 2013 Acts is hardly worthwhile. 
 
 In the circumstances, especially in view of the number of births registered outside 
marriage, it is possibly now accepted that cohabitation is a fact of life not worth 
comment.   Accordingly  it might be worth continuing routinely checking the 
apparently rising numbers of respondents whose positive views are recorded by 
various polls as to (a) whether this is a fact,  and (b) how it came about in a relatively 
short time since 1996. 
 
It is well known that a government cannot afford to lose touch with the values of the 
people who have elected it, and that missing the rise of new social concerns and 
shifting moral values can be fatal to re-election, regardless of what other targets 
have been addressed by any administration.   
 
In relation to (a) above, the complete absence of any significant media comment on 
the much more radical abandonment of traditional values in the 2008 Act than that 
proposed in 1996 does suggest that in 2008 the Labour government did not perceive 
any risk of significant disruption or they surely would not have sponsored such a 
statute as they did as late in their long period in office of 1997-2010.   
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In relation to (b) it may be that the public had moved on in the 12 years between the 
two statutes in 1996 and 2008, and thus dropped its hostility to any narrowing of the 
legal impact of the statuses of marriage and cohabitation:  alternatively it may only 
mean that when the 2008 Act was passed they were not listening to ,or even 
reading, the Daily Mail, which was the leading agitator in securing amendments to 
the 1996 Act.  In either case obtaining the ordinary person’s updated view on a 
formal recognition of cohabitation as a status alternative to marriage would be 
desirable, because of the fact that it is recognised that cohabitants have chosen not 
to marry when the alternative of marriage is available. Mostyn J, as early as 2003, 
when sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge before his full time appointment to the 
Bench, commented that he could  
 
‘not imagine anyone nowadays seriously stigmatising pre-marital cohabitation as 
“living in sin” nor lacking the quality of emotional commitment assumed in marriage’81  
             
This is echoed in Professor Rebecca Probert’s monograph Changing Legal 
Regulation of Cohabitation: From Fornicators to Family 82, which identified that only 
relatively recently has terminology in evidence of changing perceptions of, and 
popular attitudes to, cohabitants become more neutral and less disapproving, and 
that this also indicated changing presumptions about the character of modern society 
and the rule of law. This suggests that the significant changes are not so much the 
increase in the incidence of cohabitation, but of changed perceptions as such. 
 
Attitudes to cohabitation in other jurisdictions                                        
While Scotland and Australia provide excellent examples of such systems, there was 
very rapid positive feedback from Scotland in the 2010 Wasoff  et al research83,  and 
initial academic commentary emerging in the learned journals in Australia, the 
timescale since these two schemes’ introduction has not afforded either academe or 
the practising profession much opportunity to compare them to the statutory regime 
proposed by the Law Commission.   
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Nor is it easy to look further afield to see whether any of the ideas which appear to 
be sweeping in from overseas have imported any such broader perspectives into the 
socially acceptable foundations of English Family Law, to which the inflow has been 
at least as copious as the tide envisaged in the 1980s by Lord Denning when 
considering the impact of EU Competition Law. This is despite the influence of such 
organisations as the International Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and the 
International Bar Association.  Meanwhile Eire is reported to be considering a system 
similar to Scotland’s, although the 2015 annual Cumberland Lodge weekend of the 
Family Law Bar Association (8-10 May 2015) devoted its entire programme to cross 
border influences on English Family Law. 
 
However, in Spain where there are advanced equality ideas ensconced in the 
Constitution and the state is no longer constrained by religion as in the Franco years,  
could be the most likely candidate for fuller integration, especially as the fragmented 
independent regional government approach to the law is province based,  so that 
different provinces of Spain may make distinct local provision. Catalonia already has 
a developed statutory system for opposite sex couples, other provinces in the 
Spanish devolved government system vary, and some, such as Galicia, did not 
appear to start with to be participating at all, although now all provinces have 
legislated.   
 
Spain is one of the few European jurisdictions which already recognises gay 
marriage, which considering its religious historical background is certainly 
progressive. The King was historically, and remains today traditionally, ‘His Most 
Catholic Majesty’, a title granted by a later medieval Pope,  the monarchy is relatively 
popular under the new young King Felipe VI, and frequent (Catholic) religious 
festivals remain a core element of the country’s social and cultural life. However this 
appears in no way incompatible with their modern constitutional and practical 
equality.  Equality reform was indeed a speedy advance from the completely un-
modernised society existing at the end of the Franco regime in 1975.  
 
Spain also has a significant expatriate British population, mostly resident in the 
southern province of Andalucia. While in most cases in the past Spanish Family Law 
did not apply to them, since the civil law system in place in Spain indicated that in the 
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case of litigation in any province by those expatriates in Family Law matters, the 
foreign Law dictated by their nationality would apply, although procedure remained 
that of the forum and would be Spanish.  This was because Spanish law does not 
recognise the concept of English, or other, expatriates’ domicile in Spain in the way 
that English law recognises their domicile there for other purposes such as UK 
taxation. However this governing law position has now changed since the 
implementation of the 1996 Hague Convention on Applicable Law substitutes 
Spanish law in respect of cases involving children and enforcement of decisions 
involving them and also in some unrelated cases involving foreign nationals resident 
in Spain.  This means that Spanish law may now govern, which can be particularly 
confusing because the different provinces may take different perspectives. 
 
Overseas systems and professional attitudes in England and Wales 
Regardless of templates overseas but no actual English legislation, the change over 
time in the legal profession’s approach to a cohabitants’ regime is significant, as 
reviewed by Probert in her monograph.  The Solicitors Family Law Association 
(‘Resolution’) for example, has long proposed a detailed scheme for closely aligning 
cohabitation and marriage which is supported by the Law Society Family Committee 
though they too have produced their own proposals, although neither scheme has 
progressed.  
 
The cross border implications of English Law’s lack of a legislative regime for 
opposite sex cohabitants is obviously routinely before practitioners in English and 
Wales since the entire topic keeps appearing, and one potential concern of theirs 
might naturally be that, if there should at last be a normative scheme for cohabitants 
in English law, where this would leave same-sex cohabitants not in civil partnership 
and would this affect the children of such relationships, if at all?   
 
The answer to this is clearly that discrimination should not be supported and that 
same-sex cohabitants not registered as civil partners would necessarily have to be 
included in the definition of ‘cohabitants’ or it would not be fair to make changes for 
opposite-sex cohabitants alone, despite the fact that the government when enacting 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004 expressly left out opposite-sex cohabitants since they 
took the view that they had the option of the existing status of marriage.  This was 
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formally set out  in the accompanying policy statement, when introducing the 
proposed Bill, by the DTI Equality Unit  in 200384 although Lord Lester’s failed Civil 
Partnership Bill in 2002 would have provided for opposite- sex cohabitants, as 
Diduck and Kaganas85  comment. 
 
In regard to children, child issues have been separated from those concerning adults 
for many years - since at least the enactment of the Children Act 1989 - and it seems 
obvious that there would be no change in relation to them because of a change in 
status of their parents. The most telling example is in the HFEA 2008 and the Births 
and Deaths Registration Act 1953, whereby the status of parent given to same-sex 
parents when human assisted reproduction methods are used for such couples to 
have children by HAR, simply deals with the adults’ parenting rights and obligations 
and makes no changes in respect of the children whether the parents are married or 
not. 
 
However there might be some psychological impact because not all cohabitants who 
would be affected comprise a standard heterosexual couple who have simply chosen 
not to get married: the most recent human assisted reproduction statute, the HFEA 
2008, has enabled the creation of some very atypical parents There is little work at 
present on this aspect of the impact on children of the atypical families now created 
following the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the HFEA 2008, although at least 
two academics, including a medical ethicist  at the University of East Anglia and the 
former Chair of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority,  specialise in this 
area86 .    
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Is there therefore a case to say that it is time (at last) to formalise the law 
relating to cohabitation in English Law?   
This question has been proactively asked by English commentators over at least the 
last two decades, and on which tentative schemes have been built by academics 
whose field of study it was.  All have generally pressed for articulation of the rights 
and responsibilities involved in such a partnering, but without significant progress 
being made in acceptance of the principles, and still less in achieving legislation,  
while occasional Bills in Parliament have failed before reaching the statute book. 
There has been one consistently hostile commentator; Professor Ruth Deech whose 
commentary effectively began in a paper for the conference of the International 
Society of Family Law in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1979 and has continued through to 
her more recent Gresham College lectures as Gresham Professor of Family Law.87  
   
The underlying theory of this topic, arguably as compelling as the practical and policy 
pressures for introduction of a discrete cohabitants’ rights regime,  and the polarised 
views generated at various times, are initially therefore probably best addressed in a 
doctrinal literature review, for which see Chapter 3. Nevertheless, arguably there is 
at least prima facie justification to reopen an investigation into the potential for such 
a reform, which would make a significant contribution to English Family law, in which 
all the issues mentioned in the above sections of this initial scoping will be explored 
further in subsequent chapters, with a view to establishing that there is a place for a 
discrete normative regime for cohabitants in English Law.
																																								 																				
87 Ruth Deech ‘The Case Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation’ (1980) 29 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, pp 480-497; Ruth Deech, ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law p.39, 
2009-10 Gresham Lectures, www.gresham.ac.uk 
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Chapter 2:  Methodology 
 
Introduction  
This chapter considers the appropriate methodology for the project. 
 
A preliminary survey of material available for the literature review scheduled for 
Chapter 3 suggests that the essential methodology can only be socio-legal, 
embodying the social constructive approach identified by Hart88 and to a great extent 
based in the library.  A great deal of useful work has been done by specialist 
commentators in this field, much of which is still valid even if some is not recent.  
Besides the core theme of functionality, this huge literature addresses amongst other 
themes the underlying theory  which Hart recognises as transforming some moral 
principles into law, which is put another way by Maine89 who recognised that the 
origins of most normative regimes were social before being reduced to formal rules, 
rather than the other way around.  
 
Without going inappropriately deeply into legal theory for the present purpose, this 
recognition of self- developing norms is vital in the context of the instant project since 
it means that the function analysis of cohabitation actually has a valid practical 
foundation in socio-legal theory, a conclusion which has become clear in Chapter 1: 
but has apparently completely escaped three successive governments which might 
have long since legislated for cohabitants’ rights if the matter had been seriously 
considered even as far as the practical political and economic benefits.  This 
theoretical foundation is important in view of the historic context of the long struggle 
of such commentators to obtain some recognition for the concept of cohabitants’ 
rights, which has been repeatedly argued for and supported through research by 
Barlow and her various team members who have often worked with her on extended 
																																								 																				
88 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd edn, OUP, 2012. 
89 Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, 1st edn 1861, reprinted with an introduction by F Pollock, John 
Murray, 1908. 
  
 
64 
projects 90 as well as where she has worked with others,  such as in the Cooke led 
Nuffield Foundation  project which specifically proposed a Regime for England and 
Wales  in their 2006 Report 91.  
 
At the forefront of the literature must be the 2006-7 work of the Law Commission92 
which will be singled out for separate evaluation in Chapter 4, since while there is 
still much of relevance to be found in their two reports, there are obvious important 
omissions, one of which is the subject of Chapter 5, which considers the positive 
choice which is apparently being made between marriage and cohabitation, an issue 
which is barely touched on in the Commission’s reports. In particular some further 
consideration seems required of the reasons for the contemporary range of choices 
between marriage, civil partnership or cohabitation, now that same-sex marriage is 
an option but opposite sex registered civil partnership is not,; and also of the role that 
religion or other traditional influences might (or might not) now play in England and 
Wales,  in distinguishing marriage and civil partnership on the one hand and 
cohabitation on the other.    
 
Some comparative evaluation must then be undertaken of the schemes now already 
operational, and apparently well established, in the other jurisdictions identified as 
likely to be helpful to consideration of a scheme for English law, and this will be 
undertaken in Chapters 6-8. Following this some discussion is to be embarked upon 
with representative practitioners both in England and in those jurisdictions which, it is 
considered, can only be of assistance in identifying the frameworks with potential to 
																																								 																				
90	Anne	Barlow and Craig Lind ‘A Matter of Trust’, 19(4) (1999) Legal Studies 468, p 469-47; 
Anne Barlow and Simon Duncan’ New Labour’s Communitarianism: supporting families and rationality 
Part II’ (2000) The Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 129, pp. 134-139; Anne Barlow 
‘Regulation of cohabitation, changing family policies and social attitudes: A discussion of Britain within 
Europe’, (2004) 26 Law and Policy 57-86, at pp. 58-9; Anne Barlow and Geraldine James, ‘Regulating 
Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain’, (2004) 67(2) Modern Law Review, pp. 143-176; 
Anne Barlow ‘Cohabitation law reform   - Messages from research (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies, 
pp, 167-180; Anne Barlow ‘Cohabiting relationships, money and property: the legal backdrop’, (2008) 
37 Journal of socio-economics, pp.502-518; Anne Barlow and Janet Smithson ‘Legal assumptions, 
cohabitants' talk and the rocky road to reform’, (2010) 22 Child and Family Law Quarterly, pp. 328-
350. 
91 Elizabeth Cooke, Anne Barlow and Therese Callus, Community of Property: A Regime for England 
and Wales, Nuffield Foundation, 2006. 
92 Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown, A 
Consultation Paper, No 179, HMSO, 2006; Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of 
Relationship Breakdown, Final Report, No 307, HMSO, 2007. 
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be successful for England and Wales.  The results of this detailed empirical work will 
be found largely in Chapter 9, following up on the schematic outlines in Chapters  
6-893 already dedicated to each of the jurisdictions selected for comparison.  Were 
this resultant small scale research to show the potential viability of such a scheme in 
England and Wales, the contribution to be made by the present report would speak 
for itself as being of benefit to English Law, which is clearly at present conspicuously 
lacking compared to what has already been achieved by Scotland and is now 
apparently even planned by Eire. With this in mind a suggested draft Bill will be 
found in the Appendices. 
 
For the reasons set out above there is a clear case for evaluation of the two similar 
single jurisdictions cohabitants’ schemes already in existence in Scotland and New 
Zealand, also consideration of the longest established Commonwealth schemes of 
Australia (where regimes began at state level in the 1980s), and of the civil law 
scheme in the UK’s fellow EU member state of Spain.    
 
Some direct fieldwork also appears desirable in all these investigations, to flesh out 
analysis of the existing corpus of literature which is not confined to England Wales 
alone, and which appears to some extent to have turned round the anti-parity lobby 
of the 1980s and of the Law Commission’s 2006-2007 work.  However such 
preliminary scoping work as has been undertaken on the very large corpus of 
literature indicates that the wide differences of opinion in the literature, which are 
spread over a long period of study, indicate that there is often a different perspective 
available from even limited fieldwork with practitioners at the coalface, since as Lord 
Justice Sachs commented half a century ago ‘the law is a living thing moving with 
the times and not a creature of dead or moribund ways of thought’94. 
 
In this connection, the literature has fallen to a trickle in recent times, despite the 
plentiful legislation in favour of other, smaller, constituencies than that of the 
apparently flourishing new unmarried family unit of cohabitants, although an 
																																								 																				
93 Chapters 6 (Scotland), 7 (Spain) and 8 (Australia and New Zealand). 
94 Porter v Porter [1969] 3 All ER 640. 
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occasional article still appears periodically, either from an academic source95, or 
more often from specialist practitioners96. 
 
 As Coleridge J commented in his address to Jordan’s annual Family Law 
conference in October 2013 
 
‘attempts at refining the law relating to the property rights of unmarried partners were 
side lined while results of studies in Scotland were gathered and considered, with the result 
that it has disappeared off the radar and in reality shows little signs of  re-emerging’.  
 
He added  
 
‘This unreformed area of Family Law can be very harsh and unfair. No one is  
suggesting that cohabitants should be given equivalent rights to married couples but there is 
a happy medium between full post -divorce provision and nil...the distinction is recognised in 
the case of widows and non-married cohabitants in the case of the 1975 Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act which drew the subtle distinction’. 
 
This comment is the more powerful as Sir Paul Coleridge, founder of the Marriage 
Foundation, is well known to be in favour of marriage, but has not been blinded to 
the need for cohabitation reform, despite the Marriage Foundation’s  2013-14 
research programme finding that cohabiting relationships were four time more likely 
to break up than marriages . 
 
 
He went on to say: 
 
‘I suggest we need proper research, possibly research based, grown up discussion,  
and then legislation informed by 45 years of experience and social change. We can get it 
right with little effort ... So what it all comes to is, as the judges have repeatedly said, these 
areas need urgent and in depth legislative reform... the noble attempts by the Court of 
																																								 																				
95 Simone Wong ‘Shared commitment, interdependency and property relations: a socio-legal project 
for cohabitation, (2012) 24 Child and Family Law Quarterly p60. 
96 Harrison-Drury blog, www.harrison-drury.com, on the website of these specialist Northern family 
solicitors, has continuing articles on cohabitation, last accessed   29 November 2015; Graeme 
Fraser, ‘The government must support cohabitation reform’, NLJ, 22 January 2015. (This author is 
Resolution’s spokesperson on cohabitation reform). 
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Appeal and House of Lords, and more recently by the Supreme Court to put a new 
supercharged engine into the old chassis may be creative and,  as a temporary measure,  
better than nothing, but they are no substitute for modern, relevant, and easily understood 
legislation, which does not call for endless recourse to hundreds of pages of interpreted 
precedent. Surely too the endless reliance on the medieval concept of the implied trust has 
gone on long enough and as far as it should.  When the highest court in the land has again 
and again to resort to complex trust law to fill the gap to achieve justice in the field of family 
law it is the clearest possible indication that the legislation is out of date and the legislature 
has not done its job.  They (the courts) did it in the 1960s in cases like Gissing and Pettitt.. to 
give married women rights before the 1970 reforms, then Parliament acted. They did it again 
in 1985 with pensions in Brookes to enable wives to share in the pension funds of their 
husbands, until the legislature finally acted to give the courts power to redistribute pension 
rights.  They have been using it in the TOLATA litigation to ensure that a deserving 
cohabitant does not depart with nothing...’97 
 
Although there are many other reasons why a clear exposition of cohabitants’ rights 
would be beneficial, a short quotation from Stack v Dowden in the Court of Appeal 
makes clearer than any possible further critique of the present situation in which 
cohabitants’  must use TOLATA,  precisely why the Chancery Division might find a 
rationale for passing cohabitants over to the Family Court:  
 
As Carnwath LJ as he then was (now Lord Carnwath in the Supreme Court) said 
when commenting on the TOLATA methodology in cohabitants’ rights cases: 
 
‘...To the detached observer, the result may seem like a witches’ brew, in to which various 
esoteric ingredients have been stirred over the years,  in which different ideas bubble to the 
surface at various times. They include implied trust, constructive trust, resulting trust, 
presumption of advancement, proprietary estoppels, unjust enrichment and so on. These 
ideas are likely to mean nothing to laymen, and often little more to the lawyers who use 
them.  Underlying the apparent confusion is a range of conflicting policy factors which can 
validly be used to support different ideas...’98 
 
																																								 																				
97Sir Paul Coleridge, ‘ Lobbing a Few Pebbles in the Pond. The Funeral of a Dead Parrot’, address to 
Jordans Annual Family Law Conference, 9 October 2013, www.marriagefoundation.org.uk. 
 
98 Stack v Dowden [2005] EWCA Civ 857, per Carnwath LJ [75]. 
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However, while it is all very well to recognise that reform is needed, since 
cohabitation is not a family form which is recognised by the law, at present the 
English Legal System is in the same position as the ‘pregnant widow’ identified by 
Amis99 in his (apparently autobiographical) novel of the same name which, reflecting 
his theme, deals with change in social relationships since the 1960s, and in which he 
quotes Alexander Herzen100: 
 
 ‘The death of the contemporary forms of social order ought to gladden rather than  
              trouble the soul. Yet what is frightening is that what the departing world leaves 
              behind is not an heir, but a pregnant widow.  Between the death of the one and the 
              birth of the other much water will flow by, a long night of chaos and desolation will 
              pass.’ 
 
It is difficult to describe the present situation of the long hoped for cohabitants’ 
normative regime in English law more graphically, since such a discrete legal regime 
as seems required is arguably both probably appropriate and actually necessary to 
reflect society’s changes at a time when the modernisation of Family Law and the 
new Family Court is itself in full flood.   
 
On the other hand that specific drive for cohabitants’ rights reform has been in 
process for such a long time in its own transitional ’long night of chaos’,  which is 
coincidentally such an apt description of the social change which has been its  own 
background,  and which has evolved without any corresponding reform of the 
associated law.  It is therefore this long evolution which so clearly indicates the 
necessity of at least some limited fieldwork in the jurisdictions which appear 
successfully to have taken the plunge in introducing legislation, so as to provide 
some practical focus, and indeed some conclusions as to whether their innovation 
might be said to have been reckless – and a warning to English law not to follow 
without further consideration - or inspired, and therefore a helpful guide.  
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
99 Martin Amis, The Pregnant Widow, Jonathan Cape, 2010. 
100 Alexander Herzen, My Past and Thoughts, new edition California Press, 1992. 
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A plan for the fieldwork 
In view of the difficulties in lining up suitable consultees in each of the distant 
jurisdictions, and in particular because of the inevitable time and distance hurdles to 
be overcome, it was decided first to draw up a master background questionnaire to 
send ahead by email, which received ethical clearance from LJMU’s Research 
Ethics Committee and this is included in the Appendices.  This questionnaire was 
adapted as necessary for national reasons, for example,  where the breakdown of 
types of lawyers’ firms in England and Wales included standard City/West End, 
regional etc and other obviously English & Welsh distinctions, this was adapted to 
reflect roughly equivalent but  nationally distinct categories:  such as in Scotland, 
Edinburgh/Glasgow/other city and rural locations; in Spain Madrid/Barcelona, 
mainland/Canaries provincial locations; and in New Zealand and Australia similar 
urban, rural and more remote locations. 
 
The aim was to make use of qualitative research’s facility to obtain detailed insight 
into individuals’  experiences, and thus to conduct qualitative interviews with family 
professionals, but where possible to contrast their responses with those of 
academics both in person and from within the literature, since past experience has 
shown that these two resources do not always match.  This steer was obtained from 
an earlier project in New Zealand conducted by George in relation to Relocation, on 
which he reported at the second international conference of the Centre for Family 
Law and Practice at London Metropolitan University in July 2013, and later wrote up 
his definitive account101, identifying the qualitative research employed as ‘a 
systematic, rigorous and theoretically sound method for investigating and 
understanding the social world’ which he further approved  as ‘grounded in the 
interpretative tradition’ as ‘flexible and sensitive to the social context in which the 
data is produced’102 .   
 
																																								 																				
101 Rob George, Relocation Disputes, Law and Practice in England and New Zealand, Hart, 2014.  
102 George relied heavily on Carol Smart, Bren Neale and Amanda Wade, The Changing Experience 
of Childhood, Polity Press, 2001, pp 174-175, and Jennifer Mason, Qualitative Researching, Sage. 
1996, for these views in relation to his own New Zealand researches, which seemed a useful 
precedent since, like his study the present one aimed to look only at the experiences and views of 
legal practitioners so as to capture what was happening in their practices following the introduction of 
their respective legislation. 
  
 
70 
Selection of the consultees was next considered and a relatively easy process 
identified since in Scotland the legal profession is small and largely concentrated on 
Edinburgh and Glasgow.  Thus a selection of any mainstream practitioner(s) would 
necessarily include the input of others since experience is thus inevitably regularly 
and routinely shared.  In Spain anything like comprehensive regional experience was 
a hopeless goal owing to the differing local cultures and detailed legislation based on 
the local provincial government system; thus in that case,  concentration on the 
predominantly English settled area of Andalucia ,  was the obvious choice, in view of  
its local Anglo-Spanish lawyers,  who however have a national and international 
reach.  In New Zealand the small scale of the single jurisdiction and small population 
spread over the two islands, but with the main legal centre in Wellington,  also 
concentrated attention in the South; while in the vast expanse of  Australia the 
choice was so large that most reliance was placed on those academics and 
practitioners who regularly travel to Europe and worldwide for conferences and 
contribute to the International Survey of Family Law.  
 
For England and Wales, practitioners were selected from the Central London Family 
Law area around the Royal Court of Justice and eastwards towards the City,  but 
excluding the big City commercial firms which do not do much Family work, the 
‘West End’ firms who work from slightly less prestigious locations, and some regional 
firms, all of whom belonged to Resolution and subscribe to its Code and values.     
 
Participants were to be initially contacted by email in the form of the sample letter 
approved by the Ethics Committee, which explained that participation would be 
anonymous and that nothing would be included which might identify them, and that 
they  were then to be sent the master questionnaire, adapted appropriately where 
necessary,  as set out above, and the standard informed consent form.  
 
The full complement of eventual interviewees aimed for an equal number of 
academics and practitioners from each jurisdiction studied and information gathered 
was scheduled to be set out in both the individual Chapters 6-8 and in the 
conclusions of Chapter 9.   All interviews were scheduled to be conducted between 
2012 and 2014, recorded, transcribed and anonymised, and to last for varying times 
between half an hour and an hour and a half, although sometimes followed up by 
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longer email comment from interviewees, where this was suggested either by time 
and distance difficulties or by some particular factor which indicated this suitability.   . 
 
It was realised that analysis of the interviews was likely to be driven very much by 
the content of the interviewees’ own material which emerged through the semi-
structured interviews planned, although it was assumed that common themes would 
emerge, since the interviews were driven by the standard questionnaires. 
 
Projected conclusions on analysis of the interview data and comparison with 
the literature review leading to possible suggested draft legislation 
 
It was appreciated that comparison must then be made between the conclusions 
posited by the literature and the practical results of the fieldwork interviews which it 
was realised were likely to be particularly informative, since it is trite that academic 
and practitioner analysis do not always coincide,  so that such a reality test is highly 
desirable.  Should these two processes (as was hoped) show a viable way forward, 
a potential final outcome aimed for draft legislation.   
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to examine selected academic and practitioner 
contributions to the literature on the developing cohabitation trend, which began to 
be recognised in practice in the late 1970s103.  This was followed in succeeding 
decades by extended commentary in the debate on whether this social trend should 
be recognised in a formalised legislative regime for unmarried cohabitants.  The 
chapter critically reviews the most significant themes which have emerged,   
with the principal aim of highlighting those ideas which, while originally of their time, 
still have contemporary relevance, albeit sometimes potentially in a slightly different  
manner from that initially intended. 
 
A secondary aim is to select from the prolific output those arguments which might 
support and dovetail with, rather than merely to run alongside, contemporary 
pressure towards incorporation of modern themes of equality and human rights 
which have been developing Family Law in modern times; also to look for key 
underlying theory and if possible to identify sound reasons for cohabitants to be 
treated as part of the family rather than as outsiders, and in some way inferior. The 
main reason emerging from the leading commentators appears to be the 
functionality argument, early adopted and maintained by Barlow104 and later taken up 
by Cooke105 without much attention being paid to any theoretical arguments for 
protecting cohabitation as an alternative to marriage and registered civil 
partnership106. 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
103 Ruth Deech,‘The case against legal recognition of cohabitation’, (1980) 29 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, pp 480-497. 
104 Anne Barlow and Craig Lind, ‘A Matter of Trust’(1999) 19(4) Legal Studies 468, pp 469-475. 
105 Elizabeth Cooke, Anne Barlow and Therese Callus, Community of Property: A Regime for England 
and Wales Nuffield Foundation, 2006, 
106 This aspect is explored further in Chapter 5 which looks at the potential reasons for couples’ 
choosing cohabitation over other possible relationships which would impart legal status. 
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The corpus of literature: 1980-2015   
 
A substantial body of literature has been accumulated on cohabitation, of which the 
Law Commission’s 2006-7 work examined a portion of the most significant for their 
purposes.  
 
However, the impact of this substantial academic and practitioner contribution has 
apparently been such that its effectiveness in practice appears to be in inverse 
proportion both to its bulk and its persistence over a lengthy period of time. Thus 
some key contributions must now be selected for contemporary relevance, as the 
Law Commission did in 2006, since - like most long running lobbying campaigns - 
the nature of the debate has changed over time.  Unfortunately, in the case of 
cohabitation, this has culminated in nothing being done at all to advance any of the 
sometimes powerful arguments by achieving the practical outcome of legislation.  
 
Nevertheless, there has been some advance in case law, since as noted by Sir Paul 
Coleridge when addressing Jordan’s annual Family Law Conference in 2013107  the 
Supreme Court has been obliged, in the absence of missed opportunities for primary 
legislation, to adapt and clarify existing principles of English law which assist 
cohabitants’ property rights, as set out in the judgment of Baroness Hale in the 
Supreme Court in the Scottish appeal of Gow v Grant (2012), and further supported 
by similar statements in those of her brethren in that case.  
 
This review of the literature could  therefore inevitably not be entirely comprehensive, 
since there is now so much of it that, as when selecting cases, some will inevitably 
be classified as only further exemplars of principles already discussed or points 
already substantially taken.   
 
Selecting the key literature on cohabitation 
 
It is of course yesterday’s news that looking for underlying theories in contemporary 
Family law is not unlike looking for a needle in a haystack, since much of the 
																																								 																				
107‘ Lobbing a Few Pebbles in the Pond: The Funeral of A Dead Parrot’, annual Family Law 
Conference 9 October 2013, www.marriagefoundation.org.uk;  
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development of the common law is incremental with little regard for the codification 
found in civil law jurisdictions:  in this, cohabitation is no different from any other 
mainstream family topic, although perhaps more notoriously debated without 
apparent impact than in the case of some other such mainstream topics.  Moreover 
this particular debate has stretched out over a period in which several governments - 
- any of which could have implemented family specialist recommendations from both 
academe and practice in relation to cohabitation - have not given the matter priority, 
although is fair to say that there have been historic hurdles to law reform in the field 
of cohabitants’ rights dating even from before the Family Law Act 1996.     
 
The contemporary couple/family relationship and its incidences - partnership status, 
property and responsibility for children - have not attracted the sort of theoretical 
analysis beloved of the continental academic.   The creation of a framework of 
normative legal rules to protect cohabitants’ rights is not a project that has claimed 
instant recognition as the core of a corpus of new principles which must be 
enshrined in legislation either urgently or at all.   In this respect cohabitation has 
apparently had an unfair deal since that has not been a fate which has necessarily 
hindered either initial or amending legislation in other Family law fields which were 
arguably neither as pressing, although they might not have been as apparently 
controversial. 
. 
The starting point for a search for doctrinal influences on the development of 
contemporary family law, is therefore, according to Cretney108, existing English 
statute and case law and a study of the processes which led to change in the law in 
the twentieth century, and not a study of the social and economic forces which 
influence attitudes towards legislation and legal practice, although he does allow that 
‘the process of law reforming can be revealing’.  
 
In his seminal history of the development of Family law  - a discipline which was said 
by Lord Shawcross as late as 1947,  to be ‘a very simple branch of the law’ which 
required ‘no study or thought at all’ - ` Cretney considers that officials in government 
departments and parliamentary counsel have great influence on law reform and that 
it is therefore worth studying unpublished papers and archival sources, including 
																																								 																				
108 Stephen Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century, OUP, 2003, Preface, pvii. 
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studies on the working of the legal system, in order to trace the path of reform and 
perhaps to articulate what he calls the ‘fundamental characteristics’ of English Family 
law, since it seems that Family law in England Wales does have such 
characteristics, even if it does not have either underlying theory or much of  a  
normative framework . 
 
However, not much theory or framework seems to have applied to cohabitation, 
although one class of such literature, of influence in its time in generating initial 
academic interest in cohabitation, but which is probably of little contemporary use, is 
the early statistical work of commentators such as Kiernan109  and John Haskey, until 
recently Head of the Population and Demography Unit of the Office of National 
Statistics.  This is because of the conclusion set out in Chapter 1 that numbers are 
not logically  a key driver for reform in the cohabitants’ normative regime context, so 
that only the existence of the trend and identification of its continuing upward sweep  
- which is supported by figures -  is still of interest in relation to the literature.     
 
Although it is without doubt that cohabitant families now form a significant part of the 
population, there is some confusion as to their precise position in the statistical 
pattern of relationships, owing to the way in which the Office of National Statistics’ 
Families and Households tables and periodic bulletins are sourced and structured.  
As a result, it seems to be not simply a temptation to take the easy way out,  if one 
skates straight over the contribution of both the Office of National Statistics and the 
commentators on their various published figures, since there appears to be little 
coherence in their present day approach to documenting what cohabitants are doing 
and why.  This is not least as the latest interest in cohabitation versus marriage 
appears to be only in the numbers of registered civil partners who have upgraded to 
full marriage, which does not help to sharpen the longstanding ‘fuzziness’ of the data 
on un-formalised cohabitation as such, because those registered civil partners 
already had the benefit of a recognised legal regime. 
																																								 																				
109		Kathleen Kiernan,‘The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western 
Europe’ (2001) 15 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family p1; Kathleen Kiernan and Kate  
Smith ’Unmarried Parenthood: new insights from the Millenium Cohort Study’,  (2003)114 Population 
Trends 26, figure 1; 
Kathleen Kiernan ‘Unmarried Cohabitation and Parenthood in Europe’ (2004) 26 Law and Policy 
33,p.40, figure 2.  
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Making sense of relevant contemporary cohabitation figures 
 
Statistics released following the 2011 Census certainly show that married couples 
are now in a minority. In the married age groups - that is, those old enough to be 
married - numbers had slipped to 47% of the population, although in London, for 
example, only one third of the population was married110. However then the picture 
becomes more confusing, , as one reason for the low married numbers is the steep 
rise in the numbers of single person households and because of the 105,000 
registered civil partnerships apparently identified at that time.  More confusingly, this 
also does not seem to fit with the averages consistently claimed that registered civil 
partnerships have been taking place at a rate of approximately 6,000 per year since 
the implementation of the 2004 Act in 2005.  
 
Statistics that are a little more helpful are the Office of National Statistics releases of 
January and November 2015, which certainly do support the current trend towards a 
preference for cohabitation over marriage. For example, the table Families and 
Households 2014, released on 28 January 2015 shows that at that date cohabitant 
families had increased by a fraction under 30% in the period 2004-2014, making 
them now the fastest growing family form within the 18.6m UK families, of which 3m 
were identified as opposite sex cohabiting couples’ families and 84,000 same-sex 
cohabitant families as compared with 12.5m married couples’ families overall.  
However these figures did not separate out age groups which appear to be of key 
relevance to the trend identified. 
 
The equivalent Table for 2015, released in the Bulletin of 5 November 2015, 
presents a picture which is a degree more helpful than the earlier release - although 
still far from clear in attempting to discern how the trend towards cohabitation is 
actually working. This is because the tables now include marriage and registered 
civil partnership figures as a sole category, giving a figure of 12.5m families in this 
class with a slightly raised figure of 3.2m opposite sex ‘cohabitant’ families out of a 
total of 18.7m families – although this at least separates out the un-formalised 
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cohabitants of both same and opposite sex unions and does show who precisely is 
still without recourse to some legally recognised normative regime.  
 
This most recent statistical exercise has, nevertheless, concerned two particular 
pressure groups whose aims are to support family stability, one of them, in particular, 
specifically aiming to support marriage. This latter group is the Marriage Foundation 
which has identified that while at the present time 90% of 60 year olds have been 
married at some stage, at most only 50% of today’s young adults are likely to be so, 
and that divorce is currently highest in the age group 50-64; while other figures111 
indicate a 25% increase in marriages of the over 65s, whether divorced, widowed, or 
previously single. The second group is the Equal Civil Partnerships for All campaign, 
which considers that the marriage figures generally could be improved if opposite 
sex civil partnerships  were permitted,  as this has been the experience of other 
jurisdictions112.   
 
Leaving aside the surge in the 65+ age group, marriage figures for all ages in the last 
few years appear to have hovered at around a quarter of a million a year with 
apparent slight rises, for example increasing by 5% in 2012 to 262,000, although in 
reality this is  a net fall, owing to the increase in overall population figures.  At the 
same period cohabiting family formation has been a galloping trend, suggesting that 
the literature needs to be reviewed in relation to the function of cohabitation and any 
law reform taken from that point. 
 
Key themes of the post millennium literature 
 
It therefore seems that much literature of the past 40 years will be of limited use in 
looking for such underlying theory as it is unlikely to relate effectively to 
contemporary cohabitation which, if one pursues the social constructivist path to 
enlightenment, now ought to claim some space in a reform programme to bring the 
law up to date, so that it matches and serves current social and economic conditions.   
 
																																								 																				
111 The Observer, 15 June 2014 based on ONS figures for 2011-12. 
112 This will be followed up in Chapter 5 which basically considers the choice between marriage and 
cohabitation but in which the extension of civil partnership should perhaps have a place.  
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Nevertheless, there are some useful contemporary pointers, starting with the Family 
and Parenting Institute, the Centre for Social Justice and the Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, Essex University, which all provide useful data in assessing the 
likely form of the family of the future based on current attitudes.  Baroness Deech of 
Cumnor, who has always been and remains against legislating for cohabitants’ 
rights,  has not been afraid to draw on these sources to show that the sharp decline 
in divorce decrees is because of the rise of cohabitation from which it is much easier 
to emerge if a relationship breaks down.  As a result she considers that there is no 
need to reform divorce law as this would only push the statistics up even higher, but 
that different methods are required to service the contemporary family unit more 
appropriately113.  
 
Meanwhile there is in fact some still potentially useful literature, especially where 
based on empirical studies, which could  be analysed in order to ascertain what, if 
any, useful macro- or micro-level work has been done in the past 40 years to look 
individually at the four broad family groupings which society now appears to favour – 
marriage, for both opposite- and same-sexes;  opposite-sex cohabitation; registered 
civil partnership and informal same-sex cohabitation:  and then to draw broad brush 
conclusions as to the requirements of contemporary family law.    
 
In the circumstances it must first be asked whether it is worth dissecting all the 
history, when it has been only relatively recently that serious attention has been 
devoted to cohabitants.  However, given the clear numbers of cohabitants that have 
been emerging from the Office of National Statistics114, it would appear that it surely 
cannot still be argued that some sort of norm cannot at last be created in which 
cohabitant families can be recognised.  While much of what has been written in the 
past is now out of date, because, some of the earliest are surprisingly in tune with 
contemporary trends. For example,  one of the leading original mid-1990s academic 
and practitioner monographs115 sought to argue support for the function element of 
																																								 																				
113 Ruth Deech, 2009-10 Gresham Lectures, ‘Cohabitation’, www.gresham.ac.uk,  reprinted in (2010) 
40 Family Law, p39. 
114 See Chapter 1 and above. 
115 John Dewar and Stephen Parker, Cohabitants, 4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell,1995. 
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cohabitation, an analysis since firmly taken up and established by Barlow et al116  
and Cooke et al117, regardless of the fact that the cohabitants’ constituency still has 
no discrete legal regime.  In this context, perusal of the bibliography of  the extended 
literature quickly establishes that the  ‘numbers’ element is such that they are only 
peripherally important, since the various historic and contemporary drivers appear to 
be culture, ideas, concepts, perceptions and other influences. This is not really 
surprising since while cohabitation numbers have steadily risen, as has the 
numerical population though not in proportion, ideas and other influences have 
changed, not least because of the changing composition of that population. 
 
Dewar & Parker’s early work, emanating from this very productive partnership of a 
leading academic and leading practitioner, and obviously aimed primarily as a book 
for practitioners, did nevertheless attempt to look at the underlying theory, which 
practitioners inevitably require for persuasive argument in court – in this case the 
identification in cohabitation of a similar function to marriage in establishing a family 
format as well as an intimate relationship.   
 
The function argument is, nevertheless, separately important since it is trite that 
Maine’s discovery of the fundamental truth of law making in his respected classic 
19th century text Ancient Law is that law has historically only made rules for societies 
which have already in practice created them118 so that early identification of the 
function element of cohabitation is notable . In other words, if it is unarguable that  
there was already a normative role for cohabitation identified by the early academic 
commentators, which was also taken up by other,  later, English based academics 
after it seems much of the literature began: this is paralleled in other cases in Family 
Law, for example in Australia.  It therefore seems that any arguments against the 
factual establishment of a normative function for cohabitation are now superfluous: 
																																								 																				
116	Barlow, Anne (2004), ‘Regulation of cohabitation, changing family policies and social attitudes: A 
discussion of Britain within Europe’, 26 Law and Policy 57, at pp. 58-9. Anne Barlow and Geraldine 
James ‘Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain’, (2004) 67(2) Modern Law 
Review, pp. 143-176; Anne Barlow ‘Regulation of Cohabitation, Changing Family Policies and Social 
Attitudes: a Discussion of Britain within Europe ’(2004) 26 Law and Policy, pp. 57-86; Anne Barlow, 
‘Cohabitation law reform - Messages from research’  (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies, pp, 167-180; 
Anne Barlow,  ‘Cohabiting relationships, money and property: the legal backdrop’,  (2008) 37 Journal 
of socio-economics, pp.502-518. 
117 Elizabeth Cooke, Anne Barlow and Therese Callus, Community of Property: A Regime for England 
and Wales, Nuffield Foundation, 2006. 
118 Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, 1861, John Murray and reprint 1908 with a foreword by F Pollock. 
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what is thus missing if Maine’s approach is followed is a normative legislative 
scheme to complement the social function. 
 
For this inquiry it is not, therefore, intended to include a timeline survey which would 
be disproportionate, but to select those contributions to the doctrinal debate which 
appear to remain most relevant to the contemporary context, with such evolutionary 
background as is strictly necessary.  Earliest comment in fact more often includes 
key contributions from the judiciary in decided cases than from academe, especially 
before academic comment began to develop in this field, because in the early days 
of doctrinal development, the primary source of case law – the judiciary - was the 
most reliable, although continuing evolution of family law also draws some backward 
looking reflections119.   
  
The salient points appear to fall into the following five categories:  
 
(a) the historical background 
(b) underlying theories on the distinction between marriage and cohabiting 
relationships   
(c) the contemporary basis and relevance of the choice to cohabit rather than marry  
(d) indications that there should be a formal status and legal regime for cohabitants 
as a recognised family unit, and  
(e) more detailed schemes for the introduction of a discrete legal regime for this 
contemporary social norm. 
 
(a) Historical background 
Cohabitation without marriage is not new: it existed in ancient times including in 
Greece120 and Rome121 and throughout the Middle Ages. Its longstanding existence 
was probably originally responsible for the modern myth of common law marriage: 
the only aspect that is genuinely ‘new’ is the escalation of cohabitation without 
marriage in the latter half of the 20th century when  - at least in theory -  it apparently 
became socially and legally acceptable to cohabit rather than to marry: or at least as 
																																								 																				
119 Gillian Douglas and Nigel Lowe, The Continuing Evolution of Family Law, Hart, 2007. 
120  A R W Harrison, The Law of Athens: The Family and Property,  Clarendon Press, pp 13-15, 1968. 
121 Susan Treggiari, Roman Marriage: Iusti Conuiges from the time of Cicero to the time of Ulpian, 
Clarendon Press, 1994. 
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long as the status of cohabitation and that of marriage was distinct, because the 
literature of those past decades is often hostile in tone to cohabitation as a potential 
threat to marriage and social stability.  Deech, for example, remains a commentator 
who three decades later still remains opposed to the notion in her 2009-10 Gresham 
Lectures122.    
 
Going back to the 1970s and 1980s, following the radical changes in morality and 
social norms of the 1960s, there was even a strong judicial anti-recognition lobby 
which as time went on was quietly deprecated by the more forward thinking judges 
who had to deal with cohabitation in practice, both in relation to its own legal context 
and others, and especially in Commonwealth jurisdictions: see , for example, per 
Kirby, P,  in the Australian case of Bryson v Bryant 123,  who commented ‘…de facto 
relationships, akin to marriage, are neither uncommon nor (in most circles today) a 
source of opprobrium’.    
 
In 1970s England and Wales, Lord Denning, in an early judicial attempt at 
developing special rules for cohabitants, tried to do what he could for cohabiting 
women who had no home rights by attempting to use the procedural route of the 
Married Women’s Property Act 1882 s 17 to give them an interest in the homes that 
they shared, and had often improved, while cohabiting with their legally owning 
partners:  see, for example  Pettitt v Pettitt 124 where Lord Reid led a unanimous 
rejection of development of the s 17 procedural route but (with Lord Diplock) 
suggested that there might be merit in considering a fictional contract between the 
parties which led to the common intention principle.  This was followed by Gissing v 
Gissing 125 which affirmed the other idea advanced in Pettit that there was a ‘family 
assets’ doctrine.   
 
Both ‘contract’ (actually or notional) and ‘family assets’ survive today in family justice 
theory, the former most recently in Baroness Hale’s pursuit of the imputed common 
intention  in Jones v Kernott 126,  also in the developing law on ring fencing in 
																																								 																				
122 [2011] UKSC 53. 
123 (1992) 29 NSWLR 188. 
124 [1970] AC 777. 
125 [1971] AC 886. 
126 [2011] UKSC 53. 
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financial provision following divorce or other decree, and in relation to both marital 
and non-marital - that is cohabitation -  agreements. 
 
Thus the s 17 scheme was a short lived and fleeting idea, and has been dismissed 
as mere judicial sympathy: but Lord Denning was not without appreciation of legal 
doctrine and pinned his developmental theory on the concept of discretion given to 
the court about the distribution of property rights on the breakdown of marriage, on 
which a number of such post WWII decisions of the Court of Appeal had been 
based.   
 
The problem, however, was that this discretion did not transplant effortlessly into the 
Chancery Division where cohabitants’ property rights were decided, albeit that that 
Court had a jurisdiction historically based in equity. Lord Upjohn had already cast 
doubt on the s 17 theory in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth127, and after Lord 
Denning’s early 1970s attempts to help them, cohabitants were once again left in the 
awkward position of recourse to the ordinary law of trusts determined in the 
Chancery Division so as to secure property rights they had not adequately protected 
– on which they then had to rely and still do.    
 
As a result many schemes and commentaries were put forward by academics and 
practitioners in the years up to the Law Commission’s work in 2006-7, e.g. Barlow & 
Lind128; Barlow, who became a leading specialist, alone and with others and Barlow 
& James, who renewed the argument for recognition of the function of cohabitation, 
as evidenced in the wider approach in Europe rather than linking it to the religious 
ideologies associated with marriage 129. It was Barlow et al 130,  who in 2005 
identified two myths entertained by the public about their supposed equal treatment 
of cohabitants and married couples;   and Barlow et al , which in 2007 assessed the 
impact of the government’s (failed) Living Together  cohabitation information 
																																								 																				
127 [1965] AC 1175 at pp 1235-1236. 
128 Anne Barlow and Craig Lind, ‘A Matter of Trust’ (1999) 19(4) Legal Studies, 468.   
Anne Barlow and Barlow & James, n112.  
129 n116. n117.. 
130 Anne Barlow, Simon Duncan, Elizabeth Cooke, Geraldine James and Alison Park, Cohabitation, 
Marriage and the Law, Hart, 2005. 
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campaign131; and  Resolution (the Solicitors’ Family Law Association)  which in 2008  
put forward a discussion paper supported by Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC and 
subsequently made the basis of one of his Cohabitation Bills. On the other hand 
Auchmuty immediately put the alternative view, namely that there was nothing much 
to recommend about marriage (or indeed, it appears to have seemed to her, any of 
the other state regulated relationships, a stance which she still maintains132. 
 
Other significant contributors include Bailey-Harris133 who in 1998 felt it appropriate 
to include cohabiting relationships in her multi-disciplinary survey of asset division on 
family breakdown at an SPTL conference in that year; Barton134  whose 1985 
monograph on cohabitation contracts coincided with consideration by the Council of 
Europe on whether to recommend that such contracts should be enforceable, which 
the Council finally announced in the affirmative in 1988. Later with his Staffordshire 
University colleague Hibbs, Barton’s exploration of the perceptions of engaged 
couples revealed that the affianced devoted little time to any other issues but the 
wedding celebrations when they decided to progress to marriage,  and none at all to 
the legal aspects of that step135,  which was revealing in indicating that married 
couples appeared to have as little regard for the law applying to that status as 
cohabitants did to their legal position. The human rights issues in relation to 
cohabitation have been contributed by Choudry and Herring136.   
 
Statistics and their interpretation in the period up to the Law Commission project in 
2006-7 have relied heavily on contributions from Kiernan137 who looked  at patterns 
of divorce and cohabitation across nations and generations  for the Centre for 
Analysis of Social Exclusion;  also Haskey, and Haskey and Lewis  who examined 
																																								 																				
131 Anne Barlow, Carol Burgoyne and Janet Smythson, The Living together Campaign: An 
Investigation of the Impact on legally aware cohabitants, Ministry of Justice, www.justice.org.uk, 2007, 
last accessed 13 November 2013. 
132 Rosemary Auchmuty, ‘What’s so special about marriage? The impact of Wilkinson v Kitzinger’ 
(2008) Family Law Quarterly, 475, pp475-6. See further Chapter 5 which offers a more appropriate 
opportunity to consider the potential respective appeals of these state regulated statuses as against 
informal cohabitation, than is possible in the present more general literature review. 
133 Rebecca Bailey-Harris, (ed), Dividing the Assets on Family Breakdown: Strengths and 
Weaknesses of the Law, collected papers of a conference at KCL, later separately published by 
Jordans Publishing. 
134 Chris Barton, Cohabitation Contracts: Extra Marital Contracts and Law Reform, Gower, 1985. 
135 Chris Barton and Mary Hibbs, ‘Perceptions of the Affianced’, (2001) Family Law, p 197. 
136 Shazia Choudrry and Jonathan Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law, Hart, 2010. 
137 n109. 
  
 
84 
commitment in marriage and cohabitation.  Figures from these studies are regularly 
updated by new data from the Office of National Statistics and the Government 
Actuary but, as mentioned above, it still seems that precise figures relating to 
cohabitation remain elusive to capture since, unlike marriage and civil partnership, 
and PACS in France,  there is no registration or potential ‘tracking’ pathway as such 
unless cohabitants are in receipt of welfare benefits.  
 
Nevertheless, this may not matter since it is clear that the issue of a discrete regime 
for cohabitants is definitely not entirely about numbers once a defined trend sufficient 
to indicate a constituency is established. 
 
It is surprising that this complete lack of legal recognition for cohabiting families has 
been maintained not only following the Law Commission’s 2007 Final Report on their 
two year 2006-7 project138 but even following the more recent Private Members’ Bill 
in the House of Lords in which Lord Marks QC has persisted despite change of 
government disrupting its progress.   Either of these initiatives would much more 
efficiently replace the current Chancery litigation when the parties cannot resolve 
their own  property issues on separation,  a point which in logic might have had 
some claim on government attention already beleaguered by other concerns such as 
the EU referendum , unmanageable volumes of migrants and apparently 
uncontrollable terrorists.   
 
Moreover, even if successive governments did not like the Law Commission’s work 
at first, and do not particularly like Lord Mark’s current Bill,  recent revival of the latter 
has presented an opportunity for a government also under pressure to reduce  the 
national deficit, particularly since there should be a pressure to unite its economic 
and Dispute Resolution in so far as  that deficit  is contributed to by excessive cost of 
running the justice system which is itself being increased by LIPs disregarding what 
are obviously unpopular DR policies by insisting on representing themselves in court.    
It is curious that apparently none of these distracting running sores that one would 
expect a government to want to lose appear to be encouraging any attention to be 
given to Lord Marks’ Bill. .  
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Various reasons have been suggested for this apparent reluctance of some 
governments to address both the practical impact on the nature of the family as a 
whole and on the children born or taken into such family unit and the theoretical 
basis of the adult cohabiting relationships  -  which in fact do appear to have several 
key distinguishing factors from marriage apart from the absence of the marriage 
certificate. 
 
For example, the distinguished Canadian Family Judge, The Honourable Mary 
Southin, emphasised one of these cohabitation versus marriage distinctions in her 
powerful dissenting judgment in the leading Canadian case of Crick v Ludwig as long 
ago as 1994 when she drew attention to both the mindset of the parties and the 
expectations of permanence of the relationship, which she identified as completely 
different in cohabitation and marriage 139.  In that case she concluded that it was 
therefore dangerous for judges automatically to assume that ‘young people who live 
together must intend the relationship to have the permanent quality of a formal 
marriage, albeit without the piece of paper’ whereas ‘the social reality… is that many 
of these couples have no such intention’ and ‘are simply having a good time without 
intending any commitment, emotional or economic, to each other’.  It is notable that 
not only the majority judgment in that case and subsequent Canadian legislation 
suggest that her views were not uniformly shared by either Canadian judiciary or 
Parliament, but more recent literature in England suggests that this scepticism about 
permanence in cohabiting relationships could be a reason for continued reluctance 
to  legislate for cohabitants’ rights in England. 
 
Such a concern certainly chimes with suggestions by some writers that there is, and 
should be, commitment and intimacy in such relationships before they are 
recognised in law140  but contrasts with some others who do not see that long 
running cohabiting relationships can always be used to show that there is less 
commitment in cohabitation than in marriage.   Nevertheless there has been in the 
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past 3 years an American study by Pollard and Harris141  showing  that 41% of 
cohabiting men aged 18-26 were ‘not completely committed’ to their live-in 
girlfriends.  However it may be that that the age group in that study was below the 
average age of contemporary marriage, which in England and Wales has risen 
steeply as found by the Law Commission142.   
 
Further, and first of all, whatever age group is considered, of its nature there is often 
a difficulty in establishing when a cohabiting relationship either begins or ends.  But 
one must wonder whether any relevance of commitment is appropriate, as the 
separation problems of cohabiting couples occur whether or not there has been 
commitment in the first place (and who is to say what level of commitment there may 
be in many short marriages which break up too).  
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, unanimous except for the Southin dissenting 
judgment in the Crick case, nevertheless awarded the female cohabitant of 2 years 
in that case $45,000 under the doctrine of unjust enrichment: moreover in New 
Zealand an academic criticism of that jurisdiction’s  cohabitants’ law  - an opt out 
regime -  is that people who enter into the sort of potentially  transitory cohabitation 
as described in the Southin judgment in Canada do not always realise when the New 
Zealand  law applies to them (a situation which, if the basis of unjust enrichment is 
relevant,  might be concluded would actually  make it more appropriate to protect the 
other party, rather than a reason not to have a regime at all of some sort! New 
Zealand provides a check list by which the judge then decides whether the couple is 
cohabiting or not.    
 
One reason for lack of focus on the distinctions between the two types of relationship 
is that it is said by others, besides the Honourable Mary Southin, that some judges 
have dangerously jumped to conclusions about the nature of a cohabiting 
relationship and therefore wrongly assimilate all such relationships with the more 
familiar status of marriage (which is especially more familiar to senior judges at their 
likely age, status and stage in life). This was a theme taken up by Booth J  when 
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cohabitation was raised at the time of the inquiry she chaired for the Lord Chancellor  
in 1985 into matrimonial procedure, in which, in summary,  she concluded that there 
was already an alternative regime for cohabitants who considered themselves 
disadvantaged – that is,  marriage.   
 
The other main reason routinely advanced for not legislating is that the focus of the 
law has shifted to children, a theme taken up by virtually every Family law textbook 
author, so that the status of their parents’ relationship is unimportant with regard to 
the child’s legal position whereas the significance of the parents’ parenting 
relationship with the child is now of prime importance.  
 
This is certainly supported by the volume of literature on children’s issues in Family 
law which has now reached epic proportions, just as the cohabitation literature in the 
general Family law field has tailed off.   However this seems to ignore the volume 
and significance of statistics which influenced the Institute of Fiscal Studies to report 
that women leaving a cohabiting relationship with children take both themselves and 
their children into poverty on becoming single mothers143. While the same fate 
seems also to happen to women who leave marriages with children where financial 
provision is, for one reason or another, not adequate, in their case there are at least 
some rights provided by a statute upon the basis of which it should be possible to 
settle on some appropriate financial provision without entering expensive and 
stressful litigation, which is not in the interests of the individual or the State.  
 
 
(b) Underlying theories of the distinction between marriage and 
cohabitating relationships 
A more fundamental reason for this lack of focus, despite the academic and 
practitioner debate, may be that little attention has been paid to the theoretical basis 
of cohabiting relationships.  To understand this seems to involve looking elsewhere, 
at the reality of the basis of contemporary marriage which no longer resembles the 
profile of rural and suburban married life in the 1930s, which was the system before 
the social changes brought about by WWII and cemented by those of the 1960s, and 
which clearly Booth J had not realised by 1985.  
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This may be traced not through academic articles but through magazines and 
domestic publications of the first half of the 20th century. These range from Illustrated 
London News, recording the garden suburb and new town building projects between 
the two World Wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, to Good Housekeepinand the 
Good Housekeeping Institute, and affiliated women’s interest, interior and garden 
design publications, some of which can be located through the Women’s Library,  
now to be found centrally accessible on the fourth floor of the main library at LSE. 
 
Prior to the social change of the late 1960s, it was normal for the marital home to be 
in the name of the male breadwinner and the wife remained at home to attend to 
housekeeping and the upbringing of the children.  As this social conditioning, and 
discrimination against women in the workplace, was displaced and it became usual 
for married women to work, the picture of marriage which appears in the case law of 
the 1970s and 1980s is now only a fantasy, particularly as soon as it became 
necessary for both halves of a couple to work because two incomes became 
necessary to service the mortgages generated by the trend towards home ownership 
promoted by the Thatcher governments of the 1980s and 1990s. Thus it is even 
more inappropriate to equate even lengthy cohabitation to formal marriage that 
simply does not have the ‘piece of paper’, as  was attempted in the case of Mrs 
Burns in 1984, giving rise to some of the more memorable ‘sound bites’, in the report 
of that case.  Cohabitation is clearly distinct, but there may be many reasons for why 
it is. 
 
On the other hand whereas at that time it is clear from the cases that cohabitants 
often employed the same practical framework – of a male breadwinner and a female 
homemaker, largely because the man would usually be able to work and fund a 
mortgage and home improvements while the woman provided the home base – as 
time went on the case law shows that it became broadly more usual for married 
couples to own their homes jointly as joint tenants and to share expenses, although 
not necessarily prime responsibility for children,  but that cohabitants did not 
necessarily follow in  adopting this practice  - hence Mrs Burns’ plight.  
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It also seems from cohabitation cases dating from later than the initial post 1960s 
period that as time went on the parties still seldom bought a home together as 
married couples usually did; and in those cases where cohabitants did purchase in 
joint names, their ‘joint’ ownership was often muddled, whether intentionally or 
inadvertently. This was because the title documents did not make clear whether this 
was a purchase as joint tenants beneficially or as tenants in common, and as the 
parties were not married the court would not willingly assume beneficial joint tenancy 
since this required a leap over a chasm that the court was not prepared to bridge. 
The picture of cohabitant life in the post 1960s era shows in case after case that this 
pattern continued beyond Pettit and Gissing, decade after decade in  the later cases 
of Eves v Eves (1975), Stokes v Anderson (1981)  Windeler v Whitehall (1990),  
Oxley v Hiscock ( 2004), Stack v Dowden (2007)144.  
 
(c) What is the contemporary basis and relevance of the choice to cohabit 
rather than marry? 
It is thus also necessary to look at the reasons that cohabitants prefer not to marry. 
These are clearly sometimes, but not always, financially motivated, since the 
financial issues can often be addressed by pre-marital agreements: does the 
decision to cohabit therefore depend on the very nature of perceived marital 
commitment, or perhaps its avoidance as identified in Canada by Southin J, above or 
a psychological aversion to marriage? And if so why?   
 
This approach to choice in the nature of the personal partnerships of couples setting 
up house together has become possible because, largely following the Industrial 
Revolution and two World Wars, marriage changed from being a ‘mainly economic 
institution to a mainly psychological one’, as identified by Haffner145.  Many women 
who can earn their own living or have their own inherited or otherwise accumulated 
assets clearly now prefer to control their own finances, for example, Ms Radmacher , 
the heiress in Radmacher v Granatino, just as146 many men, especially those who 
have experienced divorce and financially damaging financial settlements, do not 
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wish to be exposed to further risk of this type. For example, in this context,  there is 
the practical evidence of the large numbers which the leading Family solicitors report 
as insisting on marital and cohabitation agreements before they will enter either 
relationship. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there are further underlying reasons why some will 
prefer not to marry but are willing to cohabit on the right terms.  Some of these are 
touched on in Dewar & Parker, which had the added benefit of Dewar’s experience 
at Griffith University at a time when Australian law was far in advance of England 
and Wales in the concept of de facto relationships.  
 
Their monograph analyses the law relating to cohabitants in 1995 at which time it 
seems to have been realised that the balance between marriage and cohabitation 
was beginning to change, although by this date three incarnations of the Law 
Society’s qualifying examinations for solicitors were regularly including coverage of a 
section called ‘The Unmarried Family’ in their Family Law elective. In fact up to 1992, 
when the Legal Practice Course was introduced to replace the former Final 
Examination of the Law Society for solicitors, Family Law was not an Elective subject  
at all, but one of the compulsory heads of the then new qualifying assessments 
which succeeded the former Part II, because it was prior to this ‘reform’ considered 
inappropriate that all solicitors should not have some knowledge of the broad 
principles of Family Law.  
  
This recognition of the separate new sector of the family in the solicitors’ practice of 
the 1980s may indeed be a reason for not opting at that time for a cohabitants’ legal 
regime which was close to that of traditional marriage, as it establishes that 
cohabitation was a growing and distinct alternative to marriage before that significant 
growth was apparently first noticed in the 2001 census, but that there was also no 
consensus as to whether, and if so where,  cohabitation belonged in English law -  or 
not.   
 
However,  this does not seem to be a reason now for (i) not having a legal regime of 
their own for cohabitants since the syndrome has spread so widely in the intervening 
period (ii) not having a legal regime which is fairly close even if not identical to that of 
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contemporary marriage in English law? - since it more recently appears that  - 
despite the 1994 judicial comment in Canada -   in English cases where there is no 
specific cohabitation contract the parties’  partnership approach is much the same, 
as established by Cooke et al 147 in 2006,  and there has always been much 
emphasis on function in the literature generally.  
 
In view of the lengthy two decades of debate that the transsexual issue took to be 
resolved and the present rate of progress in resolving long standing concerns about 
the impact of the lack of a legal regime governing cohabitation, there is likely to be 
as long a timescale before cohabitants have any better regime to resolve their status 
and property issues than that already existing: unless some more proactive initiative 
is embarked upon than waiting for government support for reform.   
 
One such excuse for inactivity in this regard, which lasted well past the millennium, 
was that it was unknown how many couples were involved as claimed by Roberts in  
2002148.  Roberts, a former Director of the Family Policy Studies Institute, cites the 
limited data available, particularly on the length of cohabitation, a problem which has 
still not been solved in view of the fact that there is no official starting or end point for 
a cohabiting relationship, unlike marriage and civil partnership, although Roberts 
relied on Ermisch & Francesconi 149 and Haskey150  for concluding that  ‘the median 
duration was 27 months and less than one in twenty have been together for more 
than 10 years’. 
 
Moreover, it seems that this ‘fuzzy data’ was claimed to persist as late as the Law 
Commission’s consultation in 2006-7 when the rather dismissive tone of their 
reports, which relied on these figures,  seems to indicate that they were not 
overwhelmed by the statistics available.   
																																								 																				
147 Elizabeth Cooke, Anne Barlow and Therese Callus, Community of Property: A Regime for England 
and Wales, Nuffield Foundation, 2006. 
148 C Roberts, ‘Cohabitation: Some Reflections on Development’ (2002) SFLA Review, SFLA, January 
2001 
149			John Ermisch, and  Marco Francesconi,  ‘Patterns of Household and Family Formation’ in Richard 
Berthoud and Jonathan Gershuny,  (eds) Seven Years in the Lives of British Families, Bristol: Policy 
Press, 2000. 
150	John	Haskey, ‘Cohabitation in Great Britain: Past Present and Future Trends – and Attitudes’ 
(2001) 103 Population Trends pp.4 and p.26. 
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We now know that denial of basic transsexual rights was indefensible in human 
rights’ terms.  Will we eventually have to admit the same about cohabitation following 
a further challenge in Strasbourg?  Or is there now a case for revisiting the concept 
of cohabitation vis a vis marriage as a social norm?  In the absence of some good 
reason why not, this now seems only logical, particularly as, since the 
implementation of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the enactment of the Marriage 
(Same-Sex Couples) 2014, cohabitation appears as much a valid  basis for family 
life as the status of registered civil partnership and same- sex marriage.  
 
(d) Indications that there should be a formal status and associated legal 
regime for cohabitants as a recognised family unit?  
It is by no means the case that a recognised status and attendant legal framework 
for cohabitants is a small self -contained topic confined only to academe. Indeed, it is 
not, and frequently appears, like Banquo’s ghost, in other contexts such as court 
hearings which are not primarily about cohabitation.   This is because the state of 
cohabitation inevitably impacts in other areas of law – for example, in financial 
provision on divorce.  In Fleming v Fleming (2004)151 and W v W (2009)152,  to take 
two example cases, the question arose as to what was the appropriate contribution 
for a cohabitant to make to the household budget of the payee of an ancillary relief 
periodical payments order which was to be capitalised , although in one of these 
cases the judge did not have to decide this issue, since this question was academic 
because the payee wife was entitled to capitalisation for her commitment to the 
marriage and the family in any case. 
   
Nevertheless the judge must routinely ask such a question as this cohabitant’s 
contribution issue frequently arises in cases where a payee wife is cohabiting and 
the payer husband does not wish to continue supporting her if another man is in a 
position to do so. This is clearly an additional reason for clarifying the status of 
cohabitation if it is going to flow over into other areas of Family law.   The approach 
of the court in this type of case so far has thus always been that in English law 
cohabitation is not the same as marriage, since it does not give rise to the same 
																																								 																				
151 [2004] 1 FLR 667. 
152 [2009] EWHC 3076, [2010] 2 FLR 985. 
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responsibilities and obligations as marriage. Since there is this discernible gap 
between the two states, and in view of the unjust enrichment which may otherwise 
occur if the ordinary law of trusts is relied on, it may be that New Zealand has made 
the right choice in legislating for an opt out scheme which requires the parties to 
make other provision or to be ruled by a default regime when an identifiable 
cohabitation breaks up, since this would also address the Fleming and W v W 
contexts. 
 
A good example of this distinction between the recent impact of remarriage and 
cohabitation arose in Atkinson v Atkinson in 1987153,  where the judgment famously 
said that Mrs Atkinson was in greater need of her periodical payments order, which 
the court would not therefore cancel, because her cohabitant had chosen a low paid 
job, even though it was conceded that the lady and her cohabitant had not married 
for financially motivated reasons -  that is, because then she would lose her 
periodical payments order which terminated on remarriage, as such payments, and 
pensions, commonly do. In this connection it is interesting to note that the recent 
coalition government did announce that such forfeiture will no longer occur in the 
case of the pensions of war widows, as termination in the case of voidable marriages 
which were subsequently annulled has always come as an unexpected and 
unwelcome shock to the holders of armed forces pensions, and most others, as 
occurred  in Ward v Secretary of State for Social Services154. 
 
Moreover although the Equality Act 2010 s 198 has now removed the husband’s 
obligation under the common law to maintain his wife, the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 still retains a framework to divide the parties’ assets, including their earning 
capacities, on divorce.  Thus the 2010 Act is a somewhat empty provision in this 
context since in the partnership of marriage it is likely that the wife has been 
maintained if she did not work. The concept of maintenance by one party of another, 
in this context,   whether married or unmarried, also remains in the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1075 on death, though none is available 
to the cohabitant separating from a partner in life, whether maintained by that other 
partner during the cohabitation or not or not.. 
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On the other hand the court used not to take pre-marital cohabitation into account at 
all when computing the length of married life for ancillary relief (now financial 
provision) purposes other than in exceptional circumstances, such as the Kokosinski 
case155 where there had been substantial commitment over a longer period than 
most marriages: now if it is substantial, and ‘seamless’ in practice they do. Yet one 
July in 1995, when Lord Justice Thorpe suggested on a hot afternoon in a case 
called B v B156,  which was heard on practically the last day of the legal summer 
term, that the day might come when pre-marital cohabitation would be considered as 
part of the length of the marriage, there was gentle laughter in the coffee bars 
around the Royal Courts of Justice, and upon the rest of the profession’s reading the 
subsequent law report, on the basis that such a novel idea could only be put down to 
end of term day dreaming, suggesting that the end of a hot July was time for the 
higher  judiciary to have their well- earned summer vacation.   
 
Although nowhere is there to be found any distinctive point at which judicial attitudes 
changed to this treatment of pre-marital cohabitation, judgments then eventually  
began factually to list the years of marriage and the years of pre-marital cohabitation, 
without however drawing any articulated conclusions as to the specific relevance of 
the pre-marriage years.  
 
It is therefore difficult to see how, in the contemporary context where marriage 
numbers are falling and cohabitation rising and predicted to rise further, the 
importance of formalising the cohabitants’ legal status and the incidents of that 
status can be ignored much longer.  If anything, this is reinforced by the Equality Act 
2010 s 198, in abolishing the husband’s common law duty to maintain the wife  - and 
this was also the statute that in the next section also abolished the presumption of 
advancement,  although neither of these changes was retrospective. However the 
Act does not, it seems, affect the obligation for partners, married or unmarried, to 
support each other for social security purposes if they are living together, and each 
to support their children.  
 
																																								 																				
155 [1980] 3 WLR 55. 
156 [1995] 1 FLR 559. 
  
 
95 
 In the circumstances it would appear that a completely different approach now 
needs to be taken to rights to both property and financial support in both marriage 
and cohabitation, in which case some work would be desirable on both the present 
confused state of financial provision under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the 
status and incidences of cohabitation, and on such legal rights and responsibilities 
as might exist between the cohabitants. There has of course been such work on the 
latter by the Law Commission in its 2006-7 programme on the financial 
consequences of cohabitants’ relationship breakdown, and also ongoing work on the 
former also by the Law Commission 157,  currently still 2 years later being further 
taken forward by the Family Justice Council which has taken on the task of 
articulating the ‘needs’ aspect of that recent Law Commission work. 
 
The really significant difference between marriage and cohabitation now therefore 
seems to be that for marriage there is already a system in existence, under the 1973 
Act and the case law which has developed in relation to ss 21-30 and s 33,  which 
broadly provides a scheme for the parties’ future after divorce, but nothing but the 
complex and expensive Chancery litigation based system of trusts, proprietary 
estoppel and contract at the disposal of separating cohabitants who cannot agree 
their own scheme.  
 
Surely in 2015-16  - and counting towards the likely timescale based on past 
experience towards achieving any reform in similar controversial contexts -  
cohabitants should have something better than existing, and which is based on some 
doctrinal principles and research into reasonable expectations in both these 
contemporary relationships?  
 
However, legal analysis of this situation appears to have withered, although 
journalists outside legal academic and practitioner fields continue to write: for 
example, in the USA in the Huffington Post 158 which examined the risks of 
cohabitation with children;  in the UK, The Telegraph159 concluded that marriage 
instead of cohabitation was only a consideration for a minority; and there has been 
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96 
the occasional hostile article indicating that cohabitation was threatening marriage, of 
which there is no genuine evidence except for such inquiries as The Telegraph’s into 
whether in contemporary intimate relationships marriage is actually considered, at 
least at first.  There are also occasional articles in financial journals about lack of 
rights to maintenance and property, and sometimes by eminent and knowledgeable 
speakers, such as that of Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, giving 
the Michael Farmer Memorial lecture in October 2014, in which he said: 
 
     ‘If a marriage is terminated by divorce the court has power to redistribute the 
            matrimonial assets between the spouses. There is no such relief for cohabitants  
            when their relationship breaks down, however long the relationship has lasted. This 
             is an injustice which has been recognised as long as I have been in the law. Reform  
             is desperately needed.’160 
 
This, from the President of the Family Division of the High Court, and in a context 
when no one appears any longer to be writing anything new about cohabitation, 
seems a powerful indication that all has already been said, but nothing has been 
done, so that currently a sense of direction in this field of potential law reform has for 
the time being stalled. 
 
One way of addressing this problem might be by looking at what might be the 
reasonable expectations of the ordinary person in this regard, that is the views of 
specialist lawyers’ clients - those ordinary people who go to lawyers because they 
cannot readily understand the present law – a constituency recognised by Cooke et 
al in her 2006 project to have some place in any assessment of a potential regime 
for cohabitants.  The small amount of empirical research which the team conducted 
for this project, which was the subject of their 2006 report, is amongst the most 
helpful in all the literature available, its only drawback being that it did not focus 
closely on the point of view of the female partner.  This was unfortunately since that 
project involved a variety of semi-structured interviews with couples rather than 
specifically women:  whereas  if the potential for indirect discrimination is a key 
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component of what ordinary people think,  it is logical that the female, not necessarily 
feminist, view is important161. 
 
A secondary impetus for following up the Cooke et al approach was an in a 2010 
issue of Country Life (which it is possible, owing to the timing, was influenced by the 
Cooke et al report which was in circulation at the time) in which there is a quotation 
from a young professional, expressing a view typical of the non-lawyers’ approach to 
the dichotomy between marriage and cohabitation, in which she says: 
 
‘Marriage used to be an articulated deal, but now it is much more of a compromise. If you are lucky 
the traditional model can work, but now women want different things, and that includes me…. ‘.  
 
She continues 
 
‘now roles are undefined…it’s constant negotiation’ and that she is interested in ‘the grey areas, in the 
changing relationships between men and women… brought up expecting  to have a life that panned 
out in a particular way but riding the wave of social change’  and that this has  ‘broadened their 
options’162.   
 
This echoes a 1998 article by Rothenbacher 163 of the Mannheimer Zentrum fur 
Europaische Sozialforschung at Mannheim University in Germany, in relation to his 
study on social change in Europe where he traces and summarises the fundamental 
shifts of family responsibility in the home and work to support it since WWII. This 
study looked at different age groups and differences between Eastern and Western 
Europe, as does Willekins164  also writing in1998 in the same essay collection.  
There is also a  1996 contribution on this theme from Cretney165 with a viewpoint on 
the power struggle within the family.  
 
																																								 																				
161 The imaginative approach of this writer and her team is one which is better taken up further in 
Chapter 9 when drawing conclusions. 
162 Anon, Country Life, Time Inc UK, 10 October 2010. 
163 Franz Rothenbacher, ‘Social Change in Europe and its Impact on Family Structures’ in John 
Eekelaar and T Nhlapo The Changing Family; Family Forms and Family Law, Hart, 1998. 
164 F J C  Willekins ‘Long Term Developments in Family Law in Western Europe’, in John Eekelaar 
and T NHlapo, The Changing Family Family Forms and Family Law, Hart, 1998. 
165  Stephen Cretney, ‘What will the women want next? The struggle for power within the family 1925-
1975’ (1996) 12 Law Quarterly Review p.110.  
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In a 2011 article in an issue of another upmarket ‘glossy’, Bazaar 166 it is even 
suggested that marriage is ‘anachronistic’ 
 
Moreover, the Law Commission’s 2006 consultation paper comments that it is now 
rare for unmarried parents who are cohabiting when they have children ‘to bother’ to 
marry before the birth of a child even if they do so afterwards, and not necessarily 
particularly promptly.   
 
This suggests that marriage and cohabitation are now co-existing much more 
routinely than previously, that cohabitation is now socially acceptable, that the 
distinction between the two forms of family building is narrowing and will probably 
continue to do so, and that attitudes may even be quite different now from those 
exhibited in the Hansard debates around the time of the passage through Parliament 
of the Family Law Act 1996 (and its unsuccessful predecessor which it replaced, the 
Family and Domestic Violence Bill 1995).  Certainly the ease with which the Marriage 
(Same-Sex Couples) Act was passed in 2013 suggests that the controversy 
(perhaps still remembered with alarm by governments) which  occurred in 1996  
when a group of back benchers and the Daily Mail led the campaign of hostility 
towards any similarities of status being accorded to cohabitants even when the most 
generous home occupation rights were given to spouses would be unlikely to mar 
any contemporary legislation to provide  basic rights to cohabitants167.  
 
(e) Introduction of more detailed schemes for a legal regime for this 
contemporary social norm       
There have been a number of such schemes, apart from the Law Commission’s in   
2007, for example Resolution’s 2008 version, Reforming the law for people who live 
together: shared home, shared rights168. This was a consultation paper dating from 
the autumn of 2008, and linked to the campaign for Lord Lester’s 2009 Bill, which 
ultimately did not succeed, but was generated by the government’s decision to do 
nothing about the Law Commission’s work, reasons for which Resolution 
																																								 																				
166 Anon, Bazaar, Hearst Magazines, May 2011.  
167 An account of the notable disruption of the Parliamentary process which was said to ‘threaten 
family values’  and to be ‘controversial’, as recorded in Hansard,  may still be read in  Guides to the 
Family Law Act 1996 (Bird, 1996, Burton, 1996, Cretney, 1996 and Horton, 1996).  
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(unsurprisingly) found unconvincing.   It proposed a different scheme from the Law 
Commission’s.  On the other hand the Law Society, which had long supported 
reform, also had its own slightly different proposals dating from as long ago as 2002, 
The Case for Clear Law: Proposals for Reform although these have not been 
pressed in competition with Resolution’s.   
 
The fact that after this long timeline, and several failed legislative attempts there is 
still no movement towards government sponsored reform, even of the most limited 
kind, is worse than unfortunate, especially in view of the limited legal aid available for 
the existing expensive litigation which is the current cohabitants’ remedy.    
 
Before looking in detail at  the existing overseas schemes which are most likely to 
have lessons for a relatively simple equivalent in English law it would therefore be 
worth taking a fresh look at the 2006-7 work of the Law Commission (which follows 
in Chapter 4), and in particular following up their work on potential reasons for the 
selection of cohabitation over marriage or civil partnership , before looking at the 
successful existing schemes in other jurisdictions which suggest that they may 
provide lessons to be learned in 
 
In view of the fact that England and Wales is a common law jurisdiction, is part of the 
United Kingdom and is a member state of the European Union, the obvious schemes 
to examine are self- selecting, and in the following order as set out in Chapter 1: 
 
- Scotland which is also part of the United Kingdom and close geographically;   
- Spain, which has been strikingly modernising in its progress from a Catholic 
dictatorship to contemporary European democracy and has a substantial expatriate 
British community accessing its courts on both the mainland and its islands which 
are also provinces of Spain; and then the work of 
- Australia and/or New Zealand, whose developments have consistently been 
ahead of English law’s in recent decades but which contribute to the cross border 
thinking of other common law jurisdictions such as ours;   
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Conclusion 
 
These alternative regimes will therefore be critically analysed in Chapters 6-8, prior 
to which Chapter 4 will consider the ongoing relevance, if any, of the Law 
Commission’s now somewhat dated work, applying the same critical analysis, while 
Chapter 5 will follow up one aspect of their work which received little attention in 
2006-7, namely why a preference appears to be being shown for cohabitation by 
large numbers of those partnering in England and Wales.  These obviously useful 
investigations will be supported with some limited field work with practitioners in each 
jurisdiction, including some perspectives from England and Wales, and conclusions 
drawn from those consultations in Chapter 9.   Finally in the Appendix will be found a 
short draft Bill which the current project suggests would now be more likely to 
achieve enactment than the much longer Private Members Bill based on the Law 
Commission's 2006-7 recommendations.  This Bill is currently still in the House of 
Lords after re-introduction May 2015 but so far has not made much progress169
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Chapter 4   The Work of the Law Commission 2006-7 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the 2006-7 work of the Law Commission in relation to   
its limited brief to formulate proposals for the division of the parties’ assets on 
their cohabiting relationship breakdown. It then critically reviews those results of the  
scheme which might still be relevant to the urgent contemporary need for 
legislation noted by the President of the Family Division170.        
 
The prime aim is critically to examine what might reasonably be recycled from this 
two year work programme, so far neglected by both the government which 
commissioned it and by two successive ministries in the eight years since its 
completion. A secondary aim is to compare the practicality of the proposed scheme 
with those of the jurisdictions treated in Chapters 6-8. 
 
Background 
 
The work of the Law Commission in 2006-7 was a long-hoped-for opportunity for a 
comprehensive survey of the rights and obligations of cohabitants, at a time when it 
was also hoped that this identifiable family group, which had been growing steadily in 
England and Wales for several decades, was at last going to be recognised as a 
new family unit for which legislative provision should be made.  At the time this was 
not least as numbers of cohabitants’ families had most recently been growing faster 
than before which seemed to have generated sufficient concerns in the then Labour 
government to achieve an instruction to the Law Commission to look into the matter 
of associated law reform.  Sadly, the work of the Commission, when it finally 
received its brief, was more restricted in scope than it might have been, and in 
practice was confined by their instruction to devising appropriate recommendations 
to make to government for division of a cohabiting couple’s capital assets on their 
																																								 																				
170 See Chapter 3, n160. 
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separation, although some incidental research was also to be done into associated 
topics so as to inform that goal. 
 
The project was, therefore, a major disappointment when it started out,  a greater 
one when it was completed, and an even more bitter failure to address the needs of 
a significant section of the population when it was not even implemented: although 
the latter was not much of a surprise since, anecdotally, stories still circulate in 
academic and practitioner circles of one High Court judge, on taking office as 
Chairman of the Law Commission, immediately finding  - on an early sweep of the 
past work of the institution to which he had just been appointed -  an alarming 
number of unimplemented reports gathering dust in the Commission’s archives.  
 
It is a fact that the Law Commission is a creature of statute171, so can only undertake 
work in accordance with a request from the Lord Chancellor; and only then if an 
identified government department is willing to take forward any recommended 
legislation. However, restricting the project in the manner elected was hardly 
addressing the social change which had driven long standing debate about the 
appropriate manner in which this new family form should be treated in law. 
 
Is it therefore even worth analysing the Law Commission’s 2006-7 work? The 
answer to that is in fact indubitably in the affirmative, as their reports in any case 
disclose issues that need flagging up and addressing in various ways if there is ever 
to be a discrete normative regime for cohabitants in English law.  Towards the 
achievement of this,  the present inquiry is intended to contribute, even if not 
comprehensively to deliver in detail, since it appears that striving after too much 
detailed perfection is precisely what has delayed and obstructed this outcome 
previously.  
 
Factually, the pathway to the 2006-7 project’s final report172 was that in 2005 the Law 
Commission was asked by the then Government to look at the law applying to 
unmarried couples when they separate.  In 2006 the Commission issued a 
																																								 																				
171 Law Commission Act 1965. 
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consultation paper 173 followed a year later by the recommendation of a new scheme 
for financial rights for such unmarried couples who either had children or had been 
together for 2-5 years.  The scheme was based on contribution to the relationship 
and, if desired, cohabitants could opt out of it in favour of their own arrangements.   
 
However this scheme was never implemented as the government indicated that it 
preferred to wait until research was available on the similar Scottish system, based 
on the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006.  However, four years from the final report - 
and although such research on the Scottish system was, in fact, already available174  
-the then Justice Minister, Jonathan Djanogly, announced that the research findings, 
funded by the Nuffield Foundation, did not ‘provide us with a sufficient basis for 
change in the law’, and added ‘We do not intend to take forward the Law 
Commission’s recommendations …in this Parliamentary term’175. The present 
Parliamentary term is the second since that announcement, and still there is no 
government sponsored progress. 
 
Nor was there any revisiting of the project by the coalition government which 
succeeded the new Labour administration which had commissioned the Law 
Commission work in the first place, and then abandoned its recommendations.  In a 
way this was surprising since the coalition shared no political or ideological beliefs 
with its predecessors and had every opportunity to take on a reforming stance as 
indeed they did during that Parliament, during which  there has since been legislation 
for same-sex marriage (2013), also  implemented in March and December 2014, for 
the  much smaller constituency of exclusively same-sex couples, whether those 
already in civil partnership and wishing to convert to civil marriage, or those having 
been awaiting that legislation,  They were indeed comparatively a very small 
constituency,  since average annual civil partnerships have been settled around 
6,000 per annum over the time since the Civil Partnership Act was implemented in 
2005 and this was initially not much enlarged by marriages since 29 March 2014,  
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Consultation Paper, No 179, 2006. 
174 Fran Wasoff, Joanna Miles and Enid Mordaunt, Legal Practitioners’ Perspectives on the 
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Law Research Paper No11/03, SSRN. 
175 Jonathan Djanogly, Hansard Written Statement, 6 September 2011. 
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when the initial marriage provision came into force, despite totalling 15,000 up to the 
end of 2015. 
 
Consequently, were it not for the baton having now been taken up by Lord Marks of 
Henley-on-Thames  - Jonathan Marks QC a leading practitioner at the Family Bar -  
who has now twice introduced  a Private Member’s Bill into the House of Lords which 
seeks to implement much of the substance of the 2006-7 Law Commission work no 
progress whatever would have been made to take forward the work undertaken by 
the Commission at some public expense.    
 
Unfortunately this Bill,  having by mid-December 2014 only completed its second 
reading to qualify for its House of Lords Committee stage, then had to retrace the 
earlier steps again following the dissolution of that Parliament for the election of May 
2015 .    The only positive factor in this is that the perseverance of this Bill’s sponsor 
has at least kept the process moving forward, despite his having been obliged to 
restart at  precisely the point at which previous such Bills, introduced by Lord Lester 
of Herne Hill QC in 2008 and 2009, also stalled and were taken no further.   
 
As this abandonment after one or two readings, is unfortunately usually the fate of 
such Bills unless supported by the government, sadly the Marks Bill is probably not 
likely to make further progress with much expedition, and indeed it  might not even 
reach the statute book at all unless sufficient Parliamentary time can be found for it. 
Moreover, however well received in the House of Lords, any such Bill must then 
navigate likely political opposition in the House of Commons, where the more 
outspoken resistance is often concentrated. 
 
This continued non-implementation of the 2006-7 recommendations is therefore a 
sorry result of work done by the organisation which is intended to advise the 
government on necessary law reform and of which a significant section of the public 
such as the present cohabitation constituency should have the opportunity to benefit. 
 
In view of its age, the next question is whether this 2006-7 Law Commission work is 
therefore still likely to be of any practical use in any way? The answer to this 
question must be in the affirmative, despite the fact that time and social change have 
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now moved even further on from the perspective of 2007, and also despite the fact 
that the consultation paper is lengthy and in some places repetitive so that any 
worthwhile analysis may inevitably also not be short.  
 
There is also the issue that there were, in the restricted brief of 2005, the original 
design flaws which might not now be any longer entirely relevant.  For example, is it 
still strictly correct to assume that there is no point in ignoring the possibility of 
creating a separate status for cohabitants who do not fall within the existing 
provisions of the Civil Partnership Act, or do not register if they technically can? This 
has been dismissed as irrelevant in the past owing to the alternative provided by 
marriage, which is now available to both sexes. But what about those who do not 
marry or register because they want to live together in a committed relationship 
without either  of those formalities, as this seems to be saying something to the world 
at large about a choice to live within that family format.   
 
Nevertheless, the 2006-7 work was the last on English law aspects of legislating for 
this important new family form and some analysis of what has been investigated so 
far cannot therefore legitimately be side stepped. 
 
 
The perspective from 2015.  
 
This Law Commission work thus remains the latest initiative in England and Wales 
towards providing the discrete legal regime for cohabiting couples who are neither 
legally married nor in registered civil partnerships, nor perhaps availing themselves 
of the new status of marriage for same sex couples, provided by the Marriage 
(Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013, and which it seems there is still some belief in an 
impetus for achieving 176 although some academics still adhere to the theory that 
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there are people who continue  not to choose to marry at all, see for example, 
Auchmuty177 .   
 
However, the Law Commissioner was not the only, nor the first, to propose a 
normative scheme for cohabitants, since both the Law Society Family Law 
Committee and the Solicitors’ Family Law Association (Resolution) have proposed 
such schemes 178 and there clearly remains support for some reform, not least from 
the Supreme Court, which appeared to be ‘grumbling’ a little at the work they were 
required to do to extrapolate from existing precedent in the English appeal in  Jones  
v Kernott179 .  In the following year, moreover,  they were stating the case for reform 
somewhat more trenchantly in Gow v Grant,  the first appeal heard from a decision 
under the Scottish system,  where Baroness Hale in particular deplored the lack of 
progress in this respect, when she largely approved the Scottish system stating that 
cohabitants in England and Wales ‘deserved no less’.180  
 
The Law Commission itself has concurred, stating ‘The prevalence of cohabitation 
and of the birth of children to couples who live together means that the need for 
reform can only become more pressing over time’ 181. Moreover, while Lord Marks’ 
Cohabitants’ Rights Bill, under consideration in the last Parliamentary session, has 
now been revived in the present session, following earlier aborted initiatives by Lord 
Lester, and the Inheritance (Cohabitants) Bill 2012 which was not taken further 
either, this is at least a sign that there is still thought to be some responsible interest 
in legislating on the basis of the Law Commission’s work, even if successive 
governments have been dismissive of it. 
 
It is, however, possible that the government was right not to take the  
2006-7 scheme any further in 2011, though not necessarily for the reasons given. 
The Law Commission’s 2006-7 work is now over 8 years old, and the 2006 
consultation paper and the 2007 report have not necessarily covered all the issues 
																																								 																				
177 Rosemary Auchmuty, What’s so special about marriage? The impact of Wilkinson v Kitzinger’ 
(2008) Family Law Quarterly, p 475, and see Chapter 5. 
178  See www.resolution.org.uk, Reforming the Law for People Who Live Together, 2008. 
179 [2011] UKSC 53. 
180 [2012] UKSC 29, [56]. 
181 Statement by Professor Elizabeth Cooke, ‘Response from the Law Commission’ 6 September 
2011, www.lawcom.gov.uk.  also reported in The Times and other broadsheets. 
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which with the passage of time and other developments are now becoming 
increasingly obvious. 
 
 In short, there is more to the cohabitation debate than property or inheritance rights, 
or protection of the vulnerable.  Even rudimentary comparative study indicates that 
there are other ways of achieving some significant improvement in cohabitants’ 
problematical separations without a complex new statute. Apart from the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006 introduced by our close neighbour Scotland, several other civil 
as well as common law jurisdictions, have managed to put workable schemes in 
place, e.g.  Spain, Australia and New Zealand and  even Eire, the Irish Republic, is 
considering legislation.  England and Wales surely need not be left behind 
indefinitely.  Nor should England and Wales even be left behind in this way because 
of the apparent need for Parliament to address other issues, nor for fear of 
obstruction from traditionalist lobbies, nor even owing because of political concerns 
of offending any other constituency, since there is now no imminent election, the 
issue is irrelevant to the EU Referendum and there is ample time to address such 
essential housekeeping. 
 
The Law Commission’s work therefore bears some re-examination, first the initial 
consultation, then the final report. 
 
The 2006 consultation paper 
 
The consultation paper is in 12 parts with 5 appendices.  It is convenient therefore to 
summarise the structure and content as it stood at the time that it was issued in 2006 
before commenting on changes that have occurred in the 9 years since that time, 
during which much has moved on, making redundant at least some of the material 
considered.   Some points may also now appear in sharper focus than was perhaps 
realised to be desirable at that earlier stage, and to which less attention and/or or 
emphasis was given then for one reason or another. 
 
It has to be said that the first impression of this work is that, if the government was 
not wholeheartedly behind reform in accordance with whatever recommendations 
the Law Commission might have been expected to make, the entire 2006-7 process 
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of consultation, research and recommendations was overly complex and that 
something simpler might have had greater appeal.  However it is now, of course, 
possible to select the useful parts of the work, and to discard the rest if arguably not 
any longer relevant. 
 
The Introduction – Early Mistakes  
 
This highlights that the consultation paper is strictly a consultation (although the 
content was put together with the assistance of many specialist experts who are 
identified in its Appendix 1) and that no conclusions had been formed as a result of 
the preliminary work of drafting it to place the issues before the public - although it 
does also refer to putting forward a possible new scheme.  However this 
‘consultation only’ claim is fairly quickly abandoned when it is explained, in this same 
introductory section,  that the Commission had nevertheless already concluded that 
they preferred to rely on encouraging individuals to make express written 
agreements to  ‘agree the terms on which they are living together before they begin 
to do so’ 182.  
 
This approach was despite the fact that it was acknowledged that there was 
significant public misunderstanding about the consequences of cohabitation in the 
belief that, under common law, married couples’ rights were acquired after a period 
of living together, also that there had been various attempts to educate the public, 
including the Government’s 2004 Living Together campaign, investigated and 
reported on by one of Professor Anne Barlow’s research teams183.  Moreover, by the 
time that the 2006 consultation was reached,  the Commission  - dismissing the idea 
of adding opposite sex couples to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 -  was actually 
stating that  ‘there is no pressing social need for opposite-sex couples to have a 
“marriage alternative” which confers broadly similar rights and obligations as 
marriage’184, a conclusion directly contradicted by Professor Cooke in her statement 
in 2011, mentioned above, that reform was urgent.   
 
																																								 																				
182 Law Commission 2006, paragraph 1.29. 
183 Anne Barlow, Carole Burgoyne and Janet Smythson, The Living Together Campaign: an 
investigation of the impact of legally aware cohabitants’, Ministry of Justice, 2007.  
184 Law Commission, 2006, paragraph 1.31. 
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It is therefore stranger than ever that in 2011 the decision was taken not to 
implement the Law Commission’s 2007 recommendations as by that date there had 
developed an extensive academic literature on the ‘common law marriage myth’  
misunderstanding 185, as by that stage the cohabiting public had in some way 
internalised a firm impression that such common law marriage existed and protected 
them, indeed  it appears that they are still telling their legal advisers that they firmly 
believed in this when entering the cohabiting relationship!186 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, this dismissal of ‘pressing social need’ may have been 
a mistake, as possibly was the inclusion in the 2006 consultation - without actually 
following it up -  of the background to the project in the Commission’s 2002 
Discussion Paper Sharing Homes 187 which had reviewed the law relating to property 
rights of all individuals who might share a home (such as friends and relatives, 
including siblings) and who might therefore claim an interest in the shared property.  
 
While that earlier shared homes project did not  address only the rights of couples, 
despite its still  being labelled on the Commission website as a part of their 
Cohabitation work,  if  the apparent link made with it in the 2006 Cohabitation 
Discussion Paper had  then been followed up, it might  immediately have raised a 
train of thought later taken up some years later by Baroness Hale,  when assessing 
the practical efficacy of the Scottish scheme in Gow v Grant188 -  namely that both 
the Scots’ essentially compensatory statute and the English Law Commission’s 
scheme were likely to be most usefully developed from the principles of proprietary 
estoppel than from the more complex scheme of trusts189.  
 
There are in fact indications that Lady Hale began to touch on this train of thought in 
both Stack v Dowden190 and Kernott v Jones191 when she  insisted on the 
constructive - rather than resulting - trust as the appropriate approach to shared 
																																								 																				
185 Rebecca Probert, ’Common Law Marriage: Myths and Misunderstandings (2008) 20 CFLQ p1.  
186 See Chapter 9, 
187 Law Commission, Sharing Homes: A Discussion Paper. Law Com 278, HMSO, 2002. 
188 [2012] UKSC 29. 
189 Ibid, at [55] where she discusses the possible practical outcomes of the Scottish legislation’s 
compensatory approach. 
190 [2007] UKHL 17    
191 [2011] UKSC 53. 
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ownership of the family home where a couple acquired such a property in joint 
names and made themselves jointly liable for any mortgage192, before actually 
articulating the relevance of the compensatory approach in   Gow v Grant193,  the 
first Scottish appeal to come before the Supreme Court. Since in this later appeal 
she explicitly referred to the discretionary remedy which is the key benefit of 
proprietary estoppel, and which she had seen when reviewing the practical 
application of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 in that case, it is interesting to 
speculate what might have been included in the 2006 Consultation paper had the 
Law Commission team thought about these concepts further at the time they were 
writing that first document.  It might have saved several years and much work if that 
reflection had been developed before either Kernott v Jones or Gow v Grant had 
reached Lady Hale’s more penetrating analysis, and might have avoided the overly 
complex regime they in fact recommended in their Final Report, which at the time 
most people could not realistically see working in practice. 
 
It is fair to say that the Commission had intended in 2002  to clarify and simplify the 
complex principles of trusts and proprietary estoppel when at that time they still had 
hopes of creating a Shared Homes scheme - that is,  before giving up what they 
eventually saw as the unequal struggle of achieving that, because, they said, it was 
just not possible to achieve such a simplification in a contribution based scheme 
which would provide for a fair result ‘in the diversity of domestic circumstances which 
are now to be encountered’.  They had obviously been strongly motivated at that 
time to provide more certain outcomes than under the TOLATA system, which, since 
they did not achieve their aim, now remains, years later,  not much changed despite 
the efforts of the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned above. Clearly, if they had 
succeeded in providing a new Shared Homes scheme,   this would have applied also 
to cohabiting partners, whether  same - or opposite-sex, and whether they were in an 
intimate relationship either on their own or heading a family.  Altogether the period 
2002-2007 seems to seen a number of missed opportunities. 
 
However, as the 2002 Shared Homes work was eventually abandoned without 
recommendations,  and the fleeting reference to it in the 2006 Cohabitation 
																																								 																				
192 Ibid at [51] of the joint judgment of Lady Hale and Lord Walker. 
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Consultation paper not followed up, the whole focus of the Law Commission’s 2006-
7 work took another course and thus missed the chance to achieve a very different 
outcome half a decade before the government declined to implement their 2007 
recommendations,  which happened to coincide with Lady Hale engaging with the 
choice of underlying juristic theory in relation to the family home in her seminal 
Supreme Court judgments of 2011 and 2012,  mentioned above.   
 
Nevertheless, the Commission’s proposed reliance on education of the public 
towards entering into consensual private agreements should, perhaps, have already 
been explicitly abandoned at an even earlier stage than the 2006 Consultation 
Paper, such as when the Law Commission received their brief in 2005, as even at 
that stage the Living Together campaign, then already failing, was not the first such 
(unsuccessful) attempt at awareness raising in this respect.  In the 1980s the law 
reform society JUSTICE had already imaginatively conducted a similar campaign, 
with sponsorship from Nat West Bank, apparently with no educative effect whatever 
at that time: this was thus a previous project of which the government should have 
been aware since, while JUSTICE was always an all -party apolitical organisation, 
there was a long history since its foundation in the 1950s of government attention to 
the evidence based reports of its working parties.   
 
Thus even before the Barlow team’s report for the Ministry of Justice in 2007194, 
there were no indications that the ordinary public had become any more receptive to 
the possibility of the private ordering that the government had naively advocated, so 
it seems strange that this ‘educative’ policy was even seriously considered, since it 
completely ignored the fact that expectation of such a sea change in public 
perception and cooperation was probably the triumph of hope over experience. 
 
If the throwback to an educative approach was an initial error, the terms of reference 
of the 2006-7 project were clearly Mistake No 2: this was that the Commission was 
to work only on financial hardship of cohabitant couples and their children on 
relationship breakdown, and in clearly defined relationships, and that the project 
																																								 																				
194 Anne Barlow, Carole Burgoyne and Janet Smythson, The Living Together Campaign: an 
Investigation of the impact on legally aware cohabitants, Ministry of Justice, 2007, since available on 
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would include consideration of the place of cohabitation contracts, but that it was not 
intended to be a comprehensive review (such as to include intestacy).  Rather the 
task was to focus on the impact of separation, and in any case specifically excluded 
status (besides a number of associated issues which it was probably right to omit or 
the project would have become unwieldy).  On the other hand the really fatal driver 
was this limited focus which did not send a message that radical reform, addressing 
a new family format, was the flavour of the project. 
 
The work was also to concentrate on couples’ relationships as such (whether same- 
or opposite-sex) and to look towards devising a scheme for financial relief on 
separation, possibly on an ‘opt-in’ basis (but not one which treated cohabitants as if 
they were married).  
 
Such a possible scheme was set out in Part 6 of the consultation paper, and was to 
have strict eligibility criteria, besides which the basis of any awards was to be 
contribution based.  While narrowing the focus was clearly right, since the Law 
Commission has often found that large scale projects need taking apart to form 
smaller discrete tasks, actually omitting status probably made their work more rather 
than less difficult, and the omission of intestacy was probably a major mistake as 
practical experience has shown - especially while people continue to believe that 
they are in a common law marriage! 
 
Only far down the hierarchy in this introductory paper was reference made to the 
statutory schemes in other common law jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada, and to the Scottish scheme, and even then they are distinguished 
elsewhere as ‘deferred community of property and associated remedies’ in such a 
way that the impression is given that this might not be the way forward in the 
common law jurisdiction of England and Wales. In effect this dismissed the likely 
underlying theory of stable cohabiting relationships, namely that, with due respect to 
the Honourable Justice Mary Southin in Canada  in 1994195 (see Chapter 2) they are 
not necessarily  transient, short lived and uncommitted, so that their stability indeed 
appears to have been the main driver in the common law jurisdictions mentioned.  
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With the benefit of contemporary perspective, this approach was arguably 
fundamentally misguided, although there were no doubt good reasons for it at the 
time.  Of course the fundamental problem was that the Law Commission was a 
creature of statute - so only able to work within the confines of its practices, which 
require sponsoring of its work by a government department willing to implement 
legislation if that is recommended,  plus approval of the Lord Chancellor, which 
immediately restricted its activities.  Nevertheless,   it is clear that the tradition based 
policy current in 2006-7 was still resisting a Same-Sex Marriage Act which has now 
been enacted, having 6 years later been carefully presented as an equality measure.  
There have since been social changes in the public approach to both homosexuality 
and cohabitation: see below. This seems immediately to raise a question mark over 
the whole tone of these historic reports.  
 
Thus, very early in the Law Commission’s 2006-7 work the fatal seeds were sown to 
achieve a doomed result of what might have been a successful initiative to create a 
discrete normative regime for cohabiting families.  This appears to have been owing 
to the failure firmly to dismiss, without wasting time on any significant investigation, 
the mistaken traditional idea that members of the public intending to cohabit will both 
consider and,  at that point, make such practical agreements as the Law 
Commission thought appropriate: and also to dismiss any idea that the very 
cohabitants for whom rather conservative provisions were being contemplated might 
see themselves as enjoying a different status from either marriage or civil 
partnership or as two single people,  rather than a committed couples.  
  
The Social Context.  
 
While nine years have elapsed since this part was written it now looks very old 
fashioned in the light of the contemporary approach to cohabitation, which is in effect 
now a social norm even if it is not yet a legal norm.  Quite properly,  the demographic 
data is included showing the decline in marriage and the increase in numbers of 
cohabitants and their children, as well as identifying the drivers towards cohabitation, 
the fact of increased relationship duration, the reasons for these syndromes and 
actuarial estimates for future further increases in numbers of those affected.  
However, nowhere else is the dated approach of the project in the 2006 consultation 
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so clearly demonstrated as in the Commission’s obsession with the data: the 
impaired focus thus given to the remainder of their work, cast something of a blight, 
a fate which was already flagged up by exclusion of the long list of items that the 
team  was  not to consider, but some attention to which might have better informed 
their approach to legislation for some basic, practical, cohabitants’ rights.  
 
The data do not tell the research team anything at all, for example, about the 
reasons for cohabitation being elected in place of marriage or registered partnership, 
and therefore anything about what provision really needed to be made for such a 
significantly emerging unit – instead, the raw data available only told them that 
cohabitants were there, because they were not in marriage or registered 
partnerships.  Had this data been followed up by some semi- structured interviews 
they could have had qualitative data as well, a resource which can be analysed and 
is well recognised as reliable and robust196. 
 
This material also notes that these cohabitation trends had been observed in other 
European countries197 , a highly relevant factor owing to the contemporary incidence 
of cross border movement of families - cohabitant  as well as married -  since the 
volume of international child abduction cases being reported  was clearly indicating 
that by 2006 there was already established a cross border relationship breakdown 
trend involving several of our federal European neighbours -  as much as more 
distant jurisdictions such as Australia and New Zealand - France and Germany being 
favoured European destinations.   
 
Such an incidence of European family mobility is clearly more of a concern in the 
absence of a normative regime for cohabitants in English law, since under the EU 
treaties freedom of movement is positively encouraged in international business 
contexts.  Thus by 2006 family mobility must have for some time been indicating that 
a discrete regime for cohabitants was likely to become urgent  since,  once cross 
border complications apply in family breakdown,  unravelling both married and 
unmarried relationships becomes complex and expensive - and descent into poverty 
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being much more acute, and more quickly,  in the case of cohabitant family breakup 
than in the case of married separations,  as later specifically identified by the Institute 
of Fiscal Studies198 .    
 
The key statistics identified in the 2006 consultation paper are quoted from the 2001 
Census of the Office for National Statistics although the problems of obtaining 
entirely accurate information are acknowledged 199.  Other associated statistics are 
taken from 2001 ONS Social Trends and Population Trends , now of course very 
dated although the very datedness is of value. In particular it records that in 2001 
there had, since 1991, been a 67% increase in cohabiting couples, and the numbers 
had been increasing significantly since the 1970s. Over one and a quarter million 
children had been found to be dependent on cohabiting couples, that just over half a 
million of such children were in cohabiting step-families: moreover three quarters of a 
million cohabiting couples had a dependent child or children.   
 
Data also showed that there had been a steep increase in births to cohabiting 
couples: in 1970 these were less than 10%, but in 2004 those born to cohabitants 
were 42% of all births, with a similar increase in the proportion of such births 
registered by both partners over the same period - 76% of which were to parents 
living at the same address from which it was deduced that they were cohabiting, 
while one-parent registrations had remained fairly constant at under 10%. 
 
ONS data in 2005 and 2006 further showed that there had also been a drop in 
marriage figures per year over the previous 30 years: 480,000 in 1970 to around 
300,000 by 2000, although there had been small rises.  Divorce had also risen in the 
1970s-1980s, possibly directly increasing the proportion of marriages which were re-
marriages for one or both parties: this category amounted to two-fifths in 2003.  
Records had also showed that marriage was being deferred to the late 20s and early 
30s: the ages 25 and 23 respectively recorded for men and women in 1970 had risen 
to 31 and 29 in 2003.  The Law Commission had identified reasons for this in a 
pattern of earlier cohabitation preceding marriage and because of the older ages 
																																								 																				
198 Alissa Goodman and Ellen Greaves, Cohabitation, Marriage and Child Outcomes, IFS, C114 2010.  
199 Michael Murphy ‘The Evolution of Cohabitation in Britain, 1960-1995, (2000) 54 Population Studies 
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later recorded when entering into first partnerships, which they obtained from a study 
of Ermisch et al in 2000200. This account of relevant data potentially affecting 
cohabitants included consideration of the relatively new phenomenon of ‘living apart 
together’ for which 2005 and 2006 studies by Haskey were relied on201.  
Reading  the Consultation Paper today, almost a decade later, the most obvious 
question which is immediately posed is ‘How could it possibly have been said in 
2006, by any researcher confronted with this data, that reform was not urgent?’ 
 
However, the answer to this question may have been because regard had also been 
had to the ages of cohabitants, which clearly had contemporary significance, in that 
while it was noted that cohabitation had increased across all generations since 1970, 
the greatest increases were stated to be in the younger age groups, and 2004 data 
showed that the highest  numbers of  all were in the 20s, for both men and women.  
This may have been seen as evidence that cohabitation might have been transitory 
owing to social change being most marked in the lifestyles of those in their 20s, but 
appears also to have led to some not necessarily compatible views.  While the 
section begins with the statement that ‘Marriage remains the most popular form of 
partnership’  not long into this section it is then being said that ‘Combined with the 
data about age at first marriage, it is clear that cohabitation has overtaken marriage 
as the preferred form of first partnership’202.   There is also then reference to 
‘establishing co-residential relationships  (whether marriage or cohabitation ) later in 
life’ , which does not seem to coincide with the greatest increase in cohabitation 
relationships being in the 20s age group as stated previously.  
 
Further 2005 statistics evidenced that three quarters of cohabitants in Great Britain 
aged 16-59 had never been married and about one fifth of cohabitants had been 
divorced, that the increase in births to cohabiting parents was accompanied by a 
corresponding drop in married births and that conception outside marriage now 
																																								 																				
200	John	Ermisch and Marco Francesconi,  ‘Patterns of Household and Family Formation’ in Richard 
Berthoud  and Jonathan Gershuny  (eds) Seven Years in the Lives of British Families, Bristol: Policy 
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rarely resulted in the parents’ marrying before the birth, or in ‘shotgun weddings’ - 
suggesting that these had simply been replaced by cohabitation 203.  
 
It was also acknowledged that while cohabitation existed across all classes and 
socio-economic circumstances, cohabiting parents were generally less affluent than 
married ones, that this decreased the chances of the couple marrying, and that there 
was a good deal of literature and research on this issue which pointed to a theory 
that cohabitation was favoured as it allowed for an easier exit from the 
relationship204.  
 
It is fair to say that these were all conclusions that are probably still valid today, 
especially owing to the post-Radmacher v Granatino (2010) popularity of marital 
agreements but at the time should perhaps have been one of the most powerful 
indicators that some legislation was urgent to address the practicalities of 
cohabitation breakdown -  especially as the Office of National Statistics’ data relied 
on showed that  at that time most cohabitants were owner occupiers, although there 
was also some evidence even then for younger cohabitants renting their homes, 
which would almost certainly be a more marked situation today when the age of first 
home purchase has become so delayed, owing to current high property values in 
relation to earnings and the high deposits now required. 
 
Data was also included on the duration and outcomes of cohabitation.  Late 1990s 
data put average duration at 27 months as opposed to the median length of marriage 
at divorce in 2004 which was 11 years, although it was also accepted that there had 
been a steady increase in the median duration of cohabitation.  The Ermisch-
Francesconi late1990s research (Economic Research Council Research Centre, 
1998) suggested that 60% of cohabiting couples would eventually marry,  although 
this does not seem to match the declining marriage rate evidence elsewhere in the 
section, nor when that evidence is also supported by future projections of marriage 
rates which (according to this section) are addressed later in the paper. 
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Public attitudes to Cohabitation were also dealt with here.  The British Social 
Attitudes Survey 2000 showed that at that time (now 15 years ago) 67% of 
respondents agreed that it was ‘all right for a couple to live together without intending 
to get married’.   This was an increase by more than 10% from 1994, although 
responses ‘varied markedly by age group’ and a survey for BBC Panorama claimed 
that as much as 84% thought this situation was ‘all right.   
 
This data ended with the statement that ‘what is clear is that cohabitation has 
become an established part of British society’ and that the Government Actuary’s 
department had projected that by 2031 over 1 in 4 couples would be cohabiting 
rather than marrying.  The actual figures relied for this statement were 16% 
cohabiting and 41% marrying and that the ages and numbers of those cohabiting 
would be expected to increase by the target date, to 305,000 men and 234,000 
women over 65,  which, it was noted, had significant implications for such 
relationships ending by death205.   
 
However all these figures, as mentioned in the present and previous paragraphs, 
have so far escalated in the intervening period since they were first relied on that 
none are realistically any longer of practical use, other than to show that there was 
some urgency for legislation in 2006! As a result,  it is hardly surprising that this 
section of the Consultation Paper is more of a shock to read in 2015 than it could 
possibly have been when this data was included in the consultation paper in 2006, at 
which point there was clearly a case for reform, which has now been so completely 
overtaken by events in various ways that it would now not only be droll to suggest 
that cohabitation is not an accepted fact of life but also that it still seems to 
relentlessly growing, so that ‘by how much’ is not a useful question to ask .   
 
Under the impact of contemporary perception of a clear case for reform in 2006,   
this volume of indicative statistics from as long ago as 2006 is especially remarkable  
when, despite some obvious inconsistencies, it was at the same being seriously 
suggested that there was ‘no pressing social need’ for a normative legal regime for 
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cohabitants. Presumably the influence must have been the long held view, current 
since the 1985 Booth Committee, that marriage was available and cohabitants 
should make use of it.   However, if anything,  the pressing social need is even more 
compelling nearly 10 years later when the separate cohabitant constituency is much 
clearer and judges regularly accept cohabitation as a social norm even if not always 
legally provided for206.  
 
However, the 2006 ‘no urgency; approach is certainly mutually exclusive with the 
view expressed by Professor Elizabeth Cooke in September 2011 referred to above.  
In that statement, made on behalf of the Law Commission when the government 
announced that it would not implement the 2007 recommendations, she made the 
only realistic point on the basis of the evidence which had been gathering over years 
-  that owing to ‘the prevalence of cohabitation...the need for reform can only become 
more pressing’, which is clearly the currently correct conclusion, regardless of any 
ambivalence that might have been justified in 2006. 
 
How the Law Recognised Cohabitants in 2006.  
 
Much was made in 2006 of the fact that cohabitants were not totally unknown to the 
law which then made provision for them (and still does) in various respects. Attention 
was duly drawn to the financial and property consequences of cohabitation and its 
breakdown and also to the prevalent myth, apparently still believed by many people, 
that living together for some period of time created a ‘common law marriage’ - a 
position which remains static, speaking for itself in that the lack of reform has 
resulted only in the initiatives of Baroness Hale and other Justices of the Supreme 
Court, already noted, to clarify the existing common law. This, therefore, was one of 
the better sections of the Consultation Paper, since it drew attention, in stark detail, 
to the fact that the current provision in 2006 was completely unsatisfactory, including 
in particular, that public knowledge of the law- based on the ‘prevalent myth’ -  was 
positively dangerous to those unfamiliar with the true position, as to which there is no 
evidence that there has been any change since 2006, thus cogently supporting 
Professor Cooke’s 2011 conclusion.   
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Thus the lay cohabitant has since been left sleep walking through the legal position 
identified in 2006 whereby, while providing no discrete regime for stable 
cohabitation, the law potentially ranges through self- regulation by cohabitation 
agreements, or gifts, to the creation of trusts of the family home, none of this very 
satisfactory.  In particular, any express declaration of trusts of land, such as under 
the Land Registration Act 2002 s 44(1) and the Land Registration Rules 2003, 
r.95(2)(a) has to be effected on either form FR1 for first registration or Form TR1 on 
transfer, all of which still clearly floats somewhere above the heads of most of those 
involved in cohabiting relationships, considering the continued prevalence of their 
disputes regularly coming to court!   
 
As a result, the continued progress through the courts of cases like Kernott v Jones  
in 2011 and Seagrove v Sullivan  in 2015 makes clear that the cohabiting lay public 
is in no way any more knowledgeable about their situation than they were in 2006 
and/or in any case still not consulting their lawyers where they might at least have 
done so if they had had any recollection of the publicity at the time for the Law 
Commission’s 2006-7 work.   
 
How much easier this would of course be for those involved if at any time between 
2007 and 2011 either one of two governments which by then had had the chance 
had done something to implement a normative scheme -  at least as scheme of 
some sort if the Law Commission’s scheme was not entirely acceptable – so as to 
enable cohabitants either to work out their own cohabitation agreements at the start 
of their relationship, or to use that scheme as a guide to brokering an agreed solution 
when the relationship broke down.   
 
It must be wondered to what extent the consultation paper was read with any 
attention by those at the time in the Ministry of Justice who were presumably 
charged with advising the Lord Chancellor on the urgency for reform which was later 
emphasised by Professor Cooke:  significant space is given in Parts 3 and 4 to the 
express and inferred common intention constructive trusts which have in many cases 
resulted in a party whose name has not been put on the title documents being 
treated as the beneficiary of an express common intention to share,  such as in 
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Grant v Edwards in 1986207  and Eves v Eves 208 in 1975. The Consultation paper 
even  expressly noted  that ‘the case law remains crucially ambiguous on whether a 
court may infer a common intention from financial contributions if the parties confess 
to having never considered the matter of ownership’ -    the very point which has 
since had to be dealt with by the Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott  in respect of 
which there has been some criticism of the Justices’ concept of imputing intention 
from the parties’ conduct if they could not identify it from express terms .   
 
This examination of the legal ambiguities also concedes that ‘The clear lack of any 
actual intention might be expected to rebut an inference of common intention to 
share beneficial ownership’ and that ‘Some judicial remarks suggest that this is not 
necessarily the case, though those remarks themselves are ambiguous’ 209. As if this 
were not enough to argue for urgent introduction of a normative scheme, sale and 
occupation are also considered in the Consultation Paper under the Trusts of Land 
and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA) - whereby application may be 
made to the Court to resolve disputes over a home co-owned by cohabitants - and 
under Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, or Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 
where the couple have children.   
 
This part also considers the transfer of tenancy function under Schedule 7 of the 
Family Law Act1996, and summarises maintenance and capital provision for 
children,  respectively under the Child Support Acts and the Children Act 1989,  as 
well as property entitlement on the death of a cohabitant under the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975,   besides the complete lack of 
provision under the present intestacy rules, save for the limited power of the Crown 
to make discretionary provision for ‘dependants’ of the intestate if the estate is in fact 
bona vacantia, under which exception discretionary grants have been made to 
surviving cohabitants. 
 
Unfortunately this rehearsal of a cocktail of non-specific remedies that might be 
fished through in case some helpful provision might be found to provide an ad hoc 
																																								 																				
207 [1986] Ch 638. 
208 [1975] 1 WLR 1338. 
209 per Waite LJ in Midland Bank v Cooke, [1995] 4All ER at 575D and H,   and per Chadwick LJ in 
Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546, [2005]  Fam 211 at[68]. 
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remedy speaks for itself.  If anything in the Consultation does, it is clearly articulated 
here that a customised normative scheme is required, for which at present there still 
remains no adequate substitute.  The Consultation paper could not make clearer that 
while cohabitants and their children are not ignored by the law, resolution of financial 
and property affairs on the termination of cohabitants’ relationships are not only  
‘driven by strict property law’ which the parties are unlikely to understand,  but  that 
‘there are problems that it has left un-remedied and (even) created’.   
 
With all due respect to the Law Commission team of the time of this 2006-7 project, 
this final  concessionary comment noted in the paragraph above is a significant 
understatement, especially in the post LASPO 2012 virtually legal-aid-free 
landscape, where litigants in person are entirely unprepared and lacking in aptitude 
to navigate their way through a recondite area of the law which challenges many law 
students (and indeed some practitioners as soon as they have left their professional 
qualifying examination rooms). 
 
It is simply not appropriate for ordinary members of the public to have to forage for 
the law in a number of statutes and a plethora of case law when there is no evidence 
that they are managing that even in the relatively simple contexts of marriage and 
civil partnership, where they are at least concerned with only one or two statutes  - 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004 - in which to 
find the relevant provisions affecting the divorce of married partners or dissolution of 
registered civil partnerships.  Apparently the government has just found it necessary 
to clarify and consolidate the law of Sale of Goods210 for better understanding of the 
consumer, so why not – much more urgently and when the Law Commission was 
expressly involved for the purpose -   the law relating to cohabitants? 
 
A leading set of Family Law Barristers Chambers has recently found it necessary to 
publish a detailed guide called DIY Divorce and Separation 211 for the litigants in 
person who are now obliged to secure orders in relation either to marriage or 
registered civil partnership: the reason being, of course, in order to conduct their own 
cases without legal aid when they cannot afford advice or representation.  However 
																																								 																				
210 Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
211  S Sugar , P Clapham,  J Foster, DIY Divorce and Separation,  Jordans Publishing,  2014 
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no professional source, at the Bar or in the solicitors’ part of the profession, has so 
far braved publication of a similar layman’s guide for cohabitants, and it is not far to 
seek the reason why in that case,  when the law is so scattered and complex. 
 
A similar statute for cohabitants seems little relative clarity for lay people to have 
asked for when required by the government to deal with matters concerning  their 
property and financial interests without legal advice or guidance, especially since 
cohabitants’ sheer numbers have vastly exceeded  those indicated to be using the 
Civil Partnership Act, which remained between 6,000 and 7,000 unions a year until 
the introduction of same-sex marriage under the 2013 Act when there has been a 
surprise defection to same-sex marriage.  This, however, appears to be confined to 
same-sex marriages only, but not the core opposite sex cohabiting community where 
figures continue a steady rise.  For example, the latest 2015 cohabitation figures212 
seem to be now 3.2m and were already 2.9 in 2011 when the Law Commission’s 
scheme might reasonably at last have been implemented after the publication of the 
Wasoff Scottish research213. 
  
With regard to the case law referred to by the Law Commission in 2006, this is a 
point where the law has already moved on since 2006-7,  in that there has now been 
the Supreme Court decision following up Stack v Dowden (2007) in Jones v Kernott 
(2011)  where the court has dealt with the instance of cases where common intention 
might be imputed from conduct,  in respect of which  - despite Lord Bridge’s earlier 
view in Lloyds Bank v Rossett (1995) -  Baroness Hale has suggested that this 
raises no particular problem, especially as she has in the same 2011 case confirmed 
that the constructive trust is the preferable pathway when attempting to discern the 
parties’ intentions in connection with shared ownership in the family home.   
Although Lord Neuberger did not agree with her in Stack v Dowden where he 
expressly preferred use of the resulting trust, while arriving at the same numerical 
result via that distinct route. 
 
																																								 																				
212 November 2015 ONS statement. 
213 Fran Wasoff, Joanna Miles and Enid Mordaunt, ‘Cohabitation: Lessons from Research North of the 
Border’(2011) 23 Child and Family Law Quarterly, pp.302-322. 
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Consequently this, surely, presents an unarguable case for the clarity of legislation:  
when the current President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court cannot 
agree on the pathway to clarity in a core issue between cohabitants legislation 
spelling the matter out must be the solution,  both to any disquiet about such 
divergence of doctrine and to confusion by the ordinary person who is entitled to 
know with certainty what the law is?  
 
It is fair to say that the consultation paper makes clear that the 2006 team was aware 
of the criticisms and the potential impact within the law of human rights, that is,  that 
the law was already then perceived as  ‘unfair…uncertain and…illogical’ besides 
being ‘procedurally complex’.  It was conceded that many of these failings affected 
cohabitants, both those with children and those without, but which did impact, 
uniquely or more acutely, on those who did have children.  It was acknowledged that 
there was criticism that litigation on the breakdown of a relationship failed to provide 
fair outcomes, ‘in particular by failing to recognise the value of certain types of 
contribution made by one party to the acquisition of assets owned by the other’, also 
‘the economic sacrifices made by those who give up paid employment... in order to 
care for the couple’s children’.  It was acknowledged that the root of this criticism 
was because of the law’s apparent inability to recognise contemporary domestic 
financial management, failure to respond to the parties’ interdependence and an 
inherent lack of remedial flexibility in the law’s concentration on distinct assets rather 
than looking at the parties’ economic positions as a whole.   
 
In the circumstances, this is the one section of the Consultation Paper which needs 
little or no comment, except to say that if this situation was realised why was it not 
‘urgent’ to achieve some reform, and perhaps why was the tone of both the 
consultation and the final report not more compelling? – which, had it been shorter, 
more succinct, and its key points less buried in excess descriptive matter of less 
importance,  might have been an important achievement. Such a more robust final 
report might have convinced both supporters of the research team and the 
government receiving their reports that reform was necessary.  This should have 
been realised especially since,   before the end of 2007,  human rights aspects had 
moved on slightly in that the Lisbon Treaty, then under negotiation and since signed 
by the UK, and which was at the time notable for advancing protection of ‘the family’, 
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thus created even stronger arguments for reform of the cohabitant constituency in 
that ‘family’.  
 
One contention not well developed at the time -  owing to the length and diffuse 
nature of the consultation paper  -  was the long standing grievance that in the 
absence of common intention to share ownership of property - mainly the family 
home -  the law of implied trusts was unsuited to cohabitants’ disputes because of 
the arbitrary allocation of a beneficial share to the one who paid the mortgage, but 
not to the one who paid household bills: and that this did not fit with the realities of 
family life214.   
 
This was a key point in support of the need for a simple scheme, and it is fair to say 
that the paper conceded that ‘whether an applicant succeeds in establishing an 
interest may be entirely fortuitous’, and that ‘it could be said to favour calculating and 
self-interested individuals over the more altruistic (or less legally aware)’ because 
‘many people simply do not appreciate the significance that the law attaches to 
certain intentions and contribution, and the lack of significance it attaches to others’. 
However, the structure and drafting, as so often in the Commission’s 2006-7 
documents, managed to obscure both the evidence for reform and the obvious 
channel through which it should be achieved – that is,  through a discrete normative 
scheme - despite the fact that it was also acknowledged that the search for common 
intention ‘neglect[s] most of the ethical case to be made, in the family context, for 
having this jurisdiction at all’215.   
 
Another curious failing of the Commission’s 2006-7 documents is the mismatch 
between the Commission’s apparent awareness of the principle in strict property law 
that non-financial contributions are not recognised to establish an interest in property 
and their acknowledgement of the disproportionate economic impact upon women of 
child care in cohabitation.  The Law Commission could have been expected to have 
followed this up,   not simply because women in general and female cohabitants in 
																																								 																				
214 Simon Gardner, ‘Quantum in Gissing v Gissing constructive trusts’,(2004) 120 Law Quarterly 
Review p 541 at 546. 
215 Simon Gardner, ibid (2004); Rebecca Probert, ‘Land law and ex-lovers’ (2005) Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer, p.168 at pp171,172; Anna Lawson, ‘The things we do for love: detrimental reliance 
in the family home (1996) 16 Legal Studies p.218.  
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particular can often be in part time or no employment, but can also often suffer low 
pay and lack of career progression when actually employed, then suffering again 
through the inevitable consequence of their then having smaller pensions - or lack of 
pension provision for them at all -  and thus, through lack of any claim which married 
women would have under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,  delayed poverty216.  
However, again this was not capitalised upon as it might have been, despite the fact 
that contemporary cases in the House of Lords – the 2006 Miller, McFarlane 
judgments217 – were examining the entire concept of fairness, besides needs, 
compensation and sharing, within the married context.   
 
It is not that the Law Commission was not aware of these issues in relation to 
cohabitants, as space is also given to the improved provision by then available in 
childcare, tax credits, maternity and parental leave and flexible working to support 
‘family friendly’ employment since the classic cohabitant’s disadvantage case of Mrs 
Burns in the 1980s.  Again, however, despite reciting these benefits, and 
acknowledging that the law does ‘fail the primary carer cohabitant’ when economic 
sacrifices have been made, opportunity was lost to emphasise that inevitably the 
resulting economic disadvantage may continue long after the relationship ends, 
although had it not ended the support within that relationship would probably have 
made up for the sacrifices which would have been compensated both financially and 
non-financially – and that this is a key problem in providing appropriately on the 
ending of a cohabiting relationship.   
 
One of the most significant failures of the Commission’s 2006-7 work is that they did 
not consider that the Scottish scheme was capable of addressing these sorts of  
issues impacting on a female cohabitant,  while still treating an ex-cohabitant as 
cohabitant rather than equally with an ex-spouse, as the Scottish Act  was then 
shown to be able to do in Gow v Grant218. This failure is difficult to understand, as 
the Scottish scheme was already enacted before the London project was half way 
through and was sufficiently advanced to have been appropriately flagged up for late 
detailed consideration in the 2006 Consultation Paper,    
																																								 																				
216 Katherine Rake (ed), Women’s Incomes Over Lifetime, HMSO, 2008.  
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A further point to be extracted from the paper is the surprising one that limited use 
was being made of the existing provision for accommodation and financial support 
under Schedule 1 of the Children Act.  It was suggested that this was because, like 
the TOLATA jurisdiction, this is a remedy that might be found too complicated to be 
of practical use owing to the fact that in an ‘ordinary money’ case the capital will not 
be available to provide a home for the child and carer cohabitant, as well as for the 
other cohabitant who has moved out.  Another reason might be because the court 
has no power to order the non-resident parent to pay the mortgage, while the carer 
parent may not have the means to support the home or the non-resident parent to 
provide maintenance for the former cohabitant, and because the accommodation 
provision will in any case terminate when the child reaches majority.  
 
This contrasts with the position on divorce where the child’s parents are married219 
since then the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 may address all these problems.  There 
is also the problem of the procedural complexity in any cohabitants’ property dispute 
case which is well documented by Lord Justice Carnwath in Stack v Dowden 220. 
 
Indeed, once more in the instance of the potential Children Act 1989 remedies, 
complexity of existing provision needed to be much more forcefully put.  Moreover, 
while the Commission did  address the uncertainty created by such decisions as 
Oxley v Hiscock (2004) in the Court of Appeal  of which there was much academic 
criticism (Gardner, 2004, and Cooke,2005), the illogicality unfairness of provision on 
death but not on separation, and the human rights implications were not fully 
exploited, which is odd since they engage Article 8 (the right to respect for family life 
and home) and Article 14 (the right to be free from discrimination in the exercise of 
Convention rights) which means that cohabitants must not be treated worse than 
married couples (Rasmussen v Denmark, 1984, Saucedo v Spain, 1999).   
 
While it is true that in many respects cohabitants are treated the same as married 
couples in English law, clearly on separation and to some extent on death they are 
not, although the 2006 Consultation Paper concludes that it is ‘unlikely’ that the 
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220 [2007] EWCA  Civ 857 at [75].  
  
 
128 
European Court of Human Rights would treat shortcomings in cohabitants’ treatment 
as a violation of Article 14, especially as that Article is only engaged if there is 
breach of another Convention right.  However the Consultation Paper seems to have 
proceeded on the basis that either the Court would not be concerned, or, if it did take 
exception, any deviation from what might be regarded as a norm would be 
proportionate to a legitimate aim, and also that some cohabitants might argue that 
they actually had a right to different treatment, precisely because they are not in fact 
in an analogous situation to married couples!      
 
This latter idea must be wrong. Given the IFS 2010 research221, even if cohabitants 
are entitled to a right to distinction of treatment for themselves, could this possibly be 
right for the children in their care? It is a principle of English Family Law that children 
should not be disadvantaged in any way on account of the status of their parents. 
This may be loosely dated to the abolition of the status of illegitimacy which had 
impacted upon them since the early Middle Ages, and from which followed the 
Legitimacy Act 1976 and the gradual separation of Child Law from the main corpus 
of Family Law following the Children Act 1989, although the welfare principle in s 1 of 
that Act is older and can be traced back to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, 
despite not having much practical effect until later in the 20th century. 
 
It is fair to say that the Consultation Paper does acknowledge that there might be a 
case for claims of indirect discrimination against the children of cohabitants, but 
raises a further problem in that Article 1 of the First Protocol as well as Article 8 will 
protect the property rights of potential respondents, so that they could object to any 
reformed law to replace the existing declaratory provisions available within the law of 
trusts and other remedies discussed,  which currently apply to them and their 
property.   
 
This is a problem created by failure to view Family Law as a whole when dealing with 
its micro-compartments, but actually is probably a paper tiger.  In the case that 
legislation was introduced to protect the weaker parties in a cohabiting family – 
usually the woman and children - any complaint could surely be met by the pincer 
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movements of the proportionate and legitimate aim arguments, and of course by an 
opt out provision, which is a feature of the New Zealand scheme for cohabitants222.   
 
The Consultation Paper thus concluded that any case for reform would therefore 
have to be stringently evaluated, presumably owing to these potential conflicts, but 
this is a pedestrian argument, stating nothing but the blindingly obvious, and surely 
what the 2006-7 work was intended to consider and address. In any event there is 
an approach already taken by English Family Law in the case of conflict, for example 
in such disputes as relocation of a child with a parent which will impact on the 
contact of the left behind other parent.  In  such a case the normal approach 
attempts to prioritise the rights of children, although it must be accepted that 
sometimes the solution is that there is no solution as the child itself may have 
competing rights, that is,  to meaningful contact with both parents, the carer parent 
and the non-resident parent.  
 
Nevertheless, in the case of financial impact of parental separation on a child, 
preservation of the first consideration that is normally given to minor children in 
cases under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and s 15 and Schedule 1 of the 
Children Act 1989 must surely trump any other consideration where there is a 
conflict, since the provision of a home and enough resources to live there during a 
child’s upbringing are usually regarded as the basic minimum to secure a child’s 
welfare. 
 
However, the human rights aspects of any cohabitation reform is one of the aspects 
which has been overtaken by events after the 2006-7 period in which the Law 
Commission work took place, since when English Law also has a new Equality Act 
and the European Union has new treaties. While the equality aspect of same-sex 
marriage was taken on board in presenting that Act as an equality measure, no such 
fundamental approach to the human rights aspects of English law’s treatment of 
cohabitation was included in the 2006-7 work. This is not surprising since the Lisbon 
Treaty, also known as the ‘Reform Treaty’ was not signed in Lisbon until December 
2007 and did not come into force until 2009.   
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This treaty significantly changes human rights protection within the EU, mostly in 
amendments to Article 6 of the Treaty on European union.  These provide that the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is legally binding, having the same status as EU 
law, and that ‘the European Union’ shall accede to the European Convention on 
Human Rights223.     
 
It is thus possible that the there is a newly highlighted indirect discrimination issue 
involved in the non-recognition of cohabitants as such within English Law which 
inevitably impacts disproportionately on women and children in any cohabiting family 
where a traditional division of labour is the norm, since on leaving the relationship 
the woman is more likely to fall into poverty, taking the children with her, as 
established by the IFS224. This is probably inevitable, in the absence of an accessible 
discrete normative regime which protects the homemaker woman’s rights to a share 
of the family wealth which she may have helped to create in the manner identified in 
historic leading cases where common intention has sometimes, but not always, been 
found in the parties’ conduct, owing to the uncertainty of judicial outcome.  This 
theory has been touched on by human rights commentators but is nowhere 
investigated in prior work in this field.  This cannot be right and it would seem that 
any updated perspective must include a consideration of this indirect discrimination, 
which is flagged up by at least two commentators, Choudhry & Herring225 who also 
refer to work on indirect discrimination by Glennon226, in both cases post-dating the 
Law Commission project. 
 
The Consultation Paper did evaluate the case made by the perceived shortcomings 
in the law,  including by looking into research into marriage and cohabitation,  and 
the possible sufficiency of existing or adapted remedies for the ills identified227 .   
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Marriage, registered civil partnership or self-regulation under contract or trusts, 
including the place of opt-in or opt-out alternatives, had all been long suggested 
alternatives.   The options for, and cost of, reforms and the impact of any reform on 
different types of cohabitants were all duly reviewed by the Commission, but the 
charge of unfairness in the law’s treatment of cohabitants was approached on the 
basis that any unfairness is self-inflicted, since a cohabitant may marry or self-
regulate by adopting another form of protection, such as a trust or cohabitation 
agreement. Alternatively, whether there should be an opt-in or opt-out scheme was 
also considered.  
 
Unfortunately, however, the Commission also relied on the educative work of the 
Living Together Campaign, drawing attention to the consequences of cohabitation 
without marriage, civil partnership or other legal arrangement, although they did 
accept that some cohabiting partners have no choice as the other cohabitant may 
reject marriage, civil partnership or even a cohabitation agreement, although it was 
also accepted that many cohabitants were, for whatever reason, simply not taking 
these steps when they are available. 
 
However, equally unfortunately, this area of the 2006-7 work was bedevilled by 
failure to note that time was already marching on somewhat vigorously, since the 
Living Together Campaign was in 2006 already nearing the end of its life, and has 
since completely petered out, the website having shortly afterwards entirely 
disappeared.  Nevertheless, even in 2007 it must objectively have been doubted 
whether such educative initiatives were genuinely effective or even had the potential 
to be so, given the long past ineffective results of the JUSTICE campaign of the 
1980s, and the fact that unprotected cohabitation, and the marriage myth, were both 
firmly continuing.  
 
In the circumstances it was a flawed and forlorn hope even in 2007 to suppose that 
the ordinary member of the public would cooperate by suddenly accepting the fact 
that there were no common law quasi-marriage rights for cohabitants.  This was so 
obvious that it was later followed up by a series of articles over the succeeding 5 
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years, including a leading monograph228 in which she traced the history of this 
erroneous belief back to far earlier than the 1970s when ‘common law wives’ 
featured fairly frequently in the press.  First instances found were in pre-1960s cases 
and common law marriages overseas, especially in far flung locations where no 
Anglican clergy or local law were available, so that some recognition had to be given 
to a variety of alternative rites.  Next, there were more cases, even further back in 
the 1700s, prior to Lord Hardwicke’s Clandestine Marriages Act 1753, an early 
measure intended to prevent forced marriages for property acquisition reasons, but 
which had the effect of requiring more strict formalities than previously. 
 
The other major flaw in the 2006-7 work is the concern that any statutory protection 
for cohabitants might undermine marriage, although the Law Commission did take 
note of research in Australia where cohabitants have had some protection since 
1985 and this has not had any identifiably adverse impact on marriage. There is also 
concern expressed in the Consultation Paper that there may be no justification for 
interfering in cohabitants’ rights to self-determination in not marrying,  so that it might 
be preferable to explore the experience of some other jurisdictions’ alternative civil 
unions, for example,  New Zealand’s Civil Union Act 2004 and France’s Pacte Civile 
de Solidarite (PACS).   However, it seems that nothing came of this, 
 
Concluding that it would be appropriate to enable those who chose not to be subject 
to any new legislation to opt out, and that there were already at least 2 opt-in 
schemes available in English law which were not being taken up by some  -  that is,  
marriage and civil partnership -  the Consultation Paper did then move on to consider 
a potential opt-out scheme, which would enable there to be a default system in 
place, unless the parties positively agreed to opt out of it.   The Consultation Paper 
indeed pointed to the adoption of this solution in several jurisdictions both common 
law and civil, although no attempt was made to evaluate any of them.229   
 
The Consultation Paper also addresses the common suggestion that failure to marry 
shows lack of commitment, that is, in choosing instead to cohabit, but does reject 
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this as inappropriate on the ground of the continuing evidence that numerous 
couples are already living together on the basis of their belief that they enjoy a 
‘common law marriage’ which is hardly compatible with a lesser commitment than 
marriage.   Additionally, studies have in fact found commitment between cohabiting 
couples230 together with credible reasons for their rejecting marriage, ranging from 
not wanting a public ceremony to not being able to afford the apparent cost of a 
wedding, but again the Commission   goes no further into this thread231 . 
 
The section on eligibility for a statutory scheme concludes that those with children 
should definitely qualify, but that those without children pose more difficult questions 
for decision since they are less likely to have suffered any economic disadvantage 
through their cohabitation.  This is because - except in the case of death of the other 
partner where there is already provision under the 1975 Act - they could resume their 
pre-relationship lifestyle, unless there was some strong case for seeking provision 
from the other partner.  
 
It was therefore resolved in the consultation to leave the issue of provision for a 
separated childless cohabitant to the views of those responding on whether such 
cohabitants should be included in a new statutory scheme - however oddly 
proposing exclusion of those with few assets and low household incomes  who 
would often be renting their homes as they  would be able to use the tenancy 
transfer and child support provisions: which, however,  should logically be a decision 
for choice of remedy of those concerned.   
 
A further suggestion that judges could  adapt existing law, perhaps adopting a 
comparative perspective in particular with Australia, New Zealand and Canada232 
was clearly seen as  similarly unsuitable since there had already been academic 
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comment that this was a task for Parliament233,  despite the fact that the lack of 
reform has left the Supreme Court to do something very similar in adapting existing 
common law principles, on which the justices have commented in their judgments in  
Jones v Kernott 234. The concept that judges might be able to make the necessary 
changes to the law has now also been effectively commented on by the Supreme 
Court in that very Jones v Kernott appeal decision, where the court did take the 
opportunity, not only to clarify their less than comprehensive analysis of the law in 
the earlier case of Stack v Dowden, but also to comment on the fact that they had 
had to do so since legislative reform had not been effected over a long period235. 
 
The other oddity of the Consultation Paper was that costs of potential litigation, in the 
absence of a normative scheme, were also considered but not thought to be 
‘burdensome’, although the topic not taken any further, despite the fact that there 
were obviously identifiable costs of the existing situation, whereas a new scheme 
could be self -financing even if parties were eligible for legal aid.  Costs is, of course,  
an area where there has been very significant change since 2007, since there is now 
usually no legal aid available and normally costs are no longer awarded in Family 
cases except where there is litigation misconduct or other good reason for departing 
from the principle that each party pay their own.  
 
First the idea that costs could be ‘not burdensome’ would not have survived the 
Jackson Inquiry into costs in civil litigation236 the recommendations of which were 
implemented in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, 2012, 
(LASPO 2012) in force April 2013, which has removed almost all civil legal aid as 
well as from most Family Law cases.   
 
Moreover, the Jackson Inquiry was designed precisely to find a way to control the 
escalation of costs in litigation, which in the case of heavy costs in the Chancery 
Division of the High Court has always been a significant factor in a litigant’s decision 
as to whether to start proceedings in a trust case – and which inevitably is where 
																																								 																				
233 John Mee, ‘Property Rights and Personal Relationships: reflections on reform’ (2004) 24 Legal 
Studies p. 414 at 453. 
234 [2011] UKSC 53, per Lord Collins [56]-[66] and per Lord Kerr at [67]. 
235 Ibid, per Lord Wilson at [78]. 
236 Sir Rupert Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs, Interim Report, 2009; Review of Civil Litigation 
Costs, 2009-10,  Final Report, both available at www.judiciary.gov.uk. 
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cohabitants are obliged to litigate if alleging a constructive or resulting trust, or 
proprietary estoppels – that is,  the stock in trade of cohabitants’ property disputes 
since cohabitants have no access to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 or the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004. 
 
Secondly, legal aid has since largely disappeared following LASPO 2012, so that 
whether cohabitant parties who required a determination of their property rights 
could obtain legal aid or not so as to litigate is now irrelevant, since there is so little 
legal aid available to apply for. 
 
However the really major flaw in the Law Commission’s 2006-7 work is that, while in 
conclusion the Commission rejects the view that any new remedies should attach to 
a new legal status to which cohabiting couples could opt in by registration, it was 
accepted that eligible couples should be able to opt out. The exclusion of a 
cohabitation status  - although not the fault of the Commission but of their original 
brief -  may also be a mistake since those common law jurisdictions which have 
recognised a status of cohabitant as being in fact an ‘un-formalised’ partnership, 
have apparently successfully side stepped problems which appear to have presented 
themselves to those briefing the Commission initially, and generally in the 
Commission’s 2006-7 work.  
 
 Clearly, a close look should be taken at these jurisdictions which, in the interests of 
practicality, this inquiry has always had the intention of doing in view of the 
established experience in those leading common law systems237.  
 
Financial Relief on Separation: The Scheme Proposed in 2007   
 
The scheme eventually proposed was based on structured judicial discretion 
indicating clear principles rather than fixed rules, and to some extent analysed the 
underlying principles in other jurisdictions, rejecting a needs- or partnership-based - 
scheme similar to that available to married couples under the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973, which had been advanced by some commentators such as Bailey-
																																								 																				
237 See Chapters 6-8. 
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Harris238.  Instead a contribution-based and disadvantage-generated system was 
preferred, linked to ‘economic advantage’ and ‘economic disadvantage’, as found in 
the Scottish legislation. 
 
The aims of the scheme were set out to provide what were said to be fair, principled, 
flexible but certain, coherent and consistent outcomes,  which were also ‘clear and 
readily comprehensible’ and ‘practical in application’.  It recognised the balance 
needed between ‘predictability which flows from firm rules and the flexibility to secure 
justice in individual cases’ and agreed that this was ‘notoriously difficult to achieve’239 
- but on balance opted for discretion, partly as this was said to be well recognised by 
English Family law.   
 
The proposed scheme did, however, recognise the importance of giving credit for 
non-financial contributions and sacrifices which are linked to economic advantage 
and disadvantage and which should be capable of being valued, but did not consider 
that adopting a partnership approach would be appropriate for cohabitants because 
some do not adopt such a stance, unlike in most marriages; or so it is said, though 
there are many which do not240.  
 
 In view of this sort of example, it is obviously too sweeping to attribute gold standard 
commitment to married couples and a lesser quality in a cohabiting relationship. 
 
Moreover, precise valuation of domestic contributions is rejected because although 
such contributions have commercial value - because if they were not made 
professional domestic help or child care might have to be paid for -  it was 
																																								 																				
238 Rebecca Bailey-Harris, ‘Law and the unmarried couples – oppression or liberation’ [1996] 8 Family 
Law Quarterly, p. 137; Rebecca Bailey-Harris (ed) Dividing the Assets on Family Breakdown: 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Law, collected papers of an SPTL conference at KCL, later 
separately published by Jordans Publishing. 
239 As argued for by Wilson J, now Lord Wilson of Culworth, a Justice of the Supreme Court, ‘Ancillary 
Relief Reform: Response of the Judges of the Family Division to Government Proposals’, (1999) 29 
Family Law, p 159. 
240 See, for example, the dissenting judgment of Baroness Hale in Radmacher v Granatino, [2010] 
UKSC 42, where she appears to be severely deploring the lack of mutuality between the parties 
where the husband had moved, not only employment but also continents,   for the wife’s happiness.  
However, the wife had not extended the same courtesy to him when he was unhappy in his new 
employment, accepted as a consequence of the move when she could have done this so as to 
recognise and address his lower income following a career change undertaken to secure his own 
happiness. 
  
 
137 
considered impractical to attempt to value the ‘tasks beyond the range of a domestic 
servant’ in the ‘support, love and affection so necessary to maintain a happy family 
unit’241. This approach appears to be on the basis that such ‘extra’ non-commercial 
services should not have a value because they are not available on the market, 
which  apparently accounts for the rejection by Australian courts of any attempt to 
value them despite early attempts to do so.   
 
This, then, was the basis for the Law Commission’s rejection of what is called the 
‘global accounting’ principle, of valuing every last contribution that a cohabitant may 
make when attempting to produce a fair outcome on separation and thus preferring 
the economic advantage/disadvantage model which appears to work on the basis of 
a ‘retained benefit’ together with an ‘economic disadvantage’ beyond the point of 
separation.  
 
Instead the Commission therefore looked at various methods of quantification of 
economic disadvantage, drawing on experience in New Zealand and Scotland,  
which did  not appear to be necessarily precise or systematised, indeed in one New 
Zealand case242 the judge’s method was described as ‘judicial plucking out of the 
air’243  In Scotland the calculation of economic/advantage disadvantage has been 
said to be ‘particularly difficult to quantify,   although this is now included for use in 
the new provisions under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, and Baroness Hale in 
Gow v Grant244 has indicated that she found it worked. 
 
The Law Commission went on to consider that no particular property should be ring 
fenced when considering how to apply the proposed scheme over which property/ies 
might be relevant in a particular case. This is another point which has been 
overtaken by events in relation to married couples’  property since English case law 
has since been developing in relation to inherited and pre-acquired property in cases 
where ‘needs’ in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s 25 criteria does not trump any 
such claims. Further, the most recent Law Commission work, the report on which 
																																								 																				
241 Per Lord Wilson of Culworth, [2011]  Jones v Kernott , UKSC 53, [89]; n71. 
242 Fischbach v Bonner, (2002) NZFLR 705 (New Zealand).  
243 See per Clarke J, in Black v Black, an Australian case (1991) 15 Fam LR 109. 
244 [2012] UKSC 29. 
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was published on 27 February 2014, has also considered ring fencing in detail245.  
However this work is not yet quite finished, since while concluding that it might be 
too difficult to formulate any rules or guidance in relation to such ring fencing, the 
Commission then referred further work on the concept of ‘needs’ to the Family 
Justice Council. Although they immediately entered this task into their 2014-2015 
work schedule no result has yet been published.  
 
Basically, as far as the FJC’s task is concerned, the key to unlock this conundrum 
about whether any property should be ring fenced before orders are made under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is probably whether any of it is realistically required for 
‘needs’ and, in principle, whatever is ultimately decided in relation to spouses under 
that Act could well inform the treatment of such property in a cohabitants’ separation.   
If a normative scheme is eventually introduced to deal with financial arrangements 
on breakdown of their relationship any ring fencing felt appropriate under the 1973 
Act could simply be adapted for cohabitants as well. Arguably, the point should 
certainly not be dismissed outright in the cohabitation context since, depending on 
the length and circumstances of that cohabitation, such ring fencing might or might 
not be relevant, since if this entire topic of cohabitants’ position on separation is to be 
tackled properly inevitably there will be similar points arising as on a married 
separation of assets. 
 
Finally the Commission considered how the scheme would operate in practice, for 
example in practical terms whether there should be a needs based ceiling once a 
party had established eligibility or whether there should be any, or merely 
transitional, support.  It seems these thoughts were generated by the practical 
consideration of the forensic problems that might arise in proof of economic 
advantage/disadvantage. Further it was apparently decided that conduct should 
have no relevance to the scheme - unless financial or litigation misconduct-  since 
generally in married financial provision cases there is no relationship between 
conduct and economic provision, unless such conduct had impacted on a party’s 
earning capacity,  such as in the case of some well-known divorce decisions246.  
 
																																								 																				
245 Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements, Law Com 343, 2014. 
246 See for example, Jones v Jones [1976] Fam 8. 
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With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the Law Commission’s 2006-7 team had 
not in fact thought through the practical considerations which have since been 
articulated by the Scottish scheme, which has also been academically evaluated, not 
only by the speedily funded Wasoff et al research project247, but also by Baroness 
Hale in Gow v Grant, where the opportunity arose in that first Scottish appeal to 
reach the Supreme Court.  Thus this is another instance in which the 2006-7 work 
has been overtaken by events, and not least by the further Law Commission work on 
‘needs’  ‘agreements’ and ‘ring fencing’ for married parties which,  without in any 
sense jumping to any conclusion of equating cohabitants’ situations to those of 
spouses,  is clearly potentially informative if  , the function argument is accepted, as 
is arguably increasingly inevitable248.  
 
Eligibility for any new normative scheme 
 
The Law Commission saw basic eligibility as membership of a ‘couple’ (two 
individuals only), ‘characterised by (sexual) intimacy and exclusivity’, sometimes 
described as ‘partners in an enduring family relationship’. They were not in favour of 
any marriage analogy although it was accepted that some UK statutes do define 
cohabitation in this way, for example in the terms ‘living together as if they were 
husband and wife, such as in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006,  s 25(1)(a)and(b). 
 
There are, however, many terms in use around the common law and civil law world, 
such as simply  ‘cohabitant’249, ‘de facto partner’250, ‘domestic relationship’ 251. 
Nevertheless, the thrust of the Law Commission’s argument in this respect was that 
the marriage analogy is inappropriate and probably contributes to the common law 
marriage myth, but this was another issue on which the Consultation Paper invited 
the views of those responding to the consultation.   
 
																																								 																				
247 Fran Wasoff, Joanna Miles and Enid Mordaunt, ‘Cohabitation: Lessons from North of the Border’ 
(2011)  23 CFLQ , pp.302-322. 
248 See Chapter 1. 
249 Scotland and Sweden. 
250 Australia, New Zealand. 
251 Australia: a term also taken up in  American law reform proposals, such as by the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations 
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A further basic requirement suggested was a shared household, looking to 
approaches to this concept in the Fatal Accidents Acts (1976) as already established 
in English law252. In this respect, the checklist approach is useful to establish 
whether there is or is not cohabitation, such as is used in social security contexts in 
the UK, and elsewhere in varying forms worldwide, whether inclusive253 or 
exhaustive254, although the Commission also noted the American Law Institute’s 
distinctive presumption that even cohabiting parties without children are officially 
cohabitants, but which use of the check list might rebut.  
 
The fact that it was considered by the Law Commission  that cohabitants with 
children should automatically qualify as eligible for application to any new scheme 
whatever the length of their relationship is not surprising as this is mostly a standard 
approach in default regimes worldwide, and recommended by the Law Society in 
2002  and Resolution -  the Solicitors Family Law Association -  in 2000, although 
some jurisdictions impose a shorter period of qualification than for those cohabitants 
without children, e.g. Manitoba, and some other provinces of Canada . 
 
However, this was the point at which the Commission’s scheme began to show its 
potential complications.  It was accepted that qualifying children in the cohabitation 
context needed to be identified despite the fact that it was conceded that a decision 
to cohabit where there were already non-familial children would  have been carefully 
taken and therefore be likely to be evidence of commitment. This in turn led to a 
further issue - as to whether there should be a minimum relationship duration 
condition in this case and in the case of cohabitants without children at all.   
 
All these points were therefore considered appropriate for referral to the views of 
respondents to the consultation, a conclusion that eventually began to appear in the 
Consultation Paper with monotonous regularity, yet when the consultation was 
compared with the final report the impact of the responses was less than convincing 
as a basis for the final view taken. 
 
																																								 																				
252 Kotke v Saffarini [2005] EWCA Civ 221, [2005] 2 FLR 517, a case of partly’ living apart together’ 
which might be relevant in considering any time requirement to establish settled ‘cohabitation’.    
253 In Scotland. 
254 In Australia, New Zealand and currently under English law. 
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The next such point was that it was considered that eligibility should have some link 
to the potential remedy, with a view to ‘isolating those cases which might be thought 
to merit access to a particular type of remedy’.  This is because of the preliminary 
view expressed that any new remedy should be subject to judicial discretion rather 
than to automatic equal sharing, which in turn has implications for eligibility since this 
is ‘less crucial where a scheme is discretionary’.  There is some echo of this 
approach in the much later comment of Baroness Hale, when she had given 
judgment in the Scottish appeal of Gow v Grant  that the Scottish system was more 
akin to proprietary estoppels than the use of the by then  preferred tool of the 
constructive trust that the Supreme Court had identified in the English appeal of 
Jones v Kernott. 
 
The Law Commission’s remedial distinctions appeared to fall into two categories:  
 
(i) those where commitment suggested a partnership and needs-based 
approach 
(ii)  those where economic impact was significant, for example including 
future child care costs.  
	
It was considered that there should be a difference in the requirement for a minimum 
relationship duration, in which case questions arose as to (a) the optimum minimum 
relationship duration, (b) the relevance of relationship breaks, and (c) any alternative 
triggers for short relationships.   
 
It was accepted that, in this relationship duration context,  that further consideration 
needed to be given to remedies on death, about which the Law Commission had 
certain reservations, so that they would prefer to develop the court’s existing 
jurisdiction. 
 
A further point identified was the need to identify the precise end of a relationship, 
both for remedies on separation, for which long established separate household 
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case law in  divorce could be relied on, and on death255 so that it could be 
established whether the cohabitation had ended in the parties’ joint lifetime. 
 
Some basic exclusions from any category of cohabitant were accepted: for example 
age  - minors, including those of legal age for marriage or perhaps above, as some 
jurisdictions set;  blood relations and family members within the prohibited degrees , 
where sexual relations would be criminal in cohabitation, as adopted by the social 
security approach256 although globally the range of prohibited degrees is variously 
wider than the criminalisation categories.  Other exclusions include carers; 
commercial relationships; concurrent live relationships and moribund marriages, 
which create some potential problems257, but where a financial claim need not 
always be barred outright as the court can sometimes take all the circumstances into 
account under existing law in the case of such concurrent relationships. 
 
It was, however, noted that other jurisdictions took differing approaches to 
concurrent relationships, so that this was another matter that was therefore left for 
discussion in 2006, and thus to the view of those responding in England and Wales 
to the instant consultation.  
  
It was also accepted that those who have contracted a ‘non-marriage’ should not be 
excluded from eligibility and in fact perhaps have a stronger claim than most to be 
included, in that they have shown commitment by trying to contract a valid legal 
relationship. 
 
By this stage in the Consultation Paper, the Law Commission had raised so many 
complex potential problems that from the contemporary perspective the practical 
view must be that if there is now to be workable reform following the 2006-7 failure, 
and soon, there are even greater arguments for a simpler system - preferably much, 
much simpler -  rather than one more complex and more detailed.   
 
																																								 																				
255 Gully v Dix [2004] EWCA Civ 139, [2004] WLR 1399 at [24]. 
256 DWP, Decision Makers Guide, 2006, and later editions, currently 13th edn, Ministry of Justice, 
2013,p4.   
257 See for example Jessop v Jessop [1992] 1 FLR 591, an example of how complex concurrent 
cohabitation and marriage can be, since this was of both a happy marriage and a happy cohabitation! 
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Concurrent relationships, for example, are not new, neither in the past - such as that 
of the novelist Charles Dickens and Nellie Ternan, the subject of Claire Tomalin’s 
excellent biography258 - or now, of which a classic example is the polygamous 
marriages which must be addressed by social security in the case of immigrants and 
certain religious sects and their British born children.  This is another of those issues 
which realistically cannot conveniently be labelled ‘too difficult’, since ultimately in a 
multi-cultural society, which includes immigrants and asylum seekers, polygamous 
relationships are likely to be an everyday occurrence with which the law and practice 
must grapple.  It seems ever Eire recognises this, since the latest research from Irish 
academics is now addressing the impact of polygamy in Family law259 .  
 
 
Cohabitation Contracts and Opt-Out Agreements   
 
Having got as far as considering all the potential problems that would arise in any 
reform, the Commission was naturally obliged to address when and how cohabitants 
should be entitled to opt-out of the proposed statutory scheme; also the extent to 
which opt-out agreements should be reviewable by the courts.  They proposed that 
statute should provide that the courts should be able to enforce cohabitation 
agreements dealing with property and finance.  This is in no way novel since in 
theory if cohabitation agreements are not contrary to law of course the court will in 
logic enforce them, particularly if not unfair or in some way vitiated260.  
 
However the consultation paper unsurprisingly took the view that enforceability of 
such agreements required clarification in order to encourage private ordering and the 
avoidance of litigation amongst the eligible cohabitants envisaged as participating in 
the proposed new scheme;  and that  further such agreements would need to include 
a valid opt-out indication so as to oust the proposed statutory scheme.  The team 
considered that the status of such an ‘opt-out’ could have one of three potential 
																																								 																				
258 Claire Tomalin, The Invisible Woman, Penguin, 1990. 
259 Avril Cryan ‘Legal Responses to Polygamy and the Challenge Ahead for Ireland’, paper to be given 
at the 3rd Trienniel Conference of the International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice, Kings 
College London, 6-8 July 2016.  And see further Chapter 9. 
260 Chris Barton, Cohabitation Contracts: Extra Marital Contracts and Law Reform, Gower, 1985; 
Precedent of such a contract, (2008) 123 NLJ, 591. Professor Barton has been writing on this issue 
for 20 years at least.. 
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consequences, being either (i) merely a factor that a court could take into account, 
(ii) binding, but enabling the court to ignore it in certain circumstances, or (iii) 
completely binding subject to the general law. 
 
Suggested examples of a potential opt-out included  
(a) the case of those previously married and with adult children where it was desired 
to protect the separate inheritance of those children of each party,  
(b) the preservation of inherited capital for other relatives, or  
(c) preservation of money given by parents for provision of an adult child’s home.  
 
 Thus such agreements would need to be certain, protective of vulnerable parties 
and accessible, that is, not too expensive or burdensome so that they could be used 
by those with few assets as well as those having assets of substantial value. It was 
accepted that this would require protection from undue influence, and clear indication 
that taking the opt-out step would exclude recourse to the statutory scheme unless 
the opt-out was vitiated in some way in accordance with the general law. 
 
The position of minors in this context was considered to be a matter for consultation, 
since in English law a minor may only make valid contracts for necessaries, but in 
other jurisdictions, for example, New Zealand, a minor’s general contractual disability 
is suspended subject to scrutiny of the opt-out contract by the court261. In Sweden 
consent of the child’s guardian is required262. 
 
It was envisaged that any such opt-out agreements could either simply oust the 
statutory scheme (in total or only in part in relation to certain assets) or could make 
alternative provision for the parties, however that there should be some qualifying 
criteria for validity, e.g. as in other jurisdictions, writing, signature by the parties, 
independent legal advice, and possibly witness by a lawyer.  Some uncertainty about 
the issue (and extent) of disclosure of assets appeared to be accepted on the basis 
that the point of the opt-out was to preserve independence of the parties’ assets so 
that at least full disclosure might be considered burdensome.  Again this was thought 
appropriate for the views of those responding to the consultation. 
																																								 																				
261 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 211 (1)-(3). 
262 Cohabitees Act (Sweden) 2003, s9. 
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It appears that New Zealand is the only jurisdiction offering model cohabitation 
agreements to minimise the expense of private ordering although there are many 
private collections of skeleton agreements available on the internet which can be 
used by English and Welsh cohabitants and their legal advisers. 
 
Grounds and criteria for review are well developed in other jurisdictions, such as 
Australia and New Zealand, but, owing to the long lack of recognition of similar 
agreements in England and Wales, the Law Commission’s team accepted that this 
would be entirely open for discussion in the case of creating a system for 
cohabitation agreements in England and Wales. However it was thought that failure 
to observe qualifying criteria, revocation by conduct or supervening events should 
enable the court’s review, for example. birth of a child, grave and unforeseen change 
of circumstances, including ‘manifest injustice’, and the passage of significant time - 
to address the latter of which a ‘sunset clause’,   time limiting the agreement should 
be included. 
 
It was also accepted that complications could arise where the parties had entered 
into an express declaration of trust in respect of certain property as the issue of 
whether this was a valid opt-out of the statutory scheme or not would need to be 
clarified. 
 
Consideration was also given to whether there could be a valid opt-in to the statutory 
scheme by parties who were not otherwise eligible e.g. because they had not lived 
together for any prescribed minimum period.  
 
 
 
The Final Report 2007 
Compared to the consultation, this was rather a ‘damp squib’. It is a slightly shorter, 
and more keenly focussed, document, which largely confirms the provisional 
conclusions of the Consultation Paper, that is, before any work had been done.  It 
includes some revealing rationales for those concepts and principles which had, 
however, been rejected in forming its conclusions  - and those provisionally 
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expressed in the initial paper -  and broadly confirms the proposals which are 
advanced in the consultation.  Some key responses which support the infrastructure 
of the scheme are summarised or directly quoted and throw light on the conclusions 
that have been reached in the recommendations. 
 
As a result the Consultation Paper is much the more illuminating of the two, and in 
particular appears to have steered the research team’s thinking throughout the 
project, so that the impression is more than ever established in the reader’s mind 
that the team had already decided from the start in which direction its 
recommendations would go.  This may be a good support for focus but one must 
query whether it has perhaps stifled creativity and imagination, in particular by fixing 
an established perspective too early to allow a real appreciation of the underlying 
issues driving cohabitation - thus it seems that the position of committed cohabitants 
did not have the best opportunity to be understood in the round and catered for 
appropriately in this 2006-7 project. 
 
The Way Forward 
While there are many key issues, and good ideas for addressing them, in the Law 
Commission’s 2006-7 work, it is clear that not much detailed thought had been given 
to some,  because of the very multiplicity of those which did, and do still, need such 
attention.  In particular the concept of the ordinary layman finding cohabitation 
contract templates on the internet is more alarming than the continuing harm done 
by the ongoing incidence of home- made wills, which have been famously said to 
have put many solicitors’ children through expensive private schools!  
 
Setting up a normative scheme clearly requires articulation of many of these more 
complex points, but with the benefit of much of the 2006-7 work which is still relevant 
should not be unduly taxing.  This is especially so because time has marched on 
since 2007, during which period the Law Commission has been considering 
agreements, needs and ring fencing of property for spouses.  In the circumstances 
careful calibration could clearly now be achieved in accordance with the distinctions 
between the two classes of partners – those who are married or in a registered civil 
partnership and those who have elected cohabitation with a different regime,  which 
might vary along a spectrum from separation of assets to some sort of community,  
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This particular task of detailed articulation is clearly at the very core of any discrete 
normative scheme, in which simplicity wherever possible obviously claims some 
priority. This includes the procedural consequences of proposed reform, addressing 
limitation periods, jurisdiction and anti-avoidance and the retrospective effect. There 
would also have to be transitional provisions, for which the successful transitional 
arrangements following the creation of the new Family Court,  pursuant to the 
Crimes and Courts Act 2013,  would be a clear model, together with the way that the 
Rules Committee has managed the change from the Family Proceedings Rules 1991 
as amended to  the Family Procedure Rules 2010, in force since April 2011, as well 
as all subsequent amendments from April 2014 made through the recommendations 
of the working parties set up by the President to handle these much more complex 
changes. 
 
A key feature of any scheme which took up the Law Commission baton now is that 
cohabitants are ‘family’ and as such should be part of the ongoing modernisation of 
Family Justice. In fact this is already being proposed by certain family practitioners, a 
core group of whom includes several of the newly qualified Family Arbitrators 
working under the Rules of  the IFLA Scheme – the Institute of Family Arbitrators –  
pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1996.  
 
Like the Family Law solicitor, David Burrows263,  the group, led by Sir Peter Singer264 
has already examined the Rules and found that there is no precise provision which 
requires TOLATA 1996 applications to be made in any particular court, despite  this 
class of business normally being  assigned - as a ‘trust’ case-  to the Chancery 
Division.  This is because the CPR 1998 refers to such an application being made to 
‘a Court’, which could equally well be the new Family Court, where  - as already 
mentioned in the case of Seagrove v Sullivan265 -  in practice a TOLATA application 
is already sometimes consolidated, when the need arises, with a purely Family Court 
application.  
 
																																								 																				
263 See Chapter 1. 
264 Formerly Singer, J, of the Family Division of the High Court from which he has now retired. 
265 [2014] EWHC 1410 (Fam). 
  
 
148 
Broadly, it was accepted in 2006 that jurisdiction should follow that in financial relief 
in divorce266 now called ‘financial provision’ and itself now subject to some European 
regulations,   but that jurisdiction under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependents) Act 1975 depends on domicile, a different concept from the EU 
jurisdiction rules.  Thus  it may be time to reconsider how jurisdiction should operate 
in relation to any potential new scheme on death provision since domicile ‘is looking 
increasingly antiquated’ since most matrimonial jurisdiction now depends on habitual 
residence pursuant to the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 s 5.   
 
However, while it was considered that in relation to cohabitants’ claims under that 
Act  application would continue to depend on domicile, it was considered that claims 
on separation should be based on habitual residence, and the applicable law should 
be English law, the law of the most recent cohabitation, usually called the lex fori. 
 
Since the Rome Convention on contractual obligations does not apply to ‘rights and 
duties arising out of a family relationship’ it was considered that there was freedom 
when devising the potential new scheme for a choice to be made as to whether to 
allow foreign law to apply in certain circumstances.  From the contemporary 
perspective it is possible that this should not be permitted, since the Institute of 
Family Law Arbitrators (IFLA) when setting up Family Arbitration under the IFLA 
Rules with the pan-professional support of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the 
Family Law Bar Association and Resolution, expressly considered this point and 
elected to restrict the scheme in its Rules to English Law, although this would not 
preclude recognition of foreign status, such as nationality, domicile and marriages. 
 
With regard to limitation it was provisionally considered appropriate to provide that 
claims should be brought within one year of separation but that this should be a 
matter for the views of those responding to the consultation.   
 
It was also accepted that the potential new scheme should not be fully retrospective 
but that some provision might have to be made for relationships which had begun 
prior to its introduction because of the impact on existing property and contractual 
																																								 																				
266 No longer ‘ancillary relief’. 
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rights, implied trusts and estoppel equities, and that the comparative experience of 
New Zealand was looked to for assistance in determining how the transitional 
arrangements into full application should be handled.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Since overall in 2006-7 it was accepted that generally the scheme envisaged by the 
Law Commission would be likely both to confer benefits and to impose some costs 
but to save others, the government’s total abandonment of the work in 2011 is both 
surprising and wasteful, and there seems no reason not to recycle as much of it as is 
still useful, as Lord Marks’ Bill now seeks to do.   
 
However, the very complexity of the Law Commission’s vision of how this might work 
out is a strong indicator of the crucial role of simplicity in achieving success in 
introducing any reform, since it is clear that many have already fallen at this final 
hurdle of actually achieving a practical normative scheme to address the cohabitants’ 
overall situation. This is particularly so since cohabitation is clearly not the same as 
marriage or registered civil partnership, but has certain practical and ideological 
similarities which should be accepted as conferring a normative family identity.   
 
The 2006-7 work should in principle therefore be  liberally adapted wherever the 
complexities identified by that 2006-7 team obviously demand, and such adaptation 
should probably err,  if at all, on the side of simplicity and in many cases on excising 
unnecessary detailed prescription . The team resisted the ‘marriage clone’ approach, 
but was in favour of protecting vulnerable cohabitants and children and eliminating 
their hardship on relationship breakdown. It rejected an undesirable system of 
‘registered cohabitant’ alongside marriage and registered civil partnership, but 
permitted opt-out on the basis that valid private ordering had made alternative 
arrangements which were not manifestly unfair at the same time as considering it 
had obviated any impact on the institution of marriage. 
 
Further comment on how this vision might be realised is more conveniently reserved 
for Chapter 9 in which are discussed the Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
current project. With a view to encouraging some movement towards a discrete 
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normative scheme which might be accepted by the profession and the average 
cohabitant client alike,  an example of rather simpler draft legislation than has so far 
been put forward is then found in the Appendix.  
 
Meanwhile, before considering any other jurisdiction’s apparently successful reforms 
in relation to cohabitants’ rights which appear in Chapters 6-8, the next chapter, 
Chapter 5,  will look at some potential reasons for the choice being made between 
cohabitation and marriage, an issue to which the Law Commission did not devote 
much attention while working on a possible English reform.
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Chapter 5 The role of choice between marriage and cohabitation   
 
Introduction  
This chapter critically reviews what is known about choices made between marriage 
and cohabitation by couples in intimate relationships and, although evidence is 
sparse since little work has been done in this area, examines the potential impact on 
any reform of cohabitants’ rights. This issue is clearly important in the context of any 
subsisting case against such legislation in England and Wales, particularly since the 
Law Commission 2006-7 work missed another opportunity in this respect through 
giving the matter little coverage. 
 
The prime aim is to establish the reasons driving a choice for cohabitation, assuming 
a choice is actually made, rather than a couple’s simply drifting into one or the other 
potential relationship. A secondary aim is to evaluate how this might affect whether 
there should be cohabitation reform at all and, if so, what form it should take. 
 
While earlier investigation appears to indicate a clear case for legislation to articulate 
cohabitants’ rights in a discrete normative scheme, two further investigative tasks 
must be undertaken before the precise nature and scope of such a scheme for 
England and Wales can properly be extrapolated from the evidence:  
 
(1) what is the role of choice between marriage and cohabitation? 
(2) what is the extent of the remaining impact, if any, of the hostility which has been 
long identified to provision in English law for cohabitants’ rights, despite the ongoing 
efforts of supporters of legislative reform which have, most recently,  now been 
unsuccessful for a decade and a half since the papers of Resolution (in 2000) and 
the Law Society (in 2002) each proposed their own schemes. 
 
 However, more recently there has apparently been such change in official attitudes 
– for example the enactment of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 which 
goes way beyond the Civil Partnership Act 2004 – that the answer to the second of 
the above questions certainly cannot be presumed. 
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In fact, former resistance  to  cohabitants’ rights which the British Attitude Surveys 
cited by the 2006-7 Reports of the Law Commission  seemed to have at last 
displaced must have been one of the longest running opposition lobbies of all time. 
Literature had already begun to pour out well before the Law Commission’s 2006-7 
work, stretching from the strong opposition of Deech in 1980267 through immoveable 
opposition to the plight of Mrs Burns in 1984 and sterling work in1999 on  
comparative clarification of the impact of trusts on cohabitant property by Mee268.  
Hem in fact, did not take sides at all but  appeared simply to accept that the 
‘problem’ could be addressed by doctrinal provision in the common law which he 
rehearsed in detail in his monograph.   
 
This was coincidentally when the timeline of encouraging academic comment, in 
particular by Barlow and her various teams of colleagues,   began to gather 
momentum, with Barlow and Lind’s creative 1999 article269 , and the papers of 
Resolution and the Law Society, although the literature mostly tails off by the time of 
Baroness Hale’s comments in Jones v Kernott in 2011 and Gow v Grant in 2012.   
Resolution continued to publish material supportive of Lord Lester’s aborted 2008 
and 2009 Bills, in particular an associated consultation paper before the first Bill270, 
although none of these attempts to advance the matter were any more successful 
than in the pre-2000 a period. 
 
1. Marriage or cohabitation? 
 
The key question in relation to the first investigation appears to be: Why do people 
not marry but prefer to cohabit?  
 
																																								 																				
267 Ruth Deech ‘The case against legal recognition of cohabitation’ (1980) 29 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly pp.480-497 
268 John Mee, Property Rights of Cohabitants, Hart, 1999. 
269 Anne Barlow and Craig Lind, ‘A Matter of Trust’, (1999) 19 (4) Legal Studies, 468, pp.469-485. 
270 Resolution, Living together, Shared Home, Shared Rights: Reforming the Law for People Who Live 
Together, 2008. 
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This question was to some extent addressed by the Law Commission in Part 2 of 
their initial Consultation Paper No 179 in 2006, which is entitled ‘The Social Context’, 
and also in Part 5, however in a somewhat inconclusive and dismissive manner.   
 
Why do people not marry but prefer to cohabit? – The evidence 
 
Treatment of this question in the consultation paper is largely based on statistics and 
trends from the literature, such as Kiernan271 , Kiernan and Smith272 , Kiernan273 and 
Murphy274  and the various ONS statistics,  starting with the 2001 Census275  which 
track the relative numbers and classifications of persons in the age group 16-59 
living with a partner outside marriage, in the process recording that 25% of children 
in the Millennium Cohort were born to cohabiting couples and 15% to couples ‘not 
living together in any co-residential relationship’.    
 
However,  at the same time,  these  statistics were used to conclude that ‘marriage 
remains the most popular form of partnership’ with 10 million married couples 
recorded in the 2001 Census, and 7.6 dependent children in these families, leaving 
only one in six dependent children in a cohabiting couple family.   
 
It is therefore difficult to see how these statistics do more than confirm what the 
Government Actuary has been warning that we should expect by 2030, namely an 
explosion in cohabiting numbers and a corresponding fall in marriages below the 
present 10 million, but without adequately addressing the reasons for this. 
 
																																								 																				
271	Kathleen Kiernan, ‘The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western 
Europe’   (2001) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family p.1. 
Kiernan, K (2004) ‘Unmarried Cohabitation and Parenthood in Europe’  26 Law and Policy 33, p. 40, 
figure 2.  
272	Kathleen Kiernan  and Kate Smith, ‘Unmarried Parenthood: new insights from the Millenium Cohort 
Study’,  (2003) 114 Population Trends 26, figure 1. 
273	Kathleen	Kiernan, ‘Unmarried Cohabitation and Parenthood in Europe’ (2004) 26 Law and Policy 
33, p. 40, figure 2.  
274 Michael Murphy ‘The Evolution of Cohabitation in Britain, 1960-1995, (2000) 54 Population Studies 
p.43. 
275 ONS (2001) Census 2001, Table S004. 
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To return for the moment only to these particular statistics, together with the work of 
Haskey276, and Haskey and Lewis277, on the contemporary non-residential 
phenomenon of ‘Living Apart Together’,  the ‘numbers’  establish a slightly higher 
percentage of cohabitants within the population than might appear from the bare 
statistics alone.  
 
From this and other statistics at their disposal in 2005-6278  the Law Commission 
appears to deduce that two reasons for cohabitation being preferred to marriage in 
the potentially ‘coupling’ age group is  
 
(1) the older age at which the data establishes that marriages have more recently 
been taking place, the average age having risen in 2003 to 31 for men and 29 for 
women, and that is because of  
(2) ‘people’s tendency to cohabit in their first partnership’ together with ‘older age 
when entering into first partnerships’ 
 
for which latter perception they rely on the 2000 work of Ermisch and Francesconi279 
.  
 
From this the Commission also concludes that cohabitation has overtaken marriage 
as a preferred first partnership, but in spite of the fact that their project expressly 
excluded any consideration of a discrete cohabitant status, they  do not appear even 
to have considered cohabitation as a freestanding state, apparently ignoring  the 
distinction between the two concepts.  
 
																																								 																				
276	John	Haskey	 ‘Cohabitation in Great Britain: Past Present and Future Trends – and Attitudes’ (2001) 
103 Population Trends p.4 and p.26; John Haskey, ‘Living Arrangements in Contemporary Britain: 
Having a Partner Who Usually Lives Elsewhere’ and Living Apart Together (2005)   122 Population 
Trends p.35. 
277	John Haskey and Jane Lewis Living-Apart-Together in Britain: Context and Meaning’ in  (2006)  2 
International Journal of Law in Context p.37. 
 
278	Office for National Statistics, (ONS) (2005) General Household Survey 2004,  table 4.11;Office	of	
National	Statistics	(ONS)	(2005)	Social	Trends	p35,	p.24;	Office for National Statistics, (ONS) (2006) Social 
Trends 36, figure 2.12 and General Household Survey 2004, table 5.3. 
279 John  Ermisch and Marco Francesconi,  ‘Patterns of Household and Family Formation’ in Richard 
Berthoud and Jonathan Gershuny (eds) Seven Years in the Lives of British Families, Policy Press, 
2000. 
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However, while their brief clearly restricted their project, this was not necessarily 
helpful in precluding any in depth consideration of why cohabitants are cohabiting 
rather than marrying.  This would have been a valid inquiry if the Commission was 
going to consider making such limited investigation as they did, because the answer 
to what seems to be a vital question might have had significant influence on their 
legislative proposals, as indeed it is likely to do so in the present project. 
 
Following this somewhat inconclusive trawl of statistics, the Consultation Paper then 
looks at class in relation to cohabitation and concludes that data on socio-economic 
status shows that, while cohabitation began as a middle class syndrome, Ermisch 
and Francesconi identify it as one which has now ‘become a classless phenomenon, 
at least as far as its prevalence at the outset of a relationship is concerned’.   
 
The Commission considered that this was supported by the British Social Attitudes 
Survey of 2000, although the Consultation Paper goes on to deduce that the ultimate 
destination of these cohabitants -  that is whether into continued cohabitation, 
separation or marriage -  is influenced by economic circumstances. This is backed 
up by data on renting through the private sector versus owner occupation of homes, 
apparently suggesting to the Law Commission the relevance of the fact that 
cohabitants apparently earn less  and that this in turn may be because of their 
younger age (than married couples) and/or reflect their desire to emerge from the 
relationship quickly if they wished to separate.  
 
Anecdotally, the latter reason has always apparently been the main driver for 
cohabitation rather than marriage, and this does seem to be borne out by the many 
reported cases where a cohabiting relationship seems to have started happily only to 
end up in (usually) the female cohabitant suing the man for a share of the home.  
This was a pattern which began in the early 1970s with such cases as Eves v 
Eves280 in 1975 and of course the notorious Burns v Burns281 in 1984 and further into 
																																								 																				
280 [1975] 1 WLR 1338. 
281 [1984] Ch 317. 
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the 1990s, and 2000s, for example  Windeler v Whitehall282  in 1990,  Oxley v 
Hiscock283 in 2004,  right up to the most recent Jones v Kernott284 in 2011. 
 
Thus these conclusions of the Law Commission’s, in so far as they go, seem to be 
largely speculative, despite the sound basis of numerical and statistical data on 
which the deductions are based. But the Consultation Paper then seems to make 
assumptions for which not much sound data is offered at all: for example,   that ‘it is 
increasingly common for a couple to cohabit prior to marrying for which the same 
address of the parties when giving notice of marriage is relied on -  since in 2003 
78.7% of spouses did this whereas in 1970 the equivalent figure was 10%.  
 
The Commission relied on Haskey285 for their information that ‘the median duration 
of pre-marital cohabitation [is] 27 months’ and their conclusion that ‘Cohabitation... 
may be consciously viewed by one or both parties from the outset as a trial which 
may lead to marriage, or the parties may drift into cohabitation and from there to 
marriage’. 
 
If these conclusions were any basis for not examining cohabitants’ reasons for not 
marrying any further, this seems a rather shallow investigation, as even without a 
brief for addressing a cohabitant’s status, and believing that cohabitation was only a 
transient state, the Commission might obviously have been assisted in their work by 
knowing more about why people do cohabit rather than marry.  
 
Nevertheless, the essential transience of the phenomenon seems to be a common 
conclusion amongst specialist professionals and not only in the UK.  Eight years later 
in 2014 a key session of the 2014 annual conference of the AFCC286  concluded 
without obvious empirical support, that most cohabitants were young, poor and in 
transient relationships287.  Moreover,  although the session had been examining 
																																								 																				
282 [1990] 2 FLR 505. 
283 [2004] EWCa Civ 546, [2005] Fam 211. 
284 [2011] UKSC 53. 
285 Haskey n272. 
286 Association of Family Conciliation Courts, the leading organisation uniting American family justice 
across all states. 
287 Rachel Kennedy, Joyce Woodford & Dawn Kuhlman, ‘From Chaos to Co-Parenting: Helping 
Unmarried Parents To Work Together’, Session 69, AFCC Annual Conference, Toronto, Canada, 28-
31 May 2014. 
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ways of helping separating cohabitant parents to work together over contact with 
their children on the basis that half of all children born in the USA were born to 
unmarried parents, it had apparently not occurred to the presenters that a reason for 
any undocumented transient relationships might equally be prior broken 
relationships, including dissolved marriages, and that the lack of commitment to the 
ruptured cohabiting relationships might be previous adverse experience in failed 
relationships, which had produced the children now requiring the contact which was  
to be promoted.    
 
This conclusion is, nevertheless, also supported by American population literature, 
for example by Oppenheimer288 (2003) and Bianchi289 (2014), neither of which 
sources were available to the Law Commission, Oppenheimer as they did not 
appear to have considered that particular Oppenheimer resource, and Bianchi as it 
postdates the Law Commission work.   
 
It is of course a pity that UK statistics have not so far captured an equivalent 
numerical demographic picture for British cohabitants, but even in so far as obviously 
escalating numbers do assist the argument for legal recognition and provision for 
cohabitant families, numbers alone are obviously not the entire story – a conclusion 
which it was possible to discern at the outset of study of this topic - and the Law 
Commission barely touched on other elements. 
 
One suggestion for the rise in cohabitation and fall in marriage is that the former 
‘shotgun weddings’  pattern notable in the past has now been replaced by 
cohabitation290 . Others suggest that cohabitation is often a routine preparation for 
marriage, particularly for second marriages291 or is the preferred choice as a first 
couple relationship .  
 
																																								 																				
288 V K. Oppenheimer, ‘Cohabiting and Marriage during young men’s career development process’ 
(2003) 40 Demography, pp127-149. 
289 S.M. Bianchi, ‘A Demographic Perspective on Family Change’ (2014) 6 Family Journal of Theory 
and Review , pp.35-44. 
290 Anne Barlow, Simon Duncan, Elizabeth Cooke, Geraldine James and Alison Park, Cohabitation, 
Marriage and the Law, Hart, 2005. 
291 Haskey, n276, n 277.. 
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Only in 11 short lines at page 39 of the initial 2006 consultation paper, on which their 
project was based, does the Law Commission concede that some couples, whom 
they identify as ‘maybe’ less than 10%, appear consciously to select cohabitation 
rather than marriage, at the same time simply noting, but not detailing, significant 
literature on this point, such as Barlow et al292: Barlow in a variety of teams being the 
leading commentator on cohabitation in England and Wales over a long period.   
 
However the Commission does also concede that cohabitation has become ‘an 
established part of British society’ and later in the consultation paper that couples 
both appear to believe in the ‘common law marriage myth’   - that is, believing that 
they have or will become married after a period on account of their cohabitation293 . 
They also consider that the legal impact of marriage is far down their list of priorities 
when couples are arranging their weddings294.  Both of these research papers were 
perhaps regarded as supporting the concession that cohabitation is now an 
established incidence of adult living arrangements. 
 It is fair to say that the Commission does record a hope that that the Living Together 
campaign, on which Barlow et all’s 2007 research was published in the same year as 
the Commission’s final report, would alert cohabitants to the necessity of formalising 
their relationship and disentangling ‘the legal aspects of marriage’ from the other 
‘religious or cultural facets of the institution’ which they might consider less 
‘necessary or desirable for their relationship’.  Sadly since 2006-7 the Living 
Together campaign has proved to be the triumph of hope over experience expected 
by those aware of the similar project some years ago sponsored by NatWest Bank 
for the law reform society JUSTICE.  
 
However the report does go on to recognise that some individuals deliberately 
choose not to marry so as to retain their legal independence, but does not explore 
any further why that might be, although it does recognise that in some cases that 
might not be a choice but a default position because one or the other party might not 
																																								 																				
292 n290. 
293 Anne Barlow, Carol Burgoyne and Janet Smythson, The Living Together Campaign: an 
Investigation of the Impact on legally aware cohabitants, Ministry of Justice, 2007, since available at 
www.justice.gov.uk, last accessed 3 November 2013. 
294 Chris Barton and Mary Hibbs, ’Perceptions of the Affianced’ (2001) Family Law, p.197. 
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be free to marry, for example, as in the 1980 example of Watson v Lucas295, a 
housing case in which the woman who had cohabited with a married man for a 
lengthy period was held to be a member of his family for the purposes of her rights in 
their rented property, or because one party  - the stronger financially - might be 
unwilling, owing to the financial responsibility thus undertaken.  This situation has, of 
course, since somewhat changed following the Radmacher v Granatino296 decision 
of the Supreme Court  because such concerns of the richer party can now be 
addressed with a pre-nuptial agreement, a trend which has kept much of the Family 
section of the legal profession in work ever since.  
 
There is at least significant literature on such disincentives, for example Hale297 in 
2004, MacLean and Eekelaar298 in 2005, and the Gingerbread Policy Seminar 
debate in 2011, which was held at the Athenaeum Club on this very topic on the 
motion ‘No man in his right mind should marry. No woman in her right mind should 
cohabit’. As a result it probably must be conceded that there is a strong suspicion of 
financial motive in deciding to cohabit rather than to marry, as was established to be 
the situation in the 1995 case of Atkinson v Atkinson299 where the parties actually 
admitted their financial motive in not marrying! 
There is also some reference in the Commission’s 2006-7 work to concurrent 
relationships, other than those which may exist in a case where one party is 
apparently openly not free to marry, as in the example of Watson v Lucas already 
mentioned.   In this respect, the Commission identified in the initial consultation 
paper such cases as Jessop v Jessop where there were concurrent live relationships 
involving two separate families, the existence of neither being known to the other 
party in either relationship.  The Final Report acknowledges the principle, as 
generally accepted in other jurisdictions having a scheme for financial relief on 
cessation of cohabitation,  that such relationships should qualify on eligibility for 
cohabitants’ rights schemes, and as in fact  Australian law expressly  allows300. 
																																								 																				
295 [1980] 1 WLR 1493, CA. 
296 [2010] UKSC 42. 
297 Baroness Hale, ‘Unmarried Couples in Family Law’, (2004) 34 Family Law p.419 at p. 422. 
298 Mavis MacLean and John Eekelaar, ‘Taking the plunge: perceptions of risk taking associated with 
formal and informal partner relationships (2005) 17 CFLQ  p. 247 at 257. 
299 [1995] 2 FLR 356. 
300 See Chapter 8.  
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Nowhere, however in this range of reasons contemplated by the initial consultation 
paper does the Law Commission investigate in any detail precisely why in each case 
a decision might be made by a couple, or one of them, that they shall not marry but 
shall instead cohabit. In particular no focus has been trained on whether recognition 
of cohabitation for purposes more extensive than those already existing at the time 
of the Law Commission’s work would impact in any way on marriage, although in 
their 2007 final report it is conceded that neither in Australia  - where fundamental 
reform had preceded the Law Commission’s work -  nor in England and Wales had 
any connection ever been established between cohabitation law reform and an 
associated drop in marriage figures. 
 
Possible reasons for a preference for cohabitation over marriage 
Of the various reasons acknowledged, either explicitly or by implication, in the Law 
Commission’s two reports, the most significant appear to be  
(i) treating cohabitation as a temporary or preparatory stage to marriage; 
(ii) believing that established and stable cohabitation over a period carries the 
same rights and obligations as marriage, that is,  ‘the marriage myth’ 301;  
(iii) risk aversion to the responsibilities of marriage; 
(iv) a preference for legal independence or ‘autonomy’, connected or 
unconnected with (iii)); or 
(v) religious objections to divorce, either by of one of the parties to a new 
relationship which can thus only be an unmarried one, or of a party to 
whom one of the parties is still formally married, and that party’s existing 
spouse refusing a divorce.    
 
Nowhere, however, has any consideration apparently been given to the extensive 
feminist literature on the nature of marriage and the feminist objections to it, nor to 
the nature of the commitment which some cohabiting couples nevertheless 
apparently do have to their relationship, although this possibility is acknowledged in 
sections 2 and 5 of the initial consultation paper.  
																																								 																				
301 Rebecca Probert, ‘Common Law Marriage: Myths and Misunderstandings’, (2008) 20 CFLQ, p.1. 
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This disregard of the feminist perspective is despite the fact that the concept of a 
separate regime for cohabitants – that is,  preserving their autonomy but recognising 
their commitment - is  ultimately rejected in section 5, a conclusion which seems to 
hint at the impact of the extensive consideration of the importance of marriage and 
the need to support it.   
 
However reference is then made to the literature against any recognition of the 
analogous nature of cohabitation to the functionality of the marriage relationship - 
despite the validity of this analogy, which is strongly supported by the long standing 
work of Barlow and her teams at different times over many years, and which seems 
to suggest that the functionality role of cohabitation has simply not been given 
serious consideration by the Commission’s 2006-7 project.  Barlow’s work over time 
has made this functionality very clear and cohabitation’s essential characteristics are 
also clearly the driver for the Australian and New Zealand, Scottish and even 
Spanish approaches302,  besides traces of this recognition existing in English law in 
the periodic housing cases such as Watson v Lucas already mentioned. 
 
Surprisingly, the Church of England did not oppose reform, despite the fact that it 
might fall short of Biblical ideals, although some other religious bodies did and 
continue to do so303  and there was significant adverse response recorded in section 
2 of the Final Report from members of the public.  
 
Categories (i), (ii) and (iv) of the possible ‘anti’ reasons set out above are relatively 
easy to understand,  but the ‘autonomy’ objection of category (iii) possibly requires 
further investigation, and (v), religious objection, may be a topic where opinion has 
moved on in various ways in the last eight years, and which also has connections 
with the second investigative task – that is, whether there is still such serious general 
opposition to reform as to preclude,  or at least seriously limit,  the potential design of 
any new normative scheme for cohabitants’ rights.  Thus the next topic, not 
addressed by the Law Commission at all, must be the highly elusive ‘autonomy’ 
argument for choosing cohabitation rather than marriage. 
																																								 																				
302 See Chapters 6-8. 
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What is the ‘autonomy’ which cohabitants apparently prefer, so as to lead 
them to avoid marriage and prefer cohabitation? 
For an answer to this question, first recourse should probably be had to the feminist 
literature on the subject, a leading commentator in which is Professor Rosemary 
Auchmuty, who is basically opposed to state regulation, whether by marriage or civil 
partnership304.  It seems that this may reflect a strongly held belief, in the gay 
communities as much as amongst feminists,  which,  it seems, have always 
traditionally preferred private ordering including resolution of any disputes.  This was 
apparently on the basis that both groups were always a minority and therefore 
depended on community solidarity, which could thus not afford internal  dissension, 
especially where their communities were small,  so it was  more important to rely on 
one another’s support than to seek external enforcement of any rights they 
considered they might have against one another.   
 
For many feminists  - of either sex, since it appears that neither feminist belief nor 
feminist scholarship is necessarily uniquely restricted to women – the prime question 
seems therefore always to have been ‘Why would anyone want to marry in the first 
place?’   
 
At least one male writer, Haffner305 , has taken up this theme.  
 
While there is a strong tradition of antipathy to marriage in both first and second 
wave feminism - which had its roots in the differential treatment of women in 
marriage until the comparatively recent post 1960s social and legal changes - 
academic researchers in this area point out that many women who have been 
married and divorced are very clear that they would not marry again.    
 
There are also indications that people in general have developed an inertia, even if 
not an antipathy,  towards marrying,  as when most women now work, earn and are 
																																								 																				
304 Rosemary Auchmuty,  ‘Out of the Shadows: Feminist Silence and Liberal Law’ in Carl Stychin and 
Vanessa Munro (eds) Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements, Routledge, 2007, pp. 91-124, 
reprinted in Leslie J Moran, Sexuality and Identity, Ashgate, a volume in the International Library of 
Essays in Law and Society, general editor Austin Sarat; Rosemary Auchmuty, ‘What’s so special 
about marriage? The impact of Wilkinson v Kitzinger, (2008) Family Law Quarterly 475, pp 475-6.  
305  Julian Haffner, The End of Marrige: Why Monogamy is not Working, Random House, 1993. 
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separately taxed they cannot see what difference it makes to be married except in 
relation to inheritance tax. While for IHT to be relevant there must be enough money 
available to protect for this tax to impact at all, it is now fair to say that with rising 
property prices and an IHT limit which does not keep pace even with periodic 
adjustment, this approach may be changing, especially if the government does in 
fact continue to legislate for significant marriage tax incentives. 
 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to comprehend such an incentive actually making a real 
difference to a decision as to whether to marry or cohabit that any reasonable person 
would actually marry for a relatively limited tax incentive.  
 
The same reservations about marriage, however, might also apply to any normative 
regime for cohabitants’ rights, since recent research still being undertaken by 
Auchmuty has indicated that civil partners who entered into a civil partnership under 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004, and then were amongst the earliest to dissolve their 
partnership,  were amazed and dismayed to find that the Family Court had  the 
power to alter their previously amicable and mutually agreed division of assets and 
financial responsibilities, which they had  apparently expected still to be able to do on 
dissolution of their civil partnership because that had been expressly promoted by 
the government in 2004 as ‘not gay marriage’.  
 
While these early civil partnership financial provision awards were no doubt made in 
individual cases because the agreements in question did not make proper provision 
for the needs of the weaker partner financially, and were perfectly proper in relation 
to the relevant statute and the judicial discretion in determining whether to uphold 
such agreements when they were unfair,  there is some evidence that the belatedly 
discovered power of state intervention in any legally formalised relationship  is now 
regarded as a deterrent by some individuals who might have entered either marriage 
or civil partnership, particularly the latter306.  
																																								 																				
306 Anecdotally, the reason for antipathy to state intervention in civil partnership appears to be historic, 
because same sex relationships traditionally depended on mutual support in their communities, for 
example because of limited meeting places available in small towns or other  regional centres for 
those in such minority relationships.  Thus a culture of ‘getting on with one another’, and thus private 
ordering in relation to any disputes, was a normal feature of such communities, particularly until same 
sex relationships became socially acceptable in the early days of the new millennium when legislation 
was finally contemplated in the Civil Partnership Act 2004.   
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If this is so, it may mean that Auchmuty’s current research project has inadvertently 
revealed the most credible reason for a choice between marriage (or civil 
partnership) and cohabitation, namely a desire to exclude state intervention in 
personal relationships and the formation of the contemporary family.   
 
If that is the case then neither formally legislating for cohabitants’ rights for those 
neither married nor in registered in civil partnerships,  nor amending the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 to include opposite sex cohabitants would find favour with 
either opposite sex or same sex cohabitants.   
 
In that case,  if fairness, protection of the vulnerable and avoidance of unjust 
enrichment is a part in principle of any potential cohabitants’ rights scheme, it would 
appear that the New Zealand opt-out scheme307 would be the fairest one to follow, 
since this provides protection but enables a couple to reject that default scheme if 
they prefer arrangements of their own  - a result which would have been achieved for 
married couples in English law if the Law Commission’s 2014 Report on Marital 
Agreements and attached Draft Bill308 had been acted upon by the government;  and 
this could easily have been adapted for cohabitants in relationships  of either sexual 
orientation. 
 
Indeed, if avoiding state intervention in their personal relationship is at the root of the 
preference for cohabitation rather than marriage, then certainly it seems there is a 
strong argument for some default scheme which can be opted out of, otherwise it 
seems that cohabitants seeking an alternative to marriage have stumbled on a new 
‘myth or misunderstanding’, namely that entering into a registered civil partnership 
provides all the benefits of marriage without the label, but none of the downsides of 
dissolution, which naturally does provide legal control over breakdown of their 
relationship since the Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 72 does of course give to the court 
the same powers as the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 on divorce! 
 
																																								 																				
307 See Chapter 8. 
308 Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements,  Law Com 353, published 27 
February 2014. 
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It is not clear how those registered civil partners who so misunderstood the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 had been so misled by their (uninformed) belief that their 
partnership was not subject to any financial provisions similar to those on dissolution 
of a marriage.  However, in logic it was probably because their partnership was 
expressly promoted as not being gay marriage:  thus  as uninformed lay persons,  
potential civil partners did not make any attempt to check whether ‘all the same 
rights as marriage without the label’ also meant all the same obligations!   
 
This seems surprising since all Parliamentary Bills are published, and the 2004 Act 
naturally received wide media attention, so it might be assumed that the registered 
civil partnership community knew what it was getting.  On the other hand if opposite 
sex cohabitants can believe in common law marriage,  despite all attempts to 
dislodge that belief,  there is perhaps no reason to believe that non-lawyer registered 
civil partners would be more knowledgeable!  - especially as  it must be conceded 
that especially in the wake of LASPO 2012 government information for ordinary 
people has been outstandingly poor, particularly in the context of lack of legal aid for 
advice and representation.   
 
Consequently it would appear more than likely that individuals of both sexes 
probably do avoid marriage and civil partnership in favour of informal cohabitation 
because this permits them to arrange their financial and property affairs as they wish 
without risk of any statutory interference, and that this might well be because the 
richer party does not want to be compelled to divide assets in any particular manner 
on separation – at least at the moment.   
 
Identification of this situation may perhaps be a temporary position since following 
Radmacher v Granatino  in 2010, it is now likely that most marital agreements  will 
now be routinely treated by the court as binding in the absence of any vitiating factor,  
and therefore civil partnership and cohabitation agreements surely being treated 
likewise.   This has certainly caused a sea change, since such agreements were 
formerly regarded in extensive case law as somewhat foreign to English law.  
However, despite non-activation of the Law Commission’s report and Draft Bill 
issued in February 2014, which recommended legislation to recognise agreements 
which complied with the Commission’s suggested conditions, the courts have been 
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enforcing such agreements, and the trend has continued to approach solicitors to 
draft them. 
 
Consequently , whether or not the government eventually enacts the Commission’s 
2014 Draft bill, this approach of the court to honour autonomous marital agreements, 
could quite possibly impact on the treatment of cohabitation agreements as well, this 
is because any such initiative  could be seen as a golden opportunity to enforce what 
governments have for years been attempting to persuade cohabitants to do309,  
namely to make self-regulating agreements at the start of the relationship, for 
disposal of their assets on separation.  
 
However  - as has been seen in the failure of numerous information campaigns, 
including Living Together - this reliance on education rather than more formal 
measures has not succeeded in its mission:  thus it may be that cohabitants will 
simply continue not to make the recommended agreements! 
 
The identification of cohabitants’ reluctance - on the grounds that they wish to retain 
their own financial autonomy or other freedom - to avail themselves of a formal legal 
status for their relationship by getting married or entering into a civil partnership, 
therefore seems more of an argument for some form of normative regime for 
cohabitants’ rights rather than against it.  Regardless of the form of couple 
partnership, the enforceability of marital agreements, and the fact that the large 
numbers of cohabitants need not have them as their assets would normally remain 
separate and unregulated by any statute310   amounts to a strong argument for 
having some default position for cohabitants. 
 
This is especially so if, first,  the autonomy claimed is the right to retain control over 
an individual’s own financial arrangements through private ordering to the detriment 
of the state as well as the weaker party financially in the couple;  and secondly, the 
government is serious about reducing the unaffordable costs of litigation on the 
separation of cohabiting as well as married couples and civil partners, and  also to 
																																								 																				
309 In the Living Together campaign and other contexts. 
310 Unlike spouses under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and civil partners under the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004.   
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encourage mediation and other ‘non-court dispute resolution’ methods in family law 
generally.    
 
This government policy has generated a new acronym, N-CDR, now to be embodied 
in the Family Procedure Rules 2010311. To provide cohabitants with a default position 
an opt-out option might not be at all unfair, since clearly for an individual to claim a 
committed cohabiting relationship – that is the ‘autonomy constituency’ justification 
for not marrying or entering into a civil partnership -  while declining to enter into a 
self ordering agreement is illogical and mutually incompatible, and appears to be the 
logical basis for the ultimate opt-out regimes legislated for in such jurisdictions as 
New Zealand312.  
2. A case against cohabitants’ rights? 
The key question in relation to this second investigative task appears to be:  
Is there any remaining impact of the formerly long standing case against 
cohabitants’ rights? 
This question was addressed in the Final Report of the Law Commission No 307 at 
1.35 et seq and in more detail at 2.31 et seq. 
 
Treatment of opposition to reform is, however, only very briefly and sketchily 
addressed in these sections although they repay detailed study since they do not 
appear to amount to evidence for objecting to any reform.  Precise objections were 
to any scheme: 
(i) replicating the reliefs for married couples under the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 or the Civil Partnership Act 2004 – thus not excluding differentiated legislation 
such as that in the Family Law Act 1996 Part IV; 
(ii) permitting automatic claims to a share of property by any cohabitant per se – 
in practice an unlikely result in law even, for example, of an extension to cohabitants 
of either the 1973 or 2004 Acts, which would be likely to restrict any such rights to 
existing judicial discretion under those statutes because of the overriding 
																																								 																				
311 President of the Family Division, Twelfth View from the President’s Chambers, 2014, 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/view-from-presidents-chambers/.  
312 See Chapter 8. 
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discretionary jurisdiction which is a distinctive feature of English family law. Thus a 
discretionary principle would be  likely to be inherent in any reform – so in that case it 
is hard to see where any ‘discretionary’ decision giving automatic property rights to a 
cohabitant could come from;  
(iii) weakening the role of marriage or setting up a ‘cut price’, ‘reduced’ or other 
inferior marriage clone – obviously a major absorption in 2006 but unlikely in practice 
a decade later when full marriage, on the same terms as opposite sex couples, was 
extended to same-sex couples in 2013.  
The Commission also received some comments which indicated that a separate 
status of cohabitant was probably not especially desired by any individual or 
constituency, although that had been the effect of creating practical equality in some 
jurisdictions, both civil and common law.   
 
This particular objection was  broadly expressed to be in case there was a threat to 
marriage from the cohabitation alternative, although it was also noted that research 
in Australia had indicated that there had been a Nil impact on marriage in that 
jurisdiction following the inclusion of their own cohabitant ‘de facto relationships’ in 
Australian property relationship legislation.  This would appear, in logic, to be 
because the two states of marriage and cohabitation are essentially different, in that 
positive decisions are evidently made to elect entry into one or the other for 
individual reasons on the part of each couple so that neither is in fact a threat to the 
other. 
 
The Final Report also concedes that the opinion of the greater public in general can 
best be discerned from the British Social Attitudes surveys, rather than the individual 
emails received by the Law Commission in response to its consultation paper, which 
could not compete for weight with the volume of direct interview methodology in the 
BSA surveys, in support of which the last such survey then available to the 
Commission was cited.   
 
Successive surveys had in fact shown a rising percentage in support of accepting 
cohabiting couples and their families as a recognised form of social unit, and in 
accepting some sort of reform, especially where the parties had children.  
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It would therefore appear to have been broadly established that reform which 
benefited cohabiting families would be acceptable to the wider public, although there 
might be some slight dismay emanating from religious groups which were amongst 
those individually identified in the Final Report. It may therefore be worth looking at 
what this (even mild) objection from religious groups is likely to mean in practical 
terms if reform is pursued, since religious belief is also given sometimes for a former 
partner’s refusal to give a divorce to a spouse who is cohabiting with another person 
so as to release that party from a moribund marriage, and this presumably emanates 
from the same religious groups as might also still oppose cohabitants’ rights. 
 
What part does religion play (if any) as a hurdle to cohabitants’ rights reform?  
It is not evident from such quotations of communications as appear in either of the 
Law Commission’s 2006-7 Reports that religion as such is really the stumbling block 
for any respondents to the consultation:  while there may be some remaining pockets 
of resistance to legal recognition of cohabitation as a normative family form,   there 
are firmer indications that tradition or culture is a much more likely hurdle to be 
cleared for comfortable acceptance by the public at large.  
 
For example, in section 2 of the Final Report, which details some of the responses 
(adverse, positive and hybrid in nature) to the initial consultation, it is not recorded 
that the Church of England had sent in any objections on purely religious grounds, 
since they have merely stated that while the Church supports ‘marriage as the best 
context for nurturing children’ owing to its ‘greater potential for a stable, committed 
and healthy environment’ the Church is also ‘sympathetic to reform that addresses 
the effect of relationship breakdown on children and those who make sacrifices for 
them’.  Moreover it goes further in stating that there is ‘strong Biblical precedent not 
only for upholding standards but also for introducing laws to address situations that 
fall short of Biblical ideas’ and that ‘the Church of England recognises that there are 
some issues of hardship and vulnerability for people whose relationships are not 
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based on marriage and that these need to be addressed by the creation of new legal 
rights’313.  
 
On the other hand, the question must be asked to what extent is opposition to any 
perceived threats to marriage based not on religion, when the established Church 
now recognises divorce,  and even in some cases remarriage in church subject to 
certain conditions,  but on culture and tradition.   
 
This is the approach of some of the most scholarly of the philosophical writers 
currently publishing on this theme, for example Grayling314 whose approach is that 
‘Religion is a pervasive fact of history and should be addressed as such’.  He goes 
on to prefer Humanism which ‘has a rich ethical outlook, all the richer for being the 
result of reflection as opposed to conditioning or tradition’.  
 
The tenor of his brand of philosophy is that religion, for many people, is really a 
traditional comfort in which they cannot, based on scientific discoveries, seriously 
believe, but that they accept the comfort just the same, so that the true thinker relies 
on humanism whose ‘roots lie in rational consideration of what humankind’s 
cumulative experience teaches; and that is a great harvest of insight’.  
 
De Botton315 takes up this theme in rejecting the supernatural claims of religion but 
pointing out the contributions of the great world religions to the many good principles 
by which we should live. These thoughts strike a chord with the approach of the (now 
secular) Spanish state, formerly so rabidly Catholic, to the appropriate principles in 
their 1978 Constitution, including to the problem of where to place religion in the 
post-Franco democracy, which they have so neatly dealt with in that new 
Constitution316.  
 
																																								 																				
313 Statements from the General Synod of the Church of England, and the Church’s Mission and 
Public Affairs Council, February 2004. 
314 Anthony Grayling, The God Argument: The Case Against Religion and for Humanism, Bloomsbury. 
2007 
315 Alain De Botton, Religion for Atheists: a non-believer’s guide to the uses of religion, Penguin, 
2012.  
316 See Chapter 7.  
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However religious and philosophical ideas of today are not the only potential 
influences on the moral infrastructure of a socially acceptable concept of 
cohabitation outside traditional marriage. The background to marriage in the Middle 
Ages was not exclusively or even mainly Christian, so that our Established Church, 
in what is claimed to be still a predominantly Christian country, is intellectually not 
even the strongest claimant to rule on what is acceptable to Christianity as the state 
religion, even if our diverse population was not now living in a religiously and 
culturally pluralist society.  
 
Brundage317 has explored the origins of religious thought in England in the Middle 
Ages and concluded that the basic beliefs of the Church of that time drew on many 
non-Christian sources.  Christ himself said little about sexual relationships and it was 
not a core of his moral teaching, so that post-early Christian orthodoxy took many 
ideas and practices from other sources, such as Judaism and even paganism, a fact 
which Grayling periodically repeats in less scholarly newspaper articles.  Brundage 
also shows in his study of the period 550AD to 1500 that Christian ethics have never 
been uniform or static, and that it also took a while for the Church to organise and 
take over regulation of sexual behaviour, especially extra-marital and non-marital 
relationships in the period before the Reformation.  
 
Moreover, a system of recognised and regulated concubinage existed in Justinian’s 
time, and Justinian actually legislated for protection of cohabitants and their families 
in recognising this status, a system which was not dead in Medieval Europe when 
Anne Boleyn came upon the scene in the 1520s at the court of Henry VIII of 
England.   
 
Much has been written about that sovereign’s divorce, but little on the fact of the 
continued existence of concubinage in that century which might at the time have 
raised the query of whether the divorce from Catherine of Aragon would have been 
strictly necessary, had it not been for Cromwell, the need for money from the 
dissolved monasteries, England’s military concerns with the Protestant League 
against the alliance of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire and Anne’s own 
																																								 																				
317 James Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society in Medieval Europe, University of Chicago 
Press, Chapters 1-5 and 6-9, pp, 117-118.  
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preoccupation with the theological tracts of the time promoting the reformed 
religions.  
 
Perusal of some contemporary documents suggests that the apparently pejorative 
label, ‘The Concubine’, by which Anne was widely known, was not entirely vulgar 
abuse of that haughty lady who unwisely made herself unpopular with some factions 
of the court, but a purely factual description. ‘Concubinage’, including registration of 
such relationships at the town hall),  also persisted in France in modern times prior to 
the establishment of the PACS (‘Pacte Civile de Solidarite’)  system, and  has not in 
fact been abolished but merely superseded by the superior PACS   model. 
 
Thus the Church, which gradually took over regulation of the former, somewhat more 
flexible, adult relationships through canon law in the later Middle Ages, can therefore 
look back to a period since Biblical times when its doctrines turned more flexibly 
towards the tenor of the comments quoted above from its contemporary Synod and 
Mission and Public Affairs Council.  Indeed there appears to have been more fuss in 
the Church over women bishops than cohabitation, and it is fair to say the Marriage 
(Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 raised even more elevated concerns, so that some 
front line Christian church groups of various denominations remain active 
campaigners on the issue, since same-sex relationships are not, and, as far as it is 
possible to see, never have been, sanctioned by any world class religion, not only 
not by Christians and Muslims. 
 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, it does not appear that religion as such is any realistic bar to a 
normative scheme for cohabitants’ rights, nor that there is a potential public outcry 
likely if such a scheme were introduced, although religion may certainly preclude 
some cohabitants from marrying a new partner if a previous spouse will not agree to 
a divorce, and that cohabitant is not minded to make use of s 1(2)(e) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act  1975 to obtain one without consent.  As to the influence of 
any of the other reasons for cohabitation being preferred over marriage - whether to 
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preclude or impact on the form of any reform – evaluation of the role of any of these 
potential hurdes belongs properly in the concluding chapter of this project318. 
																																								 																				
318 Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 6 Scotland 
 
 Introduction 
 
This chapter evaluates the apparently successful Scottish scheme introduced for 
Scottish unmarried cohabitants by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, and critically 
reviews its background and prompt execution.  
 
The chapter’s primary aim is to examine Scotland’s potential contribution to the 
development of cohabitants’ rights reform in England and Wales. The Scots scheme 
is likely to be of particular interest in that Scotland’s statute is so far the only such 
scheme within the United Kingdom, or indeed the British Isles:  although it was 
stated at the time of the Law Commission’s 2006-7 project, that Eire was also 
considering such reform, nothing further appears to have been done to further this.  
 
Moreover, much has been made by aspirant reformers - particularly in the wake of 
the Scottish referendum which decided against departure of Scotland from the UK 
Union - of the fact that some illogicality is seen in the existence of two entirely 
separate systems of law in relation to cohabitants in such close geographical and 
jurisprudential proximity.  This is a highly relevant practical point,   since not only is 
Scotland located immediately adjacent to the counties of the North of England, 
across a barely defined land border, but its distinct legal system enjoys the same 
final appellate court as English Law, in the Supreme Court at Westminster. This has 
inevitably now led to two distinct results when the law addresses cohabitant 
relationships in the UK’s highest appellate court, so that the result is different 
depending on whether a cohabiting couple who separate live north or south of the 
border. The Justices of the Supreme Court are applying two completely different 
statutes when cohabitants’ appeals arrive before them: the Trusts of Land an 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 in English cases and the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006 in Scottish disputes. 
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Distinct characteristics of the Scottish and English legal systems 
Although some unity between UK jurisdictions might be expected in modern times, 
considering the constitutional ties occurred as long ago as the Act of Union of 1707, 
there is in fact a very simple explanation for this division of legal systems, which in all 
probability did not even occur to any member of the three government ministries at 
Westminster which have still not moved to introduce cohabitation legislation in 
England.  This is  because most members of the Cabinet have no legal background 
at all, let alone as practitioners or academics: indeed there has not been a legally 
qualified Lord Chancellor and Minister of Justice in that post since before the last two 
ministerial reshuffles, when first Chris Grayling (with a background in the media) and 
now Michael Gove (with a background in journalism) were appointed by the Prime 
Minister to serve respectively in the coalition government of 2010-2015 and most 
recently in the Conservative government which took power in May 2015.   
 
At least the Labour government which ordered the English Law Commission’s work 
in 2006 always included a legally qualified Lord Chancellor, the last being Lord 
Falconer of Thoroton,  who is no stranger to law reform. 
 
What is this key difference between Scotland and England and why should it be 
important? The distinction is, of course, that Scotland has always enjoyed a separate 
species of legal system from England and Wales, a fact which most ministers should 
know,  although they might not appreciate the nature of the distinctions, which is 
that,  unlike that of England and Wales, which is a common law system – indeed the 
first common law system spread by England to its colonies long ago - Scots’ law is 
not a pure common law system, but one which owes much to the influence of civil 
law systems such as that of the French, with which country Scotland had close 
connections in the Middle Ages at the time that the common law was developing in 
England and Wales,  but Scotland allied itself frequently with France,  England’s  
main enemy at the time.  
 
Clearly when the Plantagenet and later Tudor English sovereigns were battling with 
both countries – the unruly Scots on their northern border,  and their old enemy, the 
French kingdom, at their southern extremities on either side of the Channel, Scotland 
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and France sought solidarity in a defensive alliance with each other against their 
perceived common enemy, England.   
 
This was not all however. Such was the closeness between Scotland and France, 
from the signing of the treaty known as the Auld Alliance in 1200, that by the first half 
of the  16th century  Scottish peers, who ruled Scotland as regents for three 
successive minor Scottish sovereigns,  held land and even French titles in France.   
At this time, while English Kings and nobles from Normandy, Anjou and Aquitaine, 
had also held continental territories in mainland France for three centuries, by the 
time of the accession of Queen Elizabeth I in 1558 England retained nothing but 
Calais of its formerly extensive French possessions . Thus while English common 
law was being  progressively developed by a series of strong Kings with able 
ministers,  the leaders of Scotland, ‘the Lords of the Congregation’,  spent time on 
their French lands and inevitably absorbed the influence of French law and 
government. 
 
Only in the fourth year of the 17th century were Scotland and England finally united 
under one King, James VI of Scotland and I of England, coincidentally the only son 
of Mary, Queen of Scots, the third of the minor Scottish sovereigns whose youthful 
accession to the throne as babies had generated the series of regencies by Franco- 
Scottish peers who were thus inevitably under French influence  and, through 
residence on their French lands, familiar with French law.  Moreover it was not until 
the first decade of the 18th century that the political fusion of the Act of Union came 
about, far too late for England to impose any changes on the entirely distinct Scottish 
culture let alone its law.  
 
Because of certain characteristics which are more akin to a civil law system than a 
common law one, some call Scotland’s legal system a ‘hybrid’  or ‘mixed’ one,  since 
it adheres to elements of both common and civil law systems. 
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To this day, everything about the Scottish legal system is foreign to English law - its 
courts, legal personnel, terminology319 and substantive law -  particularly in Family 
Law,  where Scottish law has always sparingly awarded ‘aliment’320,  not the routine 
‘maintenance’ through periodical payments  that is a feature of English law, whereas 
Scotland approaches matrimonial property along the lines of the community enjoyed 
in France and other civil law jurisdictions, rather than the individual ownership with 
discretionary re-distribution of property and capital on divorce that is familiar in 
England and Wales.   
 
Moreover, this discretionary distribution under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, 
which enshrines the post WWII English Divorce Law, has been jealously guarded by 
English judges who see it as a unique means of providing on marriage breakdown 
for the needs of the weaker spouse financially in an English matrimonial partnership.  
On the other hand while the Scots now statutorily protect cohabitants in a new 2006 
Act (and previously did so by a species of common law marriage by habit and repute 
which the Act repealed) England and Wales provides no such regime for those 
couples who live together without being married, who must  instead use the Law of 
Trusts in the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 to establish their  
property rights,  and are otherwise not provided for in any discrete legislative regime 
although some other aspects of English law recognises them as individuals.  
 
This, therefore, was how in the 16th century it seems that Scotland drifted on sleep 
walking through a legal system which had absorbed some of the principles which 
were later developed when France’s civil law system was modernised by Napoleon 
in 1805, and which thereafter spread through Europe in the form of their own 
national civil codes to all the countries that that activist Emperor had ‘liberated’, that 
is,  more accurately conquered,  systems which those countries later kept after his 
overthrow.  
 
																																								 																				
319 For example, a claimant and respondent are known respectively as the ‘pursuer’ and the ‘defender’ 
and Scots junior first level judges are called ‘sheriffs’ which English people tend to associate with 
Robin Hood! – and if  they have occasion to  hear about Scottish sheriffs at all wonder why this office 
in Scotland is so named since Scotland lies significantly North of Sherwood Forest! 
320 The Scottish word for American ‘alimony’ and English ‘maintenance’, originally from the 16th 
century English exported with our colonists to America, in some of whose legal systems alimony still 
persists, although in contemporary English law the relevant term is ‘maintenance’. 
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In the same way, it seems that Westminster governments in London did not concern 
themselves with changing Scottish law to remove the civil law influences it had long 
before absorbed.  There were two opportunities, first following the union of the two 
kingdoms under James VI of Scotland and I of England in 1603, then secondly, 
following the Act of Union in 1707, but neither was taken.  Thus it is that, even in the 
21st century, in comparative law terms Scots law still belongs exclusively to neither 
the common law nor civil law families of such systems, subtly mixing characteristic 
features of both.   
 
Contemporary English perceptions of Scotland and Scottish law  
 
It is not known whether, when the Scottish system was seen to be successful, any of 
this background in Scottish law was known by those ministers in the three 
governments which were concerned with the task of deciding whether there should 
be any implementation of the 2006-7 recommendations of the Law Commission321.  
 
However, in the case of the last days of the New Labour government of Gordon 
Brown, there were other more pressing issues in their last three years of office up to 
2010, despite the fact that there was a lawyer Lord Chancellor in post, and that was 
Lord Falconer, who had already been involved in the major changes of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, so possibly there was no time to think about   the 
Law Commission’s 2006-7 work at all.  
 
In the case of the coalition of 2010-2015, and the following Conservative government 
which took office in May 2015, the leadership of a legally qualified Lord Chancellor 
had been lost, and certainly the then Minister of Justice, Chris Grayling, would not 
have realised the nature of the legal system in Scotland, unless he were specifically 
briefed by any of the dwindling staff of the Ministry of Justice who might have had the 
background.   
 
Nevertheless,  in theory the government’s law officers, the Attorney-General and 
Solicitor-General - whose responsibility it is to advise the government and who are 
																																								 																				
321 See Chapter 4. 
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both fortunately still appointed from the legal profession -  should have been able to 
understand the nature of the compensatory scheme proposed by the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006.  They should certainly have noted its resemblance both to the 
English law of proprietary estoppel in its remedial flexibility, and to the English Law 
Commission’s similar approach to relationship generated disadvantage.  With 
antennae attuned to Europe they should also have appreciated that the civil law 
influence in the hybrid Scots system would have had the added advantage of being 
particularly understandable to European civil law systems, which would at least have 
imported a positive advantage in an era of much cross border movement and 
settlement by families which later break up.  Even if neither the Scottish Act nor the 
English Law Commission’s recommendations were welcomed in their totality, there 
were certainly indications that as one small part of the United Kingdom had swiftly 
achieved legislation in a highly topical contemporary field, England and Wales, albeit 
with more onerous obligations to a larger population, should not be far behind. 
 
All the same,  as was made clear on the release of the Djanogly statement in 2012 
that nothing was going to be done in England just because Scotland had legislated, it 
seems that Westminster did not want to acknowledge any external pressures to 
change English law on cohabitants’ rights, and did not mind also implying that that 
was particularly so if anyone thought that that pressure might come from Scotland’s 
success in introducing a system which had earned a quickly produced and largely 
positive analysis by leading English academics in the Wasoff research322.   
 
Certainly, the particularly unappreciative, and impliedly pejorative comment on this 
positive analysis of Scotland’s achievement by Mr Djanogly made sure to give no 
credit to Scotland for its prompt and innovative achievement, since his statement 
apparently did not hesitate to make clear  that whatever Scotland had done, it was 
not going to be such as to lead an English government to do anything similar.   
 
The fact that there were other English academics besides the Wasoff team who 
thought that this was a wrong approach by the government is evidenced by the 
																																								 																				
322 Fran Wasoff, Joanna Miles, Enid Mordaunt, ‘Cohabitation: Lessons from Research North of the 
Border, (2011) 23 Child and Family Law Quarterly, pp.302-322. 
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prompt statement, issued the same day from the Law Commission by Professor 
Elizabeth Cooke, immediately following the government minister’s announcement323. 
 
This, therefore, is why there is currently, and until any cohabitants’ rights reform, a 
certain awkwardness, in  that two distinct systems pertain on the mainland of the UK,  
depending on where precisely, within perhaps a few miles, a cohabiting couple lived 
when they fell out and took legal proceedings.  Besides the geographical aspect, this 
situation has also been brought jurisprudentially into keen focus in two recent 
Supreme Court appeals, Jones v Kernott  in 2011 and Gow v Grant  in 2012, heard 
only a year apart, respectively concerning English and Scottish cohabitants, each 
under its current applicable law.   
 
As it happened, the contrast between these two cases was particularly fortuitous, 
enabling comparison of the two distinct systems, since Baroness Hale – the only 
academic amongst the Supreme Court justices, and a long standing leading Family 
lawyer – sat on both cases, thus easily taking her opportunity in the second 
(Scottish) case to include some authoritative comment, actually within her judgment.  
 
It was also particularly fortuitous that this opportunity came, as it did, such a short 
time after the Court had made what seemed a major fresh contribution to the English 
law applying to cohabitants in Jones v Kernott.  Creative as the Court was in its 
treatment in 2011 of the English law of trusts as it applied to the family home 
whether of married or unmarried couples, Lady Hale’s detailed comments on the 
potentially superior impact of reform along the Scottish lines could not conceal the 
unwieldiness of the English trust law as a tool to resolve disputed distribution of 
assets on a relationship breakdown.  Her comments were particularly apt, informed 
as they were by her hands on experience of the Scottish system in Gow v Grant. 
 
A secondary aim of the chapter is therefore to examine, against the background of 
the apparently successful Scottish scheme, the basis of the abandonment of the 
English Law Commission’s 2006-7 work on potential reform in English Law, since 
there seems to be nothing in the Scottish scheme to put English lawyers off reform in 
																																								 																				
323 See Chapter 3. 
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English law and in fact much to encourage an equivalent English scheme, whether 
more or less similar or completely different.  What rather does seem to be indicated 
is that there is simply no political will for reform in any of the main parties at 
Westminster let alone the government.  Moreover, owing to the weakness of reasons 
claimed for this English failure to legislate,  it seems worth establishing that whatever 
the Westminster government’s real reasons, failure to legislate is not to be blamed 
on any claimed failure of the Scottish legislative achievement .  
 
 
The background to Scottish reform 
 
Scotland has always had its own legal heritage, sources of law and influences on 
both, and is proud of these differences, including its own Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1985 dealing with financial provision on divorce, which demonstrates some strong 
distinctions from the equivalent English law.  
 
 It is not thus surprising that the Scots took the earliest opportunity they could to 
create some of their own legislation when the Scottish Executive decided in 2005 to 
reform a particular aspect of its Family Law by modernising its treatment of 
cohabiting families. Amongst other catalysts they have their own Law Commission, 
separate from England and Wales’s324  and which is taken very seriously in Scotland 
where Scots have remained jealous of their traditions and way of life, which have in 
any case been easy for them to highlight and maintain, as it is a country with a small 
population, spread over a wild, disparate and relatively large rural landscape.   Thus 
they have not had to absorb immigrants and their cultures in the same way as has 
happened in England and Wales (particularly England). The Scots clearly see 
themselves as essentially separate from England, English Law and the English, 
whatever the political union within the EU: indeed recent events indicate that the 
feeling is probably mutual. 
 
																																								 																				
324 Law Commissions Act 1965, a statute of the UK Parliament, setting up the distinct English and 
Scottish Law Commissions. The Scottish Commission has the equivalent task in Scotland as that in 
London has for England, to advise the government on the law, in the Scottish Commission’s case to 
review Scottish law. 
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The Scots’ unique discrete statutory regime addressing cohabitants’ asset 
distribution claims on separation thus currently comes from the enactment of the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 (‘the 2006 Act’ or ‘the Scottish Act’) and is to some 
extent influenced by the background set out above.  As already explained, in 
comparative law classificatory terms, Scotland is not technically a common law 
jurisdiction like England, but has a mixed common and civil law system. Despite the 
fact that it has its own Parliament and Scottish Executive, there is also still some 
English legislation which applies to Scotland alongside its own civil law influenced 
principles which endure in some contexts.  This is because of certain civil law origins 
in the ius civile, - that is. Roman law - although this ius civile did not come directly 
from the Roman occupation but through the canon law of the Church, since the 
Roman Empire never had much impact in Scotland which they found unruly -  quickly 
withdrawing behind the wall erected in the time of the Emperor Hadrian under whom 
construction began in AD122 to mark the northern extremity of their rule. Successive 
provincial governors from the time of Caesar in 44BC had incessant trouble with the 
Scots from the moment of their invasion and colonisation of’ Britannia’ (as they 
called England, Wales and Scotland), and never succeeded in subduing the Celts 
who lived there.   
 
Thus the Scots originally ingested the Roman Law influence, well established by the 
time of Charlemagne, from their association with France, and the English never did 
anything to eradicate that, even after they repressed the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 
1745, nor, as it happened, in the time of George IV (1820-1830) who actually tried to 
woo the Scots to a closer relationship with England, by adopting their tartans and 
appreciating their art and architecture, certainly a contrast of approach with,  but no 
more successfully than, his great uncle, the Duke of Cumberland, who had 
repressed their rebellion with great severity in the previous century . 
 
 As a result perhaps of the historic ‘baggage’ and (if they had realised that that was 
what they were objecting to) the civil law influence, it is perhaps not so surprising 
that the potential for learning any lessons from the Scottish Act was not received by 
government in England and Wales with much apparent enthusiasm, but a short 
summary of the Scots methodology and legislative process indicates the merit that 
has been overlooked.   
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Nature of the Scottish scheme 
Some brief detail of the Scottish scheme indicates the broad outline of the system 
that Baroness Hale considers good enough that she was able to add,  in  - the now 
famous -  paragraph 56 of her judgment in Gow v Grant,  the view that ‘English and 
Welsh cohabitants deserve nothing less’. 
 
The Scottish legislation is an ‘opt out’ scheme as the parties can avoid the 
consequences by agreement in life or by will on death if they do not wish its 
provisions to apply to them.  Compared to some other jurisdictions, such as Australia 
and New Zealand325, the changes are modest.  
 
Cohabitants are defined in s 25(1) of the 2006 Act as a couple who ‘are (or were) 
living together as if they were’ husband and wife or civil partners: and the Act gives 
statutory guidance in s 25(2) as to how this is to be determined. Moreover this is 
done in a manner not dissimilar to the methodology historically widely used by UK 
welfare benefits assessments:  that is to say, relevant factors include length and 
nature of the relationship and of any financial arrangements, although the Act does 
not refer to the existence of children nor to a minimum qualifying period as most 
other jurisdictions’ schemes do. 
 
Nevertheless, while first impressions of the provisions of the 2006 Scottish reforms 
are perhaps that they are not as clear and comprehensive as the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 1985 is  in respect of  the law applying to spouses, the 2006 Act is 
undoubtedly superior to present provision for cohabitants’ relationship breakdown in 
England and Wales, which still relies on the non-specific TOLATA remedies already 
mentioned, which are all that is currently available to separating cohabitants in 
English Law, 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
325 See Chapter 8. 
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Framework of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006: the policy of ‘easing of 
certain legal difficulties’326 
 
In accordance with the original 1992 aim of such reform, which had its origins in a 
Scottish Law Commission report of that time suggesting that reform was needed, the 
core provisions of the 2006 Act are not as comprehensive as those in respect of 
spouses in the 198 5 Act, which provides a financial provision scheme effective on 
marriage breakdown and dissolution, which is based on valuing and dividing property 
capital rather than awarding maintenance327.  
 
The 1985 Act is itself not a community of property system as such, although it is not 
unlike those which pertain in European countries with civil codes. It nevertheless 
demonstrates some similarities to those systems, which, as already suggested, may 
owe something to a combination of the historical medieval relationship with France 
known as ‘the Auld Alliance’ and thus the long established influence of civil law.  
 
The basic principle of the Scottish cohabitation scheme is that,  as has been the 
case for spouses since the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 on separation and 
divorce, maintenance (known as ‘aliment’ in Scotland) is not usual but only awarded 
exceptionally, so that the financial consequences are normally confined to capital 
and property division together with maintenance for children only but none for adults:  
although there can be ongoing support under the 1985 Act for a spouse in 
appropriate circumstances, this is neither routine nor usual unless there are special 
circumstances and then it would be short term and the 2006 Act, creating the 
cohabitants’ system, follows the capital and property approach of the 1985 Act save 
that in the cohabitant system there is no power to order any maintenance payments 
																																								 																				
326 This now famous phraseology was initially that of the 1992 Scottish Law Commission report on 
general reform of Scottish Family Law, which was then preserved in the Memorandum of the Scottish 
Executive to the Scottish Parliament when proposing the legislation in the 2006 Act. That legislation 
was presented not as radical reform but as a means of dealing with the Scottish cohabitants’ social 
problem, which was the fact that the rising number of cohabitant families was not adequately 
addressed by their own outdated legal provision of recognising cohabitation as a common law 
concept of marriage by habit and repute, which might be compared to the inconvenience of English 
Law’s unsuitable remedy of resort to TOLATA 1996. In Scotland, their antiquated law was of the 
common law marriage by habit and repute was formally abolished by the 2006 Act.   
327 Elaine Sutherland ‘Child and Family Law, 2nd ed, (2008) W Green, paragraphs 16-017 to 16-186. 
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at all.  
 
The 1985 Act is without doubt a clearer, more articulated, system than English Law’s 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as Sir Mark Potter, the then President of the High 
Court Family Division, identified,  when he commented on its ‘clarity and certainty in 
the case of Charman v Charman (No 4) (2007). It is therefore no surprise that the 
2006 Act, dealing with the breakdown of a cohabitation relationship, makes no 
provision for maintenance for a cohabitant either during or after cohabitation.  
 
Instead s 28 provides capital orders of 3 sorts:  
 
- s 28(2)(a) (capital order in compensation for economic advantage gained by the 
defender from the pursuer’s contributions, and for the pursuer’s economic 
disadvantage suffered thereby); 
- s 28(2)(b) (capital order for payment towards the future ‘economic burden’ of child 
care; 
- s28(2)(c) (an interim order) 
 
any of which must be applied for within one year of the cessation of cohabitation. 
 
Sutherland is critical of the drafting of these provisions, in that there is lack of 
guidance on economic advantage and disadvantage in s 28(2)(a); ‘untidy’ language 
in s 29(2)(b) which does not make it clear whether periodical payments would be 
permitted instead of a capital payment, and which also does not cover the position of 
an ‘accepted child’ - the equivalent of the child ‘treated’ under English law as a ‘child 
of the family’); and in all cases she finds that the one year time limit on application 
from the date of separation is too short, would lead to rushes to litigate and inhibit 
attempts to settle out of court.  Baroness Hale agrees with her on the latter point: see 
further below. 
 
Sutherland also examines the case law accumulated during the initial five year 
period 2006-2011 and concludes that judges are frustrated by the comparative lack 
of guidance in determining economic advantage and disadvantage in s 28(2)(a) 
cases  - especially compared to the ‘crispness’ of the 1985 Act for spouses and civil 
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partners - and because there is no guidance as to the relevance of conduct, or of the 
existence of resources in making an award. It is, of course, possible that this might 
have been a concern in the minds of the ministers at Westminster when they 
decided to do nothing until further evidence of the Scottish experience was available, 
but one that could easily have been addressed in English drafting if the basic 
principles of the Scots scheme was found a useful prototype..  
 
She also considers  - as Baroness Hale does when delivering judgment in Gow v 
Grant -  that a s28(2)(b) order should permit periodical payments, and also variation 
when circumstances change,  and that it should be made clear that the carer’s loss 
of earnings should be relevant.  Sutherland further considers that the position of 
caring costs for the ‘accepted child’ and ‘what it means to be a step-parent’ require 
further examination. 
 
She acknowledges that some further guidance on s 28(2)(a) was given by the Inner 
House of the Court of Session - (on the Scottish  leg of the Gow v Grant -  when that 
appeal was heard by that Court on 22 March 2011, before subsequent appeal to the 
Supreme Court.  However she also commented that the Court of Session had not 
approached the matter with ‘much enthusiasm’ and had thus deprived future courts 
of useful guidance in interpreting terms.  It is possible that the further consideration 
of the case when appealed to the Supreme Court in London has supplied any such 
deficiency in enthusiasm by the Court of Session, since - as may be seen below - 
Baroness Hale, herself a former academic who makes clear in her judgment that she 
has read the same research as Professor Sutherland, fortunately took the 
opportunity to address these and other practical issues.  
 
However,  Sutherland’s328 main comment is that the initiative for this legislation was 
so long ago – 1992, over 20 years prior -  and that while some of the problems 
identified could be addressed by statutory amendment, the more fundamental 
question of what is the right legal provision for contemporary cohabitants is urgent, 
since she says that some judges have questioned whether the Act’s ‘modest 
																																								 																				
328 Elaine Sutherland ‘The Easing of Certain Legal Difficulties: Limited Legal Recognition of 
Cohabitation Under Scots Law’,   in Bill Atkin (ed) The International Survey of Family Law 2011, 
Jordan Publishing 2011, pp335-366.  
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reforms’ are adequate for the legal recognition of cohabitants in an era of increased 
‘popularity and social acceptability over the intervening years’.  This may be true of 
Scotland, although the Executive was initially cautious in introducing its reforms as 
their Memorandum prepared for the Scottish Parliament indicates. On the other hand 
the Scots have already exhibited superior proactive creativity to that of England and 
Wales in addressing the matter at all.   
 
Any concerns about the modesty of the Scottish reforms also perhaps need to be 
considered in the light of the fact that as far as English Law is concerned any such 
progress may be a policy step too far,   despite all the English evidence gathered, 
both at the Law Commission and elsewhere, that reform was clearly needed. This 
seems the more puzzling as it seems that there were some valid questions asked by 
the English government before they adopted their stubbornly negative stance, but 
these still do not adequately explain the absence of any drive for reform at all, 
besides which some were duly answered by early research on the operation of the 
Scottish scheme. 
 
 
Why did the English government really decline to implement the Law 
Commission’s recommendations and why did they blame that on the Scots? 
 
In fact, there were, apparently, a number of reasons,  apart from mere petulance with 
the Scots, which in the context of the paucity of official statement on the matter seem 
mainly to be summarised as  
 
(i) potential costs of legislating for England and Wales,  and  
(ii) a belief that the Scottish system was not appropriate for English law. 
There are, nevertheless, as strong arguments against these two reasons, 
as it appears have been claimed by the only official statements advanced 
for maintaining the clearly unsatisfactory status quo.  
 
Cost of reform 
The ‘costs’ argument originates in 2008, following the publication of the Law 
Commission’s 2007 recommendations in the Final Report on their work of 2006-7, 
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when Bridget Prentice, the Justice Minister of the time, announced in Parliament that 
the government would not take any further action until the likely costs and benefits to 
the jurisdiction of England and Wales had been evaluated. For this, it was intended 
to await further empirical research.  This research329 by the Wasoff team -  funded by 
the Nuffield Foundation - sought to capture Scottish practitioners’ practical 
experience of the operation of the new Scottish law over a 3 year period from its 
implementation.   
 
The study was not restricted to cases which had reached court but was based on 
interviews with 97 legal practitioners, mostly solicitors, whose clients had consulted 
them about cohabitation under the new legislation.  The project used questionnaires 
and 19 follow up telephone interviews. It enabled the researchers to do precisely 
what the Minister had highlighted in 2008 as important for England and Wales, that 
is,   to extrapolate from their research the conclusion that there was no significant 
likely extra delivery cost in adopting a similar scheme in our own jurisdiction.  
Although fairly quickly available, this research was surprisingly rejected as 
inapplicable to a decision about English law, by a further statement in 2011: 
surprisingly, because the research addressed precisely what the English government 
wanted to know about costs.  
 
Taking the costs argument first, it is hard to see why, even  if the Scottish scheme 
was thought to be a useless prototype,  the Law Commissioner’s project was not 
taken forward in England and Wales, or at least something similar introduced – even 
perhaps simpler if there were thought to be likely Parliamentary difficulties in 
agreeing detail.  At the lowest level of change, perhaps some suitably adjusted 
version of the outline scheme suggested by the Law Commission’s work could have 
been beneficial. Absence of any legislation at all is now particularly 
disadvantageous.   
 
Given the obvious professional and public unease about both contemporary lack of 
legal aid for litigation, and lack of either any specific legislation for the large and 
																																								 																				
329 Fran Wasoff, Joanna Miles and Enid Mordaunt, Legal Practitioners’ Perspectives on the 
Cohabitation Provisions  of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (2010) University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No 11/03, available on SSRN, was also the subject of a subsequent 
article ‘Cohabitation: Lessons From Research North of the Border  (2011) 23 CFLQ pp.302-322.  
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growing cohabitant constituency to resolve their own disputes themselves, or any 
clarity of the law on the subject of their legal position on separation so that they 
might consider autonomous agreements on entering their relationships, there would 
be some merit in legislation that would go some way to address these concerns,  
despite the sterling efforts of the Supreme Court in clarifying, in so far as they can, 
the TOLATA regime which currently governs cohabitants’ asset division on 
separation.   
 
The lowest level requirement, now urgent, is obviously to achieve clarity in some 
straightforward legislation which might be understood by separating cohabitants with 
average lay appreciation of access to justice.   The level of understanding required is 
that suitable for addressing litigants in person, either seeking an agreed settlement 
with their former partners, or the prospect of litigation:  moreover this urgent need is 
highlighted by the most recent cohabitants’ case to come before the High Court, 
Seagrove v Sullivan 330 where excess costs had already been run up in attempts to 
litigate the property aspects in the Chancery Division before the case was 
consolidated with a Child  Law application in the Family Court. 
 
The present basic lack of information is clearly unsatisfactory for the ordinary citizen 
in both practical and jurisprudential terms, since the present position in the context of 
current legal aid constraints is broadly of official encouragement to settle all legal 
disputes by mediation, if necessary without legal advice unless the parties can pay 
for that privately; and for  costs not  to be wasted on unnecessary litigation: that is,  
neither costs  of the individuals concerned, nor those of the courts and judiciary.  
How can the public policy work towards this goal without legal aid, and without clear 
legislation which a lay person acting as an LIP can understand?  
 
Such a non-court dispute resolution policy clearly needs to be supported with 
accessible infrastructure, which adoption in some form of the Law Commission’s 
2006-7 work would at least have supplied.   It may be argued that the position has 
now years later been recently slightly improved by the Supreme Court’s clarification 
in Jones v Kernott of the English Law of Trusts as it applies to the family home, 
whether that home is of a married or unmarried couple.  However the latest potential 
																																								 																				
330 [2014] EWHC Fam 1410. 
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for improvement in the processes open to cohabitants on separation is because of a 
judgment of Mr Justice Holman as recently as 3 December 2014 in what may now 
turn out to be the watershed case of Seagrove v Sullivan331 precisely because it 
addressed the enormous cost of TOLATA 1996 litigation.    
 
However this judgment was obviously directed not at the lay participants in the case, 
or at other potential lay litigants in the same sort of dispute, but at the specialist 
professional advisers, the practitioners normally involved where the parties can 
afford to pay them.   Holman J’s signposting on the significant Supreme Court 
judicial clarification cohabitants in Jones v Kernott,    points out that such cases now 
only require citation of that Court’s two most recent seminal cases,  Stack v Dowden 
in 2007  and Jones v Kernott in 2011,  rather than the dozens previously habitually 
relied on by practitioners .   
 
Nevertheless it is still likely to be the case that the average litigant in person will not 
be particularly grateful, or well served, to be told that it is only necessary to master 
two long complex judgments of the country’s highest appeal court, especially when 
one of those is still Stack v Dowden, not one of the easiest to understand, even with 
the sufficient background in Legal Method of a qualifying law degree, from which the 
average ‘LIP’ usually has not benefited! 
 
Moreover, Seagrove v Sullivan inadvertently came before a Family- judge    - rather 
than the substantive hearing being placed in a Chancery list - because it was 
consolidated with a Children Act 1989 application,  which must be made in the 
Family Court,  so that the TOLATA portion of the dispute was able to be moved from 
the Chancery Division where the child issues could not conveniently be determined.  
It was also a case where the judge was particularly outspoken about both the excess 
paper and excessive cost incurred by the parties in unnecessarily citing to him 32 
authorities now overtaken by the analyses of the Supreme Court in the two key 
cases cited that he actually considered relevant. Thus, he was able to say,  it should 
no longer be ‘necessary to look beyond those two authorities’, making the remaining 
30 largely redundant - though he did also concede, without going into further detail, 
																																								 																				
331 Ibid. 
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that some of those might be relevant to a particular theme being pursued by counsel 
for one of the parties.   
 
The judge in this case nevertheless also highlighted that the substantive dispute was 
only over £500,000 making the costs aspect of the court fight disproportionate, and 
added that the male cohabitant, a businessman, should have realised this.  
 
 A businessman is not, however,  a lawyer (unless he also happens to be so 
qualified) and It is, of course, a giant leap of logic, to suggest that because a party to 
such a dispute is a businessman, he should, as a layman also be expected himself 
to research  the law, which happily was not necessary in that case since the parties 
had been able to afford legal advice -  unlike many ‘ordinary’ lay cohabitants, since 
the Law Commission in 2006-7 identified that cohabitation is a classless syndrome. 
 
It is also important to note that the major strand of the judge’s attack on the excess 
of authority being presented to him was in connection with the overriding objective of 
both the CPR 1998 and the FPR 2010, that is to decide cases justly and at minimum 
cost, a consideration which should have been firmly in the mind of the government 
Minister when she made her announcement about rejection of any analogy to be 
drawn for English law from the Scottish system in 2008.   
 
It is therefore extremely difficult to defend the Minister’s 2008 announcement, even 
more so in 2015 than in 2008,   since it is now known that the origins of the 
subsequent public funding crisis which ultimately resulted in the LASPO 2012 legal 
aid cuts lay in precisely the same period, and indeed also coincided with the initiative 
for the most recent official investigations of costs limitation, which was, first,   that 
taken on by Lord Justice Jackson in November 2008, immediately following, 
secondly,  the Master of the Rolls’ Costs Review also in 2008, of at least of the 
second of which the Justice Minister might be supposed to have been aware when 
she made her statement in September 2008, only two months previously. 
 
As a result of these civil litigation cost cutting initiatives, Lord Justice Jackson went 
immediately to work on his review, so quickly that he delivered his Preliminary 
Report  in May 2009 and his eventual findings in his Final Report  in 2010 In short, it 
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would therefore seem that the Labour government in which Bridget Prentice was 
Justice Minister in 2008 was well aware of the ongoing crises in civil litigation 
generally and legal aid in particular, both of which had been bedevilling access to 
justice since initiatives in the era of Lord Mackay of Clashfern as Lord Chancellor in 
the late 1980s when he published his Green Paper332 which initiated the long period 
of civil costs reviews which have followed ever since,  and indeed  have been a 
matter of government concern since the Royal Commission on Legal Services 
chaired by Sir Henry Benson,  ten years earlier333.   
 
It may therefore be safely concluded that despite this plethora of evidence in 2008 
that costs saving was at least as urgent as it had been for many years, it was more 
likely that there was simply no political will to legislate for cohabitants, so that waiting 
for evaluation of the Scottish scheme in terms of costs and benefits to the jurisdiction 
of England and Wales was a fairly threadbare excuse, only just credible even at that 
date. Even then it was not believed by the Solicitors’ Family Law Association, 
Resolution, which went straight into a project to support the first of Lord Lester’s 
2008 and 2009 private member’s Bills in the House of Lords. 
 
How the government stance on the irrelevance of the Scottish Act was maintainable 
after the publication of the Wasoff et al research in 2010 is even more difficult to 
understand, as the Supreme Court has made clear in the most recent of the Justices’ 
seminal judgments, Jones v Kernott in 2011, another point referred to by Holman J . 
 
The Supreme Court would no doubt be pleased to agree with his views expressed in 
the Seagrove v Sullivan judgment, since their own collected judgments specifically 
comment, in the latter of their two key cases to which he refers,  on the fact that, in 
the absence of discrete legislation catering for separating cohabitants, the judiciary 
has been obliged to fill the gap334. Particularly apt in that respect is the comment of 
Lord Wilson in Jones v Kernott: 
 
																																								 																				
332 Lord Mackay of Clashfern ‘The Work and Organisation of the Legal Profession’, Lord Chancellor’s 
Department, 1989. 
333 Sir Henry Benson, GBE, Royal Commission on Legal Services,  Final Report, HMSO, 1979. 
334 Kernott v Jones [2011] UKSC 53, per Lord Collins [57]. 
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 ‘In the light of the continued failure of Parliament to confer upon the courts limited 
redistributive powers in relation to the property of each party upon the breakdown of a 
non-marital relationship, I warmly applaud the development of the law of equity, 
spear-headed by Lady Hale and Lord Walker in their speeches in Stack v 
Dowden ([2007) AC 432, and reiterated in their judgment in the present appeal, that 
the common intention which impresses a constructive trust upon the legal ownership 
of the family home can be imputed to the parties to the relationship’ 335. 
 
Nevertheless, this is hardly a satisfactory source for the average LIP cohabitant to 
access in order to discern the likely application of the law in relation to his or her own 
case, in particular because until the 2007 case of Stack v Dowden was clarified in 
Jones v Kernott in 2011, even Holman J could not have made the statement he now 
has in Seagrove v Sullivan, a situation which perhaps might also have been obvious 
to the Minister at the time of her 2008 statement recorded in Hansard.   This is 
because in 2008 the Supreme Court would have been the first to admit that their 
reasoning in Stack v Dowden – progress as it was – was nevertheless not by any 
means a final clarification of the law, because they explicitly took the opportunity in 
Jones v Kernott in 2011 to update and  - in their own words-  ‘to clarify’ that earlier 
decision. 
 
Moreover, there was certainly no evidence to suggest that any new concerns might 
have arisen in the intervening two years between the Minister’s statement in 2008 
and the researchers’ conclusions in 2010. Similarities of principle and practical 
application between the Scottish system and the Law Commission’s 
recommendations had already been confirmed by the Law Commissioner, Stuart 
Bridge, at the time that the Commission had considered the then only just available 
Scottish legislation while their English project was still ongoing336. It might therefore 
have at least been thought that perhaps the availability of such a scheme in England 
and Wales might have had a costs neutral impact on existing expense, rather than 
causing an explosion of unaffordable costs. 
 
Further, this result might not least have been achievable since the commonly used 
remedies available to cohabitants in England and Wales have always been to resort 
																																								 																				
335Ibid, [70]. 
336 Stuart Bridge, ‘Money, Marriage and Cohabitation’, (2006) 36 Family Law, p.641. 
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to the standard trust remedies provided by either fully contested TOLATA 
applications, that is. under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, 
commonly called ‘TOLATA 1996’,   or under Schedule 1 and s 15 of the Children Act 
1989, neither of which has ever been conspicuously inexpensive in terms of judicial 
time, court costs and legal aid, even before Holman, J protested about the plethora 
of lever arch files containing the 30 surplus authorities of which he has been recently 
complaining.    
 
On the other hand, a discrete system might have actually saved costs, in terms of 
public awareness, consideration by lawyers and clients alike of the developing 
culture of DR or private settlement through solicitor negotiation,  not to mention client 
satisfaction in avoiding litigation at all.   
 
Indeed this is precisely what Wasoff et al concluded in stating that 
 
‘reform would not simply create new business. It would, to some extent, displace 
existing  remedies, and provide a more appropriate, productive and possibly more 
cost effective avenue’337. 
 
If the costs saving aspect was not readily obvious to the government spokesperson 
in 2008, it must surely have been so by the time of the next statement, on 6 
September 2011, when the then Justice Minister Jonathan Djanogly announced in a 
written statement that, following the Wasoff et al research, there were no plans to 
take forward any reforms in England and Wales. The subsequent audible silence 
from the recent coalition government, which in effect confirmed this stance, was 
equally illogical, since it has been their five years of office, 2010-2015, which has 
had to contend with the problems of austerity in general, and the implementation of 
severely truncated legal aid from April 2013 in particular, and it goes without saying 
that one thing that the present Conservative government could do to save some 
public money would be to provide support to an easily accessible government 
sponsored Cohabitants’ Rights Bill. 
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The Scottish scheme and English law 
The second reason for declining any assistance from the Scottish scheme seems to 
have been adopted by the government because what might have been a valid costs 
argument eventually appeared clearly not to have force, so that it was soon obvious 
that it would be necessary to rely on the alternative ground of resistance at which 
both Bridget Prentice and Jonathan Djanogly  had respectively hinted, that is that 
there is some perception that the Scottish system is in some way inappropriate to 
form even a signpost towards a similar scheme for England and Wales – or perhaps 
even a dissimilar scheme if the Scots system was not for some reason attractive.   
 
The only result of this is arguably that it has allowed time to show that the very 
scheme already now established in Scotland works for the Scots, and has also now 
been firmly supported by Lady Hale in the Supreme Court,  in judgments in both 
Jones v Kernott  and Gow v Grant, in the latter of which she had the opportunity to 
consider the practicality of the application of the Scots scheme in the first appeal to 
reach the Westminster Supreme Court judiciary under the very same Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006 which is apparently not welcomed on behalf of the  Westminster 
government   by the UK Ministry of Justice. 
 
The apparent reluctance to take any inspiration from Scotland is difficult to follow, 
given that this is a part of the United Kingdom which is not only adjacent to England 
but in such geographical proximity that there are already certain irritants in different 
systems in other fields which can vary widely depending on whether a claimant lives 
North or South of the Border338. 
 
With regard to the law, while there is a certain divergence in many areas of, 
respectively, Scottish and English law, and some unfamiliar points of terminology,  
any study of reports of the cases decided to date under the 2006 Act in Scotland is 
easy to follow, although it is true that procedural systems and the legal vocabulary in 
Scotland are different  
 
																																								 																				
338 For example, different, more advantageous, treatment of university fees and prescription charges 
in Scotland, in respect of which much ‘grumbling’ can often be heard in the Northern Counties of 
England, where these benefits are not available!   
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However it does not appear from any evidence currently available that there is an 
identifiably distinct division of opinion in either moral or policy terms in connection 
with potential reform of the law relating to cohabitants, in either Scotland, on the one 
hand, or England and Wales on the other,. Much has been made in England and 
Wales of not equating marriage and cohabitation in any way, but Scotland has 
specifically followed this approach also. The Scottish Ministers said so explicitly in 
their first announcements of their intention to legislate ‘for Scottish families’339 .  
 
It seems, therefore, that there must be some other reason for the early rejection by 
English Ministers of valuable practical insights that might otherwise be obtained from 
the Scottish reforms, especially as the United Kingdom has not been slow to follow 
even more fundamental initiatives where other jurisdictions, both common and civil 
law, have been proactive and innovative in leading.  
 
Further academic evaluation five years from the Act 
The tardiness and scepticism of the English government at Westminster in 
progressing the Law Commission’s recommendations has been widely criticised, 
both in the media and academe340. Professor Elaine Sutherland of Stirling Law 
School in the University of Stirling has looked in more depth at the operation of the 
Act in a chapter for the International Society of Family Law’s annual survey in 2011 
and at the problem of making Scottish law more accessible and appropriate for 
Scottish people in the annual survey of 2013341. She has suggested both that there 
should be some amendments to the legislation but that, on assessing the first five 
years of judicial decisions as to whether they are ‘realising the modest goals set for 
them’,  there should also be a ‘fresh evaluation of the goals the legal system should 
be seeking to achieve in regulating cohabitation’. 
 
																																								 																				
339 See further below in connection with the original Memorandum by Scottish Ministers to the Scottish 
Parliament where they set out their stall for Scottish people. 
340 Melissa Darnborough, ‘Untidy Lives: A Missed Opportunity for Reform’, School of Law, Manchester 
Metropolitan University 
341.Elaine Sutherland, The Easing of Certain Legal Difficulties’, in Bill Atkin (ed)  International  Survey 
of Family Law 2011, ‘Family Law, Jordan Publishing Limited, p335;  in Bill Atkin (ed) International 
Survey of Family Law 2013, ‘Can Family Law Be Made More Accessible  Family Law, Jordan 
Publishing,  p333. 
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Similarly, Frankie McCarthy342 has analysed some of the early 2006 Act cases and 
commented on the confusion caused by the judiciary’s lack of adequate guidance in 
the Act as to the underlying principles relevant to the distributive orders that may be 
made under s 28. This article offers three re-distributive rationales based on analysis 
of the first 15 cases under the Act, which are distinguished as the partnership, 
compensation and restitution models.  However this article dates from 2011 before 
Gow v Grant reached the Supreme Court and the Act found at least limited favour 
with Baroness Hale who shared Professor Sutherland’s criticisms, but overall found 
the scheme workable. A further article by McCarthy in the New Zealand Universities 
Law Review343, also in 2011, compares Scotland’s and New Zealand’s schemes and 
finds the New Zealand system, which is based on amendments to their Property 
Relationships Act to include cohabitants,  is considered more useful since it 
approaches the problem from the point of view of existing spousal provision on 
marital breakdown. Indeed, this possibility is also canvassed in the CFLQ article344.  
 
There are also other new commentators on the 2006 Act who agree with McCarthy’s 
concerns about lack of guidance for judges deciding cases under s 28, for example 
Malcolm, Kendall and Kellas345 share McCarthy’s issues with the uncertainty of 
outcomes under the present statute.  Their monograph, which is practitioner 
focussed, however at least favours the abolition of the former – more uncertain-
outcomes of the old cohabitation doctrine of irregular marriage by habit and repute 
and at least compares the fact of legislation in Scotland favourably with the position 
in England, on which they include some coverage in case their readers have a client 
south of the border.  This really highlights the practical concerns about a scheme in 
Scotland and nothing in England and Wales, since one cannot compare TOLATA, 
even clarified by the Supreme Court, with the Scots 2006 Act for practicality and user 
friendliness.  
 
																																								 																				
342 Frankie McCArthy, Cohabitation: lessons from  North of the Border?(2011)  CFLQ  277. Frankie 
McCarthy,’Playing the Percentages:New Zealand, Scotland and a global solution to the 
consequences of non-marital relationships (2011) 23 CFLQ, 277. 
343 Frankie McCarthy,’Playing the Percentages:New Zealand, Scotland and a global solution to the 
consequences of non-marital relationships (2011) 24(4) NZULR  499-522. 
344 See Chapter 8 for the New Zealand statute. 
345 Kirsty Malcolm, Fiona  Kendall and Dorothy Kellas, Cohabitation, 2nd edn, 2011, Sweet & Maxwell. 
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The Wasoff et al team have also written further on their research project in 2012346 in 
the Journal of Social Welfare, although it is unlikely that the Ministry of Justice in 
Westminster would have had the opportunity to read these later comments on 
cohabitation law reform. Perhaps the academic and practitioner comments on the 
Scottish scheme is the basis of the caution exhibited at Westminster. If so, the 
government has obviously not looked any further into either the background or the 
ongoing implementation of the 2006 Act in Scotland, which clearly had defined goals 
and has had some positive results, and which did not really need to be subjected to 
the perfectionism that the Westminster government has been claiming, especially 
since what England and Wales has at present with no cohabitation reform at all is far 
from perfect! 
 
What Scotland was trying to achieve  
 
The ‘goal’ of the Scottish reform is to be found in a recommendation of the original 
Scottish Law Commission’s Report, which was that any reform 
 
‘should neither undermine marriage, nor undermine the freedom of those who have  
 deliberately opted out of marriage … [and] … should be confined to the easing of certain  
legal difficulties and the remedying of certain situations which are widely perceived as being 
 harsh and unfair.’347  
 
This, so far, is almost exactly on all fours with the ultra-cautious approach of the 
English Law Commission in 2006-7.  This very similar Scottish recommendation was 
not implemented until after Devolution, when the Scottish Executive set out in the 
Family Law (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum, usually referred to as ‘the 
Memorandum’, which was presented to the Scottish Parliament on 5 February 2005, 
that the goal was 
    
           ‘to provide a clearer statutory basis for recognising when a relationship is a cohabiting 
              relationship; and a set of principles and basic rights to protect vulnerable people either on the 
              breakdown of a relationship, or when a partner dies. The Scottish Ministers do not intend to  
              create a new legal status for cohabitants. It is not the intention that marriage-equivalent legal 
																																								 																				
346 Joanna Miles, Fran Wasoff and Enid Mordaunt, ‘Reforming Family Law – the case of cohabitation: 
‘things may not work out as you expect’ (2012) 34(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family,  167, 
347 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Family Law, 1992, Scot Law Com Mo 135.2, para 16.1. 
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              rights should accrue to cohabiting couples, nor is it the intention to undermine the freedom of  
              those who have deliberately opted out of marriage or of civil partnership.’  
 
This again is a mirror of the English Law Commission’s approach, in which the 
Commission, as has already been seen in Chapter 4, was absolutely committed, in 
2006-7, to not creating a new cohabitant status but providing some practical 
alternative to the complex and inappropriate litigation which was otherwise the only 
official way of resolving disputes not addressed by separating cohabitants 
themselves. These twin points of ‘no separate status’ and ‘no undermining of 
marriage’ are significant, and should obviously be noted as key positive factors if the 
Scottish scheme is to be any effective signpost for potential English legislation, since 
they also appear historically always to have been key non-negotiable issues in 
England and Wales – whether or not that is now still appropriate, which is entirely 
another matter for debate, now that much more time has passed and other 
developments have occurred in Family law and in the perception of the family. Not 
least of these other and later developments must be included the ONS’ discovery in 
the statistics from the 2011 Census that the influence of religion has now significantly 
declined in English life.  
 
But while this overall Scottish stance looks very similar to the English Law 
Commission’s recommendations towards reform - in particular in not establishing a 
separate status of ‘cohabitant’ - when the Scottish scheme was finally rolled out,  the 
Scottish Act in fact went further in making provision for some rebuttable 
presumptions about equal ownership of property during cohabitation, including 
household chattels (but not motor vehicles, securities and animals) and money 
(which includes any housekeeper’s allowance), as well as providing for very similar 
legal redress on relationship breakdown as the English Law Commission’s.  They 
also provided for applications on a partner’s death: in other words, addressing 
important practicalities, and despite the criticisms about lack of guidance for the s 28 
orders, the Act also includes a practical criteria checklist for judges to determine 
whether there was a ‘cohabitation’ in the first place: Family Law |(Scotland) Act 
2006, s 25, a feature replicated in New Zealand.  
 
In effect, it must therefore be recognised that Scotland has, therefore, created a 
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recognisably separate identity for the cohabitants’ situation -  a manner of living 
which has legal consequences but does not claim to be a ‘status’ as such.  Indeed it 
is on the contrary formally stated that as a matter of policy this is neither the intention 
nor the effect of the reform. Possibly this statement was made with the intention of 
providing a convenient fig leaf behind which the average Scot, being  content with 
the statement, would not look in detail, and as such a practical strategy designed to 
push the new enactment through with minimum likely media fuss.  Alternatively, 
perhaps this was intended to avoid other disturbance which might rock the boat on 
what, on the face of it, already seemed utterly calm waters, since adverse media 
attention does not seem to have been evident.  
 
This, of course, is fundamentally unlike the public reaction which was generated by 
the Daily Mail in England and Wales when the Family Act 1996 was being debated in 
Parliament, with a view to giving cohabitants quite modest protection from domestic 
violence alongside spouses – albeit explicitly on a lower level - an occurrence which 
seems to have had a lasting impact in England and Wales whenever any further 
cohabitation reform is contemplated.  
 
What the Scots have not done, as was stated in the Memorandum they would not 
wish to do, is to replicate marriage in any way, either exactly, or in a reduced ‘second 
class’ form. This Scottish scheme and its apparently peaceful reception in Scotland 
should, therefore, in theory have chimed harmoniously with the expressed intentions 
of the English Law Commission’s approach, although the methods are in no way 
identical.  
 
Nevertheless, while it cannot be said that there has been no criticism, the academic, 
judicial and professional comment, either from legal or lay sources, has been of the 
nature of suggested improvement rather than fundamental objection, and as such 
what has been done has comparative value for the purposes of considering a 
potential scheme for England and Wales, Scotland’s near territorial and political 
neighbour.  
 
In particular, Sutherland’s contribution to the debate, in the International Survey of 
Family Law 2011, is useful, since she spends only half the year in Scotland annually:  
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for the other half of each year she holds a similar professorial appointment in the 
USA, where cohabitants’ rights differ according to the individual state,  and brings to 
her expertise in the field her background at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, 
Oregon, a state which does not in fact give either the same or similar rights to 
cohabitants as to married couples, who must otherwise make a cohabitation 
agreement if they wish to address their situation formally.  
 
 
 
The impact in English Law of Gow v Grant (correctly on appeal Grant v Gow) in 
the Supreme Court 
 
Anecdotally, both academics and practitioners remember Baroness Hale expressly 
commenting on the complexity which she then perceived of the English Law 
Commission’s recommendations at the time of their 2007 Final Report, and then on 
the early Scottish decisions where initial impressions were that the Scottish judges 
were experiencing difficulties of interpretation of Scotland’s 2006 Act,  such as in the 
early conflicting decisions on a point of interpretation by two Scottish Judges, Lord 
Matthews in M v S  (in 2008)348,  and Sheriff Hogg in Jamieson v Rodhouse (in 
2009)349, as to whether ss 8-10 of the 1985 Act were relevant to determinations 
under that of 2006,  which was only settled by the decision of the Inner House in the 
Gow v Grant appeal there, that the 1985 Act was not relevant, owing to the radically 
different purposes of the two Acts. 
 
However when Gow v Grant finally came to the Supreme Court she appears to have 
had no such concerns, at least about the Scottish Act.  While she did not give the 
leading judgment in the case which was that of Lord Hope, the Deputy President, 
she agreed that ‘the appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by Lord Hope’ 
350 and then elected to ‘add a few words because there are lessons to be learned 
from this case for England and Wales’.   
 
It is in respect of this detailed commentary in her paragraphs 44-56 that she delivers 
																																								 																				
348 M v S (2008) SLT 871. 
349 Jamieson v Rodhouse (2009) Fam LR 34. 
350 [2012] UKSC 29 [44 ]. 
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significant argument for reform in English law, although both suggesting some 
potential amendments which might benefit Scotland and drawing attention to some 
practical problems that might be relevant to a scheme for England and Wales. She 
went on to highlight both the government apathy in 2008 and 2011, including its 
finally ignoring the Wasoff et al research mentioned above.   She further included 
mention of the Law Commission’s much more proactive response, delivered by 
Professor Cooke, who was leading the Family team at the Commission, but working 
on other issues by then, at the time of the Djanogly announcement in 2011 of 
abandonment of their scheme.   
 
Baroness Hale’s commentary: 5 lessons to be learned 
 
Baroness Hale conveniently marshalled her commentary in paragraphs 44-56 in 
grouping no less than five observable outcomes of experience of the Scottish 
scheme which do significantly build on the 2006-7 work of the Law Commission: 
 
(i)        Need for reform in English Law. 
(ii) Any reform needs to cater for a wide variety of situations, as the Law 
Commission’s exemplar case studies in its Reports did not, for example, include 
engaged couples who were intending to marry, and that the marriage might never 
happen, still allowing disadvantage of one partner to arise, even without necessary 
advantage to the other. The relevance of this was obvious, as Mrs Gow had only 
moved in with Mr Grant on this basis and had left the relationship the worse off. 
(iii) Lack of definition of cohabitation or length of the period of cohabitation had 
not proved a problem in Scotland. 
(iv) Compensation principles were sometimes difficult to apply and a provision to 
enable a court to do what was ‘just and equitable’, as contained in one of Lord 
Lester’s Bills, might be more appropriate. 
(v) Flexibility of remedy is important – the Scottish system was preferable in this 
instance rather than the Law Commission’s more rigid compensatory approach, 
though both schemes had recommendations of value: for example a checklist might 
help the English scheme and the potential for periodical payments assist the Scots’.  
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Baroness Hale’s 3 key points 
 
In respect of the first of these lessons to be learned Lady Hale identified three 
separate key points which could be extracted in relation to a possible English 
system, and which considering her background as a distinguished career academic, 
teaching and writing extensively on Family law, and her subsequent experience in 
the High Court and Court of Appeal, unsurprisingly could not be better targeted: 
 
1. The need for such a scheme in England and Wales.   
 
The Hale commentary loses no opportunity to highlight this, a relevant point since 
the Law Commission - while invited by the government, apparently urgently, to 
undertake the 2006-7 work - was clearly disappointed not to have seen its 
recommendations adopted351. This was, moreover, although their recommendations 
were broadly similar to those of the Scottish scheme, in that there was no intention to 
replicate in any way the incidence of financial provision on breakdown of formal 
marriage in the case of cohabitation breakdown, nor to involve cohabitants, who had 
chosen that alternative to marriage, in any similar principles of sharing of property 
nor maintenance of one another if they wished to make alternative arrangements.  
Instead, the two systems adopted the similar approach of a compensation scheme 
for economic advantages and disadvantages, although the detail of each was distinct 
from the other. 
 
2. The fact that the government had not apparently given any weight to the 
conclusion in the Wasoff et al research.   
 
This was that 
    ‘ the introduction of broadly similar provisions in England and Wales would not 
       place significant additional demands on court and legal aid resources” 352.  
 
																																								 																				
351 Stuart Bridge, Cohabitation: The Law Commission’s Recommendations for Reform of the Law’, 
Family Law Week, www.familylawweek.co.uk, 2007 Archive; Elizabeth Cooke, Response from the 
Law Commission, 6 September 2011 also published in The Times and other broadsheets. 
352 n329. 
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She coupled this with the fact that Professor Elizabeth Cooke, the Law 
Commissioner most recently still in charge of the Family Law programme at the Law 
Commission,   had, on the Minister’s announcement that the government would not 
take forward any reform at the present time, expressed the hope that 
‘implementation would not be delayed beyond the early days of the next Parliament 
in view of the hardship and injustice caused by the present law’, which was 
‘uncertain and expensive to apply’, ‘not designed for cohabitants’  and often giving 
‘rise to results that are unjust’353. She also drew attention to a further useful research 
item in the ‘Miles et al’ article in a leading Family law journal354 on the Law 
Commission’s approach to cost effectively addressing quantification of retained 
benefit which was the core of their system.  
 
3. The fact that there had already been ample justification for change in the 
law.   
 
She found this justification in the ‘long standing judicial calls for reform - dating back 
at least as far as the case of Burns v Burns in 1984 - and in ‘the Law Commission’s 
analysis of the deficiencies in the present law and the injustices which can result’;  
the demographic evidence of births to cohabitants outside marriage,, and by the 
widespread belief in the non-existent status of ‘common law marriage’,   so that 
‘there was no need to wait for experience from north of the border to make the case 
for reform’355. 
 
The other two points made were (a) that any definition of cohabitation should not be 
too prescriptive since the Law Commission’s Reports’ example case studies did not 
include some obvious cohabitation contexts, such as those of couples who were only 
cohabiting as they were engaged to be married, e.g. Mrs Gow who only agreed to 
move in with Mr Grant if they were engaged and were ultimately to marry, a situation 
which she said was widely supported by research of Barlow et al356;  and (b) 
flexibility of remedy and ability to address a situation in a way that was flexible and 
fair, as to which see further below. 
																																								 																				
353 Elizabeth Cooke, n181, Chapter 4. 
354 This was in fact the Wasoff et al article in CFLQ, cited in n329. 
355 Gow v Grant, UKSC 29 [50]. 
356 Ibid [51]. 
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These three main points which emerge from Baroness Hale’s first additional ‘few 
words’ are a powerful summary in themselves of the rationale for considering 
whether there should be some harmonisation with new law in a part of the United 
Kingdom which has not only grappled with what appear to be identical social and 
demographic pressures to those found in England and Wales, but in doing so has 
achieved a result, whereas the English Law Commission has, for some reason, not 
had its recommendations received with any official enthusiasm. This in itself seems 
worth closer examination in that appeals from what are now two widely different 
systems in relation to cohabitants arrive at the same highest court, the Supreme 
Court in London, which cannot be convenient or appropriate.  This must be 
especially so, for example, when potential appellants under the two disparate 
systems may reside respectively in either Northumberland or the Scottish Borders 
and live no more than a dozen miles apart, which is little distance justifying 
determination under the completely different systems of law which will apply to their 
respective circumstances when both are UK citizens and citizens of the same EU 
member state.  
 
Indeed, if there are arguments for harmonisation of marital property systems within 
the European Union, because of the professional, employment and therefore family 
mobility which contributes significantly to the child abduction problems addressed by 
the Hague Convention with the aim of preventing adverse impact on children and 
their families, there must be no less potential adverse impact on children and their 
families in disparate cohabitation provision.  Such cross border problems were often 
articulated in international property cases by Lord Justice Thorpe, when Head of 
International Family Justice.  Again, this must be especially so when in Scotland 
there is a coherent scheme, albeit that it has room for improvement, but a few miles 
south of the border in England and Wales there is none.   
 
Thus besides the argument for a scheme for England and Wales  - now that 
Scotland has legislated -  there must be some argument for at least some basic 
similarity of provision, even if detail differs, as indeed it does between English and 
Scottish law in some other respects, just as there are distinctions between different 
legislation either said of the English Channel. 
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The second of Baroness Hale’s observations on the Scottish experience was that the 
worked examples in Appendix B of the Law Commission’s Final Report  did not 
identify all the likely cohabitation cases which could commonly arise,   and thus 
require judicial attention in any scheme which attempted to provide better than the 
fragmented provision already available under existing English law.  
 
This seems to be a further powerful argument for a very simple umbrella system for 
England and Wales which merely provides basic protective remedies in a normative 
framework, so that a wide variety of circumstances could potentially be covered, 
although it has been shown in New Zealand that an intention to provide very wide 
coverage can have its own problems.357.  Put another way, this would address Lady 
Hale’s suggested ‘flexibility’ requirement both as to actual remedy, as in proprietary 
estoppels, and as to its practical articulation, for example in an ability to make either 
periodical payments or capital orders. 
 
In addition to acknowledging the common example of the young couple where the 
child carer suffers disadvantage capable of financial compensation under both the 
Law Commission’s and Scottish schemes, Baroness Hale flags up the case -  
demographically equally common in contemporary society - of the mature couple 
such as Mrs Gow and Mr Grant whose positions post-cessation of cohabitation can 
quite easily be sufficiently impacted upon by one of them having given up a home, 
and either all or part of an income, and the other not being so affected.   
 
In particular Baroness Hale articulates the potential for a widow’s occupational 
pension being lost by cohabitation as much as by remarriage. Here, Lady Hale’s well 
known interest in Equality and Diversity issues enables her to bring to the evaluation 
of any cohabitants’ rights scheme her valuable experience in indirect discrimination 
issues alongside her expertise in Family law. 
 
Baroness Hale’s third ‘lesson’ is that there is probably no need for concerns 
expressed in the Law Commission’s work about difficulties in establishing whether 
																																								 																				
357 See Chapter 8. 
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the parties involved were cohabiting or not, nor about the optimum period of 
cohabitation for couples without children to be able to qualify for remedies.  She says 
at paragraph 52 of the judgment that ‘people have not disputed whether they were 
cohabitants, though they have sometimes disputed when their cohabitation came to 
an end’,  and suggests that it might reduce disputes for the Scottish system to drop 
the requirement to bring proceedings within one year of the cessation of 
cohabitation,  and for the Law Commission’s scheme to omit any initial qualifying 
period before a claim could be made, in support of which she refers again to the 
Wasoff et al research, and to the researchers’ subsequent article in Child and Family 
Law Quarterly358. Baroness Hale’s fourth observation, the most crucial, both of her 
valuable comments on the occasion of this first Scottish appeal to the Supreme 
Court, and in any potential updating of the Law Commission’s English 
‘advantage/disadvantage’ model, is that it appears to be entirely true that the 
compensation principle, although attractive in theory, can be difficult to apply in 
practice because of the problems of identifying and valuing those advantages and 
disadvantages’.   
 
She relies for this conclusion on the fact that Lord Lester’s 2009 Bill, which did not 
pass beyond a second reading in the House of Lords in March of that year,  favoured 
a much wider discretionary power to do what was ‘just and equitable’ in the particular 
context whereas the Law Commission had,  in its 2006-7 work,  already seen the 
problems associated with micro-analysis of every ‘past gain and loss over the course 
of a long relationship’ by ‘focussing on the end of the relationship’. As she says, the 
case of Mrs Gow and Mr Grant ‘illustrates the problem very well’ since, while it is not 
possible - as well as being disproportionate -  accurately to reflect every advantage 
and disadvantage in terms of payments made and benefits in kind received, besides 
that not being the way in which ‘living together in an intimate relationship is all about’,   
it is possible to assess net advantage and disadvantage if the parties’ positions are 
examined at the point of entry and exit from their relationship, which appears to be 
the approach that is permitted by the Scottish legislation. 
																																								 																				
358 n329.. However, it should be noted that this issue of how best to establish when a cohabitation 
relationship has begun has been found to be a problem in New Zealand, as to which see further at 
Chapter 8: there seems a simple remedy for this in England and Wales for which see Chapter 9.  
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Baroness Hale’s final point, and conclusion, is in essence a hint that an approach to 
the ultimate disposal under either the Scottish or any potential English scheme could 
perhaps be more akin to that in a case of proprietary estoppel than to the more exact 
analysis demanded by an interest under the concept of trust to which English 
claimants must currently still apply their energies if they seek to establish any 
compensatory award to redress the disadvantageous impact of unmarried 
cohabitation. In short, she says, the order should fit the circumstances - which is 
precisely the unique approach of proprietary estoppel - and overall approves the 
flexibility of the Scottish scheme, which largely permits this, over the rigidity of the 
Law Commission’s proposals, which in effect propose that ‘the losses should be 
shared equally’.  Nevertheless, she likes the Law Commission’s structured ‘factors to 
be taken into account’ and would also like the Scottish system to permit a periodical 
payments order for ‘the rare cases where it is not practicable to make an order for a 
lump sum to be paid by instalments’ .  
 
Her overall conclusion,  in the now famous paragraph 56,  is that  ‘.. a remedy such 
as this is both practicable and fair. It does not impose on unmarried couples the 
responsibilities of marriage, but redresses the gains and losses flowing from their 
relationship’ and repeats the comment of the researchers: ‘The Act has undoubtedly 
achieved a lot for Scottish cohabitants and their children. English and Welsh 
cohabitants and their children deserve no less’. 
 
The Scottish Philosophy behind the 2006 Act 
 
Despite criticism of the long period of gestation since 1992, the philosophy behind 
the 2006 Act is clearly that of the Memorandum of March 2005, presented by the 
Scottish Executive to the Scottish Parliament and archived on their website359, 
following which the Bill it supported, which had been introduced into the Scottish 
Parliament on 7 February 2005, was enacted the following year.   
 
It seems clear from this Memorandum that the Scottish Executive had determined 
																																								 																				
359 Scottish Executive. Family Law (Scotland) Bill, Policy memorandum 2005 (‘the Memorandum’), 
www.scottish.parliament,uk, last accessessed 27 December 2013. 
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‘that action should be taken’ in the interests of ‘Scottish families’ and ‘all of 
Scotland’s people’ which are expressly referred to in the Memorandum, and that they 
had then proceeded expeditiously to achievement of the task they had set 
themselves.  The only further comment relevant here appears to be a congratulatory 
one, for the fact that a small jurisdiction, serving a population of approximately only 
five million, should have made this legislation a priority and achieved its introduction 
so speedily when all the resources of the Westminster government had not, 
apparently, been able similarly to address clearly urgent demand south of the border.  
The Scottish system may not be perfect, in the eyes of either all academics - 
Scottish or other -  or practitioners,  including the Scottish judiciary which seems to 
have identified some practical complexity; but this is not uncommon in relation to any 
new legislation, especially of a radical nature.  There are in fact also many English 
and Welsh statutes which have undergone later polishing after their initial 
introduction, and some that have undergone much fairly fundamental amendment.  
Not to achieve perfection at first introduction is not a fundamental flaw sufficient to 
preclude any such introduction at all, or unconstructive criticism from jurisdictions 
which have not achieved a similar reform. 
 
The 2005 Memorandum thus set out the aim to ‘provide legal protection and 
safeguards for children and adults in today’s family structures’. It articulates support 
for a commitment to ‘legislate to reform family law for all of Scotland’s people’ and 
made clear that the role of government was seen as enabling rather than 
prescriptive, but that it was sought to reduce anomalies, to clarify the law and to 
respond to the reality of family life and contemporary family formations, in particular 
because children were often the powerless ‘extras’ in the family dramas in which 
their childhood and upbringing proceeded.  This approach cannot in principle be 
criticised since it addresses those issues which governments are supposed, by their 
very existence, to address in a liberal democracy.  
 
The Memorandum did also indicate that it was firmly based on data obtained in 
research360 in which a significant section of the public indicated, as in England and 
Wales,  that unmarried cohabitation was no longer regarded as unusual or socially 
																																								 																				
360 Scottish Executive, Family Formations and Dissolutions: Trends and attitudes among the Scottish 
population, https://www.scotland.gov.uk/cru/resfinds/ls/f43-00.asp.   
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deviant;  and indicated that, as in England and Wales, that Scotland had also 
suffered from the ‘common law marriage myth’ which had in certain circumstances 
been addressed at common law through the process of recognising irregular 
marriage by ‘cohabitation with habit and repute’.  Thus, although the impetus for the 
Scottish legislation was based in the  - by 2005, somewhat elderly - 1990s Scottish 
Law Commission research, the Scottish Executive appeared to obtain up to date 
attitude survey data before taking forward the initial concept of addressing social 
change in Scotland.  It is difficult to see what else they could, or should, have done 
without delaying matters for further Scottish Law Commission research to update 
their original early 1990s report.   
 
Rather, in proceeding expeditiously to provide some relatively simple reform, the 
Scottish Ministers appear to have taken the obvious pragmatic decision, that some 
prompt reform was the way forward, even if further refinement might be required. 
Limited fieldwork in connection with the operation of the Scottish legislation indicates 
that there is indeed some evidence that the Scottish legal profession - which is very 
small, like the Scottish population in relation to the much larger population of   
England and Wales – has shared views and experiences about the operation of the 
2006 Act in practice and does not have an overall negative opinion of its application, 
albeit that there are suggestions for practical improvements.  This limited fieldwork 
which it was possible to undertake appears to support Baroness Hale’s suggestions 
for amendments, but no one has said that that is a justification for wholesale 
condemnation of a system which was not initially 100% perfect, nor for dismissal by 
English ministers in London of any comparative value of the Scottish system as an 
indicator for the validity of reform in England and Wales. 
 
This is not the place to examine the jurisprudential basis of recognition of the former 
Scottish concept of irregular marriage which the 2006 Act has now overtaken, but it 
does seem that the deficiencies of that situation was one of the reasons for the 
formality of enacting the Scottish legislation, just as the French ultimately replaced 
their former long standing practice of recognising concubinage with the formal PACS 
system.  Moreover, while the Scottish Executive may have formally said in their 
Memorandum that they did not see the creation of a separate status of cohabitant, 
as an alternative to marriage, as a formal part of their scheme, it seems that they 
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have in fact recognised a ‘state’ of living in such a relationship even if not a formal 
change of status. This too might well be of interest in ultimately considering the 
optimum provision for England and Wales.  This reassessment of the position in 
England and Wales is clearly what is now required.  
 
The underlying theory of the impact of the 2006 Act on this prior state of irregular 
marriage is therefore worth examining because of its potential relevance to the 
common law marriage myth in England and Wales, which is in fact one of the most 
important core mischiefs of the lack of any normative regime for cohabitants’ rights in 
English law.  The not dissimilar position in Scotland must be looked for in the pre- 
2006 history. 
 
 
Cohabitation in Scotland before the 2006 Act 
 
Looking at this historical background, it is fair to say that in Scotland there was, 
perhaps, more reason than in England and Wales for an erroneous belief in common 
law marriage since, prior to the 2006 Act which abolished it, Scotland has long 
enjoyed a custom or culture, enshrined in the common law of that country, of 
recognising for certain purposes a state, if not a status as such, of ‘marriage by 
cohabitation with habit and repute’.  However, this was more recently felt by some 
academics and practitioners to be undesirable, owing to the necessary legal process 
in order to establish such a state in any particular circumstances, and because of the 
fact that jurisprudentially it was more properly a part of the Law of Succession rather 
than the law applicable to either marriage or cohabitation.   
 
Thus it seems that in the eye of the ordinary Scot there was a concept of irregular 
marriage attached to a practical state of cohabitation, but that in reality it had status 
in law only in the certain circumstances to which it in practice applied and was 
otherwise no more ‘common law marriage’ than those ‘common law marriages’ in 
which the English public affects to believe. 
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For example,  in No 6 of his Commentaries361 Professor Kenneth Norrie is critical of 
the initial decision of the Scottish Executive, in their response to their 1999 
consultation setting out proposed changes arising from Scottish Law Commission 
work, to retain the concept of marriage by habit and repute, ‘on the basis that it 
continues to serve some useful function’ – to which the author of the Commentary 
immediately adds the  - presumably rhetorical - request ‘Perhaps someone can 
explain what that useful function is, for it is beyond me’.  
 
It appeared that at the time of Professor Norrie’s originally writing this Commentary  - 
July 2000 -  there had been two recent cases in which the Court of Session had 
been asked to grant a ‘declarator’ of marriage on the basis of cohabitation with habit 
and repute, which in one case was granted and in the other refused  in the cases of 
Ackerman v Logan in 2000362 where habit was  established, but repute missing, and 
Vosilius v Vosilius in  2000363,  where habit and repute were both existing, 
 
The Commentary goes on to illustrate, through the facts of the cases, the author’s 
conclusion that this concept was illogical and unfair, and to point out the close 
relationship of the doctrine to the Law of Succession in respect of which ‘the law is 
attempting to ameliorate the otherwise harsh and unfair position that cohabitants 
would otherwise find themselves in – that of having no claim against the estate of the 
person with whom they have spent ‘a considerable period’.  In other words, the 
concept was little different from the provision for cohabitants available, where the 
criteria of that statute can be met, under the English legislation contained in the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975. 
 
Professor Norrie’s update to this situation, immediately prior to his publication in 
2011, thus much approves the impact of the passage of the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006 in stating 
 
‘Marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute was partially abolished by section 3 of the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. It survives only to preserve the validity of marriages 
contracted abroad which, for some technical reason, are otherwise invalid’. 
																																								 																				
361 Kenneth Norrie, Commentaries on Family Law, University of Dundee Press, 2011. 
362 (2000) EX 2000 SLT 37. 
363 (2000) Fam R 58. 
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This is also replicated by provision in English law for recognition of such marriages 
by the common law where formalities might be defective for good reason,  such as  
in cases like Taczanowska v Taczanowski  in 1957364 where the Marriage Act 1949 
could not be complied with owing to wartime conditions.  This was a case where the 
parties were both foreign nationals who could also not be expected to comply with 
local law owing to one being a member of occupying forces but nevertheless other 
requirements of a valid marriage -  such as the vows and the presence of an 
episcopally ordained priest – were present. 
 
His commentary continues: 
 
‘The major importance of the 2006 Act is that it rendered irregular marriage entirely 
pointless by creating proper claims for financial provision for cohabitants, both when 
the couple  separate and when one dies.  These claims do not depend, as irregular 
marriage depended, on the parties being economical with the truth.  Whatever flaws 
there are in the 2006 Act, the legislation is far more principled and far better reflects 
today’s society than does the old common law doctrine, which had long outstayed its 
welcome’. 
 
In fact it thus seems that the old common law doctrine of recognising irregular 
marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute is no different from the same common 
law doctrine which would also permit English law to recognise an irregular foreign 
marriage in appropriate and unusual circumstances, such as where a religious 
marriage was contracted with irregular formalities in occupied territory in time of war 
as in the case mentioned above.   
 
 
The post 2006 situation of cohabitants in Scotland  
Thus it seems possible that vernacular social familiarity with the old Scottish 
common law practice of recognising marriages effected by cohabitation with habit 
and repute may have had some influence on the reform now benefiting Scottish 
cohabitants, not least as it is recorded in the Memorandum of March 2005 that 
research had shown that some Scots believed that after 10 years cohabitation the 
																																								 																				
364 [1957] 2 All ER 583.  
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parties had the same rights as married couples365.  However, the main driver 
appears to have been the Memorandum itself, in which the Executive recorded that 
its 1999 consultation document Family Matters: Improving Scottish Family Law366 
‘focussed on the need to consult further to refresh thinking, and, in particular, to 
canvass opinion on which a settled view had not been reached”. Included in this 
category of issues were “provisions for cohabiting couples’.  
 
It would appear likely, therefore, that both Professor Norrie’s 2000 condemnation of 
marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute, and his 2011 update, both mentioned 
above, had something to do with response to these consultations, since the 
Memorandum also mentions that the 1999 consultation document Family Matters: 
Improving Scottish Family Law ‘picked up the outstanding Scottish Law Commission 
proposals relevant to addressing the legal vulnerabilities experienced by families in 
Scotland today’ . 
 
The Memorandum goes on to set out the key data relevant to legal safeguards for 
cohabitants, showing the demographic evidence for reform, and concluding that 38% 
of cohabiting couples at the 2001 census had children (10% of Scotland’s 1,072,669 
children therefore living in a cohabiting couple family) although it was conceded that 
there was ‘no robust data’ to identify how many of such couples were legally married 
elsewhere. 
 
A particularly interesting feature of the Memorandum is that it records that while ‘the 
available evidence suggests that cohabitation has moved from a minority to a 
dominant family type in the UK’ it also records that cohabitations rarely last long 
term’.  
 
Nevertheless the Scots have legislated as they have because of research 
information available to them, in contrast to the approach in England, where, on the 
one hand  the English Law Commission has recommended reform although not 
dismissing short cohabiting durations as counter arguments to legislating for 
breakdown of relationships, but on the other hand  the government at Westminster 
																																								 																				
365 n360.. 
366 Scottish Office, Consultation paper. 
https://pure,strath.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/...scottish.../export.html.  
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has obviously perceived no pressures in the Government Actuary’s predictions on 
rising numbers of cohabiting families towards 2030, as set out in the legal 
professional press, for example.  Jordan’s Family Law Newswatch in  2009, which 
commented in September of that year on the Family and Parenting Policy unit’s 
report issued in the same month367,  projecting  a likely doubling of the numbers, 
then  2 million, a figure which could even be conservative since 10 years ago the 
number  - in the absence of accurate data -  was thought to be about 1 million.   
 
It would therefore seem that the Scottish Executive has done what the Westminster 
government should have done, i.e. taken a policy decision in accordance with 
research available to them and in accordance with what they perceived to be 
acceptable to contemporary culture and society, since in Scotland the Memorandum 
states that  
 
‘the policy objective is to introduce greater certainty, fairness and clarity into the law 
by establishing a firm statutory foundation for disentangling the shared life of 
cohabitants when their relationship ends...The Scottish Ministers consider that the 
legal vulnerability arising from the current absence of systematic regulation sits 
uncomfortably alongside the increasing number of cohabiting couple and the 
increasing number of Scotland’s children living in cohabiting-couple families’.   
 
It is notable that the Memorandum continues 
 
The Scottish Ministers aim to provide a clearer statutory basis for recognising when a 
relationship is a cohabiting relationship; and a set of principles and basic rights to 
protect vulnerable people either on the breakdown of a relationship or when a partner 
dies’.  
 
This is exactly what was needed in England and Wales in 2008, or at the latest in 
2011 – not complete dismissal of all the indications that legislation south of the 
border was urgently needed. 
 
Further content of the Memorandum in fact considers the alternative of ‘information 
and raising awareness’ but rejects this course as ‘unlikely to result in all cohabiting 
couples making adequate private arrangements, leaving a significant number of 
																																								 																				
367 National Families Parenting and Policy Institute, Families Since the 1950s, NFPPU, 2009. 
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cohabiting couples and their children without legal protection’. This does not suggest 
that Scotland, in 2005, was placing any reliance on the success of the concurrent 
English approach to ‘education’, that is the Westminster Government’s Living 
Together Campaign! 
 
Similarly, any alignment with marriage is rejected in the Memorandum,  since it is 
stated that the Scottish Ministers ‘are clear that marriage has a special place in 
society and that its distinctive legal status should be preserved’. Registration and an 
alternative status for cohabitants were alike rejected but ‘a list of factors that a court 
shall have regard to in determining a legally relevant cohabitation’ is mentioned (and, 
as already mentioned, then appeared in the 2006 Act).  It is not inconceivable that 
these clear statements, directly addressing potential objections from the stricter 
Scottish churches and also from any more conservative sections of society, were the 
direct cause of lack of objections to what, on the face of the legislation, appears to 
give more or less the same practical results to cohabitants as to spouses.  It is 
unclear, in these circumstances, whether the question really needs to be asked as to 
whether it matters if the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 does provide much the 
same practical end result for separating cohabitants as for divorcing spouses, when 
the Scottish Executive expressly states an aim to benefit ‘Scottish families’ in general 
and  ‘all’ of ‘Scotland’s people’    
 
Conclusion 
 
In the circumstances the Scottish scheme appears not to be in any way an adverse 
comparable for a potentially successful scheme in English law.  Of course 
improvements can be made especially with the benefit now of almost a decade’s 
experience, and comparative evidence from other jurisdictions as well, none of which 
the English Law Commission undertook.  Their reports look much more like scoping 
documents than law reform proposals. 
 
The Scottish scheme does not  appear to endanger the status of marriage at all, nor 
to impose on cohabitants any matrimonial obligations or rights, yet  it protects the 
vulnerable, both adults and children, in a compensation based scheme, which  - 
though distinct -  resonates with that devised in England and Wales by the Law 
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Commission.  
 
While not appropriate to replicate the Scottish Act in any detail –English law would 
not benefit from any clone but would be potentially enhanced by import of 
comparator ideas  -   it is a powerful signpost to potential reform for cohabitants in 
England and Wales, especially as certain amendments are suggested by both 
academics and the Deputy President of the UK Supreme Court who - besides having 
had the experience of hearing the first appeal to Westminster under the 2006 Act - 
has a long standing academic background in Family law.  
 
The principles of the Scottish scheme appear to be both practical and inherently 
unobjectionable, and of value in comparative terms in the study and development of 
other such potential systems. Above all, as generally in English Family law in 
England, it preserves some discretionary element in addressing the relationship 
generated advantage and disadvantage which the inappropriate TOLATA 1996 
provisions are unable to deliver: although in paragraph 55 of her judgment in Gow v 
Grant  Baroness Hale reviews  - with practical examples - the remedial scope of the 
flexible Scottish scheme which permits precisely the same range of outcomes in the 
order awarded as in the common law remedy of proprietary estoppel under  English 
law.   
 
These critiques have been further developed in the modest fieldwork which it has 
been possible to undertake in respect of each of this project’s exemplar 
jurisdictions368   the first of which   - the EU state of Spain - is the subject of the next 
chapter, Chapter 7. 
																																								 																				
368 For which see Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 7 Spain 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines a European comparator to both the Law Commission’s 
recommendations for reform in English Law and to the Scottish scheme also rejected 
by the English government – Spain, like Britain, is an EU member, but unlike 
Scotland not a recent convert to the legal as well as social recognition of cohabitants’ 
rights. Spain provided for this in its new 1978 constitution drafted upon replacement 
40 years ago of its former ultra-right wing Fascist regime by the modern liberal 
restored monarchy it still retains. 
 
The primary aim of the chapter is critically to examine provision in the Spanish legal 
system, on which Spain’s membership of the EU and signature to Hague 
Conventions also impacts through the general influence of the European Union 
philosophies and the spread of human rights law and practice. 
 
A secondary aim is to look at what lessons could be learned from this particular 
European comparator, and to analyse how and why the Law Commission’s 2006-7 
project apparently missed the opportunity to draw guidance from the success of 
radical Family law reform in Spain, in which coincidentally the largest European 
diaspora of British expatriates resides in the sun of its southern and Mediterranean 
coasts.  This area of substantial British residence stretches from the Costa de la Luz 
in the Atlantic South West - near the border with the Portuguese Algarve and 
adjacent to the still British territory of Gibraltar – and extends Westwards to the 
Costa del Sol, Costa Tropical, Costa Blanca and Costa Brava, which run in a virtually 
continuous largely beach and golfing orientated strip from the Rock in the South 
West all the way up the Mediterranean coast towards the eastern Pyrenees border 
with France, north of Barcelona.  
 
In this large coastal resort territory may be found a substantial number of Anglo-
Spanish lawyers.  Sometimes these are located in small Spanish firms where the 
expertise tapped by British expatriates may be limited to a single partner with some 
knowledge of English law and its interaction with their own local Spanish regime. 
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Alternatively, they will sometimes congregate in much larger firms where whole 
departments may be devoted to the complex interface between the personal law of 
the British expatriates living locally – which will usually be English law – and the 
Spanish law of that particular region, which now also applies in some circumstances.  
 
As a consequence of this significant concentration of British residents, as well as of 
the relatively new but now well established approach of Spanish law to cohabitation, 
Spain was thought to be a better EU comparator in the present project than, for 
example, France, which 60 years ago could have instantly claimed priority as a more 
suitable choice, owing to the long standing British expatriate residence on the Cote 
d’Azur of the South of France.   
 
For at least a century many London lawyers - both solicitors and barristers from 
several sets of Chambers at the Tax and Chancery Bars – enjoyed large practices 
advising the wealthy British residents who habitually congregated on that strip of the 
French Mediterranean coast, following in the wake of the early English devotees of 
the temperate seaside climate. Initially these were winter sun sojourners, who had 
noticed Lord Brougham’s discovery in the 1820s of this pleasant alternative to 
disagreeable English winters.  However in the 1960s, the availability of much 
cheaper property and lifestyle in equally sunny Spain opened up a new mass market 
along its much longer Mediterranean coastline, while the development of low budget 
air services also established a substantial English population in the Canary Islands’ 
offshore province of Spain, thus moving the need for the bulk of European expatriate 
legal services away from France.    
 
Spain, the English and Scottish schemes and the influence, if any, of Eire 
It has been seen in Chapters 4 and 6 that both the Law Commission in England and 
the Scottish Executive in Scotland researched existing normative regimes in other 
jurisdictions worldwide while in the course of the respective work addressed in those 
chapters. Such research might have been expected as a natural preparatory review 
of existing provision in both common law and civil law systems.  However in the Law 
Commission project the particular research was somewhat superficial, in fact little 
more than scoping, and the team did not look below the fact that Spain had some 
cohabitants’ rights provision in some of its provinces and took no more notice of 
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Eire’s contemporaneous plans than to observe that the Republic (which of course 
has a land border with the UK) had plans. The team seemed to have completely 
overlooked the methodology of Spanish law, which relies not in the first instance on 
the provincial cohabitants’ rights which they had noticed  but on the overarching 
Constitution for its principled provision,  together with some freedom to make 
detailed law regionally.  The Commission completely missed the fact that this suits 
Spain’s historic and cultural background which has been more mixed even than 
England’s recent multi-cultural immigration. 
 
Spain is of course a civil law jurisdiction, having taken its national law in modern 
times from the Napoleonic Codes introduced by the French Emperor following his 
conquest of Spain in the Peninsula Wars of the early 1800s, and thus even more 
alien to English law than the mixed common law and civil law system of Scotland.  
However, so is virtually every other potential EU comparator, although some - for 
example Germany - also have more mixed origins and influences.  It was therefore 
really self- selecting as a comparator in the present project, largely as other 
candidates were not very suitable at all.   
 
Had Eire already embarked on its cohabitants’ rights programme which was 
projected as long ago as 2006-7 but has only recently been much progressed, that 
might have been an additionally useful comparator since, as well as having the land 
border with the UK,  the Irish Republic is an English speaking EU member: but as 
there was then no Eire cohabitants’ legislation clearly this was not an option at the 
time.  
 
While the Law Commission in London briefly noted Spain as one of several potential 
comparator jurisdictions, Scotland’s Executive apparently looked more closely at 
France as a potentially useful to them, possibly because of Scotland’s closer historic 
links with that country. However, neither in Scotland nor in England was much more 
than passing reference made to other European jurisdictions, which seems an oddly 
missed opportunity, given the concurrent EU harmonisation initiatives, which are the 
obvious drivers for addressing the conflict of laws problems created by UK-EU family 
mobility.   
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In the contemporary context of both employment and recreational ease of movement 
across borders, such mobility within Europe has developed significantly despite the 
fact that while the Channel has historically been a political and juridical, as well as 
geographical, boundary between England and Wales and Europe, in modern times 
the UK is a party to the European Union which has written that freedom of movement 
into its founding treaties.  
 
Thus despite the fact that England and Wales is a common law jurisdiction and most 
European states, whether EU members or not, operate in a civil law context, there is 
clearly a strong motive for considering the relevance of the treatment of Family Law 
in Europe when considering any English law reform, including the discrete topic of 
cohabitation, although previously more attention has traditionally been paid to the 
jurisdictions of the Commonwealth common law systems from which English law has 
in the 20th century drawn much inspiration, in both doctrinal study and practical 
application of Family Justice. 
 
 Of the jurisdictions in the European Union of potential comparative value to England 
and Wales - other than Scotland, already a natural frontline comparator, since it is 
part of the United Kingdom - Spain has a stronger claim to consideration for the 
present project than the majority of other Western European states, most of which 
automatically disqualify themselves owing to the difficulty in accessing their law 
libraries and reading these resources either personally or through court translators. 
 
On the other hand Spain’s  language is easily accessible for reading its documents 
in original texts, only French is more likely to be read by English legal researchers, 
unlike the languages of the Low Countries, Germany, Central, Eastern and Northern 
Europe with which few English legal researchers are familiar unless they are 
specialists in the law of those countries369.  Unlike those of the other states and 
European regions mentioned, Spain’s constitutional and legal texts are also readily 
available to read in solicitors’ firms and barristers’ chambers in England.  Moreover, 
apart from Anglo-Spanish practices in London, there are also substantial resources 
																																								 																				
369 As it happens, the present researcher also reads and writes Spanish and is familiar with most 
regions of Spain and with Spanish legal practice, thus saving the cost and inconvenience of using 
court translators.   
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in Oxford owing to several decades of Spanish Studies at Oxford University, long 
keenly supported by Queen Sofia of Spain.   
 
Further, as a recently politically modernised state with a relatively new democratic 
constitution and a substantial British expatriate residential and commercial 
community, Spain also has useful parallels to offer in relation to some of the issues 
which appear to have caused potential reforms to stall in England and Wales.  
 
The Law Commission in London chose, in their case, to tabulate - in some detail - 
both all the other worldwide jurisdictions where they were aware of legal provision for 
cohabitants, and briefly to note the relevant statutes in those jurisdictions.  Two 
separate appendices were included in the initial summary of such regimes in the 
preparatory document required for the obligatory statutory consultation which, owing 
to the Law Commissions terms of work, they were obliged to conduct before 
embarking on any potential law reform project.   
 
In the first of the Law Commission’s 2006-7 reports, the initial consultation paper,   
were thus listed in Appendix C370, 33 separate jurisdictions where statutory schemes 
were provided for which eligible couples automatically qualified without the need to 
enter into a contract or to register their relationship with the state authorities, 
although some permitted couples to inform the state of their opting out or to do so by 
entering into a formal contract instead. These 33 jurisdictions included Argentina;  
Australia  - 8 separate states each with its own statutes,  including the Capital 
Territory;  Canada  - 7 provinces each with its own separate provisions;  Croatia, 
Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Scotland -  and Spain.  
 
In Appendix D 371 the Commission noted a further 37 jurisdictions which provided 
‘opt- in’ statutory schemes for registered partnership, into which a couple could opt in 
by complying with the criteria, the consequences of which varied from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  These 37 jurisdictions included Argentina  - Buenos Aires and the Rio 
Negro region; Australia – Tasmania;  Belgium;  Canada - 5 provinces; Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
																																								 																				
370 Schemes for Cohabitants in Other Jurisdictions. 
371 “‘Opt-In” Regimes in Other Jurisdictions.   
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Norway, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain  - 10 provinces;  Sweden, Switzerland, USA - 5 
states. In this category of registered partnership, some schemes applied to same-
sex and opposite sex couples, but others to same-sex couples only. 
 
Thus, in 2006 the Spanish entry in the Appendix C list comprised provision in only 
six of the 50 Spanish provinces in which the Commission was aware at that time of 
the enactment of statutory provisions for cohabitants, and in the Appendix D list of 
registered partnerships there was provision in 10 such provinces - although there is 
now, nearly a decade later, legislation of some sort in all Spain, including its islands,  
covering both types of partnership.   
 
In accordance with the Spanish system of delegation by the Constitution of local law 
making powers to 17 autonomous local areas - within which sit the 50 provinces and 
two autonomous cities - the Constitution lays down the principles to protect 
cohabitants, as in other areas of the law, but local laws then define their own 
customised local implementation, which must reflect the provisions of the 
Constitution, but may otherwise vary in detail. 
 
Thus Spain was firmly situated within the Law Commission’s comparative 
consciousness, although they also belatedly included their noting of plans to legislate 
in the Irish Republic - the EU member state of Eire.  Although Eire’s plans were not 
then well advanced, and have indeed only more recently been progressed, the 
Commission’s noting of the Republic’s intentions should have thrown Spain into stark 
relief as an obvious comparator to inform English reform, the reasons being as 
follows.   
 
First even the prospect of Eire following Spain’s reforming lead should have been of 
significant interest to the Commission’s investigative team.  This is because 
everybody knows that Eire, like Spain, was a formerly extremely conservative and 
inherently religious state, which had in 2006-7 only relatively recently relaxed a 
previously rigid approach to the moral compass in their concept of law.  
 
Secondly, had  more than a moment’s passing attention been given to the news 
about Eire at that time,  it might  have been realised, even at that stage of the 
  
 
224 
Commission’s work, that legislative thought in those two EU states of Spain and Eire 
was potentially  of keen relevance to the project in England and Wales: the reason 
for that being  that it was then - and still is -  anecdotally said that there would be                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
bound to be religious objection to cohabitants’ rights in English law, and in particular 
that the religious perspective of the Welsh strict ‘chapel’ lobby would be likely to be 
so hostile to legislation protecting cohabitants that it could  be a significant hurdle.  
Clearly ignoring a hint of sudden social radicalism from a second previously strictly 
religious community, this time the Catholics of Eire, was at the least inattentive on 
the part of the Law Commission team.  
 
Obviously, given the ONS’ discovery of a diminution of the importance of religion in 
England and Wales in the 2011 Census, this situation has now moved on since 
2006-7, so it is possible that there is no longer any strictly religious objection as such 
to recognising the cohabitation phenomenon in English Family Law.  Nevertheless, it 
may be as well to look at the possible impact on the potential cultural conservatism 
which no doubt may continue to exist to some extent in England and Wales, a 
problem which Spain has clearly addressed very effectively in its 1978 constitution, 
 which drives the approach to cohabitation in that country.  
 
Accordingly, while the thorough tabulation details of foreign systems in the 2006 Law 
Commission consultation document does at least indicate an awareness of 
significant reform outside England and Wales,  and not simply in the obvious close 
comparator of Scotland, which brought its Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 into force 
in 2007 at the time of the English Law Commission’s final report,   it seems 
regrettable that no advantage was taken at that time of the very useful comparative 
material available from Spain about it reconciliation in the 1978 constitution of so 
much historic religious and cultural ‘baggage’..    
 
The reason for this is that while historically Spain has suffered precisely the same 
invasion of multi-cultural influences as now must be addressed in English law, and 
has endured much past religious and cultural conflict, in the past 35 years it has 
coordinated its approach to family formation through the 1978 Constitutional 
principles, while preserving the right of local autonomous authorities to legislate for 
their own local population.   
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This has thus neatly overcome not only the legacy of the warring religious factions of 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam in the originally fragmented minor kingdoms of 
medieval Spain, but also the ensuing extreme Catholicism which resisted both  the 
Reformation and  the Age of Enlightenment in Europe, and  culminated in the victory 
of the  Fascist Franco regime in the Civil War of 1936-9, which thus preserved such 
long standing Catholic conservatism for the 36 years of Franco’s rule from 1939 to 
his death in 1975.   
 
Unfortunately, no advantage appears to have been taken of what could have been 
this otherwise valuable awareness by the Commission of not only Spain’s reform but 
also Eire’s intentions, since the Commission apparently did not look beneath its 
comparative tables at the essence and process of radical reform in those two 
jurisdictions where strong religious objections traditionally discriminated against even 
stable cohabiting relationships if they were outside marriage.   
 
If the investigative team had even scratched the surface, by for example reading the 
Spanish Constitution372, their observation of Spain’s handling of potential religious 
objections might have provided some useful signposts for addressing any such 
religious, cultural or other conservative lobbies in England and Wales.  Had they 
then delved a little deeper - since there are practising Spanish lawyers readily 
available in London - it is of course possible that this might have had some influence 
on the otherwise extremely narrow and conservative approach of the 2006-7project, 
albeit that the Commission’s entire work at that period was already constrained by 
the terms of the original brief, which excluded the initial briefing’s long list of issues 
that they were not to consider.  However, with the benefit of a 2015 perspective - and 
the discovery in the 2011 Census of a reduced regard for religion in England and 
Wales - the current project is now not so constrained.   
 
It is perhaps understandable that the London researchers’ thoughts did not 
immediately turn to the - by then long standing but little generally noticed -  equality 
provision for cohabitants in traditionally Catholic Spain, which had its origin in the 
immediate work on the Spanish Constitution of 1978, produced between 1978 and 
																																								 																				
372 Available in English, www.congreso.es.  
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1981 but which was already rolling forward within the local legislative powers of the 
semi-autonomous provinces,  of which the notoriously independent Spanish Basque 
country and Catalonia were always in global news .    
 
At least the 1978 post Franco constitution should have been within the contemplation 
of the Law Commission’s 2006-7 work, since while this prompt initiative had been 
originally  generated by the death in the winter of 1975 of General Francisco Franco, 
once the Nationalist hero who rescued the country from communism, but had then 
as Head of State installed a third of a century of strict religion and conservatism, the  
30 years up to 2006 also coincided with significant commercial as well as ideological 
expansion in Spain, during which it was also playing its full part in the European 
institutions at Brussels and Luxembourg, which could hardly  be overlooked by the 
English Law Commission. 
 
By 2006 the prompt introduction of the 1978 Spanish Constitution had long already 
made it clear that Spaniards had only been collectively waiting to emerge from the 
straitjacket of the past, which indeed they had done immediately on the institution of  
the democratic restored monarchy of Juan Carlos I, grandson of the King deposed in 
the 1930s, and  since recently succeeded,  as an even more modern monarch,  by 
his own son, Felipe VI. 
 
It is possible of course that,  from the perspective of English law reform, Spain might 
simply have been seen as no different from any other European jurisdiction  with a  
civil law jurisprudence, and therefore possibly of no great relevance to England and 
Wales.   However it is perhaps surprising that, as in the EU neither strongly 
Presbyterian Scotland nor the staunchly Papist Republic of Eire was at that stage 
apparently raising any objections to cohabitants’ rights reform, this did not serve to 
raise antennae in the Law Commission team to an awareness of the potential impact 
of social trends in England and Wales which might also favour reform, even amongst 
the more conservative - including religiously observant - sectors of society.  Spanish 
and Irish developments might have at least given pause for thought in relation to the 
apparently well flagged policy concern in both London and Scotland not to take any 
action which might appear to undermine marriage. 
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EU messages on potential religious issues in English law cohabitation reform 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is probably easy to see how the Law Commission 
initially missed the relevance of Spain.  However it is harder to see how it still missed 
this once they also knew of potential reform in Eire, especially as together the 
apparent abandonment of the historic Catholicism of both should have been sending 
a relevant message of some sort, despite the fact that while Spain was now 
presenting in its Constitution as a secular state Eire was in fact formally retaining its 
religious links to the Catholic Church. 
 
It is also of course possible that the Law Commission team was simply dismissive of 
the Irish news or that news even distracted such  attention as might have been 
trained on Spain, rather than acting as a catalyst to highlight important religious 
radicalism in the EU,  both because ‘the Irish problem’ has been a thorn in the side 
of England since the time of King John, and not least in the even more memorably 
recent 20th century. Thus it must be supposed that Eire’s law reform activities were 
hardly a headline paradigm shift to have any impact on an English project, and in 
any case because the apparently endless religious issues in Ireland have been so 
frequent and such a running sore as to be hardly ‘news’ -   thus perhaps it was seen 
as a side issue of no relevance to England and Wales if, even on the UK’s doorstep, 
the Catholic Irish Republic were suddenly contemplating radical social reform.   
It was probably a mistake not to pick up this strong Irish support for Spain’s 
pragmatism in putting equality issues before traditional religious adherence, since 
Eire had issued formal announcements of its intentions373   despite the fact that 
																																								 																				
373	By the Law Reform Commission of the Republic of Ireland which in 2006 through its Working 
Group reported to the Ministry of Justice and the Tanaiste (Irish Deputy Prime Minister, which the Law 
Commission also mentions in its final report (2007). However since 2006-7, the Irish Parliament has 
passed the Civil Partnership and Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010, following the report 
of the Law Reform Commission report, Rights and Duties of Cohabitants, 2010, LRD 82-2206, 
www.lawreform.ie, Republic of Ireland. Their 2010 Act mainly provides for same-sex civil partners, but 
also for long standing cohabiting relationships where the parties have not entered into a civil 
partnership or marriage.  The key point about this Act is that there is no difference made in its 
provisions between rights and obligations given to same-sex or opposite sex cohabiting couples 
although there is a difference made between the rights and obligations of opposite sex married 
couples and same-sex civil partners. Eire has, of course, since also voted for same-sex marriage, 
though only in 2015, so presumably is now on a similar equality wave length to Spain’s.  
 
  
 
228 
nothing else was being done to progress formalised cohabitants’ reform in the 
Republic until 2010, by which time the Commission’s 2006-7 project was long over.   
 
At the least, it might be supposed that the English Law Commission should have 
been looking in its 2006-7 project towards any available guidance from the EU 
generally, in which Eire - within the British islands even if not part of the UK – should 
in suddenly following Spain’s modernisation lead, should have alerted the 
Commission to what they could have learned by training their intellectual telescope 
on 30 years of post-Franco Spain..  However the Commission seems to have fallen 
victim to some sort of selective blindness in respect of potential relevance of either 
the EU in general or either of these traditionally religious states, which is odd  in a 
formal Law Commission project where structured law reform planning might be 
thought to be  informed!   
 
Thus Spain was merely included in the Law Commission appendices and Eire 
received only a passing mention in the text.  The significant signposting  which, it 
seems, the Law Commission also missed in passing so quickly over developments in 
these two relevant Catholic EU states was that news of the potential for Irish reform 
to protect opposite sex long term cohabitants was  that for Eire  - a fiercely Catholic 
community at least as religiously orientated as Spain -  even to consider such 
legislation was a powerful social integration indicator, perhaps a really significant 
‘wake-up call’ for law reformers everywhere when Spain had also already begun to 
take such steps in 1978 – realistically as soon as they could under the new 
constitutional monarchy following Franco’s death.   
 
First, it is one thing, even for a Catholic country, to legislate for same-sex civil 
partnerships - especially on the crest of a trend towards a wave of Western 
European equality legislation - but quite another for any such religiously and 
culturally conservative society to go further to protect those who could be married in 
the traditional manner of such religiously driven societies.   
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Secondly, even to think of  including, as Spain did from 2004,   same-sex 
relationships  - which are disapproved of by every world class religion -  suggests a 
deep level of social policy re-thinking of which note should perhaps have been taken 
in England and Wales, even if further investigation into Spain’s progress in this 
respect was ignored; although  it must be conceded this would possibly have been 
an understandable  oversight on the part of the Law Commission at the time,  since 
Spain would have been seen, in the Law Commission’s perception, as  
 
(a) across the Channel in Europe, rather than geographically closer to the United 
Kingdom and England and Wales, as at least Eire clearly is, even if it is still 
not a secular state (unlike Spain which is),  and  
(b)  a civil law jurisdiction,  so perhaps without much relevance either to England 
and Wales or the United Kingdom.   
	
However neglect to tap into Spain at the time is a pity since, despite a small (recent) 
economic downturn exodus, the English expatriate diaspora in Southern Spain is 
now even larger and more widespread than has been the case at any time in France, 
and there are significant commercial links which drive these expatriate links, 
providing much Family Law work for Anglo-Spanish lawyers in both Spain and 
England which could have informed the Law Commission, as will be seen below in 
relation to the structure of Cohabitants’ Rights provision in Spain which even in 
2006-7 already had enough provincial legislation in place to provide the Commission 
with exemplars that would have much benefited the scheme they eventually put into 
their Final Report374  .  
 
Thus it is strange that the Commission apparently did not notice the full impact of the 
fact either that the famously Catholic jurisdiction of Spain had already for 30 years  
apparently been simply ignoring their formerly conservative religious views in favour 
of passing radical legislation for cohabitants who but a short time before would have 
been seen as ‘living in sin’, and that Catholic Eire was suddenly following in Spain’s 
footsteps. Both being member states of the EU had something to contribute to the 
debate in England and Wales, and whereas Eire in 2006-7 as yet had nothing to 
																																								 																				
374 See Chapter 4 for the Commission’s 2007 recommendations. 
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show but intention, Spain had a constitution 3 decades old and actual legislation in 
several provinces while other provinces were slowly catching up. Moreover, while 
Spain had begun reform 3 decades before and thus had an established system, the 
recent sudden change of heart and mind in Eire in following the other previously 
strongly Catholic EU state was potentially more of an impact on England and Wales 
being, like Scotland, geographically closer to home in sharing a land border in the 
British islands although not the national and EU entity of the UK member state..  
 
The impact of the established Spanish system and  Irish activity in following their 
lead might have been even more obvious if the Law Commission team had stopped 
to consider current political events: this was the time when the contemporary English 
law equality drive, then at its height,  had most recently resulted in the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 in England and Wales, a development which would have 
already been leading within government policy to the Equality Act 2010, a realisation 
of the long held aim of consolidating the disparate threads of anti-discrimination law 
which had initially spiralled into English Law piecemeal through the impact of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
 
While the actual implementation of the Irish reforms was still in the future at the time 
of the English Law Commission’s 2006-7 work, Irish conceptual development was 
well publicised at the time, and the policy must have been clear.375   
 
It does therefore seem strange that the English Law Commission did not give greater 
prominence to the likely importance in 2006-7 of Eire’s already published intention to 
legislate than simply mentioning their intention.  As Eire‘s Act,  eventually passed in 
2010,  also now provides a cohabitants’ redress scheme376, the only conclusion that 
could have be drawn was that in following Spain’s lead even Eire too had 
																																								 																				
375 At the signing into law of the Irish Republic’s 2010 Act by the President, Mary McAleese, the 
Minister for Justice and Law Reform, Dermot Ahern, said that it was ‘one of the most important pieces 
of civil rights legislation to be enacted since independence’.  When he added ‘Its legislative advance 
has seen an unprecedented degree of unity and support within both Houses of the Oireachtas’  - the 
Irish Parliament - no one politically aware could fail to be struck by the fact that even religiously 
conservative Eire had united behind a measure which looked behind their own previous moral 
condemnation of those who chose not to marry - and any concerns they might have had about any 
threat to the status of marriage - but had instead focussed on contemporary tolerance of diverse 
social norms. 
376 Described as a ‘safety-net’ for financially dependent long-term cohabitants at the end of a 
relationship. 
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recalibrated its equality criteria.  While the Act itself was not passed until three years 
after the Law Commission finished its 2006-7 work, it is really surprising that the 
team did not see this coming, 377 so as at least to take time to consider the potential 
philosophical importance in England and Wales of both Spain and Eire apparently 
having addressed their formerly overriding religious cultures.   
 
Why did Scotland’s reform research take no interest in Spain? 
Unlike the Law Commission in London,  the Scottish Executive did not undertake a 
trawl of other jurisdictions’ provision when they set about their own reforms,  
preferring merely to refer in its Policy Memorandum to the research which the 
Scottish Executive had published 378  in relation only to a smaller group of such 
regimes as they had selected to review,  namely those in France, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand and Australia, commenting that ‘this international comparison of the 
legal position of cohabiting couples reveals a complex and varied picture’.  The fact 
that Scotland did not look towards Spain at all is unsurprising since, apart from the 
fact that Ireland was  not yet into cohabitation reform as early as 2005,  Scotland’s 
obvious connections are historically in Europe towards Protestantism not 
Catholicism, and in some respects more towards common law than civil law 
systems, especially in the colonial context towards New Zealand, substantially 
settled by the Scots.   
 
Nevertheless Scotland’s narrower focus was probably not disadvantageous to the 
development of their own statute, since the Policy Memorandum makes clear that 
the Scottish Executive had already decided in principle on a normative regime which 
did not at all resemble marriage - an approach which differs sharply from the 
Australian federal statute of which the New Zealand statute is a fairly close cousin.  
Thus the choice of comparator European jurisdictions, such as France and the 
Netherlands, objectively made sense for Scotland, since if England and Wales were 
not necessarily introducing their own normative regime for cohabitants, some 
comparative lessons from Europe  - especially the European Union -  could in some 
ways be a more logical template to review for ideas than those of the more distant 
																																								 																				
377 Despite the fact that the Law Commission’s 2007 final report specifically refers in its section on 
developments in other jurisdictions to the title of the Irish Law Commission’s paper recommending 
reform, ‘Rights and Duties of Cohabitants’. 
378 See Chapter 6. 
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Australian and New Zealand common law systems with which England and Wales 
has ongoing connections, albeit that New Zealand has had a Scottish connection 
since its earliest European  immigrations two centuries ago.     
 
Moreover, owing to Scotland’s historic ‘Auld Alliance’ with France, Scottish law 
already manifestly has in some respects an approach to marriage, divorce and family 
property ownership which has some resemblances to that still found in the civil 
jurisdiction of France, although Scotland also shares some common law tradition 
with England, as do the two leading southern hemisphere jurisdictions of Australia 
and New Zealand. 
 
The relevance of Spain to English cohabitants’ rights reform 
Despite Scotland’s closer connections with France, and its own relevance to English 
law reform, since it is a geographically close jurisdiction within the UK, the more 
significant EU comparison for English law  is clearly still with Spain, which only in the 
last quarter century had the chance to legislate for cohabitants’ rights, following a 
long period of restricted Catholic tradition and political dictatorship up to 1975.   
 
Nevertheless the post Franco Constitution still places Spain well ahead in Europe in 
accepting cohabitation as a recognisable family form alongside marriage. 
This historically early equality based acceptance of cohabitation owes its priority in 
time to the late transformation of Spain from dictatorship to democracy, which 
enabled the Spanish to legislate from scratch - with no antecedent legislative history 
to take into account -  and to pass radical legislation from a position where previously 
adultery was a crime and cohabitation a sin which was also seen as socially deviant, 
so that first principles have now had a place in Spain of which there has been no 
equivalent in any other jurisdiction in recent times, except possibly the post-Soviet 
legal systems of Eastern Europe, where unfortunately there is again a language as 
well as cultural barrier for most English legal researchers.  
 
The opportunity has also uniquely existed in Spain, as nowhere else in Europe, to 
begin afresh with a new constitution because of the long planned restoration of the 
monarchy as a democratic institution, bringing with it a ‘Parliamentary Monarchy’ 
Constitution of Spain for which Franco had in his lifetime coached the potential new 
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young monarch, Juan Carlos, passing over his father, the legitimate heir of the 
previous King deposed in the Civil War379.  
 
Cohabitants’ rights in Spain  
The new Constitution explicitly set out to provide ‘an advanced democracy’, and 
guarantees equality, ‘human dignity’, respect for human rights as in both the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the treaties to which the Spanish state 
has signed up380.  Moreover, Article 14 further spells out the right to equality before 
the law so that Spaniards ‘may not be discriminated against in any way on account 
of birth, race, sex, religion or opinion or any other social opinion or circumstance’.  
Article 18 guarantees the inviolability of the home and ‘personal and family privacy’. 
Further, unlike the position during the Franco regime which stretched from the end of 
the Civil War in 1939 to his death in 1975,   Article 16 guarantees religious and 
ideological freedom and articulates a secular society on the basis that there is no 
State religion, but that the State ‘shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish society 
into account’ and maintain ‘appropriate cooperation with the Catholic Church and 
other confessions’.   
 
Thus Spanish Law, in the Civil Code, follows the Constitution in providing 
appropriately for all its citizens, therefore protecting cohabitants as well as spouses 
in accordance with the wide constitutional principles of equality and liberty.  While 
there is no specific national legislation, as that has been left to detailed local 
provision by the regional governments, the Civil Code broadly regulates most areas 
of personal or family law.  However,  since  Spain is divided into ‘provinces’ and also 
into areas of local government into which provinces are grouped381,  the local 
governments382 constitute the level for making detailed regional laws in respect of 
some matters, including cohabitation.   
 
																																								 																				
379 The legitimate heir, Juan Carlos’ father, - King Alfonso III’s eldest son, Don Juan de Borbon - 
having long been seen as likely to be even more reactionary than conservative and therefore not 
suitable for a reformed monarchy, although the Franco regime had probably not anticipated the extent 
of the social change that would follow in the first three  years of that constitutional monarchy. 
380 Article 10. 
381 Such as Andalucia in the South and Catalonia in the North. 
382 Called ‘juntas’. 
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This is neither unexpected nor unusual, since following the new Constitution in 1978, 
the established system of leaving a great deal to local government to be 
administered through the town halls continued, much as in France, from which Spain 
obtained this framework through the establishment of the Code Napoleon in those 
countries occupied in the Napoleonic Wars.   
 
Accordingly, detailed legislation was established exclusively provincially at different 
dates and often not at all quickly. For example, while some provinces legislated more 
promptly, the Canary Islands passed its cohabitation laws relatively late in 2004 and 
the region of Rioja in the North of Spain – the last to legislate -  did not publish a full 
regime until 2010.  There are thus regional variations, but they all operate on the 
basis of cohabiting couples being ‘parejas de hecho’ ,  which literally translates as 
‘couples of fact’ , or ‘de facto relationships’, which is the term used in Australia,  
where there has been such statutory provision regulating what they term ‘un-
formalised’ cohabitation since 1985.   
 
Owing to the equality principles of the Spanish Constitution, the regional laws apply 
to couples of both opposite sex and same-sex, both of which are obliged to register 
their relationship with their town hall, whereupon the precise law which will govern 
that relationship will depend on the region in which the cohabiting couple lives. This 
centralisation of the role of the town hall also proceeds from a tradition, as in France, 
where until the PACS regime383  was introduced the town hall was central to all and 
any registrations. In France a pre-PACS system of registered ‘concubinage’ was 
widespread, leading to certain ad hoc recognition of cohabitation, not unlike the 
piecemeal recognition of ‘living together as husband and wife’ in English welfare law,  
which has always been an irritant to pro-cohabitant rights lobbyists in England and 
Wales. 
 
An example of the wide differences in level of detail in the various regions’ provisions 
relating to cohabitants is that of Andalucia in the South, an area where there are 
many British residents.  In this autonomous region there is detailed provision for 
personal and family relations, ‘inscription’ -  that is,  town hall registration -  
																																								 																				
383 ‘Pacte Civile de Solidarite’ . 
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dissolution and inheritance, and also for regulating the obligations of the public 
administration. These provisions cover in detail not only the all- important local 
registration of the couple’s relationship, including in relation to cohabitation 
agreements in the couple’s life time, including division of pensions,  but also 
consequences on death.   
 
An advantage of the registration system is that it also imports tax benefits, on a par 
with married couples.  This appears to be a particularly neat way of establishing the 
commencement of a cohabiting relationship, which has been a concern to the Law 
Commission in England in articulating any reform in English law because  - unlike in 
marriage or civil partnership -  there is no cohabitation ceremony.  The requirement 
to register in Spain is not technically an ‘opt-in’ to cohabitants’ rights, since the 
Constitution already guarantees those, so that cohabitants’ do not need to register to 
obtain such rights in law, but  in effect only to obtain the concomitant advantages, 
similar to obtaining the ‘passport benefits’ on making certain welfare benefit claims in 
English law. 
 
Neither Spaniards nor established English residents would find such registration in 
any way abnormal or onerous since the town hall has always been a central actor in 
Spanish life.  Registration therefore fits well with the Spanish approach: for example, 
Spain had compulsory registration of ‘escrituras’  -- real property ownership 
certificates - evidencing transactions in property, also effected at the town hall,  long  
before the English Land Registration Act 2002 imported our own compulsory 
property registration. Spanish people are therefore entirely familiar with such town 
hall involvement from a variety of previous contexts.   
 
Some regions have taken this local law making  to extremes and require proof that a 
couple has been together for a period, for example one year, before registration is 
possible, which is similar to the position in some Australian states, and also  - as in 
most jurisdictions in relation to marriage -  that the parties are single. Some require 
that at least one is on the local electoral roll.  The application to register must then 
usually be made by the couple together as for the Civil Partnership Act 2004 in 
English Law, and not unilaterally.  A registered couple will then be jointly liable to 
third parties for household bills and expenses. 
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In the event of death of a cohabiting partner, a couple who have registered their 
‘pareja de hecho’ will have enabled the survivor to remain in the home which has 
been their habitual residence for a year after the death, regardless of whether there 
is title to the property or not and regardless of the legal heirs’ rights, a system which 
appears superior in practical terms to such limited provisions as exist in Part IV of 
the Family Law Act 1996 for cohabitants in England and Wales. 
 
Where there is no registration the couple will have the same rights and obligations in 
respect of children as if they were married, that is, there is a children’s right to 
compulsory inheritance, but the situation of the cohabitants inter se in relation to 
property will not be protected, unless there is a contract between the parties, joint 
ownership or a business venture which can give rise to a civil claim.   
 
However, this need have little practical consequence as Spanish contract law does 
not require consideration as the Constitution gives a right to contract as well as 
equality for cohabitants. In effect a cohabitant in Spain is in a similar position for 
legal purposes to, for example, the unmarried father in English law who can 
realistically obtain parental responsibility if he wants it, in that a cohabitant status as 
such already exists owing to the Constitution, just as an English unmarried father will 
be recognised as a father, but he will have to take steps, administratively with the 
mother or by application to the court, to obtain the concomitant parental 
responsibility.   
 
However the cohabitant in Spain is in a better practical situation in that only an 
administrative act - that is, registration -  is needed to provide full protection without 
recourse to court as would be necessary under TOLATA in respect of property 
claims in England and Wales. With the government always pleading such poverty 
that it says it cannot afford to run HM Courts and Tribunal Services, English Law 
might advantageously learn from this! 
 
Cohabitants and Children in Spain 
The Civil Code makes no distinction between married and unmarried parents, and 
unmarried fathers in Spain will have parental responsibility from a child’s birth 
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without having formally to obtain it, and this will last until majority (18 as in English 
Law): Civil Code Articles 154-171. This is the same for adoptive parents as for any 
father, married or unmarried, successfully claiming paternity. 
 
Where a cohabitants’ dispute is about a child there is similarly no distinction between 
married and cohabiting parents, although there may be different presumptions in 
different provinces, depending on the default approach to resolution of such 
disputes, for example, in Catalonia the approach of the judiciary is for shared 
custody – custody is a word still used in Spain although English Law has abandoned 
it - but different provinces have different practices. 
 
It should be noted that since the implementation in Spain on 1 January 2011 of the 
1996 Hague Convention on Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and 
Cooperation in Matters of Parental Responsibility or Child Protection, it is normally 
now Spanish law which is always applied in the case of foreign nationality of families 
involved in any disputes about children habitually resident in Spain, whereas 
previously the law dictated by their nationality would have governed.  However there 
remains the possibility that a foreign rather than Spanish law may still apply to non-
Spanish parties in a cohabitation dispute concerning property or money in Spain, so 
Spanish judges may find themselves applying more than one law in a case 
depending on the issues in it.  This is clearly a classic example of the drive for 
harmonisation in Family law where possible, particularly in Europe. 
 
Cohabitants who marry 
The Civil Code has made provision for pre-marriage cohabitation followed by 
conversion to the married state, in that it is possible to enter into a pre-marital 
contract or pact while the parties are still living together informally, similar to a pre-
nuptial agreement in English Law.  These agreements are called ‘capitulaciones’ and 
by Article 9.3 of the Civil Code will be valid, if they modify or substitute the parties’ 
own provisions for those which would normally regulate the intended spouses’ 
relationship, which would generally be community of property, called 'gananciales’: 
Articles 1.315-1,316. This will normally be the case unless the parties specifically 
elect separation of property, called ‘separacion de bienes’.   Provided they conform 
to the law of the parties’ nationality or of the habitual residence of either at the time 
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that they contract,  such a pre-marital contract will be valid and the married regime, 
whichever was chosen, will take effect when the marriage is celebrated.   
 
However, if a matrimonial regime is elected prior to the marriage, the actual marriage 
must take place within one year of signing the contract when it is thus a marriage 
contract. For it to be valid as such it must be made by deed, that is, executed before 
a Notary in accordance with Article 1.325-1.327 of the Civil Code.   
 
Nevertheless, the terms of the Constitution must be remembered here, as the 
agreement can be invalid not only if there is any provision which is contrary to law or 
‘good custom’ - such as in bad faith to defraud creditors - but also if it is contrary to 
the couple’s equal rights.  Article 1.333 requires the Civil Registry to record the 
matrimonial regime which has been elected and also to record any court order or 
resolution which changes the couple’s economic regime.  If immoveable property is 
involved these can be recorded by the Spanish Land Registry in accordance with the 
Ley Hipotecaria  - Land Law. Moreover the marriage contract agreeing the 
matrimonial property regime can be registered where it contains rights over 
immoveable property. 
 
The requirement to effect such a contract by deed before a Notary is thus readily 
understood when it is considered that the Notary is a public  - government -  official: 
not a solicitor or similar, such as might be involved in any contract in English Law. 
This requirement also enables the crucial terms of the agreement, and its effects, 
rights and obligations, to be fully explained and understood by the couple prior to 
signing the document.  As the Civil Code establishes the right to enter into such a 
contract and treats it as binding from the moment it is entered into,  the Notary’s role 
is obviously important, and it is for this reason that there is no requirement to obtain 
legal advice prior to entering into the contract as the Notary has this obligation. 
 
Co-ownership of property 
There is nothing in Spain, either in the Constitution or Civil Code or in any regional 
law, which is similar to the TOLATA claim which cohabitants must fall back on in 
English law, so that if cohabitants are not registered and simply buy property 
together they will be subject to the law on co-ownership which is regulated by Article 
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392 of the Civil Code.  This is more similar to English Law  tenancy in common than 
to joint tenancy.  Unlike in an English joint purchase situation, in Spain a co-owner 
cannot be fixed with co-ownership indefinitely.  This means that there is always a 
right to demand dissolution or liquidation of the property.  Two rights exist for this 
purpose, the right of first refusal; and the right of retraction.   
 
The right of first refusal in Spanish Law – called ‘tanteo’ -  is not the same as in 
English Law, as for example under the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban 
Development Act 1993 where the freeholder must offer the right of first refusal to a 
lessee.  There is no automatic right of first refusal; it must be registered in a 
particular form, declaring the right, although this is actually quite rare in practice. 
 
The right of retraction is more similar to the right of first refusal in English Law, as if a 
co-owner sells his or her share to a third party without offering it to the other co-
owner, the transaction can be challenged, the transfer will be rescinded and the 
other co-owner must be allowed to purchase at the same price and under the same 
terms and conditions.  Article 1.518-1.525 enables the costs of sale and use of the 
property to be recovered as in the case of leasehold under English Law, since this is 
in essence a compulsory purchase.  These conditions mean that it is rare for any 
sale to take place without the knowledge and cooperation of the other co-owner 
which is quite helpful in the case of a breakdown of a relationship, without the need 
for registration of home rights or land charges, provided of course both co-owners 
know their legal rights.  As in English Law the cooperation of the mortgagee is 
required if there is a mortgage over a jointly owned property.  
 
Some comparisons between the Spanish and the Scottish and English 
approaches to Cohabitation    
 
 The Equality approach 
On the face of it, the situation in Spain, whereby the law relating to cohabitants takes 
its cue from the 1978 Constitution’s insistence on liberty and equality,  appears to be 
extremely practical, since it completely ignores  - and apparently precludes - any 
discussion, let alone argument, about whether treating cohabitants in a manner 
similar to married couples is wrong, offensive, difficult or in any way a jurisprudential 
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or social problem. This must be Spain’s major practical contribution to the problems 
often raised by international family mobility and lack of international harmonisation of 
key family relationships.   
 
Cohabitation in Spain is therefore not as unlike marriage as in some other 
jurisdictions, as while cohabitants are not married as such they share much 
functionality, and the parties can in both cases elect for community of property or 
separation of assets through contracts, although a marital agreement cannot take 
away the presumption of equality, except by agreeing to a regime of separation of 
assets.  
 
This seems to meet the adult autonomy aims of the English Law Commission’s 
proposals and also the policy aim in England and Wales of retaining a clear formal 
distinction between marriage and cohabitation.  Thus requiring cohabitants to 
register their relationship to access some of its benefits  -  as is the case in Spain -  
would seem to address the objections of those who consider that creating a separate 
status for cohabitants would threaten the status of marriage.  
 
The Spanish Constitution has also expressly removed the issue of religion since 
Spain is now a secular state, while the Constitution requires the State to ‘have 
regard to’ or ‘respect for’ Spanish religions and to cooperate ‘appropriately’ with the 
Catholic Church.  This seems a most tactful way of handling the religious objection to 
any formal provision for unmarried cohabitants, which is often still said to be the 
main stumbling block to cohabitants’ legislative reform in England and Wales.   
There seems no equivalent focus on the religious question in either Scotland or 
Ireland, although the travaux preparatoires in both countries -  for example,  the 
Memorandum in Scotland, and the two Irish reports mentioned above - simply adopt 
an eminently pragmatic and practical approach to a matter of legislative reform which 
is treated like any other. 
 
Spanish co-ownership of property  
The Spanish co-ownership of property arrangements are certainly vastly superior to 
TOLATA and to the expense, stress, uncertainty and delay of litigation under that 
Act’s provisions.  On the other hand Spanish cohabitation provisions, being left in 
  
 
241 
detail to the regions, are not uniform and do not provide as clear  a regime as the 
Scots system has.  The requirement to register co-ownership with the Notary, a 
public official, is a significant advantage, as is the potential of the rights of first 
refusal or retraction, as this means that the relationship is documented, which has 
always been another stumbling block in England and Wales -  since it has been 
claimed, with some justification,  that there is no defined starting and finishing point 
indicated by a cohabiting relationship which, unlike marriage or civil partnership, has 
no ceremony,. 
 
The Spanish ‘opt in’ approach: a hybrid model? 
It is said that Spain has elected for an ‘opt in’ scheme, relying on a triple approach of 
Constitutional principle, local regional law and requirement to register the 
relationship to access its full benefits - unlike New Zealand, for example, where there 
is a clear one stage default system, but similar to Australia, where the goal is to 
persuade what their jurisdiction calls ‘un-formalised couples’ to get under the 
umbrella of their own 2006 Act. 
 
However the more complex approach of Constitution and local regional law, plus the 
requirement to register, appears to combine the best of both the opt-in and opt-out 
methodologies.  For discussion of these differences, which the English Law 
Commission debated at length, and assessment of whether opting in or opting out is 
more practical, see Chapter 9. 
 
 Conclusion 
There is much to be learned from the Spanish approach, which clearly adopts the 
functionality points repeatedly made in England, over a long period, by Barlow and 
her various teams384.  That functionality should work in overseas jurisdictions is not a 
surprise, since this is the approach in many which blazed an early trail, such as 
Australia and New Zealand.  What is a surprise is that it appears to work in 
previously fundamentally religious Spain without obvious difficulty, both in relation to 
practical application of the law and acceptance by society, and which in turn seems 
																																								 																				
384 See Chapter 3. 
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to have generated no adverse comment or hostility to the equality approach to both 
formally married and informally cohabiting couples.  
 
The value added point in relation to Spain, as a pointer to what might eventually be 
consensually achieved in England and Wales,  is Spain’s previous notably religious 
character which now, however,  appears not  - as it might have been -  an obstacle 
standing in the way of equal acceptance of cohabitation alongside marriage as a 
family framework norm.  On the other hand, in England and Wales it seems there 
has always been a major sensitivity about any possible perception of cohabitants as 
a threat to marriage, although adherence to the long standing definition of marriage 
set out in Hyde v Hyde in 1866385 has recently been almost entirely abandoned with 
the passage of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples ) Act 2013.    
 
Clearly the enactment of this statute has effected major change, despite the fact that 
it has been long held, and even respected in the European Court of Human Rights 
until Goodwin v UK in 2002, that marriage has always enjoyed such a special 
cultural meaning in English Law that the English view of marriage had to be given a 
special margin of appreciation.   
 
The result of this English law and policy stance seems to have been - so far -  that 
cohabitants could not possibly have any recognised status within the Law 
Commission’s 2006-7 work, in that its brief was specifically not to consider any 
separate status for cohabitants which might even be thought potentially to undermine 
marriage.   
 
However it does now seem that the question must be asked why, if Spain – and the 
Republic of Ireland, an equally fundamentally religious Catholic state and unlike 
modern Spain not a secular one – can entertain the norm of a parallel family 
framework to marriage, it should still be considered impossible for there to be a 
normative regime for cohabitants in English law which recognises their de facto 
status? This is the more so as Scotland - equally religiously didactic, but towards the 
																																								 																				
385 [1866] LR1 P&D 130. 
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extreme Protestantism end of the religious spectrum -  has in effect created a legally 
recognisable state of cohabitation even if it is not labelled as a status as such. 
 
It is possible that there is an explanation for this surprisingly willing acceptance of 
cohabitation in Spain, despite the fact that this is completely opposite to its historic 
and cultural circumstances: although, whatever that explanation is does not 
necessarily detract from the pragmatic success of the provisions of the 1978 
Constitution since Spain was also before England and Wales in accepting same-sex 
marriage, indicating some seriously fundamental acceptance of social norm 
reconstruction.   
 
it seems that the most likely reason for acceptance of such fundamental changes 
has its roots in the fact that,  in the four decades since 1975,  Spain has now 
become such a secular society that the constitutional position simply raises no 
queries at all.  Those who are religious appear to continue to go to church and to 
observe the rituals of religion, and those who appear neither to be protesting nor 
protested against.  
 
Faber386, writing in 2006 in reviewing the then position just over 30 years after 
Franco’s death, suggests that in the first quarter century there was a pact of silence 
about both the twin Republican-Nationalist and secular-religious confrontations of the 
1936-39 Civil War and the subsequent repression of secularity and dissident politics 
during the Nationalist Franco regime of 1939-1975, but that Spain has now emerged 
into a modern intellectualism which confronts these past demons dispassionately.   
 
If that can happen in Spain, following the bitterness of both the Civil War and the 
grudges of the defeated, there would therefore appear no reason that we should do 
worse in England and Wales where the most spectacular - and non-cerebral -  
dispute over preserving the distinction between marriage and those ‘living in sin” was 
the Daily Mail campaign against giving cohabitants equal protection against domestic 
violence in Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996.    
																																								 																				
386 Sebastiaan Faber ‘Revisting the Past, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Franco Spain, 
(2006) Revista Hispanica Modernerna, Ano 59 No 1/ 2, June-Dec 2006, University of Pennsylvania 
Press.. 
  
 
244 
 
Similarly, since in Eire there has been unity of approach to equality and tolerance for 
private choices over intimate family relationships, it is now difficult to justify the 2006 
government stance on the unique status of marriage which dictated that the English 
Law Commission should not have included in its brief any potential consideration of 
a separate status for cohabitants, as has been in effect long given to cohabiting 
couples in Australia and New Zealand.  
 
Associated limited fieldwork with Anglo-Spanish practitioners 387 indicates that 
despite the umbrella equality provisions of the Constitution, detailed local laws and 
the requirement for town hall registration in order to claim its benefits  - which seems 
to be a hybrid system, part default and part ‘opt in’ -  there are still lawyers’ clients, 
both Spanish and English expatriates, who do not know and/or understand their 
rights, and  - in the case of expatriate British residents -  the difference between 
them in England and Wales and in Spain.  
 
Nevertheless, examination of the Spanish system seems to yield two positive 
contributions to potential reform in England and Wales.  
 
First,  town hall registration - easily linked to council tax and other local government 
functions -   could certainly be an answer to the frequent conundrum,  common to 
most jurisdictions legislating for cohabitants’ rights,  of how to pin point the formal 
date of commencement of cohabitation where there is, unlike marriage, no 
ceremony.  Moreover the property provisions, including the role of the Notary, would 
save many property problems from arising in England and Wales, where it seems 
the existing conveyancing practices, Land Registry’s forms and online registration 
are not necessarily achieving declarations of trust and avoidance of subsequent 
TOLATA 1996 litigation . 
 
Secondly, the role of the Constitution in Spain  - in particular in addressing the 
former heavily religious culture,  has turned out to be so powerful in the cohabitant 
context that it may be that this is the key, unique,  Spanish contribution to the 
international debate which might find resonance in a scheme for England and Wales. 
																																								 																				
387 For which see Chapter 9. 
  
 
245 
While we have no written constitution we do have a relatively new Equality Act 2010 
which was meant to collate all anti-discrimination measures but has not addressed 
cohabitants, despite the identification of potential indirect discrimination  identified by 
Choudhry & Herring in 2010388.We also have a Human Rights Act 1998, so that both 
of these statutes should potentially be capable of addressing cohabitants’ rights, 
especially since recent 2013 legislation has now closed that gap for same-sex 
couples, which is further discussed in Chapter 9.  
 
Reform is really overdue, since besides the Law Commission’s 2006-7 aborted work, 
the Law Society in 2000 and Resolution in 2002 and 2008389 and most recently in 
their 2015 Manifesto390, have been pressing for reform for many years.
																																								 																				
388 Shazia Choudhry and Jonathan Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law, Hart, 2010. 
389 Fairness for Families: proposals for reform of the law on cohabitation, SFLA, 2000; Living 
Together, Shared Home, Shared Rights: Reforming the Law For People Who Live Together, 
Resolution, 2002. 
390 Resolution Manifesto for Family Law, www.resolution.org.uk. 
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Chapter 8 Australia and New Zealand 
 
Introduction 
This chapter undertakes a survey of cohabitants’ rights provision in Australia and 
New Zealand, and then critically examines the relevance of their historical 
background, sources, modes of thought, legal styles and other features, which 
stemming as they do from the common law tradition of English Law, lend themselves 
more readily in comparative law terms to potential transition to England and Wales 
than some of the ideas behind either the Scottish or Spanish schemes. 
 
The primary aim is to look at the reform experience in Australia, which began at state 
level and has had a long timeline since the initial legislation in New South Wales in 
1975 before becoming federal in 2006, apparently the vintage year for cohabitation 
statutes in Australia, New Zealand and Scotland.  
 
The secondary aim is to consider the New Zealand reforms, which came about in a 
slightly different manner, with an amendment being made to the former Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 to create a neutrally named Property Relationships Act, and then 
reforming that statute to consolidate all New Zealand’s married and unmarried 
couples’ legislation in one statute.   
 
This reform, envisaged by the earlier Cabinet policy paper,  was thus signalled 
through this change to a neutral title, and then completed by by including cohabitants 
within the previously existing matrimonial legislative provisions.   
 
A further difference between the process in New Zealand and Australia was 
because, unlike federal Australia, New Zealand as a single jurisdiction with no 
federal complications only had to pass one statute and did not have to consider any 
previous regional legislation. As a single jurisdiction New Zealand is thus also more 
similar to England and Wales where there is normally no distinction between the 
Family law applying in England or in Wales, although some of our statutes do may 
make distinct provisions to apply in the two geographical areas: an example may be 
seen in the Children Act 2004, which has provided for  two different Children’s 
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Commissioners, one for England and one for Wales, and a distinct force of Cafcass 
officers, one each for England and for Wales. 
 
Australia and New Zealand present further perspectives on legislating to provide a 
normative regime for cohabitants, and each has done so in accordance with its 
individual jurisdiction’s distinctive personality and character.  While there are 
similarities in the approach of these two southern hemisphere common law 
Dominions of the Commonwealth, there are in fact distinct differences in their 
respective systems,   although the similarities are greater than the divergences.   
 
One important difference is that Australia, despite establishment of  its federal Family 
Court,  still has both state level and federal level statutes, whereas New Zealand, 
being a single jurisdiction like England and Wales ,  has never had any local laws  
differing from the national statutes although in England and Wales,  Wales now has 
an Assembly – which is not at present  a Parliament as in Scotland, so that while 
Scotland can pass its own statutes, in the same way as Australian states, the Welsh 
Assembly can only pass ‘Measures’, some of which have had importance in Family 
Law, such as that mainstreaming the paramountcy of the welfare of the child in all 
legislation affecting Wales. 
 
Both Australia and New Zealand, however, have a longer culturally established legal 
recognition of cohabiting relationships than either Scotland or Spain.  Whereas 
Scotland only took a proactive step in 2006 to protect ‘all Scotland’s people’ by 
legislating  - unconnected to any specific event – so as to replace their less than 
satisfactory common law provision,   Spain’s was reactive and part of a general 
equality based initiative on drafting that country’s new 1978 Constitution, following  
the establishment of the democratic monarchy at the end of the Franco era.   
 
This virtually routine equality approach in Spain,  within the spirit of the time and 
particularly chiming with the European Union ethos, enabled inclusion of cohabitants 
within a specific principle of the new Constitution.  This was in effect a contemporary 
generalised approach to a modernising equality goal, designed to replace the 
outdated principles of the essentially repressive regime which had followed the Civil 
War of 1936-39.  This constitutional equality principle, stated in general equality 
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terms in the Constitution, thus permitted later articulation to recognise cohabitation in 
the local laws of each autonomous region of the country, while also  naturally also 
remaining bound to respect the constitutional principles in relation to cohabitation as 
in other discrete areas of legislation.   
 
On the other hand, Australia and New Zealand appear simply to have catered for 
social change by updating their existing Family legislation, along with their concept of 
the underlying theory of contemporary family life that their societies appeared to 
have developed in the last two decades of the 20th century – a strikingly 
straightforward pathway to adapting, as Scotland did, to addressing what the Scots 
simply called, in plain language, ‘today’s family structures’391. 
 
By comparison with the England and Wales, this approach is very attractive as a 
pragmatic acceptance of what might be considered to be the role of governments 
responsible for ensuring the rule of law and access to justice for their citizens, in 
other words legal frameworks that suit the nature and requirements of the society 
they serve.  
 
These two jurisdictions have apparently not only achieved this this but done so in the 
manner with which the rest of the common law world has become familiar, that is 
initially through  ongoing awareness in other common law jurisdictions,   including 
that of England and Wales,  of the steady delivery of the persuasive authority of 
Australian and New Zealand reported cases in our courts when our own English law 
precedents were silent, thus establishing a track record in the judicial development of 
English law across fields wider than Family law.   Secondly,  in academe, when 
cases from these two proactive common law jurisdictions,  having first been cited  in 
our higher courts, have then received comment in the scholarly literature of both 
academics and researchers, Australian and New Zealand Law schools have crafted 
a reputation for their research and publications.  If this ever was surprising to English 
jurists, when it is considered that originally these former colonies followed our lead, 
rather than the other way around, it certainly is not now. 
 
																																								 																				
391 See Chapter 6. 
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Thus with the different triggers in Scotland and Spain must be compared these much 
earlier proactive steps in both Australia and New Zealand, where cohabitation had 
been recognised for some years as a family format which was as valid as marriage,  
though to begin with their legislation, like that of English law, emphasised the status 
of marriage as one to be protected.   
 
More recently, however, these two jurisdictions have taken divergent views about 
upgrading their systems to include same-sex marriage: on 19 April 2013 New 
Zealand’s Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Act 2013 received the Royal Assent, 
whereas it appears that Australia has not yet legislated effectively on a federal basis,  
since on 13 December 2013,   in the case of  Commonwealth of Australia v 
Australian Capital Territory392  the High Court of Australia declared the Australian 
Capital Territory’s statute recognising same-sex marriage incompatible with the 
federal Marriage Act 1961, although there are same-sex union provisions in four of 
the states of Australia.  
 
Nevertheless, same-sex marriage apart, the two jurisdictions are fairly close on the 
treatment of cohabitation in general. 
 
Australia 
 
Australia has had discrete de facto relationships property legislation in different 
states since 1984 when New South Wales was the first state to introduce a De facto 
Relationships Act,  but since the amendment of the Family Law Act 1975 spouses 
and cohabitants,  including same-sex couples, the latter of whom are not, however, 
‘married’,  can now have their separation disputes determined by the federal Family 
Court of Australia,  although it appears that Western Australia still retains its own 
Family Court and has not referred its powers in this context.    
 
However Australia has only more recently - in 2006, when the Family Law Act was 
amended on 22 May in that year -  actually consolidated the treatment of married 
couples and cohabitants into a largely uniform system. Nevertheless, it seems that 
this has never been treated conceptually as an ‘equalisation ‘ of marriage and 
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250 
cohabitation, not least because Australian law on de facto relationships is so flexible 
that it can even encompass a relationship of more than two persons, since partners 
in a multiple relationship can also use the de facto legislative provisions393.  Thus 
Mushin J, in the case of Moby v Schulter394 is recorded as saying, when applying the 
de facto legislation, ‘it is inappropriate to draw parallels between the concept of a de 
facto relationship and marriage’.   
 
The fact remains, however, that it seems that Australia  - first at state level, then 
more recently in its federal law - has been entirely comfortable with cohabiting 
relationships since at least the last quarter of the 20th century, and that field, as in so 
many areas of law,  has been well ahead of the former mother country jurisdiction in 
providing legal recognition for cohabitation, while over the same period academics 
and practitioners in England and Wales have been commenting on the need even for 
the introduction into English law of some sort of normative regime for cohabitants, 
and doing it for very nearly as long as Australia and New Zealand have been 
developing their inclusive Family law.   
 
Such commentators in English law have, nevertheless, been doing so without 
apparent impact, other than, very lately, when the Justices of the Supreme Court in 
London have not only taken notice of the gap in our legal provision but recorded their 
dismay at the lack of any progress in law reform in this area, these comments 
appearing in their judgments in both the English and Scottish cohabitation cases to 
come before them. 
 
In specific relation to the now unarguable need for cohabitants’ rights provision in 
English law, it must be highly significant that in both these cases some notice was 
not only taken of the pressing need for a normative regime for cohabitants in 
England and Wales, but there were actually adverse judicial comments on the lack of 
such legislation, and this time not only from Baroness Hale but from at least three of 
																																								 																				
393 Lisa Young, ‘Australia: New Frontiers for Family Law’, The International Survey of Family Law 
2013 Edition, Family Law, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2013, pp.64-70. 
394 Moby v Schulter [2010] FLC 93-447 (Australia). 
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the Justices about the lack of English legislation in both the English case of Jones v 
Kernott  in 2011395  and the Scottish appeal of Gow v Grant  in 2012396.  
 
Young397 goes on to say, however, that in Australia the pre-federal legislation at 
state level ‘still operates’ and that ‘the judiciary have not adopted a uniform 
approach’ in interpreting what a ‘de facto relationship’  means.  This seems to 
support the global impression that Australia has a down to earth executive which 
takes a pragmatic and ‘no nonsense’ view of its citizens’ requirements in relation to 
law as well as in other contexts, but is of concern in that it suggests a lack of 
articulated jurisprudential theory  underpinning what is nevertheless obviously a 
practical ‘live and let live’ equality approach to society (see further below).   
 
Nevertheless, this practical, and sometimes apparently casual, response to society 
as Australia sees it to be is a national feature entirely in character with the known 
Australian ‘can do’ ethos, as typified in one its more famous linguistic expressions 
‘No worries’.  Moreover if there is sometimes an apparent lack of underlying juristic 
theory, certainly England and Wales, being still in its own glasshouse, is not in a 
position to throw stones, especially given the significant corpus of scholarship and 
jurisprudence which has often emanated from Australian sources when more 
conservative English law lacked provision to address social change . 
 
New Zealand  
New Zealand also has de facto legislation, having from 1 February 2002 amended its 
Property Relationships Act 1976 to include cohabitants, so that this statute, formerly 
the Matrimonial Property Act 1976  - until neutrally renamed during amendment - no 
longer applies only to married couples   Following the Legal Recognition of Adult 
Relationships Cabinet Document398, this renamed statute was then extended to 
cover same sex relationships by a Property Relationships (Amendment) Act 2005.  
Thus New Zealand law now recognises married couples, ‘civil unions’ - similar to 
																																								 																				
395 [2011] UKSC 53 per Lord Wilson [70]. 
396 [2013] UKSC 29 per Baroness Hale [44]-[56]. 
397 Lisa Young, n389. 
398 2003, www.justice.govt.nz/...relationships.../legal-recognition-of-adult-relationships. 
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registered civil partnerships in English Law - and de facto relationships in one 
statute.   
 
As New Zealand is not a federal jurisdiction the resulting law appears to be more 
precise than Australia’s. New Zealand law includes, for example, a checklist of 
criteria which cohabitants must meet in order to be defined as such, and which 
therefore applies to the whole country, and there is obviously less scope for the lack 
of judicial consistency  in Australia mentioned by Young399.   
 
A drawback of the New Zealand system may be that the umbrella effect of the 
Property Relationships Act is automatic, so that it is apparently the case that some 
cohabitants do not realise that, notwithstanding the supposedly clarifying criteria 
within the legislation, they are automatically subject to the property sharing regime 
that it provides unless they opt out. New Zealand academics  have highlighted this 
potential downside400, and also at the same time the concomitant problem of 
determining when the cohabitation began in order to bring the couple within the 
criteria to access the remedies provided by the legislation, and within the minimum 
period of three years for equality awards .  
 
Both of these downsides are avoided by the Spanish system, and also in France, 
where the parties are required to register their relationship401. One wonders why 
New Zealand, choosing an opt-out scheme, did not also simply require registration of 
the cohabitant relationship so that there was a record which would avoid these 
queries, at the same time also alerting the cohabitants in question to the fact that 
they were subject to the Property Relationships Act unless they opted out. Australia, 
on the other hand, does have registration, although it is not compulsory.  
 
Nevertheless New Zealand’s is a very precise scheme which reflects the country’s 
approach to social equality and their Bill of Rights 1990,  which appears, from the 
Cabinet Document, to have been the driver to the 2005 legislative amendments 
																																								 																				
399 Ibid. 
400 Nicola Peart, Margaret Briggs, Mark Henaghan, Jacinta Ruru et al, Brookers, 2004,2010: Mark 
Henaghan, ‘Discretion, status and money: The essence of family law in New Zealand,  in Bill Atkin, 
(ed) International Survey of Family Law, Jordans Publishing,  2011, pp.281-30. 
401 See Chapter 7. 
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which included same-sex partners, and that the process was conducted in a very 
similar manner to the Scottish Executive’s initiative in Scotland.   The small size of 
the population of both the Scottish and New Zealand jurisdictions no doubt facilitated 
such precision, which would have been likely to be much easier than in a federal 
state such as Australia, or in a country such as Spain with several autonomous 
areas with legislative powers. 
 
The Law in Australia  
There are several statutes because the law began at state level but is now federal, 
although the state level law also remains. 
 
The Family Law Act 2006 
Australia’s federal cohabitation law dates from the amendment to the Australian 
Family Law Act 1975 in 2006, which then generated a referral of power from the 
individual states, resulting in some different dates for implementation as the states 
completed this over a period of years.  Mostly this means that from 1 December 
2009 Australia has a federal law addressing cohabitation or,  as the terminology is 
there,  ‘un-formalised relationships’, although there is some variation in date between 
the different states as to when this federal law applied. For example,  South Australia 
has a later commencement date of 1 July 2010, whereas Western Australia, having 
its own Family Court,  has had its own similar statute, since their Family Court Act 
1997, in force since 1 December 2002. 
 
In Australia a cohabitation relationship is defined by the Family Law Act s 4AA (1) as 
one where ‘having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship’ the 
cohabitants ‘have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic 
basis’. In order to interpret the ‘circumstances’ mentioned, the Act contains in  
s 4AA(2) a list of criteria similar to New Zealand’s and on  the basis of which the 
couple’s qualification to access the remedies provided by the legislation depends:  
these are common residence, sexual relationship, financial interdependence and 
support, jointly owned property, mutual commitment, care and support of children, 
public reputation as a couple, length or the relationship and - as in Spain - by  
s 4AA(2)(g),  whether the relationship is registered.   
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These criteria were apparently derived from a decision of Justice Powell of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court in the case of Roy v Sturgeon402. However, it seems 
that not all the individual heads must be satisfied, as Young says that ‘the more of 
the above markers in a relationship, the more likely a court will identify it as a ‘de 
facto’ relationship’403.  
 
The court is obliged, by s 4AA(4),  to attach such weight to any individual criterion as 
is appropriate in the circumstances of each individual case, and it seems from the 
published guidance of the Family Law Section of the Law Council of Australia404 that 
registration alone is not sufficient, and that ‘the federal legislature was not intending 
that registration of relationships, notably same-sex relationships, be the equivalent of 
marriage’405. However, Professor Bates also gives it as his view that the 
draughtsman may, in fact,   have inadvertently done that in s 90SB(d) which sets out 
‘four gateway requirements, that is  (i) at least 2 years’ cohabitation, (ii) a child of the 
relationship,  (iii) making substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in s 90SM(a) 
(b) or (c), or (iv)  registration ‘under a prescribed law of a state or territory’.  Thus 
Bates says that registration at state level could give rise to ‘the creation of rights and 
obligations which are very similar to those arising from formal marriage’.  
 
While this may be true in the Australian state or federal case, this does not seem to 
be the result in Spain, where registration does nothing but to record rights which 
already exist and which may be the same as in marriage, since those rights under 
the Constitution in fact only require a couple to be treated equally whether they are 
married or not, without stating that they are married, or that they should be treated as 
if they were married, because what the Spanish Constitution provides is the general 
equality prohibition meaning that cohabitants cannot be treated less equally than a 
married couple.   
 
It therefore seems that in logic registration can at least be a useful aid to defining the 
existence of a cohabiting relationship while it need not also be a problem in giving 
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403 Lisa Young, n389. 
404 Law Council of Australia, The New De Facto Regime: A Handbook, Family Law Section, 2009.  
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cohabitants’ rights to couples, especially as in Australia registration is only one 
indication of the establishment of cohabitation.  This may be splitting very fine hairs, 
although in England and Wales it seems that hair splitting has been entirely what the 
debate on cohabitants’ rights has been about since 1996 and before! – that is,  we 
would like to legislate for cohabitant protection but are afraid of an adverse reaction 
to any suggestion that these couples might seem to be being treated in the same 
way as married people! 
 
It nevertheless appears that in both Australia and New Zealand there is some room 
for argument as to whether the couple qualifies for the purpose of obtaining the 
remedies provided but, if they do, property and maintenance are determined in the 
same way as for married couples, though it still seems the result may not be 
precisely the same.   
 
This contrasts with the situation in Scotland where Baroness Hale, adding ‘a few 
words’ to the judgment in the Scottish appeal in Gow v Grant, says that the 
experience there is that parties have not disputed whether or not they were in a 
cohabitation relationship, though they sometimes have disagreed about when the 
cohabitation began.   
 
The qualifying criteria and period of cohabitation appear, however, to be much 
contested in Australia as appears from Young et al406 despite the fact that in some 
states - not all - the parties can apparently register their relationship if they are so 
inclined, though do not have to if they are not: thus at least the start of the 
relationship can be easily determined. 
 
What is more surprising about the Australian legislation is that it appears from  
s 4AA(5) to apply to de facto relationships which can be valid regardless of the fact 
that a party may be already married to someone else,  or even in another de facto 
relationship with another person, although historically the development of de facto 
legislation at state level was that these relationships were perceived as  having  
‘common elements of marriage’ and were also historically relevant to some couples 
																																								 																				
406 Lisa Young, Geoffrey Monahan, Adiva Sifris and Robyn Carrol, Family Law in Australia, 8th edn, 
2013,Lexis Nexis Butterworths,  
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who were not in a position to marry,  but who could still suffer the same economic 
disadvantage as separated married couples  
.  
What is further surprising is that academic commentators in Australia consider that 
marriage and de facto relationships are not precisely the same ‘even in the context 
of this remedial family legislation’ and even though the current legislation applies to  
both.  Young says it is ‘because they are so similar that the legislation applies 
equally to both’ but that ‘of course there will be points of difference, but in practice 
they may make little difference’407.    
 
The Family Law Amendment Act (De Facto Financial Matters and Other 
Measures) Act 2008 
This Act, which came into force on 1 March 2009, provides for finance and property 
of both same-sex and opposite sex cohabitants to be dealt with under the Family 
Law Act 1975.  This has been achieved by inserting new Parts VIIIA, finance and 
property,  and VIIIB, superannuation,  together with some transitional provisions into 
the Act.  Most of these new provisions mirror those already available to married 
couples in the 1975 Act but some are new and have attracted comment.   
 
There is, for example, also an innovative provision in s 90(k)(1)(aa) which prevents a 
married person defeating a de facto partner’s claims by entering into what Bates 
calls a ‘sweetheart deal’ with a spouse or ex-spouse. For this purpose there is a 
strong provision requiring the de facto partner to show that the married person either 
had a purpose to defraud or defeat the de facto’s claim or a reckless disregard for 
the de facto’s interest.  This, Bates says, is ‘more stringent than’ the provision 
already found in s 106B applying to married couples and that this ‘given the section’s 
aims, is probably as it ought to be408. Given the religious objections that have 
sometimes been advanced against protecting cohabitants’ interests at all, not least in 
England and Wales,  this superior protection of the cohabitant in Australia from 
collusion between the cohabitant’s partner and the partner’s spouse or ex-spouse 
certainly seems a very different and unusual kind of highly moral tone for a 
legislature to take. 
																																								 																				
407  n389. 
408  n389,  
  
 
257 
This Act also deals, in s 90MX(3),  with multiple relationships and superannuation, 
and further makes provision in s 90SF(3)(s) for taking into account any binding 
financial agreement that a de facto partner has with any past or present married 
partner, given the fact that a person in a de facto relationship can also be married at 
the same time. Thus spousal obligations have to be taken into account when dealing 
with the de factos’ property. 
 
The fact that the Act provides for multiple relationships at all is at first a startling 
innovation for an English scholar to take on board: however upon closer examination 
perhaps not so startling if equality in personal relationships is the foundation of the 
legislation. Multiple enduring couple relationships are, of course, not new in England 
and Wales, for example, that of Charles Dickens and Nelly Tiernan in the 19th 
century, the subject of a multi-award winning biography by Tomalin409, and such 
multiple families continue to be discovered upon the death of – usually - the male 
cohabitant, for example, in Jessop v Jessop410. 
 
One particular provision of the Act which ‘intrigues’ Professor Bates in relation to this 
financial legislation is an amendment to s 43(a) of the Family Law Act which has 
always required the court  to have regard to ‘the need to preserve and protect the 
institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all 
others entered into for life’411 of which he says he has ‘long considered this 
enactment to be of questionable anthropological validity and of scant effect on the 
mundane operation of the legislation at large’412. Not surprisingly s 43 has been 
amended in relation to de facto relationships so that the court is not now required to 
have regard to this principle in any way when dealing with financial matters in 
connection with such de facto relationships. 
 
The Law in New Zealand 
New Zealand set about its cohabitants’ rights in a different way. 
 
																																								 																				
409 Claire Tomalin, The Invisible Woman, Penguin, 1990. 
410 [1992] 1 FLR 591.. 
411 Lisa Young, quoting Frank Bates, in ‘Australia: New Frontiers for Family Law’ The International 
Survey of Family Law 2013 edition, Jordan Publishing, 2013. 
412 Frank Bates, Principle and the Family Law Act: the Use and Abuses of s 43’, (1981) 55 Aust LJ 
p.181.  
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It appears from item 4.1 of the New Zealand Cabinet Policy paper of 26 June 2003 
that law reform in that jurisdiction set out to eliminate any provision that was 
‘unjustifiably discriminatory’, the definition of a de facto relationship being simply one 
of ‘two persons who live together who are not married to each other’. This approach 
was then further defined by  the introduction of a list of factors which could be taken 
into consideration to determine whether the two persons were living together as a 
couple and was based on the same criteria in the Property Relationships Act 1976, 
that is to say as set out in items 4.2-4.9 :  
 
• duration of the relationship 
• nature and extent of common residence 
• whether or not a sexual relationship exists   
• degree of financial dependence or inter-dependence and any arrangements 
            for mutual financial support 
• ownership, use and acquisition of property 
• degree of mutual commitment to a shared life 
• care and support of children 
• performance of household duties 
• reputation and public aspects of the relationship.   
 
Further, item 4.3 records that no one factor or combination of them was to be taken 
as determinative of whether the parties were a couple and that a decision maker 
could have regard to whatever might be appropriate in the circumstances.  
 
The Minute goes on to record the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Ruka v 
Department of Social Welfare413  that financial interdependence and emotional 
commitment were the two essential elements of a de facto relationship, not merely 
factors of importance for the purposes of recognition as a couple for couple status for 
benefit purposes pursuant to the Social Security Act 1964 s 63(b.) 
 
The Cabinet Document Legal Recognition of Adult Relationships , prepared by the 
Office of the Associate Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice in 2003,  which 
																																								 																				
413 Ruka v Department of Social Welfare [1997] 1 NZLR 154, CA. (New Zealand). 
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proceeded from the Minute which took the decisions referred to above, records that 
the ‘Cabinet has agreed to amend legislative provisions that are unjust to same or 
opposite sex de facto couples’. The paper goes on to set out the aim of legislating so 
that they could ‘offer sufficient flexibility to respond to a variety of different 
circumstances’. It then  continues ‘De facto relationships are by their very nature 
hard to define’  but envisages a range, from  ‘little more than a casual relationship’ to 
‘continuing affectionate companionship’ and on to ‘emotional commitment and 
financial interdependence’.  Moreover the paper accepts that a relationship may 
‘evolve over time’ making it difficult ‘to pinpoint a time when such a relationship 
should assume a new legal significance’.   
 
The paper then continues to make comparisons with the then existing law in relation 
to spouses,  to refer to the fact that the Property Relationships Act 1976 did not 
generally award property to partners in de facto relationships of less than 3 years 
duration, though the court could do so on the basis of each partner’s contribution to 
the relationship if 
 
(i) there was a child of the relationship or a partner had made a significant  
contribution to the partnership relationship, and  
    (ii)        not to do so would be a serious injustice.  
 
At the time that this Cabinet paper was prepared there was apparently no intention to 
include in the legislation any minimum period for which the proposed uniform de 
facto relationship must endure before the couple would have the protection of the 
new Act. However when the new uniform statute was passed in 2005 the usual 
arrangement in relation to married and heterosexual cohabitants was extended to 
same-sex relationships so that all couples’ property was afterwards divided equally 
once they had lived together for three years. At the same time the former rules which 
divided property into ‘relationship property’ and ‘separate property’ was abandoned 
and all property became available for division across all three relationships  - 
married, civil union and cohabitants -  unless there were extraordinary circumstances 
which made that unjust.  Only in relation to those relationships ‘of short duration’  - 
this is,  of less than three years -  were the old divisions of property into ‘relationship 
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property’ or ‘separate property’ retained from the original statute which provided for 
married couples.  
 
However the current uniform law also recognises both the cohabitation element and 
any married element if the parties have cohabited first and then married, so that a 
marriage of two years can be treated as one of four if the parties had also cohabited 
for a further two years beforehand. Thus a married couple with less than three years’ 
matrimony may easily overcome the requirement for a three year relationship if they 
have cohabited prior to the ceremony of marriage.  On the other hand cohabitants, 
whether of the same or opposite sex, are obliged to prove the requisite 3 years 
cohabitation through addressing the detailed  criteria for determining that their 
relationship qualifies, which is apparently a routine problem since in the case of 
informally cohabiting couples there is no ceremony and no registration. 
 
Nevertheless, this is an automatic system into which all couples who are living 
together are included unless they have opted out, which is permitted but must be 
effected in due form.  De facto couples who wish to opt out and to make their own 
agreements for the division of any property must do so having received independent 
legal advice, otherwise the agreement will not be valid nor have the effect of 
removing the couple from automatic inclusion under the Act.  
 
Conclusion: Lessons from Australia and New Zealand? 
First of all, the comparative simplicity of the provision for cohabitants in these two 
southern hemisphere jurisdictions is striking when placed side by side with the more 
complex systems devised by the English Law Commission, and even in comparison 
with the Scottish compensation approach. .    
 
This also has the merit of exhibiting some of the characteristics of proprietary 
estoppel in attempting to deliver a result which deals appropriately with the 
applicant’s detriment from the relationship, in respect of which Baroness Hale in the 
Westminster Supreme Court -  hearing final appeals from both Scotland and England 
and Wales -  has identified proprietary estoppel principles as potentially having more 
to offer to a discrete regime for cohabitants’ property in England and Wales than 
even her otherwise preferred tool of choice,  the constructive trust’ identified in the 
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English case of Jones v Kernott in 2011  as the route to resolution of claims in the 
equity of the family home whether the parties are married or not.   
 
Whatever the reason for legislating for a cohabitants’ own discrete normative legal 
regime, simplicity certainly appeals, both because an overly complex compensation 
scheme is likely to prove difficult in which to ensure consistency, as is commented 
on by Young in Australia because their system is so flexible,  and because, unless 
there is going to be a system of registration,  ordinary members of the public are 
likely to be confused about whether the legislation applies to them or not.  It is clear 
that this has already happened in New Zealand where it appears that many people 
do opt out, but in order to opt out of an automatic/opt-out scheme such a person 
would have to know  
 
(i) that there was a system  
(ii) that it applied automatically and when and in what circumstances 
(iii) that it was possible to opt out, and  
(iv) how to opt out effectively in law.  
	
With less and less legal aid available around the world clarity and simplicity of law 
will become increasingly important. 
 
The second point to note about the southern hemisphere approach is that there is 
much to be said for the Australian and New Zealand system of treating each possible 
variant of an adult coupling arrangement equally, whether that be a couple which is 
married, in a civil partnership or simply cohabiting informally - or, in an Australian 
state at state level, cohabiting having registered their relationship. This adds a 
further layer of simplicity – rather than, as in England and Wales under TOLATA 
1996 and the Civil Procedure Rules in ordinary civil litigation outside the Family 
Court -  ‘a further layer of complexity’,  as Resolution regularly complains in the  
guides with which it attempts to help both the LIP public and the practising Family 
profession which does not find the Chancery TOLATA process easy work at all414 .  
 
																																								 																				
414 Resolution, Cohabitation, A Resolution Guide, Resolution, 2011; Resolution Cohabitation Claims 
Guide. Jordan Publishing, 2011. 
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Nevertheless, while simplicity is attractive in itself, circumstances may require this 
admirable quality to be trumped where necessary, but happily the relative simplicity 
of the New Zealand scheme also has the advantage of a discretionary element, 
which chimes with the discretion valued in family justice in English law, and indeed in 
the English doctrine of proprietary estoppels which majors in a disposal that fits the 
practical and jurisprudential  circumstances.   
 
This clearly deflects much of the argument against legislating for cohabitants’ rights 
in England and Wales for fear of confusion of their rights with those of married 
couples. It is fair to say that similar success in providing a unified  ‘all relationships’ 
statute while still creating  a suitable distinction between married and unmarried 
couples has already been achieved in English law in one discrete area of law, 
namely the Family Law Act 1996 Part IV.  Although this statute only  deals with 
domestic violence and associated home occupation order  in relation to both 
spouses and cohabitants and occupation of the home, it appears to be nonsense to 
adhere to past theories that similar legislation cannot be achieved in English law in 
relation to other cohabitants’ rights too, especially now this has been done -  and 
apparently done successfully -  in New Zealand in the wider context of cohabitants’ 
rights generally,.  
 
Thirdly, of these two jurisdictions of the Southern Hemisphere,  by far the simpler 
scheme also seems to be that of New Zealand, not least as it avoids any debate 
about whether cohabitants should be treated as an accepted family format to which 
the same legal recognition and remedies on separation should be given, an 
approach which has been deliberately adopted by the New Zealand government with 
an apparent calm of response on the part of the population,  but which has led to 
academic and professional disputes in Australia , although  curiously this is not 
referred to in the Australian government’s Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms  in 2010415.  
 
Fourthly, it may also be said that the New Zealand approach addresses the true 
equality which appears to be the social norm now in most advanced societies, many 
																																								 																				
415 Australian Institute of Family Studies, Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms, 2010, 
www.aifs.gov.au.  
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of which are now also adopting same-sex marriage, which New Zealand addressed  
straight away but about which Australia has debated, and continues to do so.  
Moreover most jurisdictions adopting a simple equality approach present that as an 
equality move without further gloss.   
 
Fifthly, there is clearly some attraction, for pragmatic and theoretical reasons, as well 
as a rationale of simplicity and practicality, in adopting the Australian and New 
Zealand style of approaching such legislation on the basis that it should merely be a 
development of existing Family and equality law rather than a radical reform, since 
there is as much evidence of accepted functionality in England and Wales, in 
particular long identified over many years by Barlow  and  Barlow et al, a point on 
which Professor Barlow and her various teams have written practically every year 
since 1999 and the same functionality has clearly been used in these two southern 
hemisphere  jurisdictions which have led the way in recognising  that close alignment 
of roles by simply drawing cohabitants into the family fold.   This alone appears to 
justify presenting a unified system, as is most easily demonstrated in the single 
state, non-federal, jurisdiction of New Zealand.   
 
Finally, for an analysis of the reasons for the appropriateness of provision of some 
normative regime for cohabitants in England and Wales based on the experience of 
other jurisdictions, see Chapter 9, as it should now be obvious that this must include 
reasons, such as equality theory, which appear from the Australian and New 
Zealand experience to be taken for granted down there ‘at the bottom of the world’, 
while they are not addressed at all by the English Law Commission’s 2006-7work.   
Clearly this omission now needs to be acknowledged, and acted upon. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter marshals the conclusions of the investigation as a whole and identifies 
and analyses the most relevant points which have emerged from the inquiry.   
 
The primary aim is to review and reappraise the key aspects of the study in an 
attempt to pick out the lessons of others’ successes and errors so as to point to an 
outline of how reform  might be achieved in England and Wales, and for the benefit 
of that jurisdiction’s cohabitants, for whom Baroness Hale has said they ‘deserve 
nothing less’ 416 than the Scots have been handed by their Scottish Executive -  
particularly since this was now time some ago and after a relatively short period of 
work to achieve what is arguably overall a positive change, while there has been no 
progress in England and Wales. 
 
The secondary aim is to provide a suggested outline draft of relatively simple 
legislation which could be introduced, preferably with government backing, so as to 
achieve likely and relatively undisputed acceptance417. 
 
The rationale for this approach is as follows.  
 
The search for doctrinal influences 
The initial task for the present project was conducted, first of all, through an 
extensive reading of the available literature, including the 2006-7 work of the Law 
Commission, from which it was clear that there has never been a doctrinal approach 
to cohabitation in English law.  This is because the parties, when neither married nor 
registered civil partners,  remain single persons in every respect,  both while living 
together and on separation, although there is limited protection of a surviving partner 
on death through the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. 
However, the leading commentators have identified the key ‘functionality’ of 
																																								 																				
416  Gow v Grant [2012] UKSC 29 [56]. 
417 Such a suggested draft appears in the Appendices at Appendix 2. 
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cohabitation which resembles other coupling arrangements heading contemporary 
family structures, without the cohabiting adults either marrying or entering a 
registered civil partnership.   
 
Secondly, the study engaged in some comparative analysis of systems in other 
jurisdictions which have already introduced cohabitants’ rights, which showed that 
there is a strong equality principle forming the basis of these schemes418. 
 
Thirdly, the study has recapitulated the existing less than satisfactory provision for 
cohabitation in English law and compared the other successful systems investigated 
with current English law, which basically leaves couples relying on separation on 
resulting or constructive trusts or proprietary estoppels, unless they benefit from a 
cohabitation agreement, although there are certain other random provisions which 
may assist in the absence of a cohabitants’ express normative regime.  
 
For example, cohabitants ‘benefit’ from some provisions owing to the fact that the 
position of their children is unaffected by the cohabitation of  adults heading such a 
family format, as English law takes no account of the personal status of a child’s 
parents for the purposes of liability for child maintenance, so there is also a 
possibility of capital and income provision under the Children Act 1989, s 15 and 
Schedule 1, which, in default of a new discrete scheme, may also provide housing 
and financial support for it for a former cohabitant up to a child’s majority or possibly 
to the end of tertiary education,  as well as providing for the child or children. 
 
However, this is not much of a ‘benefit’ as such unless a former cohabitant is, in the 
first place, a parent with care of a child, and it can only apply if the non-resident 
parent is able to afford such provision.  Thus this may not be suitable in some cases, 
particularly those where capital is not available to provide a home for a child and its 
unmarried formerly cohabiting carer, and there are many drawbacks of this provision, 
as with reliance on the trusts or other equitable jurisdictions. 
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In default of any better solution in an individual case, property rights on separation of 
cohabitants are otherwise strict, pursuant to TOLATA 1996 ss 14 and 15, whereupon 
an application will be heard in the Chancery Division or the Chancery list of the 
County Court under the CPR 1998 as amended, not in the Family Court under the 
FPR 2010 as amended, unless a property case chances to be consolidated with a 
Family Court case and transferred to that Court, as in the recent instance  of 
Seagrove v Sullivan  in 2014419.  The Chancery process is not at all suitable for 
separating cohabitants since it was created for other purposes.  
 
There are, however, also some principles of English law which assist cohabitants to 
some extent. The couple can be recognised in welfare law, and have protection as 
associated persons against domestic violence and eviction from the shared home 
under the Family Law Act 1996 Part IV, and a cohabiting couple can obtain certain 
rights in succession to tenancies under the provisions of Landlord and Tenant law.   
 
The Equality Act 2010 does not explicitly protect cohabitants, but as Family law 
reform has recently to some extent been driven by equality principles -  for 
example.in the provision of same-sex marriage in the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) 
Act 2013, presented by the government as an equality statute -  in theory they could 
be.  Moreover, since both the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Lisbon Treaty protect  family life’420,  there is a respectable argument that cohabiting 
adults, with or without children should be recognised as a normative family unit, 
owing to the large numbers in which they now appear in statistics including in 
relation to their children. Moreover, Choudhry & Herring,  relying on work of Glennon 
et al  in 2009 have identified differential treatment of cohabitants as indirect 
discrimination. 
 
Equality is relied on in the cohabitants’ rights legislation of Spain, Australia and New 
Zealand, and European Union jurisdictions’ national Family law is similarly oriented, 
owing to the impact on the EU’s functions of the equality and diversity principles of 
its foundation.  Human Rights are similarly pervasive.  Accordingly, there appears to 
																																								 																				
419 [2014] EWHC 1410 (Fam). 
420 As the Lisbon Treaty (‘the reform treaty restating the earlier founding treaties’) requires the 
European Union to ‘accede’ to the ECHR, thus strengthening the application of  ECHR Article 8 
following implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, 
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be a strong case for an equality approach to any legislative reform in favour of 
cohabitants in English law, although this is not specifically addressed in the 2006-7 
work of the Law Commission. 
 
A further guiding principle of English Family law is its unique reliance on judicial 
discretion rather than on a rigid system of rights. This applies in relation to marriage, 
civil partnership and child law and there is no valid argument for its not applying also 
to any reform of the law benefiting cohabitants, providing any such legislative 
provision included a discretionary element, which currently the common law case law 
on TOLATA claims does not, despite advances in interpreting such case law in the 
recent Supreme Court decisions Stack v Dowden421 and Jones v Kernott422.  
 
Thus it would be entirely possible in any reform to preserve a distinction between 
cohabitation and marriage, which has been an ongoing concern for many years in 
considering any discrete provision for cohabitants’ rights, and probably one of the 
reasons that no statutory reform has yet taken place, despite several aborted Bills.  
 
Although the once sacred definition of marriage in Hyde v Hyde423 in 1866 has been 
amended by Parliament in the Marriage (Same-Sex Marriage) Act 2013, there is no 
reason to suppose that marriage does not remain as sacred a distinct entity within 
the traditional corpus of Family law, albeit that now two of its essential qualities as 
set out by Lord Penzance are no longer applicable in modern times, so that any 
further dilution of its unique quality would not be in any way acceptable. That may, 
however, not preclude some formal legal recognition of the state of cohabitation, 
although the Law Commission’s 2006-7 work proceeded on the basis that no 
separate status was possible or desirable. 
 
These conclusions were gleaned from both the general corpus of literature, English 
and foreign, on cohabitation and cohabitants’ rights and the 2006-7 work of the Law 
Commission, and the content and analysis distilled from this study is contained in 
Chapters 1 to 4. 
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The adverse commentary  
From the initial survey of the available literature it was clear that there has been 
longstanding and outspoken opposition to cohabitants’ rights from at least 1980, and 
obviously before that date, as cohabitation was not then a family norm.  However, 
statistics, as analysed by the Law Commission in 2006-7, indicated that at that time 
when they were working on their consultation and final reports there was no 
substantial section of the public opposed to legislation, especially where cohabitants 
had children.  Thus it seems that at that time, now nearly 10 years ago, at least 
some of this antagonism was finally waning. 
 
There was at one time certainly opposition to giving cohabitants any rights in any 
way similar to married couples, particularly in 1996 during the debates in Parliament 
on the Family Law 1996, but it seems that this has not survived to any great extent 
except possibly in certain minority religious and cultural circles.   
 
Jurisdictions with past or present strong religious cultures  - for example Spain, 
Scotland and most recently Eire -  have still legislated for cohabitants’ rights.  
Moreover, Baroness Hale , when in June 2014) giving the annual Human Rights 
Lecture to the Law Society of Ireland424 on the impact of religion and belief in law, 
clearly indicated how much change there has been in accommodation of religious 
beliefs in the law, both in our jurisdiction of England and Wales and in others, many 
of which are now  multi-faith, and where some parts of the diverse population often 
have no belief in the standard faiths although there may be reliance on other norms 
such as Humanism or a general moral code. 
 
It would therefore appear that there is unlikely to be further substantial opposition to 
cohabitants’ rights in English law on specifically religious grounds, although there 
might be some issue in social acceptance in some minority groups based on 
disapproval for cultural reasons, since it may still be true that in some sections of 
society the institution of marriage remains as firmly embedded in English culture as 
																																								 																				
424‘Freedom of Religion’, delivered Friday 13 June 2014, www.lawsociety.ie; also available at 
https://www.supremecourt/docs/speech-140613.pdf.  
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stated by Lord Nicholls in Bellinger v Bellinger 425 in 2003.  This could still indicate 
some powerful opposition,  despite the fact that this statement is now 12 years old 
and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, Civil Partnership Act 2004, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 and the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 
2013 have all been enacted since, much increasing diversity in personal 
relationships and family structures in line with contemporary equality and diversity 
thought and government policy. 
 
The Barlow and Cooke literature in England and Wales 
A major contribution to the literature on cohabitation and its acceptance in the home 
jurisdiction of England and Wales has been made by the prolific published output 
from Barlow and Barlow et al, stretching over a period from 1999 to 2013, also 
Cooke and Cooke et al, especially between 2004 and 2006,426 in particular the 2006 
Nuffield Foundation funded publication on potential community of property in 
England and Wales in which both Cooke and Barlow participated.   
 
This latter work was based principally on married couples but also on some 
cohabiting partnerships, and has yielded much useful material on both the 
methodology and content of the team investigation into how the partnerships they 
investigated organised their finances, albeit that the team’s samples were sometimes 
very small. 
 
However that project  was expressly not aiming for statistical significance but for a 
clear picture of how married and cohabiting partners organised their assets and their 
reactions to the idea of community, a concept which has been much developed in 
the English law of financial provision on divorce - though not given that name - by the 
House of Lords when the Law Lords extrapolated the ideas of needs, compensation 
and sharing, and above of all overall fairness,  in the Miller v Miller and Mcfarlane v 
McFarlane cases in 2006427 which were coincidentally before them at the time that 
the Law Commission’s 2006-7 work on cohabitation was under way.  
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426 Elizabeth Cooke, Anne Barlow and Therese Callus, Community of Property, A Regime for England 
and Wales, Nuffield Foundation, 2006. 
427 [2006] UKHL 24. 
  
 
270 
Cooke et al 428make clear that theirs was a positive methodology adopted so as to 
reach the aim of their project as stated above, and is one that has been replicated to 
some extent for the current investigation which has also not sought statistical 
significance but clear indications for a blueprint for recognition of a basic scheme of 
cohabitants’ rights provision in English law.   
 
These two teams led by Barlow and Cooke - although the membership, involving 
their colleagues, has varied from project to project - have made a major contribution 
to inquiry into the social reality of contemporary adult relationships in English and 
Wales and elsewhere, which has much assisted in working out a potential system to 
recognise cohabitation in English law in a practical manner in the present project, 
and in planning the limited field work that it has been possible to do. In particular this 
was designed to follow up the practical operation of cohabitants’ rights in Scotland, 
Spain, Australia and New Zealand, despite the logistical challenges of finding and 
interviewing suitable practitioners in these other jurisdictions and comparing their 
experiences with locally based practitioners in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. 
 
The comparative contribution 
The methodology for gathering information on, and familiarity with,  the jurisdictions 
from which a comparative contribution could be expected to be useful, was first to 
research and analyse any literature, legislation and other material, so as to attempt 
to establish a doctrinal  base relating to other jurisdictions which have successfully 
introduced cohabitants’ rights, and then to find practitioners in each jurisdiction who 
were prepared to discuss the operation of their local systems in practice, including to 
reflect on their experiences and those of their colleagues in evaluating the positive 
and negative factors of those systems. The literature, policy, statutory and 
background analyses in relation to these jurisdictions are in Chapters 6-8.    
 
All the semi-structured interviews, whether in person, by email or telephone, were 
conducted during the summer of 2014, to take advantage of the non-teaching part of 
the year from May to October, with the exception of some earlier scoping in the 
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previous year with a view to finding appropriate participants and working out how 
best to approach problems of distance and time differences. 
 
In accordance with the anonymity of respondents which was guaranteed as part of 
the ethical approval process no particular participant is identified either by name or 
affiliation, and to facilitate frank evaluation personal details have been kept 
sufficiently general so as not to provide inadvertent identification. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Scotland 
In Scotland gathering this information was relatively easy as the Scottish legal 
profession is small, Scotland is geographically close to England and Wales and 
contacts are readily available both within the profession and in academe.  
 
The proposed fieldwork was prepared by reference to the research of Wasoff et al in 
2011 - a report of a project which interviewed 97 practitioners only 5 years from the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006.   Planning also took into account commentary from 
leading Scottish academics and an introduction, through a leading Scottish 
university, to a practitioner practising in a group of Scottish solicitors who regularly 
do cohabitation work. The practitioner contact was then given a copy of the standard 
questions prepared to put to each practitioner interviewed, and interviewing was 
conducted both by email and telephone.  
 
The solicitor assigned to coordinate information for the interviews was a (female) 
Associate in a medium sized firm with offices in Glasgow and Edinburgh who was 
able to relay a good deal of communal experience, since owing to the small size of 
the Scottish profession it is routinely possible for individual lawyers to collate a 
variety of experience on an ongoing basis, because if one has a case of particular 
general interest information is regularly shared in various ways.   
 
The main surprise from the semi-structured interviewing process was that, contrary 
to the view of the Scottish system from outside that jurisdiction - whether by judges 
such as Baroness Hale in the Supreme Court, by English and international 
academics, practitioners and any other researchers or commentators - Scottish 
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practitioners are not entirely happy with their system as introduced by the Family 
Law (Scotland) Act 2006.  
 
They do not consider that the compensation scheme works, since for one thing - 
although Baroness Hale did not find it difficult to apply - Scottish judges, especially at 
first, have found it too complex.   It seems that there is also a specific problem in that 
it is in fact possible that the compensation provisions can work so as to give a 
cohabitant more than a spouse would obtain on divorce under the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 1985!  This was unsurprisingly felt to be ‘wrong’, although it is clear 
from the Scottish Executive’s original statement of policy in their Memorandum for 
the Scottish Parliament that there is no animus against cohabitants in Scotland 
despite the country’s stern religious background, because Scottish government 
policy has moved into the 21st century in making provision for ‘all’ Scotland’s 
families429.  Practitioners agreed with academic comments that there should be 
longer than one year from separation in which to make a claim, also with Baroness 
Hale  that there could be a more flexible format for awards so that both capital and 
income payments could be made, and again with Baroness Hale that there are 
difficulties in ascertaining when a cohabitation had begun.   
 
Overall, practitioners were not only not happy with the Act, but surprised that others - 
such as those mentioned in Baroness Hale’s judgment -  admired its achievement: 
comment was that it was ‘defective’ and required amendment, and there seemed to 
be both universal agreement that early amendments were now desirable and 
astonishment that outside Scotland the system was thought to be a success, as that 
was not the label that would have been attached locally.   
 
However Scotland appeared to have achieved one other positive result not always 
found in other jurisdictions, as it was thought that most people were now aware of 
the Act as there had been publicity at the time that it came into force. Moreover 
Scotland’s population is small and widely spread  - at present approximately 5.5m -  
and perhaps there is national pride in devolution to their Parliament which may 
generate a more substantial universal interest in local legislation away from 
																																								 																				
429 See chapter 6. 
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Westminster. This seemed to confirm Wasoff et al  in 2011 which also indicated that 
practitioners had received plenty of client inquiries. 
 
The major contributions from Scotland are therefore:   
(i) Scotland has achieved establishment of a discrete system preserving the 
distinction between marriage and cohabitation;  
(ii) Scotland has achieved this  without apparently raising religious issues from 
stricter sections of the kirk;  
(iii) Scotland achieved legislation through its own Parliament and brought it into 
force as soon as Scotland had that power, and  
(iv) Scotland, a separate legal system within the United Kingdom, has quickly 
made its scheme operational despite the concept’s being completely foreign to 
England and Wales, and thus was able to  bring  its first appeal to the Supreme 
Court at Westminster in 2012, enabling useful practical comparisons to be drawn 
with English law,  which at the stage that the first appeal arrived at Westminster had 
still made no similar provision.  
 
Such a practical comment reached official status when in her judgment in Gow v 
Grant Baroness Hale openly compared the Scottish system in a positive manner with 
the persistence of a complete lack of legislation in England and Wales.  It is thus 
perhaps not surprising that there are detailed provisions of the Scottish system which 
need refinement since the legislation was passed very quickly and - as commented 
upon by Sutherland430 - was based on early 1990s’ work of the Scottish Law 
Commission.    
 
Spain 
In Spain, gathering information was much more difficult as local law is different in 
every province and autonomous region or city, although the Spanish Constitution 
enjoins equality for all its citizens,  which means that there can be no discrimination 
against cohabitants as against married couples even if local law is different in detail.  
 
																																								 																				
430 See Chapter 6. 
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With no academic input available, since cohabitation has not attracted much interest 
in Spanish universities, the lawyers found most suitable to consult in the 
circumstances were Anglo-Spanish practitioners, and the most useful in a medium 
sized firm based on the South Coast (Costa del Sol) near Malaga, in the Province of 
Malaga which is located in the autonomous region of Andalucia, an area with many 
British residents. The firm approached had 21 qualified Anglo-Spanish lawyers and  
a chain of offices: these were situated  in the Marbella area in the Province of 
Malaga, , in  Nerja  in the Province of Granada,  some distance along the coast east 
from Malaga and Marbella, and  which is also another centre of British residency,  
and in  Tenerife, Canary Islands, which has a similarly substantial British residential 
presence. Besides these south coast and Canary Island locations, the firm had an 
office in Madrid, the capital of Spain,  which deals with commercial law only.  
 
The firm’s clientele was partly British, partly Spanish and partly of other nationalities; 
partly married, partly cohabitants and some fiancé(e)s. The firm also had much 
contact with the British Consul-General in Malaga. Their practice included general 
law as well as Family law and they had ongoing experience of cohabiting, married 
and engaged clients,  including those who wanted marital or cohabitation 
agreements, which such clients saw as protective of their financial positions. 
 
The two lawyers involved in the interviews were the English, female, Senior Partner, 
with an English qualifying law degree and Call to the English Bar, who had prepared 
some useful background notes to compensate for lack of any possible contact with 
an academic in the region of Andalucia; and a senior female Spanish practitioner 
who, apart from working in Family Law,  is also particularly experienced in Spanish 
property  law. For preparation, these two lawyers were sent the standard 
questionnaire, and the semi-structured interviewing was conducted by email, 
telephone and in person, when the Senior Partner was in London to attend court and 
conferences on behalf of clients.  
.   
There were surprises as in Scotland, although different ones. First, all cohabiting 
clients of this Spanish firm, working in areas with a substantial Anglo-Spanish client 
base,  were unaware of, and/or confused by, the impact of the law on their situations, 
which was sometimes even not entirely clear to the lawyers, owing to the 
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implementation in Spain of the 1996 Hague Convention on - inter alia - Jurisdiction 
and Applicable Law, which although apparently only applicable to child law cases 
sometimes also affected their parents,  as Spanish courts may decide to apply 
Spanish law rather than the national law of adult foreign residents before them.  
 
As in other jurisdictions  - including England and Wales -  cohabitants in Spain also 
believed that they were married after two or three years of living together, and 
generally did not consult the firm until they had been living together for one or two 
years.  However, even if such clients realised that any detail of the local law on 
cohabitation might apply to them they did not know its extent and did not understand 
how it applied, or  - if they were British -  whether English or Spanish law applied.  
They also did not realise that in Andalucia the law only covered certain aspects of 
the cohabitants’ relationship, although one of those is the registration of the 
relationship which seems to be such a positive feature of the Spanish system. They 
also did not know that if there was a compensation claim of any kind for money or 
property to be recovered from the other cohabitant, proceedings would be civil rather 
than in the Family court, although this was not the case in some other provinces of 
Spain. 
 
From this it was clear that the position in Spain is not as straightforward as it might at 
first appear from the fact that the Constitution guarantees equality for cohabitants as 
well as married couples, since the variation of local laws can lead to conflict of laws 
between different provinces of Spain, as much as with the law of other EU or other 
overseas jurisdictions.  The practitioners agreed that the Constitutional provision is a 
good one since the Civil Code must follow the Constitution but considered that the 
law applying to cohabitants was still in its infancy and, because of the proliferation of 
different local detailed law,  would benefit from greater harmonisation internally 
within Spain as well as in the EU.  
 
The major contributions from Spain are therefore: 
(i) the strong equality ethos which has brought cohabitants into the legal fold 
through the equality provision in the Constitution, an approach which chimes with the 
equality and human rights aspects of English law in relation to the family and to EU 
principles; 
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(ii) endorsement in local law of the functionality aspect of cohabitation as a family 
form; 
(iii) the concept of the Constitutional umbrella equality provision,  which is 
however activated by local registration,  providing definition of the individual 
cohabitation’s existence – a concept which avoids the problem of lack of the 
ceremony which gives marriage and civil partnership a firm commencement date.  
 
Australia and New Zealand 
These are two very different jurisdictions in some ways although the differences in 
their cohabitants’ rights is not as wide.    
 
First, there is a state and federal level in Australia, but New Zealand is a single 
jurisdiction, in some ways not unlike England and Wales.  
 
Owing to the distance and substantial time difference, finding suitable academics 
and practitioners to interview was more difficult than in other cases. However this 
was achieved by email and telephone, and was assisted by the presence in the 
United Kingdom of leading Australian and New Zealand academics at conferences 
where they could be accessed in person. 
 
 In Australia a suitable firm could not be found and the local interviewing was 
therefore with a female academic from a leading university who also has wider 
professional duties in an international context which also occasionally made her 
available in London, so that interviewing was possible by both email and telephone, 
and also in person. Moreover in England and Wales a dual English/Australian 
qualified practitioner was found working in a large international law firm in London so 
that contact with him was possible not only by email and telephone but also in 
person.  
  
In New Zealand a female)practitioner was located with recent knowledge of 
academic Family work in a leading New Zealand university and also a general 
Family practice in a small rural firm in the South Island. Owing to the distance and 
consequent time differences interviewing was only possible in her case by email. 
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Following issue of the same basic documentation as for practitioners in the 
jurisdictions already covered,  preparation for interviews in these jurisdictions was 
also based on the the New Zealand and Australian literature, including the Australian 
Government’s  Evaluation 2010 of the 2006 Act  and the New Zealand Ministry of 
Justice’s 2003 Cabinet Document  and some earlier preparatory discussion - when 
he was in England - with a former Australian Law Commissioner, which was then 
followed up by email.   
 
The first interview, also by email, was then scheduled with a senior male academic 
specialising in Family law in a leading New Zealand university, who indicated that 
there were, in his opinion, two problems with the Property Relationships Act 
provision for cohabitants. The first was establishing when the cohabitation had 
begun as the couple did not always register. The second was in that some couples 
did not realise that they had come under the provisions of the Act since this would 
only be determined when they took proceedings if they did not register their 
relationship, and did not opt out by making a private agreement. This replicated an 
earlier discussion with another senior female member of staff of the same university, 
which was able to take place in England when she was attending a conference. 
  
This interview was then replicated with the leading Australian academic, who said 
that lack of client awareness that the Australian federal statute  - the Family Law Act, 
as amended in 2006 - applied to most cohabiting couples was sometimes a similar 
problem to that reported in New Zealand, as ordinary people did not always realise 
that the Act applied to them in time to opt out with a private agreement.  She said 
that the rules for ‘de factos’  - as cohabitants are termed in both jurisdictions - were 
perhaps even more complicated in Australia than in New Zealand.  As a result more 
magistrates had had to be taken on as the courts were clogged with cases since 
much time was spent initially working out if the parties before the court were ‘de 
factos’ or not. However, once that stage was over she was of the opinion that the law 
was working well and was appropriate as cohabitants had the same rights as 
married couples. 
 
She said that the law in Australia is now mostly federal although it was still possible 
to apply under the state law if that was appropriate for some reason.  The general 
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public was probably on the whole well aware of the law as such, because there had 
been state laws for many years so the ‘new’ Act was not new as such, since it had 
only been an enactment federally of provisions which would have been known at 
state level. 
 
The New Zealand practitioner, practising in a small rural firm,  gave a very similar 
account of the smooth working of their Property Relationships Act although she 
considered that the position was much easier in New Zealand as there was one 
jurisdiction with no state level courts, a small population spread over a larger area 
with few cities – in fact similar to Scotland’s profile - and, as in Australia, everyone 
knew about the amendments to the Property Relationships Act as it had simply been 
amended some years previously to include cohabitants and there had been sufficient 
publicity. The problem in New Zealand as in Australia was in individual couples not 
realising when the Act applied to them. 
 
The overall impression of these two jurisdictions was therefore that their systems 
worked in an equal no nonsense manner, with each form of couple, married or 
cohabiting, receiving the same treatment under the Act. 
 
The major contributions from these two jurisdictions is therefore  
(i) the ‘no nonsense’ approach to inclusion of cohabitants in existing Family law 
rather than starting from scratch with an Act applying only to cohabitants and 
generating all the old questions about how similar (or not) they were to married 
couples;  
(ii) ‘inclusion’ even going as far as changing the name of the New Zealand 
umbrella Family statute to the ‘Property Relationships Act’ to accommodate 
cohabitants in neutrally labelled legislation -  which appears to have been accepted 
in a ‘taken for granted’ manner in New Zealand, although it seems there was some 
early debate in Australia about the advisability of this, which is echoed by further 
discussion by a dual qualified practitioner in London of Australia’s provision (see 
below);  
(iii) the use of registration to define the start of cohabitation, although this is 
optional in Australia which is surprising as Australia was first to have a discrete De 
facto Relationships Act, in New South Wales in 1985; and 
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(iv) the checklist approach to identifying whether there is cohabitation, in which 
registration is not determinative. 
 
Of the two, the New Zealand system appears to offer most to a potential scheme for 
England and Wales since it is a single jurisdiction state not unlike both Scotland and 
England and Wales in its outlook and values, though more similar to Scotland in size 
of population and to England and Wales in geographical extent.  The retention of 
some discretionary element as well as the checklist approach is also a useful 
practical element. 
 
A view on Australia from England and Wales   
In London the male dual qualified  Anglo Australian lawyer, normally working in a 
large 20 partner specialist international firm in Central London, was on holiday so 
that  to start with interviewing took place by email and telephone. He no longer works 
in Australia but solely in England and is glad to do so as - like a small number of 
commentators in Australia -  he disapproves of the equality of married and 
cohabitant couples in Australia and New Zealand, since he considers that there 
should be a conceptually and jurisprudentially distinct and different system for 
marriage and cohabitation, and that this should be the way forward in England and 
Wales.  
 
He, too, agreed with the problems about determining when a cohabiting couple is 
within the Australian Act.  He also considered that cohabitants should learn to 
manage their relationship with cohabitation agreements since such contracts would 
resolve all their problems without resorting to litigation or legislation and that this 
should be the way forward in England and Wales where  - as we have not yet 
legislated -  it is not too late to manage the cohabitant’s  legal position in that 
manner, unlike in Australia and New Zealand where legislation has now been 
effected which can clearly not be reversed,  and was in his opinion too extensive in 
including cohabitants in existing married and civil partner provision.  
 
This was a lone voice amongst the southern hemisphere practitioners and a 
conservative one in relation to England and Wales,  and was of significance in that 
the solicitor’s firm handles a good deal of international litigation and legal advice. 
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He did add that he was not averse to legislation in England and Wales, as once he 
had been, but considered it needed to be effected once further work had been done 
on the financial provisions under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 for married and civil partnership couples  - if that latter status 
was to be retained -  so as to effect further clarification of financial provision on 
divorce or dissolution.  
 
However he added that it was his impression in England and Wales that there was 
little demand for a discrete system for cohabitants, as his firm had one partner 
whose workload was devoted to cohabitant issues but who was not fully employed 
since so few clients came to the firm with those issues, whereas he considered that, 
as the firm was well positioned to be consulted if there was such work, so that if 
there was demand for advice that partner should be so overloaded that further 
provision would have to be made for clients,  which was, however, clearly not the 
case.  
 
Literature compared to practitioners’ views and experiences in limited 
fieldwork 
Although the fieldwork possible with the overseas comparators was limited, this was 
valuable because of the completely different insights obtained from interviews 
compared to the impressions formed from the literature and other available 
materials, a situation which illustrated a factor also common in English Family law 
generally, namely that the reality in practice is often quite different from the black 
letter law. 
 
The limited comparative work also clarified that no existing cohabitants’ rights 
system is seen as perfect by its practitioners, whether academics or practising 
lawyers, who all still wanted some improvements.  This is encouraging, as there 
does now seem an opportunity to legislate for England and Wales and the 
signposting resulting, even from fieldwork in this project - which was numerically less 
extensive than that of Wasoff et al in 2011 - was nevertheless highly instructive as to 
how such a system could work for English and Welsh cohabitants.  The in-depth 
semi-structured interviews proved to be a genuinely illuminating elaboration  and 
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clarification of the earlier library work, and as suggested by the leading qualitative 
methodology literature they proved a rigorous investigative tool.  
 
Contribution of Human Rights literature and humanism 
A major contribution to potential reform is the contemporary culture of human rights 
and the growth, alongside the decline of the former influence of religion,  of a 
humanist approach, which  still imports a moral code which may be reflected in law 
and which in turn reflects culture,  but in less confrontational a manner than in the 
past. This careful management of religion can be seen in both the Spanish and Irish 
Republican Constitutions which both now serve a secular state - in Eire this 
separation of church and state has technically been in effect since 1973, highlighted 
in Baroness Hale’s 2014 Human Rights lecture to the Law Society of Ireland, though 
it has taken longer for the influence of religion to become less marked in practice in 
Irish legislation as Eire is not yet a secular society and is as yet very new to its 
liberalising legislation, unlike Spain which has been working on their system for 40 
years and the practitioners still consider it is in its infancy!     
 
 The new Equality Act 2010 in England and Wales and the fact that Britain is a 
signatory to the Convention on Human Rights clearly both have potential influence 
on any likely reform to articulate cohabitants’ rights.  
 
The present Bill now once again before Parliament  
The private member’s Bill introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Marks of 
Henley-on-Thames QC has now retraced its formerly completed steps to second 
reading, so as to go  into the Committee stage which it would have reached by June 
2015 but for the May 2015 election.  The text of the Bill is still as introduced, which to 
a great extent replicates the recommendations of the Law Commission’s 2006-7 
work, and is available at www.parliament.uk.  
 
However, based on the present project, the text of this Bill still also seems overly 
complex, as was anecdotally the impression of much of the practising profession 
when the Law Commission scheme was first published in 2007. That 2007 scheme 
certainly frightened off the government of the time from any impetus for 
implementation, although with the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the subsequent 
  
 
282 
delays of both successive governments from 2010 in considering adoption of the 
recommendations were excuses for inaction which might have had many reasons 
other than those given at the time.  One must ask: is there not a simpler way? 
 
A simpler way 
The simplest way towards cohabitants’ rights which would cater for their practical 
needs would be to legislate with reference to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 to include in the provisions applying to spouses and 
registered civil partners therein some additional provisions to apply to those in a 
committed family relationship which does not qualify under the Marriage Act 1949 for 
the core provisions of the 1973 Act or under the Civil Partnership Act 2004.  
 
This could quite easily be done by a much smaller number of amendments than the 
provisions of Lord Marks QC’s Bill which, while it attempts a worthy comprehensive 
approach, in fact adds yet another extra layer of complexity which does little to dilute 
the current confusion in the inappropriate Chancery litigation which cohabitants 
currently face to unravel their property division if they cannot achieve that 
themselves by agreement.  A long Bill of 18 pages and many thousand words is also 
likely to generate much argument when it reaches the committee stage where it may 
stall like its various predecessors. 
 
An Alternative Draft Bill  
This could better be based on what has been learned from the present inquiry, 
including from comparative sources, and appears in the Appendix after this chapter. 
The comparative simplicity is instantly obvious as while the Marks’ Bill is not only 18 
pages and over 8,800 words the alternative version suggested is 4 pages - 14 pages 
shorter - and 1,322 words. If cohabitant LIPs are to adopt the ‘DIY’ solutions to their 
disputes which are encouraged, with or without Non-Court Dispute Resolution, a 
simple statute is essential, which could no doubt be bought at a low price in an 
equally simple annotated version from one or more of the standard legal publishers. 
 
The main provisions should be as follows: 
1. Definition of cohabitants as persons over the age of 16 who, whether of the 
same or opposite sexes,  live together as a couple in an intimate relationship and,  
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not being within the prohibited degrees of relationship in relation to each other, as 
set out in  the Marriage Act 1949 and Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Civil Partnership Act 
2004,  who  are neither married nor registered civil partners and where one or more 
of the following conditions also applies to them – 
(a) Sharing a household as a couple whether or not they share financial 
interdependence  
(b) Being  the parents of a minor child living with them or of whom either person 
in a couple is a parent of such a child having contact or spending time pursuant to a 
child arrangements  order under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 or in respect of 
which minor child there is in force in that parent’s favour a parenting agreement in 
lieu of such order and the other cohabitant  would be a step parent if the parties were 
married or in a civil partnership 
(c) Being the natural parents of an unborn child when they cease to live together 
in the same household 
(d) Having their names appear on the electoral roll at the same address and 
council tax is paid by one or the other on the basis that at least two adult persons live 
in their household or the parties are validly exempt from payment of such tax or it is 
paid by someone else on their behalf for example a landlord 
(e) Leading a joint social life in the manner of a couple as if they were married or 
parties to a registered civil partnership 
(f) Where there are no children,   having lived together continuously for two 
years, such period to be determined without regard to any periods up to a period of 
six months during which they have not lived together as a couple.  
2. Definition of former cohabitants to exclude those who later marry or enter into 
a registered civil partnership 
3. Definition of cohabitation established both by the Act’s definition and by 
existing local government council tax and electoral roll registration but provision also 
included to enter into a cohabitation contract which should be registered with the 
Family Court in the same manner as a Parental Responsibility Agreement pursuant 
to s 4 of the Children Act 1989, thus enabling the couple to opt out of the financial 
and property provisions , which should normally apply after two years, and follow 
those of s 72 of the Civil Partnership Act, which in turn follow those of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973: except that provision would have to be made to 
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exclude the pension order provisions of the latter which could not conveniently apply 
to cohabitants although a Brooks v Brooks type pension order could still be made.   
4. A power to apply to the court up to three years from the date of separation for 
any of the CPA 2004 s 72 remedies available to civil partners which should give 
statutory  form to the court’s discretion in relation to the  principles of meeting needs, 
delivering compensation and sharing the relationship property and financial fruits as 
appropriate to the circumstances of the case, together with the overall concept of 
fairness,  as have been developed in Miller and McFarlane and succeeding cases in 
relation to financial provision for spouses and civil partners.    
5. A statutory provision requiring the court on any application for financial relief 
so to exercise its discretion in relation to considering those principles and all the 
circumstances of the case in such a way as not to discriminate against any couple 
on the basis that they have chosen to found their family within a cohabitation 
relationship instead of through marriage or civil partnership although the court’s 
consideration of all the circumstances of the case might indicate a different outcome 
from that which might apply in the case of spouses or registered civil partners.   
6. Existing provision for domestic violence  protection and occupation of the 
home in the Family Law Act 1996 and in relation to Wills and Intestacy to subsist 
unless and until amended since this is a level of detail not immediately urgent and 
likely to provoke argument  
7. A power for the Lord Chancellor to make consequential and any further 
amendments as expedient  by secondary legislation 
8. The suggested draft should be only an outline suggestion of how a possible 
draft might look as it is made clear both by Maclean 431 and Mcleod432  that 
Parliamentary drafting is a specialist skill which should be left to its usual 
practitioners and that further work is always required to such initial drafts in order to 
deliver the legislative content that is desired by the originator(s) of any proposed 
legislation. 
 
This would nevertheless have the result that: 
(i) Without recourse to specific registration  - which the Law Commission 
rejected  in 2006-7 but which is a feature of successful regimes in Spain and 
																																								 																				
431 Mavis Maclean with Jacek Kursewski, Making Family Law, Hart, 2011, Preface and p.97. 
432 Ian McLeod, Legal Method, 9th edn 2014, Chapter 17, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
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Australia and New Zealand -  the parties’ cohabitation would be documented through 
council tax and the annual electoral roll to which there could be no objection, and 
there would be a discrete regime which respected equality principles without 
threatening marriage 
(ii) There would be a much simpler financial and property regime on separation if 
the parties did not opt out by an agreement registered in similar fashion to a Chidren 
Act 1989 PR agreement to which there could be no objection 
(iii) The scheme would not replicate marriage, but respect the functionality 
recognised by other successful regimes,  owing to the discretion left to the court in 
financial applications to differentiate between cohabitants’ and the other couples’  
relationships where necessary, for example, probably in stricter ring fencing of 
cohabitants’ separate property than is normally applied to pre-owned or inherited 
property of spouses or civil partners, and depending heavily on to what extent the 
cohabitants had kept their financial and property affairs separate 
(iv) The Lord Chancellor would be at liberty to add further detail by secondary 
legislation at a later stage without holding up early legislation as would be likely in 
the case of a Bill as detailed as Lord Marks’, since it is clear that the government has 
previously been deterred from legislation by concern about such detail. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The overall conclusions of this investigation are as follows.  
 
First, there is a pressing need, and probably a sufficiently favourable context, for the 
introduction of a normative scheme of cohabitants’ rights at the present time, 
particularly as it is urgent for cohabitants to have an accessible statement of the law 
on which they can rely in responding to the current policy of dispute resolution rather 
than litigation to settle financial and property matters on separation.  
 
Secondly, there is much useful information to be gleaned from the work of the Law 
Commission in 2006-7, despite the government’s decision not to implement the 
recommendations; and from comparative study of some of the key jurisdictions now 
selected from those which have already introduced normative schemes there are 
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indications of the optimum content of a scheme for England and Wales, although no 
one scheme or jurisdiction is particularly apt as a model for English law. 
 
Thirdly, doctrinal influence on a model for England and Wales is sparse apart from 
that of the unique discretionary nature of English Family law: and each other 
jurisdiction studied has based its scheme on a different principle driving its own law, 
such schemes being supported by a variety of practical mechanisms, some of which 
could be apt for a version for English law.  
 
Fourthly, academics and practitioners in each jurisdiction with an existing scheme 
consider that their particular system needs some potential improvements to be 
made. 
 
Fifthly, owing to the complexity of the Law Commission’s recommendations the most 
successful scheme for England and Wales is more likely to be as simple as possible, 
based on existing law rather than a more voluminous statute created from scratch in 
the architectonics style of building whole systems described by Kant, since this is not 
popular in the common law which was developed from pragmatism and best practice 
(that is by ‘what works’). 
 
Sixthly, some harmonisation with UK and EU neighbours, and as far as possible with 
other common law schemes further afield, would be desirable.  
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THE APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. The standard Interview Questionnaire copied to 
consultee lawyers in Scotland, Spain, New Zealand, Australia and 
England and Wales 
 
Appendix 2.  The suggested Draft Bill 
 
 
Appendix 1. The standard Interview questionnaire  
 
COHABITATION	–	STANDARDISED	QUESTIONS	FOR	PROPORTIONATE	ETHICAL	APPROVAL	
SAMPLE	QUESTIONS	FOR	(1)	FAMILY	LAW	SOLICITORS/NOT	FOR	PROFIT	ADVICE	ORGANISATIONS	IN	
ENGLAND	AND	WALES	
			
1.		What	is	the	profile	of	your	practice	
					(i)			Family	Law	only	
					(ii)		Family	Law	and	general	
					(iii)	Non	specialist	practice	
	
2.		Is	your	firm	
					(i)		City/West	End	
					(ii)	London,	not	Central	
					(iii)	Other,	e.g.	regional,	country	
					
Thinking	about	the	ordinary	person’s	awareness	of	the	legal	consequences	of	cohabitation:	
	
3.	In	2001	it	was	estimated	(18th	report	of	the	National	Centre	for	Legal	Research)	that	57%	of	the	
public	believed	in	the	existence	of	a	legal	relationship	of	“common	law	marriage”:	can	you	(without	
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identifying	any	particular	client,	in	accordance	with	the	usual	principles	of	confidentiality	in	the	
practice	of	Family	Law)	shed	any	light	on	your	clients’	beliefs	in	the	past	decade:	
	
(i) Are	any	aware	that	this	is	a	myth?	
(ii) Can	you	assign	an	approximate	percentage	of	those	who	are/are	not?	
(iii) What	%	are	aware?	
(iv) What	%	are	not?	
(v) Is	there	a	category	of	partial	awareness?	
(vi) What	%	is	that?	
(a) Please	give	examples	of	partial	awareness.	
(b) Is	any	time	period	involved	in	beliefs	of	legal	effect	of	cohabitation?	
(c) If	so,	is	this	2	years?	
(d) Or	5	years?	
(e) Other	period?	Please	specify.	
(vii) Do	clients	on	average	react	in	any	particular	way	when	you	give	them	the	correct	
information?	
(a) do	they	then	request	a	pre-nuptial	agreement?	
(b) do	they	say	they	“can	trust”	their	partner?	
(“Mrs	Burns’	syndrome)	
(viii) Have	you	experienced	any	returns	to	you	for	advice	if/	when	the	relationship	founders?”	
(ix) If/when	this	happens	do	the	couple	have	children?	
(x) Have	they	mingled	assets?		(If	yes,	can	you	assign	an	approximate	%?)	
(xi) Have	they	shared	responsibilities?		If	yes,	can	you	assign	an	approximate	%	in	each	case		
of	(a)	to	(g)	
(a) Financial?	
(b) Parental?	
(c) Social?	
(d) Other	(eg	business)?	
(e) Has	the	woman	changed	her	name	to	that	of	the	man?	
(f) If	so,	formally?	
(g) Or	informally?	
(xii) Have	your	clients	given	you	any	reasons	for	preferring	cohabitation	to	marriage?	(a)	
before	you	have	explained	the	legal	consequences	?	
(b)	what	were	those	reasons?	
(c)	after	you	have	explained	the	legal	consequences?	
(d)	what	were	those	reasons?	
4.		Were	you	aware	of	the	government	initiative	“Living	Together”	website	which	set	out	to	
eliminate	the	phrase	“common	law	marriage”	from	lay	use	and	to	publicise	the	legal	effect	of	
couples	“living	together”	in	quasi-marriage	(but	which	now	seems	to	have	disappeared)?	
	
	(i)		Are	you	aware	of	any	of	the	later	professional	clone	initiatives?		
(a)Stonewall	?	
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(b)Resolution?	
(c)	CAB?	
(e)Individual	solicitors’	firms’?	
	(ii)		Were	any	of	your	clients	aware	of	these	websites?	
	(iii)	Can	you	assign	any	%	of	those	who	were/were	not?	
	
					5.				If	you	had	clients	who	were	aware	of	the	publicity	on	the	status	of	cohabitation	relationships,	
and	were	advised	by	you	of	the	efficacy	of	a	cohabitation	agreement,	can	you	assign	a	percentage	
who	then	entered	into	such	an	agreement?	
	
(i) if	they	did,	what	was	their	reason	for	doing	so?	
(a) your	general	“solicitor’s”	advice?	
(b) perceived	financial	protection?	
(c) other?	Please	specify.	
(ii) if	they	did	not,	what	was	their	reason	for	doing	so?				
(a) “trust”	in	partner	or	relationship	preferred	to	formality?	
(b) “trust	to	luck”?	
(c) other?	
	
6. Did	you	respond	to	the	Law	Commission’s	2006	consultation?	
a. If	so,	did	you	suggest	that	any	relevant	question	had	been	omitted	from	it?	
b. What	were	those	questions?	
c. Did	the	Law	Commission	take	up/make	any	use	of	those	questions?	
d. Did	any	of	your	clients	show	awareness	of	the	Law	Commission’s	project?	(can	you	
assign	an	approximate	percentage?)	
e. Did	any	of	your	clients	comment	on	the	ongoing	work?	(can	you	assign	an	
approximate	percentage?)	
f. Did	any	notice	when	the	final	report	was	published	in	2007?	(can	you	assign	an	
approximate	percentage?)	
	
7. What	is	the	balance	in	your	practice	now	between	the	following	
	
a. Married	couples	wanting	post-nuptial	agreements?	(can	you	assign	an	
													approximate	%	of	the	married	couples	who	consult	you	who	want	this?)	
b. Fiancés/fiancées	wanting	a	pre-nuptial	agreement?	(can	you	assign	an	
													approximate	%	of	affianced	couples	consulting	you	who	want	this?)	
c. Cohabitants	wanting	cohabitation	contracts?		(can	you	assign	an	
													approximate	%	of	cohabitants	who	consult	you	who	want	this?)	
d. At	what	stage	of	their	relationship	do	cohabitants	tend	to	consult	you?	
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i. before	living	together	
ii. after	living	together	for	a	period?	
iii. If	(b)	after	how	long?	
(ci)	after	some	months?	
(cii)	after	one	or	two	years?	(can	you	assign	an	approximate	%?)	
(ciii)	after	a	longer	period?	(can	you	assign	an	approximate	%?)	
e. What	is	the	%	of	your	practice	which	is	concerned	with	each	category	(i)		
													to	(iii)?	
	
8. Are	you	surprised	that	the	2003	Law	Society	and	Resolution	schemes	have	not	been	
							taken	forward	in	any	way?	
	
a. Have	you	criticisms	of	either	of	these?	Please	mention	all.	
b. Have	you	criticisms	of	the	2007	Law	Commission	report?	Please	mention	all.	
	
Proposed	solicitors	for	the	study:	
	
(1)		ENGLAND	AND	WALES	
	
A	Family	partner	in	a	firm	in	Central	London	which	has	a	substantial	national	and	international	
practice	(mostly	privately	funded	clients,	some	public	funding	for	cases	now	within	the	
exceptions	to	r3	of	the	FPR	2010	which	normally	permits	funding	only	for	mediation	and	such	
exceptional	cases)	
A	Family	partner	in	a	firm	with	branches	in	North	Central	London	and	South	Central	London	with	
a	practice	including	public	funded	and	some	private	clients			
A	Family	partner	in	a	regional	firm	including	public	funded	and	private	clients	
A	Family	worker	in	a	not	for	profit	advice	centre.		
	
	
(2)	SCOTTISH	LAWYERS	
							The	same	questions,		save	for	the	fact	that	the	thrust	of	questions	must	be	amended		
							since	for	5	years	the	Scots	have	had	their	own	Family	Law	(Scotland)	Act	2007	so	that		
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							the	object	will	be	to	discover	(i)	their	positive	awareness	of	their	formal	cohabitants’		
							regime	in	the	Act	(if	applicable)	and	how	they	are	treating	this	provision,	e.g.	Q1(i)	for	the		
						Scots		will	be		“Are	any.	[of	your	clients]	aware	that	common	law	marriage	is	no	longer		
							non-statutory	in	Scotland?”	
	
						Scottish	lawyers	will	break	down,	similarly	to	England,	to	those	in	Edinburgh	and		
						Glasgow,	those	in	small	towns,	those	in	remote	Highlands	and	Lowlands	and	those	in		
						advice	centres	(few,	mostly	attached	to	universities)	
	
						(3)	SPANISH	LAWYERS	
	
							Similar	to	Scotland,	there	is	1981	constitutional	equality	provision	and	detailed	law	in		
							the	individual	provinces.		Spanish	lawyers	will	break	down	to	those	in	London	(at	least	2	
							generalist	Anglo-Spanish	firms),	those	on	the	south	coast	of	Spain	with	an	Anglo-Spanish	
							clientele,	those	in	Madrid	or	Barcelona.		It	will	not	be	worth	looking	at	any	rural	practices	
							and	advice	centres	are	very	rare.	NB	In	Spain	lawyers	are	mostly	“barristers”	(abogados)	
							not	solicitors	although	they	do	the	work	of	both,	skype	is	widely	available.	
	
						(4)	NEW	ZEALAND	LAWYERS	
	
						Similar	to	Scotland,	they	have	had	statutory	provision	since	2007.		Skype	is	widely	
						available.	The	same	process	will	be	conducted	with	participants	in	New	Zealand	which	
						also	has	a	regime	following	federal	statutory	provision	in	2006,	thus	also	having	had,	like	
						Scotland,	5	years	experience	of	its	operation,	and	where	the	initiative	is	to	bring	as	many		
						unformalised	couples	as	possible	into	the	new	scheme.		As	that	country	is	quite	small	(6m	
						inhabitants	and	40m	sheep!)	and	with	a	significant	population	of	Scottish	descent,	and	is	
						like	England	and	Wales	(and	unlike	Australia)	not	federal,		the	chosen	southern		
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						hemisphere	common	law	respondent	is	a	practitioner	who	works	with	the	researchers	of	
						the	University	of	Otago	which	has	an	Auckland	capital	city	campus	in	the	North	Island	as		
						well	as	that	in	Dunedin	in	the	South	Island.		
	
						Judges	and	academics.	
	
						It	is	proposed	to	discuss	the	outcomes	of	the	above	investigative	work	with	2	southern		
						hemisphere	Law	Commissioners	(Judge	Peter	Boshier,	formerly	Principal	Judge	New	Zealand		
					Family	Court,	now	New	Zealand	Law	Commissioner,			and	Professor	Frank	Bates,	University	
						of	Newcastle,	NSW,	former	Law	Commissioner	for	Tasmania)	and		6	other	Judges	and		
					academics	from	the	2	southern	hemisphere	jurisdictions.		
						Skype	is	widely	available	but	where	not,	email	will	be	used	if	telephone	is	too	expensive	
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Appendix 2: A suggested Alternative Draft Bill 
 
Suggested Draft Cohabitation Bill 
A BILL TO 
Make provision for certain matters in relation to persons who live together as a 
couple but are neither married in accordance with the Marriage Act 1949 as 
amended nor registered civil partners pursuant to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (‘the 
2004 Act’) and thus unable to access the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes 1973 
(‘the 1973 Act’) in relation to spouses nor the 2004 Act  in relation to civil partners 
and for connected purposes 
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice of 
the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, in this present Parliament 
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:- 
Contents 
PART 1 INTRODUCTORY 
        General 
1. This Act makes certain provisions for cohabitants and former cohabitants as 
defined by section 2 (1) and 2(2) 
(a) On their separation 
(b) On the death of one of them, and 
(c) During the period of their cohabitation as defined by section 2(3) 
       Cohabitants, former cohabitants and cohabitation 
2.   (1)  Cohabitants are persons over the age of 16 who (whether of the same or 
opposite sexes) live together as a couple in an intimate relationship but not 
being within the prohibited degrees of relationship in relation to each other as 
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set out in the Marriage Act 1949 (‘the 1949 Act’) and Schedule 1 Part 1 of the 
2004 Act since they are neither married nor registered civil partners but 
paragraph (a) applies and one or more of the following conditions (b) to (f) 
also applies – 
(g) they share a household as a couple whether or not they share financial 
interdependence  
(h) they are each the parent of a minor child living with them or with whom 
either is a parent of such a child having contact or spending time 
pursuant to a child arrangements  order under section 8 of the Children 
Act 1989 or to a parenting agreement in lieu of such order and the 
other would be a step parent if the parties were married or in a civil 
partnership 
(i) they are the natural parents of an unborn child when they cease to live 
together in the same household 
(j) their names appear on the electoral roll at the same address and 
council tax is paid by one or the other on the basis that at least two 
adult persons live in their household 
(k) they in some way lead a joint social life in the manner of a couple as if 
they were married or parties to a registered civil partnership 
(l) where (b) or (c) does not apply they have lived together continuously 
for two years, such period to be determined without regard to any 
periods up to a period of six months during which they have not lived 
together as a couple.  
(2) Former cohabitants are  persons who formerly lived together as a couple 
within the meaning of section 2(1) of this Act, but who have not since married 
or entered into a registered civil partnership. 
(3) Cohabitation shall be recognised in accordance with the principles of 
equality and diversity appropriate in a liberal democracy as a valid choice of 
the parties to establish a family format alternative to marriage or registered 
civil partnership whether or not the parties have or intend to have children of 
the family and the parties shall enjoy such rights as are conferred by this Act.   
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(4) Cohabitation shall in any event be established for the purposes of this Act 
when the parties are on the electoral roll at the same address and council tax 
is being paid on the basis that at least two adults are resident at the address 
and one or both of them  would be paying council tax at that rate but for the 
fact that they are validly exempt from that tax or it is being paid for them by 
some other person or organisation such as their landlord. 
(5) Cohabitants may if they wish enter into a cohabitation agreement which 
must be in the prescribed form and registered with the Family Court in the 
same manner as an agreement for parental responsibility pursuant to section 
4 of the Children Act 1989 and the Lord Chancellor shall provide a similar 
process for the use of cohabitants to register their cohabitation agreement . 
Part 2    FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY PROVISIONS  
Financial Provision cohabitants and children of the family 
3. Financial provision in connection with cohabitation shall correspond on 
separation of the cohabitants with that provided by section 72 and Schedule 5 
of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 provided that application to the Family Court 
for such relief shall be made within three years of the termination of the 
cohabitation subject to the following qualifications – 
(1) Sections 24B-G and 25B-E of the 1973 Act (in relation to pensions) shall 
not be capable of applying to cohabitants since they are neither married 
nor registered civil partners although nothing in this section shall affect any 
circumstances in which the court may  make an order providing  a pension 
to a cohabitant in accordance  with the common law 
(2) Section 25(1)-(4) of the 1973 Act shall thus apply to cohabitants but 
disregarding references to those sections referred to in section 3(1) above 
(3) Section 25(1)-(4) of that Act shall apply to cohabitants as if where the word 
‘marriage’ appears in the sub-sections the word ‘cohabitation’ were 
substituted 
(4) In carrying out its duty to consider all the circumstances of the case 
pursuant to paragraph 20 of Schedule 5 to the 2004 Act the Family Court 
shall have regard to the discretion to be exercised by the Court in relation 
to the principles of needs, compensation and sharing and of overall 
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fairness as established by law in relation to spouses and civil partners and 
shall not discriminate against any couple with regard to the fact that they 
have chosen to found their family within a cohabitation relationship instead 
of through marriage or registered civil partnership although some 
circumstances amongst those which the court is required to consider may 
be indicate a different outcome from that which might  apply within the 
circumstances of spouses or registered civil partners and cohabitants. 
4. Cohabitants may opt out of the statutory provisions referred to by entering into 
a qualifying agreement for financial provision on their separation such 
agreement to be made within the three year period specified in section 3 of 
this Act. 
5. Existing provisions in relation to succession and intestacy including in relation 
to the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 shall 
subsist in relation to cohabitants unless the parties make alternative provision 
by Will. 
6. Existing provisions in relation to protection from violence and occupation of 
the family home as provided for by Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 shall 
subsist in relation to cohabitants unless and until the Lord Chancellor shall 
make any consequential amendments to that Act pursuant to the power given 
to him pursuant to section 8 of this Act. 
Part 3   APPLICATION TO THE COURT 
7.  The Family Court or where appropriate the High Court shall have jurisdiction 
in relation to any applications under this Act although the Lord Chancellor may 
by order specify that any such proceedings shall be commenced at any level. 
8. The Lord Chancellor shall have power by order to make any transitional 
supplementary saving or consequential amendments that he considers 
necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving full effect to the provisions of 
this Act. 
Commencement 
9. (1)   The following provisions of this Act shall come into force upon its passing  
(a) Part 1  
(b) Section 8 
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(c) Section 10 
(2)   The remaining provisions of this Act come into force in accordance with 
provision made by the Lord Chancellor who may appoint different days for 
different purposes. 
 
Short title 
10. This Act may be cited as the Cohabitation Act 2015. 
SCHEDULES 
Schedule 1 
Consequential Amendments 
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